




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RESEARCHING JAPANESE WAR CRIMES

INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS



Researching Japanese War Crimes Records

Introductory Essays



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James Lide
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Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records
Interagency Working Group

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*“In a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of
thinking people not to be on the side of the executioners.”*
— *Albert Camus*

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About the cover

Diary of a Japanese Army Medical Doctor, 1937

Daqing Yang

THE DIARY WAS COMPACT: a total of fifty-six pages in a 3x5" notebook that fit easily inside a pocket.* Its author, Hosaka Akira, was an army medical doctor attached to the 3rd Infantry Battalion, 20th Regiment, 16th Division in the Shanghai Expedition Army. The diary begins on August 24, 1937, when "mobilization was ordered at 4 PM." It ends on December 7, a day when fighting lasted from morning till night, and soldiers became very tired. At that time, Hosaka's unit was in the vicinity of Nanjing, the capital of China, which would fall a week later and subsequently draw world attention for the massive atrocities committed there by the Japanese troops, an event widely known as the "Rape of Nanking."

Roughly a week before the diary ended abruptly, Hosaka recorded the following:

At 10:00 on 29 November 1937 we left to clean out the enemy in Chang Chou and at noon we entered the town. An order was received to kill the residents and eighty (80) of them, men and women of all ages, were shot to death [at dusk]. I hope this will be the last time I'll ever witness such a scene. The people were all gathered in one place. They were all praying, crying, and begging for help. I just couldn't bear watching such a pitiful spectacle. Soon the heavy machine guns opened fire and the sight of those people screaming and falling to the ground is one I could not face even if I had had the heart of a monster. War is truly terrible. [Allied Translator and Interpreter Section translation.]

An examination of the original entry reveals that this page had been cut loose by a sharp object at some point. It is likely that the author removed this page when he returned to Japan during the war for fear that it might cause trouble with military censors.

* The diary is found in NA, RG 153, entry 180, War Crimes Branch, China War Crimes File, 1945-48, box 5, folder: Field Diary Kept by Member of Japanese Medical Corps.

In late 1945, Hosaka sent the diary by registered mail to Col. Alva C. Carpenter, head of the legal section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). He left his return address on the envelope. To make his handwriting legible, Hosaka copied the November 29 entry in clearer handwriting on a separate sheet of paper, which was then attached to the opposite page in the diary.

The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal investigated atrocities committed by the Japanese Army in the Rape of Nanking. SCAP dispatched Col. Carpenter to China to gather evidence. Hosaka's diary was apparently not included in the evidence for the prosecution. Despite his reference to a major atrocity against Chinese civilians a week before the battle of Nanjing and in the general vicinity, officially the Rape of Nanking began on December 13th, the day the city fell, and was spatially confined to Nanjing and its immediate vicinity.

In the early 1980s, Japanese journalist Honda Katsuichi claimed that the brutal behavior of Japanese troops in Nanjing was by no means an isolated incident as some in Japan claimed. Instead, it fit into a pattern of Japanese atrocities in the Lower Yangtze area against Chinese since the battle of Shanghai. Honda came to this conclusion after extensive interviews with Chinese survivors and examining existing Japanese records.

Hosaka's diary of the Japanese atrocity in Changzhou has been corroborated by several Japanese sources that became available in recent years. The diary of Makihara Nobuo was discovered by a Japanese citizen group and published in 1988 together with the diaries of several other veterans. Makihara, a twenty-two year old private first class belonging to the 3rd Platoon of the Machine Gun Company of the 20th Infantry Regiment, 16th Division, wrote on November 29, 1937:

Depart from the village at 9:00 A.M. Various units compete to enter the town. The tank unit also starts. In contrast with yesterday, there are no traces of the enemy at all. Enter the town magnificently, passing an impressive temple (even though there are many temples in China)...

Because Wu Jing is an anti-Japanese stronghold, we carry out "mopping up" [sôtō] operations in the entire town, killing all men and women without distinction. The enemy is nowhere to be seen, either because they have lost the will to fight after their defense line at Wu Xi was breached or they are holding strong positions further ahead. So far I haven't seen a town so impressive as this one...

A squad leader in the Machine Gun Company of the 3rd Battalion (where Hosaka also served) named Kitayama also published his diary but did not record the massacre on that same day. This was probably due to the fact that he and another soldier went

sightseeing near the hills. However, Kitayama did write that “our comrades did something atrocious.” He then noted, “people of the enemy country are really pitiful. I don’t even want to hear such tales.” When Japanese journalist Shimozato Masaki interviewed Kitayama in 1987, he admitted that the machine gun company had killed several dozen Chinese civilians in Changzhou.

The diary of Hosaka Akira establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that a massacre of some eighty Chinese civilians was carried out by order by a Japanese unit equipped with heavy machine guns. The same unit almost certainly also took part in the battle of Nanjing. It reconfirms the argument, first advanced by Japanese journalist Honda Katsuichi, that the Rape of Nanking was not an isolated incident, but fit into a pattern of atrocities since the battle of Shanghai.

Researching Japanese War Crimes Records

Introductory Essays

Introduction

Edward Drea

JAPANESE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED IN ASIA and the Pacific between 1931 and 1945 concerned few Americans in the decades following World War II. Japan's crimes against Asian peoples had never been a major issue in the postwar United States, and—with the notable exceptions of former U.S. prisoners of war held by the Japanese—even remembrance of Japanese wartime atrocities against Americans dimmed as years passed.¹

American attitudes about Japanese war crimes changed markedly following the 1997 publication of Iris Chang's *The Rape of Nanking*.² Chang's moving testament to the Chinese victims of the sack of Nanjing in 1937 graphically detailed the horror and scope of the crime and indicted the Japanese government and people for their collective amnesia about the wartime army's atrocious conduct. The bestselling book spurred a tremendous amount of renewed interest in Japanese wartime conduct in China, Korea, the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific.

The Rape of Nanking raised many issues that demanded further explanation. Why were the Japanese not punished as severely as the Nazis for their crimes? Did the United States suppress evidence of the criminal responsibility of activity by the emperor to ensure a smoothly running occupation of Japan? Did the U.S. government protect Japanese medical officers in exchange for data on human experimentation?

Chang also charged the U.S. government with "inexplicably and irresponsibly" returning confiscated wartime records to Japan before microfilming them, making it impossible to determine the extent of Japan's guilt.³ Others were convinced that the U.S. government retained highly classified documents that would prove Japanese guilt beyond doubt and implicate the highest levels of Japanese government and society in the crimes.

I am indebted to Carol Gluck and Gerhard Weinberg for their insightful comments on this essay.

These issues led concerned parties to investigate Japanese wartime records among the holdings at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland, and at other U.S. government agencies. Thorough documentation of Japanese war crimes and criminal activities among these holdings seemed unavailable, leading to speculation of an official cover-up. Suspicions that the U.S. government was deliberately concealing dark secrets were fueled when, instead of finding the records they sought, researchers encountered a card stating the records had been “withdrawn for security reasons,” as well as when they received a notice that requested information could not be located.

Motivated by Chang’s assertions, disparate groups who had struggled to raise awareness of Japanese crimes and win justice for the victims were galvanized in their pursuit of answers and documentation. Armed with this latest evidence and capitalizing on a heightened consciousness in the United States about Japanese wartime crimes, victims and advocates pressed their cases with more determination and with greater popular and political support than had been the case in years prior.

American veterans who had been held captive by the Japanese renewed claims for justice and recompense, and wanted an official apology from the Japanese government for the institutionalized brutality under which they suffered during their long years in captivity. Others asserted that they had been the victims of diabolical human experiments conducted under the auspices of the Japanese Army’s notorious Unit 731, whose military medical doctors and specialists, under the command and direction of Lt. Gen. Ishii Shirō,⁴ carried out army-sponsored experiments on humans for the purpose of developing effective biological warfare weapons.⁵

The controversy over the Japanese Army’s system of coercing young women to work as prostitutes in army field brothels, the so-called “comfort women” issue, had been simmering, especially in South Korea. The 1994 publication of George Hicks’ *The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War* presented the issues in the English language and described the coerced women’s attempts to gain restitution from Japan.⁶ By the late 1990s, the plight of “comfort women” had erupted into front-page news in the United States and became a lodestone for women’s rights advocates and other groups demanding the Japanese government acknowledge responsibility for these wartime abuses of human rights.

The People’s Republic of China, which unquestionably suffered the worst depredations during the Japanese occupation and war from 1937 to 1945, was a persistent critic of the Japanese government’s attitude toward the plunder, arson, and widespread killing that characterized Japan’s occupation of vast sections of China. In the 1990s, Chinese victims of Japanese experiments, American veterans held in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps in

Manchuria, and Chinese-Americans also found their pent-up grievances expressed in Chang's narrative.

Japan was also called to account for its wartime use of slave labor or coerced workers. During the war years, the Japanese government forcibly removed workers from Korea, China, and elsewhere in Asia and shipped them to Japan as unpaid labor for dangerous work in coal mines and for heavy construction. American POWs were also subjected to brutal labor details that were illegal according to the Geneva Convention protocols governing the rights of prisoners. Filipino, Indonesian, and Dutch victims added their voices to a swelling protest against the Japanese government's refusal to acknowledge these crimes.

When confronted by advocacy and human rights groups, the Japanese government insisted these issues had been settled by stipulations of the peace treaty signed in San Francisco in September 1951.⁷ Nothing more needed to be said on the matter. Not only did Japanese authorities refuse to acknowledge any wartime responsibility, but several conservative politicians and senior bureaucrats went so far as to publicly denounce the accusations as groundless historical revisionism and Japan bashing. There was, of course, a domestic political dimension to the accusations (no candidate from the conservative ruling party could win an election by blaming Japan for a war of aggression), but the hard-line official Japanese position created the impression in the United States that Japanese war crimes and related subjects such as war guilt or the role of Emperor Hirohito in the war were taboo subjects in Japan.

Ian Buruma's *Wages of Guilt* (1994) compares responses to war crimes in postwar Germany and Japan.⁸ According to Buruma, Germany publicly accepted responsibility for the evils perpetrated by the Nazi regime and educated future generations by discussing its sordid Nazi history in school textbooks and classes. Germany apologized to various European nations and Israel. Conversely, Japan rejected responsibility, downplayed the historical evidence of aggression and atrocity in its schools with sophistry and euphemism, and apologized to no one. Worse yet, ultra-conservative Japanese commentators insisted the war crimes, if they happened at all, were exaggerated to embarrass the Japanese people.

Although the Japanese have not confronted their wartime conduct as the Germans have, there has been a popular and an academic reaction to the Japanese government's denials. As Daqing Yang points out in chapter 2, scholars and special interest groups in Japan have pursued the topic of Japanese war crimes with academic rigor, fervor, and commitment. Such views appear regularly in mainstream Japanese publications, although most of this work has had little impact in the West because it remains untranslated. A notable exception is Honda Katsuichi's graphic and highly controversial description

of Japanese Army atrocities in central China, which was published in 1972 in Japan, but not translated into English until 1999. Japanese writers, historians, and authors freely publish their work in mass circulation media where it is widely read and openly commented upon in a wide variety of opinion journals and the press.

The rise of concern about Japanese war crimes in the 1990s reinforced the notion that most Japanese war criminals escaped punishment, either because the U.S. government needed their cooperation against the Soviet Union during the early days of the Cold War, or to appease current Japanese economic and commercial interests. Unfortunately, some Japanese war criminals were not punished. Perhaps the most notorious was Gen. Ishii of Unit 731, who escaped postwar prosecution in exchange, apparently, for supplying the U.S. government with details of his gruesome human experiments. Other suspected Japanese war criminals who were never indicted include three postwar prime ministers: Hatoyama Ichirō (1954–1956), Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964), and Kishi Nobusuke (1957). A convicted Class A war criminal, Shigemitsu Mamoru, a senior diplomat and foreign minister during the war years, regained the foreign minister portfolio in 1954. The controversial treatment of Emperor Hirohito by occupation authorities was a subject of debate in Japan and elsewhere since the late 1940s, and especially since the early 1990s in the United States.

Although many notorious war criminals went unpunished and lived prosperous and prestigious lives, it is important to recognize that thousands of Japanese war crimes were prosecuted. Twenty-eight Class A war criminals accused of crimes against peace, conventional war crimes, and crimes against humanity included many of Japan's wartime leaders, such as Prime Minister Gen. Tōjō Hideki. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, the counterpart of Nuremberg, began in May 1946 and ended in November 1948 with the conviction of twenty-five of these defendants. Seven, including Tōjō, were hanged, sixteen were sentenced to life imprisonment (of whom four died in prison), and two received lesser terms. Of the three remaining, two died during the proceedings, and one was declared unfit for trial. The Japanese government paroled all those imprisoned by 1956 and the Foreign Ministry released them unconditionally in April 1958. Allied nations also held war crimes trials throughout Asia and the Pacific. Americans, British, Australians, Dutch, French, Filipinos, and Chinese held trials at forty-nine locations between October 1945 and April 1956. The British prosecuted numerous Japanese for war crimes in Southeast Asia, including those involved in the construction of the Thai-Burma railway of death, immortalized as the Bridge over the River Kwai. Australian prosecutors worked in conjunction with British and American courts to bring Japanese to justice and tried large numbers of Japanese at Amboina, Dutch East Indies, and at Rabaul, New Britain. China tried at least 800 defendants, including some involved in

the Nanjing massacre. France and the Netherlands tried several hundred more. The French brought to justice a Japanese civilian on Java who forced dozens of women into prostitution for the military authorities, and the Dutch condemned Japanese to death for the murder of indigenous people and Dutch prisoners.⁹ In late 1949 at Khabarovsk, the Soviet Union also put twelve Japanese on trial for biological warfare crimes—six were members of Unit 731, two of Unit 100, an independent biological warfare entity, and four from elsewhere—and later transferred several hundred Japanese ex-servicemen suspected of war crimes to the People's Republic of China, where Chinese authorities judged them in the mid-1950s. Of 5,379 Japanese, 173 Taiwanese, and 148 Koreans tried as class B and C war criminals for conventional crimes, violations of the laws of war, rape, murder, maltreatment of prisoners of war, about 4,300 were convicted, almost 1,000 sentenced to death, and hundreds given life imprisonment.¹⁰

Documentation of these trials has never been compiled into one source, or at one site. The Allied nations naturally gathered Japanese documents for their respective tribunals, resulting in the disbursement of Japanese records among the various nations of the Allied World War II coalition. Japanese unit records and documents held by the People's Republic of China or the former Soviet Union were, with few exceptions, unobtainable in the West because of Cold War realities. Even the handful that reached the West during this period was so encumbered with communist Cold War propaganda that many questioned their veracity. For example, when the Soviets published the official court proceedings in 1950 of the December 1949 trials in Khabarovsk, they included Unit 731 related documents, but many in the West dismissed the verdicts along with the evidence as another in a series of long-running Stalinist show trials.¹¹ With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union in December 1991 and positive change in United States–China relations, information about war crimes became somewhat more accessible, but still very limited. Diligent efforts in Japan have uncovered extensive documentation related to Unit 731 and other war crimes, but the amount of material still remaining classified is unknown. By the late 1990s, many people focused on whether the U.S. government still had classified material about Japanese war crimes, and, if so, whether it would implicate other Japanese who had escaped justice.

Declassifying U.S. Documents on Japanese War Crimes

Responding to these concerns, on December 6, 2000, Congress passed the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act (Public Law 106-567), which put to rest any doubt that U.S. records relating to Japanese war crimes were included under the aegis of the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (Public Law 105-246). The implementing directive ordered the Interagency Working Group (IWG) “to locate and disclose, subject

to the statute's exceptions," any classified U.S. government documents pertaining to Japanese war crimes and to recommend their declassification and release to the public. President Clinton appointed IWG members from the major government agencies holding classified records as well as three outside members to represent the public. The Japanese Imperial Government Records Disclosure Act provided for a fourth public member, but none was appointed. IWG public members, Thomas H. Baer, Richard Ben-Veniste, and Elizabeth Holtzman, gave willingly of their valuable time. Their shared characteristic was a determination to make the record available to the American people. It is in large measure thanks to their efforts that the work of the IWG met with cooperation and success. It was due to their persistence that the CIA redoubled its search efforts and released additional information on Japanese war criminals. Special acknowledgment is due to Senators Mike DeWine and Dianne Feinstein and Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, who supported the IWG's work in Congress and worked with the IWG to elicit the full cooperation of the CIA in the search effort. The NARA staff members who worked on the Japanese portion of the IWG project under the able direction of David Van Tassel were responsive to authors' queries, unfailingly provided requested materials, and searched collections meticulously to identify still-classified items. In particular, without the professional expertise of Senior Archivists William Cunliffe and Richard Myers and their superior working knowledge of the massive collections, the IWG could not have accomplished its goals. The distinguished IWG Historical Advisory Panel (HAP), chaired by Gerhard Weinberg, always provided sound guidance as the IWG navigated among record groups, constituencies, and politics. Professor Carol Gluck, a member of the HAP, provided insight into Japan's wartime experience and also suggested the substantive approach of this volume. Steven Garfinkel, chair of the IWG, unfailingly identified sensitive issues during the search period, brought them to the attention of the public members and HAP, and acted to ensure they were expeditiously addressed. Larry Taylor, IWG executive director, skillfully managed the multiple day-to-day administrative responsibilities of the IWG, ensuring it functioned smoothly.

The government agencies that reviewed their classified record holdings for documents pertinent to Japanese war crimes were the CIA, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the FBI, NARA, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the non-FBI components of the Department of Justice, the U.S. Information Agency, and the National Security Council.

An estimated 8 million pages of documents were declassified under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, whereas significantly fewer pages—100,000—were released under the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act. There are many reasons for this

discrepancy, most of which fall under two overarching explanations. First, the United States originally confiscated fewer documents pertinent to Japanese war crimes than to Nazi war crimes. Second, by the time the disclosure laws were signed, far fewer World War II Japanese documents than Nazi documents remained classified by U.S. agencies.

Factors Influencing the Number of Documents in U.S. Possession

U.S. government agencies held far fewer records pertaining to Japanese war crimes than to Nazi war crimes. A major reason is that at war's end, the Japanese destroyed or concealed important documents, which dramatically reduced the amount of evidence available for confiscation by U.S. authorities. How could this happen? At the time the Third Reich surrendered in May 1945, Allied armies occupied almost every inch of Germany. Document collection teams and specialists were on the scene and already confiscating Nazi records for use in announced war crimes trials. While the Germans, beginning in 1943, did engage in substantial efforts to obliterate evidence of such crimes as mass murder, and they destroyed a great deal of potentially incriminating records in 1945, a great deal survived, in part because not each one of the multiple copies had been burned. The situation was different in Japan. Between the announcement of a ceasefire on August 15, 1945, and the arrival of small advance parties of American troops in Japan on August 28, Japanese military and civil authorities systematically destroyed military, naval, and government archives, much of which was from the period 1942–1945. Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo dispatched enciphered messages to field commands throughout the Pacific and East Asia ordering units to burn incriminating evidence of war crimes, especially offenses against prisoners of war. The director of Japan's Military History Archives of the National Institute for Defense Studies estimated in 2003 that as much as 70 percent of the army's wartime records were burned or otherwise destroyed.¹²



A report filed by the 27th Marines, 5th Marine Division, on September 24, 1945, documents the systematic destruction of records by the Japanese after the initial surrender to the Allies but before Allied troops arrived. NA, RG 127, entry 1011, box 23, folder: Intelligence–Japanese.

Nevertheless, some important records survived by chance. Documents discovered in an old safe in the burned-out Navy Ministry turned out to be Imperial Navy planning and policy papers from the 1930s. The salvaged materials reposed with the Metropolitan Police Agency in Tokyo, which transferred them in 1955 to the cabinet archives. They remained there until 1968, when the Defense Agency's National Institute for Defense Studies took control of the collection.¹³

Japanese authorities also willfully concealed other wartime records. During the Allied occupation, former Col. Hattori Takushirō, a wartime senior staff officer at Imperial General Headquarters, ordered subordinates to conceal key policy and operational documents from occupation authorities. Once the occupiers departed, Hattori intended to write a factual history of Japan's war based on the important concealed materials. Individuals also hid official documents or personal diaries, some of which came to light only decades later. For example, in 1989, Kaikōsha, the association of former Imperial Japanese Army officers, published a history of the Nanjing operations together with a two-volume collection of contemporary military documents pertinent to the campaign.¹⁴ These had not been previously available to the public. Disturbing excerpts from December 1937 entries in the diary of Lt. Gen. Nakajima Kesago, commander of the 16th Division at Nanjing, were published in a mass circulation monthly magazine in the early 1980s, with permission of the family.¹⁵ These enormously valuable documents, however, had never been in the possession of U.S. authorities.

The compartmentalization of the war in Asia also diminished the possibility that one nation would end up with the lion's share of Japanese documentation. Unlike the German case, there was no one central repository for Asia-specific war crimes documentation. British Empire forces, for example, took charge of Japanese materials in Southeast Asia. Returning colonial authorities in Indochina and the Dutch East Indies gathered material for their war crimes trials. As many as 40,000 U.S. Marines garrisoned transportation centers in north China from October 1945 into 1947 and accepted the surrender of Japanese units, but otherwise there was little U.S. presence in the huge country, and U.S. units collected relatively few Japanese documents from China. The continuation of the civil war between the central government and the Communists complicated efforts to secure documentation in China. The Chinese central government confiscated Japanese material in 1945; the victorious Chinese Communists, in turn, seized it from them in 1949. The Soviet Union also captured important records about Unit 731 and the Japanese Army when it overran Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945. Sixty years later some of this documentation was still coming to light. In August 2005, for instance, the Chinese publicized detailed research findings based on previously unavailable Unit 731 documents, and in Japan two of Gen. Ishii's notebooks with brief entries for

August 1945 and January through November 1946 were made public.¹⁶ Thus, archival material remains fragmented, and while the United States might hold a large amount of Japanese navy or government archival material, many Japanese Army files apparently remained in the possession of other Allied nations or in Japanese hands concealed from the Occupation authorities.

Factors Influencing the Number of Documents Still Classified

Many records relating to the war in Asia were declassified long before the Disclosure Acts were passed, leaving fewer classified records to review. Because much of the material from the European Theater dealt with the former Soviet Union or its eastern European satellites, it was regarded as useful after the War; records that concerned intelligence sources and methods were considered indispensable during the Cold War. As a result, an enormous number of these documents remained security classified until the IWG's review. The case in the Asia-Pacific Theaters was different. The United States perceived no immediate threat from the region in 1945. By the time perceptions changed with the Chinese Communist victory on the mainland in 1949 and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the great bulk of the Japanese records had already been declassified.

A second reason is that declassification agreements with foreign governments affected the ease with which documents could be opened. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) gathered intelligence in the European Theater, often in cooperation with Allied governments. Before declassifying these documents, the CIA, as successor to the OSS, had to obtain agreement from the nations that had equities in them. However, the U.S. military—not the OSS—had control of most of the Asian Theater records. It created, captured, or confiscated records without the involvement of Allied foreign governments, which enabled the United States to declassify documents unilaterally. Most of these Japan-related records, including wartime intelligence records, were routinely declassified in the 1970s and 1980s by the Army, Navy, and other Department of Defense entities in the course of their regular review programs. In short, the United States could declassify and release Japanese records much earlier than it could German records, but the quantity and quality of the Japanese cache was also inferior to the German.

Furthermore, there were few still-classified postwar records relating to Japanese war criminals because there was not a continuing hunt for Japanese perpetrators as there was for Nazis; therefore, the Army Counterintelligence Corps, CIA, and FBI did not create dossiers on large numbers of Japanese individuals as possible intelligence assets, suspected spies, or prospective immigrants. This is not to say the U.S. Army did not employ unsavory characters in Japan, but for intelligence about the Soviet Union the U.S. government relied less on ex-Imperial Japanese Army officers than it did on former Nazis in Europe.

Finally, the United States focused on its war against Japan at the expense of other major combat theaters in Asia, especially China. This emphasis resulted in less scrutiny of Japan's treatment of fellow Asians and the Imperial Army's conduct on the Asian mainland. One might compare the situation to the attention given to the Holocaust, the genocidal campaign against Jews and other "undesirables." The enormity of these Nazi crimes stamped an indelible mark on the collective consciousness, yet Americans displayed only vague awareness of the even larger scale of the Nazi barbarities inflicted on the people of the Soviet Union beginning in June 1941. Both the Chinese and the Soviets dealt with Nazi and Japanese war criminals as they saw fit, and the United States demonstrated little concern about how they did it, unless Washington complained that the tribunals were being used as propaganda forums to embarrass the West for complicity in Axis crimes.

In sum, the U.S. government acted quickly to declassify Japanese wartime documents in its possession. By the time the IWG began its work, there were relatively few postwar records related to Japanese war criminals that remained classified.

Disposition of Japanese Documents

While the Japanese destroyed sensitive documents at the end of the war, during the first half of 1942 the Imperial Japanese Army relocated many of its records to an underground government storage facility in the Minami Tamagawa suburb of Tokyo. The purpose was to protect the documents from destruction by enemy air raids, but the unintended result was that the records cache of an estimated 7,000 cubic feet (18 million pages) fell intact into American hands. The bulk of these materials, however, predate the 1931–1945 period specified in IWG guidelines.

Elsewhere in the operational areas of the Pacific and Southwest Pacific Theaters, U.S. forces captured hundreds of thousands more pages of Japanese military materials. The U.S. government returned all of these documents to Japan beginning in the late 1950s.

Once back in Japanese hands, the Japanese government returned the records to their respective ministries of origin; that is, the Defense Agency received confiscated Imperial Army and Navy documents, the Foreign Ministry diplomatic records, and so forth. Before returning the confiscated documents, 5–15 percent were microfilmed, at the expense of either the U.S. government or private foundations. At least six major collections of Japanese-language materials were microfilmed:

- (1) **The Archives of the Imperial Japanese Army, Navy, and other government agencies.** This collection from the Tamagawa storage complex comprises 163 reels of microfilm, roughly 400,000 pages. Many of the records (57

reels) predate 1931; the material runs to mid-1942. Materials from “other government agencies” are mainly police records of the Interior Ministry. The original military records form the basis of the Defense Agency’s military archives in Tokyo, and are today open to public researchers, although this was not always the case. Microfilm sets are available at the U.S. Library of Congress and the Japan National Diet Library, among other institutions. Non-readers of Japanese may obtain a sense of the collection from James W. Morley, “Check List of Seized Japanese Records in the National Archives,” *Far Eastern Quarterly*, IX:3 (May 1950). There is an English-language finding aid to the collection, John Young, comp., *Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945* (Georgetown University Press, 1959).

On behalf of the IWG, researchers with Japanese language proficiency examined documents in this collection with titles suggestive of possible war crimes. Among those investigated were archives relating to Jewish activity in Manchuria and to maintaining internal security in occupied zones, and a technical report on Soviet chemical warfare. One collection contains Japanese rules and regulations pertaining to prisoners of war captured in the Philippines, but it consists mainly of administrative instructions and has no evidence of war crimes.

- (2) The **Japan Foreign Ministry Archives** are more than 2 million pages on 2,116 reels of microfilm. Included in this set is the complete file of documentary evidence produced for the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. The originals are available to the public at the Japan Foreign Ministry Archives in Tokyo. A microfilm edition is available at the U.S. Library of Congress and at the Japan National Diet Library.
- (3) Another collection is comprised of documents used to support the **U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)**, documents related to the **Pacific War (1941–1945)**, and records pertaining to the so-called **Fifteen Years War (1931–1945)** that U.S. government historians used to write the official account of the war in the Pacific. These Japanese-language documents were discovered in a warehouse in Alexandria, Virginia, in the early 1960s. The originals form the basis of the Japan National Archives in Tokyo and are available to researchers, subject to privacy restrictions. Microfilm copies of the USSBS (46 reels) and the Pacific War (34 reels) are available at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, while the Fifteen Years War materials (138 reels) are available at the U.S. Library of Congress. The entire microfilm collection is also available in unexpurgated form at Waseda University in Tokyo.

- (4) The **South Manchurian Railway Company (SMRC)** original documents were not returned to Japan, and about 70 percent of all SMRC records remain at the Library of Congress. Others are scattered among six American and forty-four Japanese institutions.¹⁷ The Japan National Diet Library has microfilmed the Library of Congress holdings. These materials include Japanese studies of Manchurian terrain, natural resources, geography, geology, and so forth, as well as analytical papers on political and economic affairs.
- (5) **International [Military] Tribunal for the Far East** (The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal) exhibits are indexed. The Library of Congress Law Library has a microfilm copy of “Prosecution documents which were either not offered or were rejected” (1952) and “Rejected defense documents,” produced by Harvard University. In 1975, the National Archives and Records Service (predecessor of NARA) compiled “Preliminary inventory of the records of the International Military Tribunal Far East: record group 230,” a copy of which is available at the Library of Congress as well as at College Park. The documents themselves are found on microfilm in Record Group 331 at College Park.
- (6) Japanese documents seized by the **Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS)** amounted to 350,000 captured documents of which 18,000 were fully translated. ATIS relied on Japanese-language documentation to produce Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s official report of his wartime operations in the Southwest Pacific. Some 13,800 files of original documents were returned to Japan by MacArthur’s headquarters via the Japanese Demobilization Bureaus, but the disposition of others, such as the original Japanese-language Unit 731 reports of human experimentation that were translated into English, remains unknown. In addition, Japanese-language documents held by the **Pacific Military Intelligence Research Service (PACMIRS)** were returned to the Japanese government. For the most part, these were operational and technical reports. English-language translations of the originals are available in record group 165 (P-File) at College Park. The U.S. Navy also confiscated thousands of Japanese naval operational documents and reports. These are available on microfilm (about 230 reels) at the Naval Historical Center. The originals of all of the above military documents repose in the Defense Agency archives in Tokyo, Japan.

Topics of Special Interest

In addition to adhering to the IWG’s guidelines when conducting their searches for classified records pertinent to the Disclosure Acts, agencies also paid particular attention

to records that might contain information about Japanese atrocities perpetrated on civilians, such as the Rape of Nanking, “comfort women,” the mistreatment of POWs and civilian internees, medical experimentation on humans, Unit 731, and records related to the U.S. decision not to prosecute Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal. It is important to note, however, that during World War II and its immediate aftermath, not all areas of Japanese war criminality were explored in depth. For example, while the “comfort women” issue is of great current importance, the U.S. government did not systematically collect or create records related to the topic during or after the war.¹⁸ As a consequence, there are very few documents pertaining to the topic in the archives. The same is true for records related to the Rape of Nanking.

The atrocities at Nanjing occurred four years before the United States entered the war. At that time, the U.S. government did not have a large military or diplomatic intelligence network in China. A handful of trained military or embassy personnel reported on events, sometimes second-hand; compared with the sensational press coverage, the official U.S. documentation was scant. As a result, with the exception of the records produced during the postwar Class A war crimes trial of the commanding general of Japanese forces deemed responsible for the Rape of Nanking, there are few materials on this subject at the National Archives.

Immediately after the war, American attention focused on the Japanese responsible for the Pearl Harbor attack, those involved in mistreatment of U.S. prisoners of war, and Japanese military and civilian officials implicated in war crimes, including rape (especially of Filipina women) or forced prostitution of Caucasian women. There was also knowledge of the Imperial Japanese Army’s field brothel system, as shown in scattered reports declassified during the 1960s. However, the scope of the brothel network (particularly in China) and the Japanese Army’s official sponsorship of the system were not well understood. Licensed prostitution was legal in prewar Japan, and Allied officials viewed the small part of the overseas system they uncovered as an extension of homeland practices. Prosecuting Japanese soldiers for rape, a notorious crime everywhere the army set foot, took precedence over investigating the circumstances of “comfort women,” who were seen as professional prostitutes, not as unwilling victims coerced into brothels by employees of the Japanese military. For instance, a significant document that linked the Japanese government with the military field brothel system, “Amenities in the Japanese Armed Forces,” was translated in November 1945 by ATIS and declassified in the 1960s.¹⁹ Although available to the public for years, it received little attention until the “comfort women” issue focused attention on these wrongdoings in the 1990s.

As for Unit 731, researchers found no new classified evidence related to Gen. Ishii’s experiments or the unit’s treatment of POWs. The small amount of newly released

material adds more evidence to the already well-documented facts about Japanese abuse of prisoners. As for the primary question of Unit 731's alleged experimentation on captured American servicemen, multiple government agencies conducted exhaustive searches in intelligence, military, and diplomatic records but found no definitive evidence. This was not surprising, because repeated Congressional inquiries about Japan's alleged use of American prisoners in experiments resulted in extensive examination of U.S. Army and other government agency records in the 1970s, 1980s, and again in early 1990s. In other words, Congressional interest in Japanese war crimes, especially those perpetrated against American POWs, had already opened the existing Unit 731 documents in the possession of the U.S. government and made them available to the public.

Finally, allegations arose that the U.S. government engaged in a cover-up to conceal incriminating documents pertaining to war crimes in order not to embarrass the Japanese government. Exhaustive searches by several agencies for classified materials, conducted independently of outside political interference of any sort, followed the guidelines imposed by the IWG. They found no evidence to support such assertions. There were miscarriages of justice—Ishii's case being the most obvious and disturbing—and the question of Emperor Hirohito's war responsibility remains a source of controversy in the United States and elsewhere. U.S. government archives, however, yielded no new information on these controversial topics. This result may not satisfy those who insist incriminating or embarrassing documents remain hidden, but disinterested parties will appreciate that the IWG has managed to open the remaining classified files pertinent to Japanese war crimes and to make that evidence available to the public. Archival holdings in Japan, China, and the former Soviet Union also offer the possibility of files that may clarify or lead to reinterpretation of our understanding of Japanese atrocities.

Exploiting the Records

During the search for classified records, it soon became apparent that historians, researchers, and concerned parties have not fully exploited the many records about Japanese war crimes previously declassified and made available at the National Archives. The fault lies less with the public, however, than with the organization of the massive collection. Records came from more than a dozen U.S. government agencies, each of which employed diverse filing systems and exercised multiple functions between 1931 and 2005. This led to a divestiture of central records into smaller agency collections, a standard archival practice that unintentionally complicated the researcher's task. Captured or seized Imperial Japanese military and naval records are found in at least twelve separate record groups at NARA and fill thousands of boxes. Furthermore, except for the records pertaining to war crimes trials (none of which

remains classified), there was no one central finding aid to help researchers navigate the Japanese collection.

Moreover, for whatever reasons, records reasonably expected to be at NARA are not there and turn up in unlikely places. Three important documents, translated from Japanese to English and each more than 100 pages long, detail Unit 731's clinical observations of the day-by-day spread of various pathogens through the bodies of helpless prisoners whom Japanese doctors subjected to experiments. The U.S. government declassified these key documents, titled "The Report of A" (anthrax), "The Report of G" (glanders), and "The Report of Q" (bubonic plague) in 1960. They are available to the public at the U.S. Library of Congress. With relevant documents interfiled among a dozen record groups and others available—but not at the National Archives—the researcher's task is a formidable one.

Greg Bradsher's 1700-page finding aid on the CD that accompanies this volume remedies this problem. His searchable finding aid brings coherence to the collections, enables researchers to consult a single reference to begin their search, and introduces first-time users to the variety of materials available at NARA on Japanese war crimes. The hope of all those involved in this project is that introducing the available material and making it accessible will stimulate new interest in these underused collections and encourage historians, advocates, writers, researchers, and citizens with an interest in these important issues to make use of the collections. Study of the mass of unclassified material will undoubtedly turn up documents relevant to Japanese war crimes and perhaps resolve some outstanding issues.

The huge number of documents declassified under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act allowed the IWG's first book on the records, *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*, to take the form of historical case studies based on the newly released documentary material. But the comparatively small number of Japanese documents declassified, coupled with the larger problem of open Japanese records being underused, mandated a different format. Contributors to this volume adopted an approach to make the enormous number of heretofore underused Japanese wartime documents more user friendly. Their purpose throughout the volume is to make us aware of how much is available by introducing these records to readers and explaining where the records are located. Their goal is to stimulate interest in these records in the hope that researchers will be encouraged to exploit them efficiently and produce a fuller record of the Asia-Pacific War.

Daqing Yang's interim assessment of documentary evidence and Japanese war crimes discusses the destruction of wartime Japanese documents and surveys the changing treatment of Japan's war crimes in Chinese, English, and Japanese literature. He explains reasons for the heightened interest in crimes committed against POWs, the forced

prostitution of “comfort women,” and Unit 731’s nefarious activities. Yang concludes with a plea for sustained and intense international collaboration to improve the level of research on Japanese war crimes.

James Lide summarizes the war-crimes–related materials located in the recently declassified records at NARA. His focus is on the limited number of documents pertinent to war crimes and their often vague or incomplete information. No large corpus of documentation remained classified on the Nanjing massacre, the “comfort women” issue, or Unit 731, although scattered references to bacteriological/chemical warfare and the kidnapping of women and girls by Japanese troops were noted.

NARA staff writers offer starting points for future research. The authors describe in general terms the availability of archival material spanning twelve record groups on the subject of Japanese war crimes, and then illustrate the scope of the collections by highlighting documents pertinent to their three case studies: Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners of war in Manchuria, Unit 731 activities, and Japanese atrocities committed against U.S. airmen on Chichi-Jima in 1945.

Robert Hanyok’s illuminating essay explains the U.S. military communications intelligence system during World War II, noting its successes and limitations. He devotes most of his essay to National Security Agency materials available to the public at NARA and offers an explanation for their organization, detailing different types of records: army, navy, diplomatic, military attaché, and so forth. He pays special attention to communication intelligence attempts to discover the fate of American POWs held by the Japanese. He also describes how eavesdropping on Japanese military and naval radio communications unintentionally produced evidence of Japanese war crimes and hints of the biological and chemical warfare programs.

Greg Bradsher’s two chapters are part of his larger study to be published separately. His first essay explains the wartime system for gathering documentation concerning alleged Japanese war crimes. Through the experience of the Southwest Pacific Area’s ATIS, he shows how the system developed and expanded, how it exploited captured Japanese documents, and how this material was employed during war crimes trials. His second essay examines the disposition of Japanese-language records in U.S. control. He describes the process for returning the confiscated or captured records, the extensive interagency cooperation to establish a policy for the return of records to Japan, and Congressional approval for the restitution of documents. Together with his finding aid on the enclosed CD, Bradsher has given unparalleled ease of access to those interested in serious historical research of U.S. records on Japan.

The book concludes with a chapter by Michael Petersen on the topic of U.S. use of former Japanese enemies for intelligence purposes. Petersen’s chapter, based on recently

declassified CIA material, provides an example of the kind of historical interpretation that can arise from a study of the new and previously released materials.

The work of the IWG has made it possible for the public to access a wide variety of documents related to Japanese war crimes committed in Asia and the Pacific. Subsequent investigation and study of these materials will provide a clearer appreciation of the claims and allegations surrounding Japanese war crimes. Noteworthy is the fact that the previously declassified documents corroborate much that is already known about Japan's wartime record. Furthermore, the material goes beyond the subject of war crimes and provides a wealth of historical information about the Axis nations. The range of Japanese-related documents, U.S. government as well as translated and original Japanese documents, merits extensive exploitation by academics, researchers, writers, veterans, and others interested in history. The files are filled with stories waiting to be told.

Notes

1. A few researchers (such as Professor Sheldon Harris) investigated the activities of the Japanese Army's Unit 731 during the 1980s.
2. Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: BasicBooks, 1997).
3. Chang, 177.
4. Japanese names are rendered as given name followed by surname.
5. Sheldon Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the American Cover-up* (New York: Routledge, 2002 rev ed). Harris published his original volume in 1994.
6. George Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Japan's Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War* (New York: Norton, 1994).
7. The treaty was formally implemented on April 28, 1952.
8. Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994).
9. Robert Barr Smith, "Japanese War Crime Trials," *World War II* (September 1996).
10. Philip R. Piccigallo, *The Japanese on Trial* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979) covers the B- and C-class war crimes trials.
11. *Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950).
12. Conversation with author, 2003.
13. Peter Wetzler, *Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar*

- Japan* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 19.
14. Kaikōsha, ed., *Nankin senshi shiryō-shū* (Nanjing campaign chronology primary source collection) (Kaikosha, 1989).
 15. Kuninori Kimura, “Nankin kōryakusen ‘Nakajima dai 16 shidanchō nikki’” (The capture of Nanjing: Diary of 16th division commander Nakajima) (*Zōkan Rekishi to jimbutsu*, December 1984), 252–71.
 16. “Identities of Unit 731 Victims Unearthed,” 3 August 2005, englishnews@chosun.com, <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news>; “Nana san ichi butai chōmei no-to hakken,” (Unit 731 commander’s notebook discovered) *Asahi shinbun*, 4 August 2005.
 17. Sadao Asada, ed., *Japan & The World, 1853–1952: A Bibliographic Guide to Japanese Scholarship in Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 41–42.
 18. In February 1948, the Dutch tried twelve Japanese for the forced prostitution of Dutch women held in internment camps in the Dutch East Indies. Narrelle Morris, review of Yuki Tanaka, *Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II and the U.S. Occupation* (New York: Routledge, 2002), http://www.she.murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue9/morris_review.html/.
 19. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, “Amenities in the Japanese Armed Forces,” Research Report 120, 15 Nov. 1945, 9–20, Formerly Security-Classified Intelligence Reference Publications (“P” File) Received from U.S. Military Attachés, Military and Civilian Agencies of the United States, Foreign Governments and Other Sources, 1940–1945, NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 342.

Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes: An Interim Assessment

Daqing Yang

HOW HISTORIANS DEFINE and approach an issue is almost always affected by the political or intellectual climate in society. The type of evidence historians amass to a great extent determines the persuasiveness of their conclusions. The evidence and the problematique are the twin historiographical pillars of any historian's work. Studies of Japanese war crimes in World War II are no exceptions. This chapter examines recent publications and places these works in such historiographical context.¹ In particular, it explores factors affecting the availability of documentary evidence as well as the impact of new evidence on historical research. In doing so, it seeks to illuminate the current state of scholarship on several major historical topics that have garnered particular public interest in recent years.

Defining War Crimes

Although ancient Chinese, Greeks, and Indians all made efforts to codify behaviors in battle, the concept of war crimes is relatively recent. Over the last few centuries, western European nations produced sets of rules governing the conduct of warfare as a subset of international law. The Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, for instance, prohibited the "employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable." Landmark events such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 sought to establish rules and procedures that would eliminate unnecessary suffering by combatants and protect—to the extent possible—noncombatants and nonmilitary targets. Similarly, the 1925 Geneva Protocol repudiated poison gas as a

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legitimate weapon of war after its disastrous use in World War I.² The Third Geneva Convention (1929) incorporated a separate convention on the rights and treatment of prisoners of war. Still other international conventions banned certain activities in time of military occupation. Although many of these conventions were sometimes ambiguous and not all governments signed or ratified them, by World War II it became clear that warfare was no longer an unregulated affair.

After Japan ended its self-imposed isolation in the mid-nineteenth century, it not only embraced international law but sought to use it to its advantage. Internally, it also established a modern military penal system that punished criminal offences among its ranks. With some exceptions during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, Japanese armed forces at war seemed to abide by international standards. Japan signed the Hague Conventions and the 1929 Geneva Convention, but the Imperial Diet failed to approve the latter. When Japan invaded China in the 1930s and launched a full-scale war in 1937, neither country formally declared war, raising the question of whether they were obliged to abide by the international conventions of war. After Japan attacked the United States and its allies in December 1941, the Allies questioned Tokyo about the applicability of the 1929 Geneva Convention. The Japanese government responded that it would apply the provisions *mutatis mutandis*, which to some implied its compliance.³

Treaties and conventions, however, are not the only way war crimes are defined. As we shall see, what is considered a war crime—a prosecutable war crime, in particular—is as much a political issue as a legal one.

After the war ended, the Allies tried Germans and Japanese accused of committing various degrees of war crimes. From early 1946 to late 1948, some two hundred top Japanese civilian and military leaders were designated as Class A war criminal suspects; twenty-eight of them were tried at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal from early 1946 to late 1948. Of the fifty-five counts of crime listed in the indictment, the overwhelming majority fell under “crimes against peace,” fifteen counts under “murder,” and three under “other conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Between 1946 and 1951, the U.S. and other governments separately tried about 5,700 Japanese officers and enlisted men in some 2,240 separate trials throughout the Asia Pacific. Among them were over three hundred Koreans and Taiwanese employed by the Japanese. These so-called B- and C-class tribunals were concerned with those perpetrating or ordering “conventional war crimes.”⁴

The Japanese were also put on trial by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The Soviet Union conducted a tribunal of twenty Japanese servicemen in the city of Khabarovsk in late 1949 and found twelve of them guilty of waging bacterial warfare. In the mid-1950s, China tried several hundred Japanese officers and civilians, many

of whom were transferred from the Soviet Union, while others were captured fighting alongside the Chinese Nationalists in China's own civil war from 1946 to 1949. Most were given reduced sentences in return for admission of guilt, and none received the death penalty.

Beyond revealing and punishing German and Japanese war crimes, the trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo established new standards for the future. The trials pose problems for those studying war crimes, however. As we shall see, not all war crimes committed by the Axis powers were tried. At the same time, Axis leaders were tried for "crimes against peace" established by the Nuremberg Principles, which did not exist at the time of war. Over the years, the war crime trials in Tokyo and elsewhere have come under criticism with regard to both legality and fairness. Since the trials did not try any Allied personnel for their violations of the laws of war, some critics argue, they constituted "victor's justice."⁵ Instead of accepting the definition of war crimes as adopted at these tribunals, this chapter embraces a broader concept of war crimes as activities of a state that violated international or humanitarian laws in time of war.⁶

Problem of Evidence

It is true that wherever there is war, there are likely to be war crimes. It is not true, however, that wherever there are war crimes, there is always credible documentary evidence. Distinguishing actual events from propaganda can be one problem. For example, as public opinion began to play an important role in world affairs in the twentieth century, the use of wartime propaganda also increased, with nations spreading inflated or fabricated stories about enemy atrocities to win public support. World War I was notable for its use of such propaganda, and it was also a widespread problem in World War II. Even without such intentions, rumors of enemy atrocities often end up gaining credibility under the influence of wartime psychology and are reported as real events.⁷

Historians also confront the problem of missing war crimes evidence. The problem was particularly acute regarding Japan. Intensive Allied bombing and accidental fires destroyed many documents during World War II. Moreover, at the close of the war, Japanese authorities hid or destroyed much evidence of the country's war crimes. On August 15, 1945, the Japanese government announced the decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration and surrender to the Allied forces, but the first Allied forces did not arrive in Japan until August 28. On August 16, Imperial Headquarters ordered Japanese military units to destroy all secret documents, many of which are believed to have contained evidence of war crimes. The orders themselves were to be destroyed, and no reports on the implementation of the orders were to be made except by secure telephone. While it is

standard practice for governments to destroy evidence in times of defeat, in the two weeks before the Allies arrived in Japan, various Japanese agencies—the military in particular—systematically destroyed sensitive documents to a degree perhaps unprecedented in history.⁸ Estimates of the impact of the destruction vary. Tanaka Hiromi, a professor at Japan's National Defense Academy who has conducted extensive research into remaining Imperial Japanese Army and Navy documents in Japan and overseas, claims that less than 0.1 percent of the material ordered for destruction survived.⁹ Whether or not his estimate is entirely accurate, most historians agree that the vast majority of incriminating evidence was lost in the cover-up.

The Japanese destroyed documents outside of Japan proper, as well. Having received similar orders from the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo, the Kwantung Army in Manchuria began the destruction of confidential files on August 16, 1945. Japanese personnel at the Kwantung Army headquarters burned documents in the boiler room in the basement but could not finish the job before the advance units of the Soviet forces arrived on August 18. As a result, the intelligence units of the Soviet Army captured some of the documents.¹⁰ Years later, the Chinese recovered some half-burned Japanese documents that had been buried underground elsewhere in Manchuria.¹¹

On the other hand, the Allies amassed a large body of intelligence about Japan. Its usefulness for identifying Japanese war crimes, however, varied. Some intelligence during the war came from interrogations of captured Japanese soldiers, although the number of Japanese prisoners was not large.¹² The tons of Japanese documents captured in the South Pacific Theaters offered a wealth of information ranging from communications codes to training manuals, some of which the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) promptly translated and analyzed.¹³ Perhaps the most useful of all intelligence were intercepted Japanese signal communications. Because the Japanese destroyed so much incriminating evidence, these wartime decrypts often provide the only information on some Japanese war crimes.¹⁴

The war crimes trials conducted by the victorious Allies after Japan's surrender generated a massive quantity of documentary evidence. After landing in Japan, U.S. occupation forces located and seized large amounts of Japanese documents that were spared destruction.¹⁵ The International Prosecution Section in Tokyo, for instance, collected primary documents such as official records and, occasionally, personal diaries of important political figures. Many of these documents were translated into English and used as evidence at tribunals. Interrogations of war crime suspects and personal testimonies from victims and eyewitnesses produced still more evidence. After the Tokyo Trials, the U.S. government shipped trial records and some original documents to the United States. Since then, most of the trial records in the U.S. have long been

open to the public, and as a whole they constitute the single most important source for studying Japanese war crimes.¹⁶ However, critics of these war crimes trials have noted that witness accounts were often not subject to vigorous cross-examination, if there were such examinations at all. Whether or not such criticism is justified, it is necessary for historians to use these records with extra caution.

From Verdicts to Controversies

After the conclusion of these trials, neither Western nor Japanese governments seemed interested in further investigating Japan's war crimes, in contrast to continued prosecution of Nazi war criminals in western Europe and by the Israeli government. The issue was largely left to former POWs and a small number of popular historians.¹⁷ While many academic historians referred to the brutality of Japanese forces, few actually examined the subject of Japanese atrocities in depth. Some exceptions did exist. Japanese historian Saburō Ienaga's book on the war, first published in Japan in 1968 and translated into English in 1978, contained a chapter titled "Horrors of War." Based almost entirely on recollections and secondary sources, it remained the most comprehensive scholarly discussion available in English until the late 1980s.¹⁸

Early postwar Japan was caught up in mourning Japan's own loss and suffering, although Japan's war crimes in Asia, particularly in China, remained a topic of concern for some Japanese.¹⁹ In the mid-1950s, a group of Japanese veterans who had been incarcerated as war criminals in the People's Republic of China returned to Japan. Some began to inform the Japanese public of Japan's crimes against Chinese soldiers and civilians. In 1957, they published some of their affidavits, which, as the first postwar Japanese publication based on first-person accounts of brutalities in China, caused a minor sensation. The first run of 50,000 copies sold out in three weeks. Outcry from the Right and other veterans prevented the publishing of a second edition.²⁰ The early 1960s saw the publication of *An Affirmation of the Greater East Asian War*, marking the beginning of open challenges to the legality of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial that had branded Japan's war as aggression.²¹ With that, Japan's war crimes became a contested political issue in the country.

The normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China in 1972 provided the occasion for many Japanese to re-open the question of wartime Japanese atrocities in China. The most famous, *Asahi Shimbun* journalist Honda Katsuichi, introduced Chinese testimonies about Japanese atrocities in China, ranging from forced labor in Japanese factories and mines to biological experimentation and vivisection to massacres in Nanjing and elsewhere. Most Japanese were shocked, but a few Japanese openly questioned the veracity of the testimonies. In particular, Honda's

writings ignited a controversy in Japan over the so-called Rape of Nanking, which was featured at the trials in Tokyo and Nanjing after the war. The evidence presented at the war crimes trials and the verdicts would become increasingly contested.²²

In 1982, Japanese newspapers reported government attempts to tone down descriptions of Japanese aggression in junior high school textbooks. Although the allegation was not entirely accurate, it escalated to a diplomatic incident between Japan and China (and a few other Asian governments). Three years later, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, where seven executed Japanese Class A war criminals are enshrined together with the country's 2.5 million war dead. The Chinese and Koreans again loudly protested.

These incidents once again placed Japan's war record in the limelight and served as a catalyst for some of Japan's academic historians to conduct an in-depth empirical study of Japan's wartime behavior.

The historians organized various research groups and began publishing collected documents in addition to their research. In 1993, a group of Japanese historians and activists established the Japan Center for Research on War Responsibility (*Nihon sensō sekinin shiryō senta*). Their quarterly journal, covering a range of research and often introducing new documentary evidence, became a premier journal in this field.²³

Meanwhile, in China, a trickle of publications on Japanese war crimes became a torrent in part thanks to these controversies over World War II history. Once downplayed by the government though never forgotten by the public, Japanese war crimes in China came to be prominently featured in the country's textbooks, local histories, and museums. In 1991, the Chinese Academy of Social Science—the country's premier research institution—established a quarterly journal devoted to the study of China's war of resistance against Japan. Many of its articles specifically address Japanese war crimes.²⁴

The same trend can be seen in the English-language world in the 1990s, with a number of factors contributing to the outpouring of works on Japanese war crimes. First, public interest grew as the news media helped keep Japan's World War II crimes in the limelight. Recurring controversies in East Asia received considerable coverage in the U.S. media and helped create the widely accepted belief that Japan had not faced up to its wartime past. Conflict and abuse of civilians in Kosovo and genocide in Rwanda suggested a re-examination of similar wrongdoings in the past. Hence, the rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Committee issued a special report on Japan's wartime abuse of women in military sexual slavery in 1997.²⁵ Second, with the end of the Cold War there was a worldwide attempt to re-examine the past wrongs of World War II, such as forced labor and looting of art and other property. Many victims became more outspoken and filed lawsuits seeking compensation, while aging veterans spurred another wave of

publications and commemorative activities. Finally, in the United States, the voice of Asian Americans, growing since the 1970s, became more pronounced in the 1990s. In the late 1980s, Japanese Americans won redress for their wartime internment, giving encouragement to other Asian-American groups to generate greater awareness of their wartime sufferings. In the early 1990s, a group of Chinese-American historians launched a journal devoted to the study of Japanese aggression in China and founded the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II.²⁶ Chinese- and Korean-Americans often took the lead in organizing photo exhibitions, issuing petitions, and publishing victims' accounts.²⁷

Old Evidence and New

Greater public interest in Japanese war crimes as well as the intensifying controversies created a demand for new evidence. For years, U.S. archives have been a major source of these records. As U.S. government documents concerning Japan were declassified and made available in the National Archives, Japanese scholars and journalists were often among the first to use them. Historians in Japan also used original Japanese documents that had been captured and microfilmed by the United States before being returned to Japan. In Japan, nearly all the returned Foreign Ministry documents have been open to the public since the 1970s at Japan's Diplomatic Record Office. The Japanese Self-Defense Agency War History Department Library, which received the majority of these returned materials (amounting to some 23,313 items, according to one Japanese estimate), has allowed public access to most of them. A part of its general collection (which includes some returned materials) remains restricted: while most of these records are closed to protect privacy, records concerning mistreatment of POWs, looting, massacre, use of poison gas, and biological weapons experimentation have been known to be closed as a matter of policy or partially redacted before declassification. In 2003, the Japanese Self-Defense Agency released a Catalog of Classified Materials, listing some 2,000 items that remained restricted for privacy reasons.²⁸ In addition, over two thousand documents returned from the United States are available to the public at Japan's Public Record Office (*Kokuritsu kōbun shokan*).²⁹

As many Japanese scholars acknowledge, institutional factors account for the fact that many official Japanese documents dating from the war years either are still closed or remain to be located. The lack of an archival tradition in the Western sense, as they point out, is partly to blame. Japan's Public Record Office, the equivalent to the U.S. National Archives, was established in 1978. In practice, government ministries have tended to restrict access to all the important documents they generated partly because, until recently, Japanese bureaucrats have traditionally enjoyed enormous prestige and

little accountability to the public.³⁰ A few Japanese officials were accustomed to taking official documents home for safekeeping or for personal use. Ironically, such practices might have saved some documents from destruction at the end of the war.

In recent years, various individuals in Japan have turned over government and private documents in their possession to historians or have had them published. Some Japanese documents were literally saved from waste paper recycling plants. In a notable example, a member of Japan's wartime biological warfare unit had saved various documents on human experiments. After he died, his relatives sold them to a waste paper recycling merchant, who in turn sold them to a secondhand bookstore in Tokyo. Eventually, researchers at a university discovered these documents and had them published.³¹ Similarly, historians and citizen activists have been able to save many personal diaries from veterans. Ono Kenji, a worker at a chemical plant in Japan, began collecting veterans' wartime diaries in his hometown area in 1988. Thanks to his efforts, nearly twenty diaries belonging to Japanese soldiers who fought in the battle of Nanjing in 1937 were published six years later, becoming a major source of evidence for that infamous Japanese atrocity.³² Because of the ongoing debate over this incident, Kaikōsha, an organization of graduates of the former army cadet academy, also published many of the official war journals as well as diaries of officers and men involved in the battle at Nanjing.³³

Since the 1990s, there has been some important progress toward greater public access to government documents in Japan. Marking the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, the Japanese government under the Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama established the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (*Ajia rekishi shiryō senta*) in 1995. Since then, the center has continuously made available online a vast quantity of original official documents from the national, diplomatic, and military archives. Over 530,000 titles and 7,400,000 images are available online.³⁴ Although most of these documents have been available to the public for some time, easy access provided by the Internet will be welcomed by scholars, especially those outside Japan. Separate from this, Japan's Diplomatic Record Office has been declassifying some of its postwar official documents, including a few related to the issues of war crimes and settlements. In 1999, the National Diet passed Japan's first Freedom of Information Law. It is now possible for Japanese and foreign individuals to request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to review and declassify documents pertaining to specific issues.

Beginning in the 1980s, the Chinese published various materials related to Japanese war crimes. For instance, several volumes of a document series on "Japanese imperialist aggression against China" published between 1988 and 1995 were devoted to Japanese atrocities as well as chemical and biological warfare in China. Typically, they include testimonies by Chinese victims and depositions by Japanese war crime suspects, as well

as some Japanese documents that have been discovered in Chinese archives.³⁵ Some of these Chinese publications have been translated into Japanese. Since the 1980s, Chinese scholars have increasingly endeavored to make use of U.S. documents. For instance, a Chinese historian published some personal papers relating to Japanese atrocities in Nanjing from the Chinese Missions Collections at the Yale Divinity School.³⁶ Chinese scholars studying Japanese war crimes have also begun to explore the collection at NARA.

Revelation and Contention

What does available documentary evidence reveal about Japan's war crimes in World War II? How do discoveries of new evidence affect historians' work? The vast majority of published works on Japanese war crimes tend to fall into several primary categories: (1) Japan's war atrocities in Asia in general, (2) mistreatment of POWs and civilian laborers, (3) the wartime biological and chemical warfare program, and (4) the forced prostitution of the so-called "comfort women." Recently, a number of historians have begun to study other criminal activities such as drug trafficking and property theft. Although these categories often overlap, they constitute the bulk of published histories of Japan's war crimes and each deserves a closer look.

War Atrocity or Asian Holocaust?

Before the United States entered the war against Japan in December 1941, Americans were already familiar with stories of Japanese atrocities in China. Reports of rape, looting, bombing of civilian targets, and murder of surrendered Chinese soldiers and civilians by Japanese soldiers were often featured in the popular press and helped to turn public opinion against Japan. The six-week ordeal in the Chinese capital of Nanjing after the Japanese takeover was particularly notorious and has become the iconic Japanese atrocity in World War II. Yet, it was not until 1997 that Chinese-American writer Iris Chang published the first book-length study in English, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, which received glowing reviews in the U.S. press and became a *New York Times* best seller.³⁷ While her book has been criticized for its numerous factual errors, it was the first popular work to focus extensively on the role of Westerners—including several Americans but also John Rabe, a German member of the Nazi party—who stayed in Nanjing to protect locals against Japanese troops.³⁸ Chang was one of the first to make extensive use of unpublished American missionary papers stored at the Yale Divinity School. Chang also made use of newly declassified U.S. intelligence reports.³⁹ The question of whether the Japanese massacre of Chinese in Nanjing should be described as an Asian Holocaust, as Chang and others claim, stirred up considerable

debate. Masahiro Yamamoto, who was highly critical of Chang's claim, as well as of her work, published *Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity* in 2000. Making extensive use of Japanese and Chinese documents, it remains one of the few in-depth works on the event in English.⁴⁰

In contrast to the relatively recent interest in the West, what is often referred to in Japan as the Nanjing Incident sparked a publishing industry in that country, with close to a hundred books and document collections published to date. Many of them point to newly discovered evidence. A sub-genre developed that was devoted to exposing fraudulent evidence—documentary and photographic—of alleged Japanese atrocities. Since the early 1980s, the Nanjing Massacre—the Chinese term for the Rape of Nanking—which had largely receded into obscurity after 1949, has also become a topic of popular interest among the Chinese and the subject of dozens of books. In addition to numerous historians in mainland China working on such topics, Li Enhan, a historian based in Taiwan, published many essays—half of which are devoted to the Rape of Nanking—in which he made use of some Japanese sources.⁴¹ In 2004, the Nanjing Normal University established a Center for Nanjing Massacre Studies, whose Web site became a hub of information on developments related to Japan's war crimes in China.⁴²

The total number of Chinese deaths in Nanjing remains a subject of dispute. While the Chinese government and historians insist that some 300,000 Chinese were massacred by the Japanese in and around Nanjing—a figure from the postwar trials in Nanjing—Japanese historians have offered different estimates ranging from thousands to over 100,000. Significantly, newly discovered Japanese documents, which include the diaries of several key commanders as well as official war journals from one-third of all the Japanese regiments involved in that battle, indicate that at least tens of thousands of disarmed Chinese soldiers were executed by Japanese troops at the order of their commanders. As a result, in the mid-1980s, a representative of the veteran group Kaikōsha offered an apology to the Chinese people on its behalf.⁴³

In addition to the Rape of Nanking, the “Three All” Campaign—for “Kill all, burn all, loot all,” the Chinese description of the Japanese Army's tactics in attacking Communist guerrilla forces in north China—has long been central in Communist China's history of the war against Japan. Many earlier studies relied solely on the testimonies of Chinese victims and survivors. Only recently have historians in Japan begun to systematically study anti-guerrilla operations in north China, including such practices as creating a “no-man's land” by corroborating Japanese sources with Chinese evidence.⁴⁴ The Japanese use of biological and chemical weapons (to be discussed later) and the bombing of China's wartime capital Chongqing have become an issue for Chinese historians and activists.

While the majority of Japanese and Chinese works focus on war atrocities in China,

a few scholars have begun to examine Japanese atrocities in Southeast Asia. In many ways, Japanese atrocities in China were a precursor to those in Asia and the Pacific. The shooting of surrendered enemy soldiers was commonplace in China, and continued unabated during the Pacific War. Despite the Japanese government promise, however vague, to abide by international conventions, treatment of POWs and civilians by the Japanese military was often harsh. Due to poor logistics or planning, the Japanese Army often turned to the local population in China for supplies, producing further brutalities against civilians. The problem was also widespread in the Pacific Theater. In extreme cases, Japanese troops resorted to cannibalism after their supply lines were cut off. Japanese tactics used against Chinese guerrilla forces were also practiced in Southeast Asia. Perhaps the single most infamous incident was the Battle of Manila in early 1945, in which over 100,000 Filipino civilians were massacred by retreating Japanese troops or killed by the American bombardment.⁴⁵ The massacre of ethnic Chinese in Malaya following the Japanese occupation in 1942 has been relatively well documented in Japanese and English.⁴⁶ The Center for Nanjing Massacre Studies at the Nanjing Normal University published testimonies about Japanese massacres in Malaya and ethnic Chinese forced to work on the Thai-Burma railway, collected over a twenty-year period by a single individual.⁴⁷

Mistreatment of POWs and Asian Laborers

By far the largest quantity of English publications about Japanese atrocities concerns the mistreatment of Allied POWs in Japanese captivity. Many were written by former POWs themselves.⁴⁸ The judgment at the Tokyo Trial noted that whereas 4 percent of some 235,000 American and British POWs in German and Italian captivity died, as many as 27 percent of the 132,000 American and British POWs lost their lives in Japanese captivity. Some put it in a starker way: 1 percent of American POWs died at German hands; thus, 9 out of 10 American POWs who died in captivity during World War II did so under the Japanese.⁴⁹

The single most infamous instance of Japanese mistreatment of American POWs was the Bataan Death March, in which over 70,000 American and Filipino soldiers were forced to march for days without food or supplies. Some 750 Americans and 5,000 Filipinos died en route from starvation, disease, or random execution.⁵⁰ A crime more familiar to POWs from Britain and Australia concerns the Thai-Burma Railway, which was built under extremely harsh conditions by hundreds of thousands of Allied POWs and Asian laborers.⁵¹ The Japanese also transported over 30,000 POWs to Japan to work in coalmines, factories, and other locations. Many died en route under horrendous conditions on board “hell ships” or when their unmarked ships were sunk by Allied

submarines. By the end of the war, 3,526 of the transported American POWs—approximately 10 percent—had died.⁵²

In her book on the fate of Allied POWs, *Unjust Enrichment*, Linda Goetz Holmes examines large Japanese companies that employed Allied POWs as forced labor. Although it is difficult to prove how much Japanese companies profited by using American POWs, *Unjust Enrichment* is one of the few works that goes beyond merely documenting the plight of POWs. Using some previously untapped documents, Holmes delves into the complicated financial aspects of Allied relief funds and accuses the Japanese authorities of withholding them, which aggravated POWs' suffering.⁵³ Holmes also calls attention to a Japanese document captured in Taiwan, which ordered the execution of all Allied POWs when the situation became urgent and extremely grave. She argues that this piece of incriminating evidence was presented to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal but was largely ignored, leading to the downplaying of the immense criminal intent of the Japanese military. Dated August 1944, this particular document raises more questions. It is known that the Japanese military killed Allied POWs before or during its own retreat. On the Pacific island of Palawan, for instance, some 150 Allied prisoners had spent two and a half years working on the airstrip for the Japanese. After the Americans landed on nearby Mindoro on December 15, 1944, the Japanese executed all 150 prisoners, leaving only eleven who managed to escape.⁵⁴ Whether there was an overall Japanese plan to kill all Allied POWs in their custody in case of defeat awaits further research.

What explains Japan's apparently brutal policy toward Allied POWs? *Prisoners of the Japanese* by Australian historian Gavan Daws is a scathing indictment of Japanese treatment of Allied POWs, placing great emphasis on the racial dimension. Although Daws noted that many Asians were forced to work in sometimes even worse conditions, he considered the racial tension between Japanese soldiers and white POWs as the single most important factor behind Japanese brutality.⁵⁵ Indeed, as both the Japanese and Allies recognized at the time, the humiliation of white prisoners served to diminish their prestige in the eyes of native Asians. However, the treatment of surrendered Chinese soldiers in the conflict in China was no better. Japanese historian Hata Ikuhiko emphasizes the evolution of Japanese policy toward POWs since the Meiji era, which moved from consideration to contempt as Japan's military came to prohibit its own troops from becoming POWs.⁵⁶ Historian Yoichi Kibata believes that the Japanese military's changing attitudes toward international law was another important factor in its brutal treatment of prisoners during World War II.⁵⁷

Others, however, caution against viewing brutality as uniquely Japanese.⁵⁸ Recently, some Western scholars have also challenged the conventional perception of Japan's POW camps as uniformly harsh. Using diaries and official documents from Australian and British archives, R. P. W. Havers showed that in the large camp at Changgi, Singapore,

the Japanese gave the Allied (mostly British and Australian) prisoners a high degree of autonomy, and the prison society was vigorous in contrast to other Japanese camps. Sibylla Jane Flower points out that the treatment of POWs also depended on whether they were officers or rank and file.⁵⁹

Asian civilians were often forced into labor beside POWs. For instance, there were more civilian laborers from Southeast Asia than Allied POWs working on the Thai-Burma Railway. It is estimated that at least 300,000—and perhaps as many as half a million—Asian laborers were mobilized, often forcibly, by the Japanese for such construction projects. *Rōmusha* (the Japanese word for laborers that came to be widely known in Southeast Asia) suffered an even higher rate of death due to disease and exhaustion.⁶⁰ Unlike Allied POWs, few, if any, forced laborers who survived the ordeal wrote about their experience, perhaps due to their low level of education and their postwar experience, making it extremely difficult to arrive at a precise picture of their suffering at the hands of the Japanese.

In 1958, a Chinese man was discovered hiding in the mountains of Hokkaido in northern Japan. He was one of the tens of thousands of Chinese laborers who had been taken to Japan in the later years of the war, and did not know the war was over. This event helped draw attention in Japan to the plight of Asian laborers during the war. On June 30, 1945, over nine hundred Chinese laborers in a labor camp in Hanaoka staged a riot over maltreatment and were brutally put down by the Japanese. Four hundred Chinese died in the incident, which became one of the few cases tried by the Allies at the postwar military tribunals in Japan. In terms of numbers, Korean men and women constituted the largest group forced into labor in wartime Japan. Some were forcibly moved to Southern Sakhalin (then a Japanese colony) during the war and were unable to return to Korea afterwards. Japanese authorities also forced many Chinese to construct military facilities on the continent. From 1934 to 1938, for instance, between 10,000 and 20,000 Chinese laborers were involved in building what the Japanese claimed to be the “best fortification in East Asia” in northern Manchuria along the Soviet border. Very little original documentation about this project exists. Whether the Chinese laborers had all been killed by the Japanese (as some claim) to keep the elaborate defense complex a secret has yet to be confirmed.⁶¹

Thanks to efforts of activists and historians, there is now a relative abundance of official documents on Japanese wartime labor policy and practice from various government agencies as well as from such industrial councils as the Coal Control Association. Since the early 1990s, several multivolume collections of documents on the forced labor issue have been published in Japan.⁶² The most intriguing is a comprehensive report on Chinese laborers compiled by Japan’s Foreign Ministry shortly after the war. The Japanese

government burned all copies except one for fear that it might become incriminating evidence at the war crimes trials; it later claimed the report was lost in order to avoid public inquiry into the matter. It was rediscovered in Japan in 1994 and published by a Japanese activist scholar. The report estimated that of some 40,000 Chinese laborers taken to Japan, nearly 7,000 had died by the end of the war.⁶³

Beginning in the late 1980s, Chinese scholars and university students conducted interviews with survivors or their kin in North China. The accounts of harsh conditions and inhumane treatment by the Japanese raised doubts about the veracity of the above-mentioned Foreign Ministry report, which tended to play down some of the abuses. Some survivors also recalled resentment against Chinese team leaders—often captured KMT soldiers—for bullying their compatriots.⁶⁴ In 2003, Chinese researchers also published a collection of documents relating to Japan's recruitment of Chinese laborers from North China.⁶⁵ Recently, a large-scale oral history project has been completed in China, leading to the publication of interviews with some 500 former Chinese forced laborers.

The extent to which these Korean and Chinese workers were recruited by force remains in some dispute. The official Japanese position is that the recruitment was based on free will, although the government did note internally that forcible draft might have occurred. In 2003, a Japanese professor discovered wartime documents belonging to a private company in Hokkaido that reported "taking (Korean labor recruits) away in their sleep or while they were working in the field." A document dated September 22, 1944, recommended against recruiting Korean laborers by draft so as to pacify public sentiment.⁶⁶ Whether the Japanese government should be held responsible for the fate of these laborers has been a contentious issue in the lawsuits filed by former laborers and their descendants.

Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs

During the war, the Chinese government made repeated allegations that Japanese forces deployed chemical and biological weapons, an allegation they repeated at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal but which was not prosecuted.⁶⁷ The United States military was also interested in Japanese chemical and biological warfare efforts. Given the nature of the operation of such weapons, however, irrefutable evidence was often hard to come by. Although no Japanese were prosecuted at the Tokyo Trials for crimes related to chemical or biological weapons, some were tried elsewhere as B- or C-class criminals. For instance, Kajiura Ginjirō, Commander of the 231st Regiment, 39th Division, was tried and sentenced to life in prison by a military tribunal in China in 1947 for using poisonous gas in combat.⁶⁸ From December 25 to 31, 1949, the Soviet government tried twelve

Japanese officers involved in biological warfare operations, and subsequently published the record of the trial in several languages, including Japanese, English, Chinese, and Korean.⁶⁹ Even though the publication included photocopies of original Japanese documents captured in Manchuria, the trial failed to garner international attention, and its credibility was questioned in the West. Later, during the Korean War, China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union alleged that U.S. forces used the same kind of biological weapons as those developed by the Japanese. These charges were dismissed as Cold War propaganda.⁷⁰

The story of Japan's biological weapons received little attention until 1980, when American journalist John Powell revealed the criminal activities of Unit 731, Japan's main biological warfare program. Citing U.S. government documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, he also alleged that the U.S. government pardoned the Japanese involved in biological warfare from war crimes trials in exchange for their research data.⁷¹ Although there had long been allegations of Japan's secret medical experiments using human subjects, the story did not get national attention in Japan until the early 1980s. In 1981, popular fiction writer Morimura Seiichi published *The Devil's Gluttony* in the Japanese Communist Party newspaper *Akahata* and later in a bestselling book.⁷² Morimura interviewed several dozen former members of Unit 731, and in a sequel he traced the postwar activities of former members.⁷³ Also in 1981, historian Tsuneishi Keiichi published the first scholarly assessment of Unit 731, making extensive use of the postwar Khabarovsk trial records and wartime publications in Japanese medical journals. Important as it was, as Tsuneishi later pointed out, that trial failed to reveal the extent of the connection between Unit 731 and the military medical establishment in Japan during the war. Tsuneishi argued that even without the postwar sources such as the Khabarovsk trial records, articles published by Lt. Gen. Ishii Shirō, the head of Unit 731, and others during the war provided sufficient evidence that the Japanese had experimented on live humans.⁷⁴ One such example he cited is a study on hypothermia by Unit 731 member Yoshimura Toshihito.⁷⁵

The issue soon became part of the long-running lawsuit by historian Ienaga Saburō. In 1983, the Japanese Ministry of Education asked Ienaga to remove a reference from his textbook that alleged Unit 731 conducted experiments on thousands of Chinese. The Japanese government justified its position by arguing that no academic research supported such a conclusion. In 1984, Japanese historian Tsuneishi Keiichi translated and published some 4,000 pages of U.S. documents on Japanese biological warfare housed at NARA.⁷⁶ As new studies proliferated in Japan and important documentary evidence appeared in the United States, the Ministry finally backed down. Historian Hata Ikuhiko, who had served as the expert witness for the Ministry of Education during

the lawsuit, later cited documents obtained from the United States, such as the Fell Report, as a major reason for his change of mind.⁷⁷ More recently, Japanese journalist Kondo Shōji, who has pursued the subject of biological warfare for more than fifteen years, produced perhaps the most comprehensive collection of documents on Unit 731, including many that had been declassified in the United States.⁷⁸

In the 1980s, Chinese archives began releasing some trial records and other accounts related to Unit 731, including testimony from a number of Chinese who had worked at its facilities. As it turns out, the Chinese government had conducted extensive surveys of victims of Japan's biological warfare and produced a report in November 1952, perhaps in connection with China's allegation that Americans used biological weapons in the Korean War. In 1997, a local Chinese television station discovered records belonging to the Kwantung Army military police (*kenpeitai*) concerning the so-called "special deliveries" of human subjects to Unit 731. Similar documents were found in another local archive.⁷⁹

After Powell's articles appeared, other Western authors also took up the topic and published book-length studies in English. British journalists Peter Williams and David Wallace produced a study in conjunction with a television documentary they produced in the United Kingdom.⁸⁰ Sheldon Harris, a retired professor of American history who became interested in the subject while visiting China in the late 1980s, devoted the last years of his life to studying Unit 731 and published widely on the subject.⁸¹

There is no doubt that Unit 731 conducted experiments on human subjects that included Chinese, Koreans, and Russians. The question of whether Allied POWs at Camp Hoten, in Mukden, Manchuria, were experimental subjects remains unresolved. Linda Goetz Holmes, Tanaka Toshiyuki, and some POWs themselves point to the fact that Japanese medical personnel from Unit 731 visited Camp Hoten in early 1943 and conducted medical experiments on the POWs at a time when hundreds of American POWs were dying each month. The U.S. government denied having any evidence supporting such a conclusion.⁸² The Soviet trial records only briefly touch on the matter. Although there may not be a definitive answer to the question, Tsuneishi, the leading scholar on biological warfare in Japan, considers it unlikely that Unit 731 used POWs at Camp Hoten as subjects, a view shared by Sheldon Harris.⁸³ A Japanese document introduced by Matsumura Takao, another Japanese scholar who has studied the connection between Unit 731 and epidemics in China, may shed some light on the visit of Unit 731 personnel to the camp. Matsumura writes that in early 1943, Kwantung Army Commander Gen. Umezu Yoshijirō ordered Unit 731 to immediately dispatch a medical group to Camp Hoten "to strengthen hygiene and restore POWs' health," which suggests a medical visit, not an instance of experimentation.⁸⁴ Indeed, a

Japanese document compiled immediately after the war, cited by Matsumura, seemed to corroborate this: the death toll of American POWs due to disease dropped significantly from several hundred to less than ten after the March 1943 visit.

The issue of who should be held responsible for biological warfare also awaits a definitive answer. Given that the Kwantung Army provided human subjects and the entire operation was extremely costly (¥10 million; ¥9 billion in 2005 value), some argued the military high command in Tokyo and even the emperor should be held responsible, whether or not they knew about live experiments at the time.⁸⁵ Japanese scholars such as Tsuneishi have long emphasized the complicity of the entire Japanese medical profession during the war, and criticized its silence after the war, which allowed those involved to assume prominent positions in Japan.

Questions also remain about the details of the deal struck between Ishii and the United States after the war. Officially, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) thought it lacked definitive evidence to prosecute Ishii and his group at the War Crimes Tribunal. It is true that the American investigator Murray Sanders was initially misled by the Japanese interlocutor, Dr. Naito Yōichi—himself a member of Unit 731—into believing the unit operated only in Manchuria and engaged solely in defensive work. How Unit 731 members learned about the arrival of Murray Sanders is not yet clear. It was not until the Soviet authorities made requests for information about Ishii in early 1947 that Americans renewed their investigation. After repeated promises not to prosecute Ishii and other Unit 731 members, the Americans obtained medical data from Ishii, including those from human experiments. Professor Harris believed the final decision for the *quid pro quo* was approved not only by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby (G-2) and Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo, but by their superiors in Washington. What happened to the data produced by Unit 731 remains largely unanswered. As Kondo Shōji has noted, several key documents outlining U.S. acquisition of Unit 731 research data have not yet been located.⁸⁶

While the diabolical nature of Unit 731 still commands considerable attention, recent research has expanded to include the activities of other Japanese biological and chemical warfare units. Scholars have shown that Japanese units stationed in Beijing (Unit 1855), Nanjing (Unit 1644, or Tama Unit), and Canton (Unit 1688) also experimented on human subjects.⁸⁷ Moreover, newly discovered documents such as Imoto Kumao's wartime journal confirmed the Chinese allegations that biological weapons had been used in Central China between 1940-42, if on experimental basis. Chinese researchers have recently published investigations of the victims of Japan's biological warfare.

The case of poison gas is only somewhat different. The Geneva Conventions did not outlaw the stockpiling of chemical weapons, and major belligerents, including the

United States and Soviet Union, possessed large quantities of such weapons during and after the war. While the Chinese had long alleged Japan's use of poisonous gas in battle, it was only recently that historians were able to prove this definitively with Japanese documents. The Japanese Army's Narashino Military Academy near Tokyo, for instance, had compiled a collection of fifty-six case studies of chemical weapons (including lethal agents like Yperite, also known as mustard gas) used by Japan in China during the war. The document was found at NARA by a Japanese historian among records collected by the International Prosecution Section in Tokyo, and was made public in Japan for the first time.⁸⁸ The existence of such a document, as one Japanese Diet member noted, contradicted the claim by a senior Japanese government official that available documentation concerning the use of lethal chemical weapons was "inconclusive."

In 2004, Yoshimi Yoshiaki published the most comprehensive study of the Japanese military's use of poisonous gas. In captured Japanese documents as well as other newly discovered sources, Yoshimi found evidence of Japan's use of poison gas in China and also in Southeast Asia. In a separate article, Yoshimi introduced a battle report from the 224th Infantry Brigade that detailed the use of mustard gas in a major operation against the Communist-led Eighth Route Army in Shanxi Province in the winter of 1942. Even the unit carrying out the operation noted its severity and remarked on the anti-Japanese sentiment among the civilian population affected. This report, captured by the United States and returned to Japan, was not made public by the Self-Defense Agency until May 2004.⁸⁹

In recent years, Chinese scholars have also published studies of Japan's biological and chemical warfare in China.⁹⁰ The 1995 *Chemical Warfare of the Invading Japanese Troops* alleged that the Japanese Army used poisonous gas in the China Theater over two thousand times. Based largely on contemporary Chinese evidence and some translated Japanese sources, including a document captured from Japan's 106th Division in Jiangxi Province during the war, this book claims that well over 32,000 Chinese soldiers and 9,000 civilians died as a result of poisonous gas.⁹¹ Bu Ping, a leading authority on Japanese chemical warfare, strove to corroborate Japanese and wartime Chinese records with Chinese testimony. In writing *Japan's Chemical Warfare During the Invasion of China*, Bu and his coauthors visited the survivors of a well-known Japanese poison gas attack in Tongbei Village, Shanxi Province, in May and June 1942, which killed nearly 800 Chinese guerrilla fighters and civilians. With the assistance of a Japanese colleague, Bu also located in the Japanese Self-Defense Agency's War History Department Library a postwar memoir by a Japanese battalion commander involved in the operation.⁹²

Bu's book also contains extensive descriptions, often based on interviews with victims and survivors, of numerous instances in which chemical artillery shells hastily abandoned

by the Japanese military at the end of the war continued to harm Chinese residents. For the Japanese military, the ultimate target of its chemical warfare was to be the Soviet Union, as the huge stockpile of such weapons in Manchuria indicates. The main target of its biological warfare, however, is somewhat murkier. The Soviet Union remained on the list after the Japanese clash with Soviet and Mongolian forces at Nomonhan in 1939. Reminiscences by some Japanese officers indicate that the United States was also a target, especially after the war in the Pacific began to turn against Japan. When the Japanese military developed a secret program to use balloon bombs against the U.S. mainland, bacteriological agents were said to be the ultimate payload. Documentary evidence, however, is understandably scarce.

Though not part of a formal chemical or biological weapons program, it was known even during the war in the Pacific that Japanese doctors carried out experiments on live POWs. In 1944, for example, ATIS published a research report on Japanese medical war crimes.⁹³ The incident at the Kyūshū Imperial University in western Japan, where Japanese doctors dissected American pilots for medical experiments, received the most publicity, not the least in Endō Shusaku's fiction *The Sea and Poison*.⁹⁴ Thirty people—some military, others from Kyūshū University—were tried by the Allies for this crime in 1948. Charges included vivisection, wrongful removal of body parts, and cannibalism. Twenty-three defendants were found guilty of various charges. (For lack of evidence, the charges of cannibalism were dismissed.)⁹⁵ Testimony by Japanese veterans and Chinese witnesses also revealed that such medical experiments also took place in Manchuria and occupied areas in China.⁹⁶

From Mass Rape to Military "Comfort Women"

The rape of Chinese women by Japanese soldiers has long been identified with Japan's war atrocities in China. Reports by American missionaries during the Rape of Nanking in late 1937 provided a glimpse into the extent of sexual violence committed by the Japanese Army. Numerous other incidents in China and later in Southeast Asia further tarnished the reputation of the Japanese forces. The postwar trials, however, largely considered rape to be part of a more general violation of law or inhumane treatment, and not a war crime per se.

Japanese authorities were aware of the problem during the war. In fact, Japanese records show that orders were issued to deal with the problem and that a small number of Japanese soldiers had been tried by Japan's own military courts during the war for rape or other crimes against civilians.⁹⁷ In part to reduce local resentment against Japan and in part to prevent the spread of venereal disease among its ranks, the Japanese military contracted private vendors to set up "comfort stations" for the troops as early as 1932.

Again, this practice was known to the Allies but no criminal charges were filed at the trials. There was one exception. After Japan occupied the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia), the Japanese military forced many young women—including Dutch as well as Eurasian—into providing sexual service to the Japanese. Those Japanese responsible were punished by the Dutch authorities after the war on account of the abuse of the Dutch women.

In the 1970s, a few writers in Japan began treating the subject as a crime committed by the Imperial Japanese Army.⁹⁸ It was not until the early 1990s that the case of the military “comfort women” (*ianfu*) began to attract wide attention, following the first public testimony of a Korean woman who had been forced into military prostitution for the Japanese. Her account galvanized activists around the “comfort women” issue. Most publications on the subject initially appeared in Korean and Japanese. Numerous works have been also published in English.⁹⁹ Gathering extensive oral histories, Su Zhiliang, a historian from Shanghai, published the most comprehensive work on this topic in China and set up a Center for the Study of Chinese Comfort Women at his university.¹⁰⁰ In terms of scope and impact, perhaps no other Japanese war crime has reached the level of international publicity since the 1990s as that of the military “comfort women,” a phenomenon helped by new interest in human rights and standards regarding sexual violence toward women.¹⁰¹

Initially, the Japanese government denied official involvement in the operation. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a leading Japanese scholar on Japanese war crimes, made headlines by discovering documents in the Japanese Self-Defense Agency’s library that suggested direct military involvement. He went on to publish them in a collection of primary documents, which included numerous ATIS reports from NARA.¹⁰² Under public pressure, the Japanese government admitted its complicity and set up the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) to compensate former “comfort women” from private sources. AWF established a History Committee in 1996 to gather and examine relevant documents in archives in Japan, the United States, Holland, and Taiwan. Historians hired by the AWF also interviewed former “comfort women” in Indonesia and the Philippines. Their work resulted in a multi-volume collection of documents and a comprehensive bibliography on the subject.¹⁰³ Many are not fully satisfied, however. As Yoshimi points out, numerous Japanese government documents were either lost or remain classified. Among them are police records belonging to the former Home Ministry that allegedly had been destroyed.¹⁰⁴ Private records, such as the journal of army doctor Aso Tetsuo, contributed much to the understanding of conditions in the comfort stations in China, but many others held by the Self-Defense Agency War History Department Library remained closed to the public for privacy reasons.¹⁰⁵

Many issues concerning the “comfort women” are still hotly disputed in Japan. The number of women victims remains a subject of disagreement; popular accounts frequently give the figure of 200,000. Takasaki Shōji, an expert on Korean history and chair of the AWF History Committee, emphasized the distinction between the Korean women’s volunteer corps (*teishintai*), who were sent to work in factories in Japan, and “comfort women.” As he noted, these two terms had been confused by many Korean activists and had led to an inflated estimate of the number of Korean “comfort women.”¹⁰⁶ A bigger issue concerns the degrees of coercion and government involvement. Some also question the veracity of the testimony provided by former “comfort women” as well as their motivation to testify in public. Hata Ikuhiko, for one, has taken the lead and published many essays as well as a major work on this subject. Hata essentially equates the “comfort women” system with prostitution and finds similar practices during the war in other countries.¹⁰⁷ He has been criticized by other Japanese scholars for downplaying the hardship of the “comfort women.”

Other Topics

In addition to the four main areas of research and publications on Japanese war crimes—conventional war crimes in Asia, mistreatment of Allied POWs and civilians, chemical and biological warfare, and military “comfort women”—other subjects have received some attention in recent years.

Drug trafficking is one such issue. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial accused Japan of selling narcotics to raise money for its clandestine operations. In the late 1980s, Japanese historian Eguchi Keiichi published his studies of Japan’s opium policy in north China during the war after discovering a cache of original documents.¹⁰⁸ Based on archival research in Japanese and English, John Jennings’ book introduced this topic to Western readers.¹⁰⁹ A more recent and broader study is a conference volume, which placed Japanese practices in the historical context of opium management in Asia.¹¹⁰

Compared with studies of the European Theater, a conspicuously underdeveloped issue for Asia is property crimes. It is known that not only Japanese soldiers but also some officers and newspaper reporters took part in looting after the Japanese takeover of Chinese cities like Nanjing. More recently, some Chinese scholars accused the Japanese military of systematically looting Chinese cultural property during the war, which amounted to what some called a “cultural holocaust.” Zhao Jianmin, a Chinese historian at Fudan University in Shanghai, claimed that as many as 897,178 books were looted by the Japanese military in the Shanghai-Nanjing area alone and taken to Japan. In a series of spirited rebuttals, however, a Japanese scholar accused Zhao of writing polemics, not history based on credible evidence.¹¹¹

Economic issues in occupied areas in Asia belong to an area relatively well researched in Japan. Japan's requisition of large amounts of rice from Vietnam in 1945 is known to have contributed to the great famine in the northern part of that country, leading to almost 2 million deaths.¹¹² Japanese scholars have also pioneered the study of military scrip (*gunpyō*) operations, which siphoned off the savings of many local residents in occupied areas such as Hong Kong.¹¹³ What happened to secret funds allegedly amassed by the Japanese occupation authorities remains an intriguing question. This might not have been all loot, but a significant portion was. To this day in Southeast Asia, tales of hidden Japanese treasure still create a sensation. Popular history writers Sterling and Peggy Seagraves have alleged a plot (code named "Golden Lily") by Japan's Imperial family to loot occupied Asia of gold and other treasures. The authors, claiming to have obtained many secret documents, accused the U.S. government of refusing to declassify many key documents.¹¹⁴ Their tendency to overstate their case and rely on the words of individuals, however, makes the book less than credible in the eyes of historians.

In contrast to the voluminous writings on Japanese atrocities in the Asia Pacific, there is little awareness outside Japan of the Japanese Army's brutality against its own people. The 1945 battle of Okinawa was one such instance. First raised during Ienaga Saburō's textbook trial, it has been a controversial topic for Japanese researchers for many years. Hayashi Hirofumi, for instance, revealed that Japan's military often forced Okinawan natives into so-called "collective suicide." Hayashi used U.S. intelligence sources to show that the Japanese military had intended to use agents to infiltrate captured Japanese to kill those who cooperated with the American forces.¹¹⁵

Problems and Remedies

Thanks to the discovery of new evidence and the pioneering work of many historians, a lot more is known about Japanese war crimes in World War II now than in the immediate postwar period. A number of problems still confront scholars of Japanese war crimes of World War II, however. First, sixty years after the war ended, there are still some World War II-era documents to be discovered or declassified in a number of countries. While the IWG has accomplished a great deal by unearthing valuable documents under the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act, the United States and other countries must continue a vigorous pursuit for all remaining records. This is especially true of Japan, where many World War II-era documents remain closed or forgotten.

Second, historians must make better use of documents that are already open to the public. Whereas Japanese historians are perhaps the most frequent users of the Japan-related materials at NARA, U.S.-based researchers would do well to consult more foreign documents, especially those in Japanese. Australian, British, and Dutch archives remain

to be fully exploited. As one example, Yamamoto Mayumi and William Bradley Horton, two historians employed by the Asia Women's Fund History Committee in Japan, have presented their preliminary survey of documentary evidence related to "comfort women" in various Dutch Archives.¹¹⁶

Third, while official documents are indispensable to historians studying World War II and war atrocities, historians must also use other types of evidence. This is all the more important since documentary evidence on certain subjects is likely to remain sketchy, in large part due to the large scale destruction after the war. Private records such as diaries and memoirs can help to fill the gap, as can interviews with the participants and survivors. As the number of survivors dwindles each day, conducting good oral histories is more urgent than ever. To be sure, caution is necessary when using such testimony, and every attempt must be made to confirm testimony with other types of evidence when possible.¹¹⁷

Apart from the issue of evidence, current studies leave many areas to be examined. Japanese war crimes against the local populations in Asia and the Pacific, for instance, have not received as much attention in English as crimes committed against Allied POWs. Compared with the recent scholarship on the European Theater, professional historians of Asia have only begun to study such subjects as forced labor and wartime looting of art and property.

A more challenging task for historians is to convincingly explain why these war crimes occurred. War crimes—as well as their repercussions—cannot be understood in isolation from the larger context of military, intellectual, or social-economic histories. A problem with some current work is the tendency to return to the wartime practice of demonizing the enemy. While it may be psychologically satisfying to some, such an approach contributes little to understanding the real causes of war crimes, let alone preventing them in the future. For one thing, war crimes in World War II were by no means limited to the Japanese troops. Comparative approaches, if used well, can provide a better understanding of wartime conditions and help highlight particular institutions and ideology. In this regard, John Dower's 1985 work, *War Without Mercy*, remains an exemplary piece of scholarship. By highlighting race as a force that shaped perceptions and influenced behavior on both sides of the Pacific War, Dower illustrated how racism and dehumanization contributed to the brutality of war.¹¹⁸

In the popular realm, there are encouraging signs of such development. The National D-Day Museum in New Orleans has incorporated some of these perspectives into their permanent exhibition on World War II. For instance, in his essay on Japanese maltreatment of British POWs, Kibata Yoichi described racial prejudice on the part of the British toward Japanese prisoners in their captivity shortly after the war. Rather than trivializing

Japanese brutality toward Allied POWs, Kibata emphasized, it is necessary to take into account all the ramifications of changing power relations and shifting perspectives on race.¹¹⁹ Some studies of “comfort women” have taken a step in this direction. Historian Yuki Tanaka focused on Southeast Asia in his book, *Japan’s Comfort Women*, which broke new ground by placing the “comfort women” in comparative perspective, examining prostitution around U.S. military bases in South Korea and Southeast Asia to explore the wider ramification of the sexual exploitation of women.¹²⁰

Studying war crimes serves as a reminder that historians must build their cases on the basis of credible evidence. However, the issue of Japanese war crimes in World War II is likely to remain a contested subject that cannot be resolved by documentary evidence alone. In the final analysis, sustained and intense international collaboration is the most effective way to raise the level of research on war crimes, Japanese or otherwise. Though not widely known outside Japan, Japanese scholars often take the lead in studying the war crimes of the Japanese military. Already there are translations of their scholarship into English, which are likely to stimulate further research. The continued search for documentary evidence and a broadened perspective through cross-national collaboration offer the best hope for better understanding human behavior in war and Japan’s share of war crimes.

Notes

1. I have limited my examination to English-, Japanese-, and Chinese-language publications.
2. Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolko, and Robert J. Lifton, eds., *Crimes of War: A Legal, Political-Documentary and Psychological Inquiry into the Responsibility of Leaders, Citizens and Soldiers for Criminal Acts In War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971). For a convenient and more up-to-date compendium, see Roy Gutman and David Rieff, eds., *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know* (New York: Norton, 1999).
3. The Japanese Diet did ratify the Red Cross Convention, thus obliging the government to cooperate with the Red Cross during the war. For a different understanding of this issue between Japanese and Allies, see Aiko Utsumi, “The Japanese Army and Its Prisoners: Relevant Documents and Bureaucratic Institutions,” Australia-Japan Research Project at the Australian War Memorial, March 1999.
4. For a general survey, see Philip R. Piccigallo, *The Japanese On Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations In The East, 1945–1951* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979).
5. Criticism of the Tokyo Trials began with one of its own justices, who published a lengthy dissenting opinion. Radhabinod Pal, *International Military Tribunal For The Far East: Dissident Judgment* (Calcutta: Sanyal, 1953). See also Richard Minear, *Victor’s Justice:*

- The Tokyo War Crimes Trial* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Kei Ushimura, "Beyond The Judgment of Civilization:" *The Intellectual Legacy of the Japanese War Crimes Trials, 1946–1949*, trans. Steven J. Ericson (Tokyo: The International House of Japan, 2003).
6. For a Japanese encyclopedia that adopts an even broader definition, see Ikuhiko Hata, Masamori Sase, and Keiichi Tsuneishi, eds., *Sekai sensō hanzai jiten* [An encyclopedia of war crimes in the modern world] (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 2002).
 7. Harold D. Laswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York: P. Smith, 1938); Bruno Lasker and Agnes Roman, *Propaganda from China and Japan: A Case Study in Propaganda Analysis* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938); James Morgan Read, *Atrocity Propaganda, 1914–19* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1941).
 8. Yoshida Yutaka, "Gunji kankei shiryō no sengoshi" [A postwar history of military-related sources] *Archives no kagaku* Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2003): 26.
 9. Tanaka Hiromi, *Bei gikai toshokan shozo senryō sesshu kyū rikukaigun shiryō sōmokuroku* [A catalog of captured former army and navy materials at the Library of Congress] (Tokyo: Tōyō shorin, 1995), x. See also Hiromi Tanaka, "Japanese Military Historical Sources after the War: A Brief Survey," Australia-Japan Research Project at the Australian War Memorial, March 1999.
 10. On July 6, 1993, Japan's Kyodo News Agency reported the discovery of these documents in the Russian Military Archives. For a discussion, see Rokurō Saitō, *Siberia no banka* [Eulogy of Siberia] (Tsuruoka: Shūsen shiryōkan shuppanbu, 1995), 128–215, esp. 139, 144–47. A partial list is included on pp. 529–37.
 11. For example, see the Dalian Municipal Archive (in Chinese) at http://www.da.dl.gov.cn/Arch/dazc/dazc_1.html. Some of these documents have been recently published in China as Jilin Dang'anguan comp., *Guandong xianbingdui baogaoji* [Reports of the Guandong Military Police] 84 vols. (Nanning: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2005–2006).
 12. A study based on U.S. documents at NARA of what captured Japanese military personnel revealed to American interrogators is Yamamoto Taketoshi, *Nihonhei horyō wa nani o shabetta ka* [What did captured Japanese soldiers tell?] (Tokyo: Bunshun shinsho, 2001).
 13. Paul Kesaris, ed., *The MAGIC Documents: Summaries and Transcripts of the Top Secret Diplomatic Communications of Japan, 1938–1945*, 35mm microfilm, 14 reels (Washington, DC: University Publications of America, 1980).
 14. See, among others, Edward Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942–1945* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992). Unfortunately, many original records of intercepted telegrams were lost, and the translations of them were not without mistakes. A conference of Japan's highest leaders before the Emperor (*gozen kaigi*), for instance, was often translated as "morning meetings." For a work that lists many

- of MAGIC's mistranslations, see Keiichiro Komatsu, *Origins of the Pacific War and the Importance of MAGIC* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).
15. Cecil H. Uyehara, comp., *Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 1868–1945*, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1954). Japanese records collected by the International Prosecution Section, however, were not returned, but were later microfilmed by Japan's Diet Library. See also John Young, *Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1959).
 16. R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide, eds. and comps., *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial*, 22 vols. (New York: Garland, 1981), and *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: Index and Guide*, 5 vols. (New York: Garland, 1981–87). An earlier guide is Paul S. Dull and Michael Takaaki Umemura, *The Tokyo Trials: A Functional Index to the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957), which listed Japanese atrocities (“violation of laws and customs of warfare and laws of humanity”) primarily by location, but also by particular crime, such as “use of opium and narcotics,” “sea atrocities,” and the like. See also Yoshio Chaen, comp., *B, C kyū senpan kankei shūsei* [Collected materials on B-, C-class war criminals], 15 vols. (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1984–1992).
 17. For instance, David Bergamini's controversial book gave detailed accounts of events like the Rape of Nanking. David Bergamini, *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy* (New York: Morrow, 1971). Historians have accused Bergamini of using evidence of dubious credibility, among other things.
 18. Saburō Ienaga, *The Pacific War, 1931–1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II*, trans. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978).
 19. On Japan's war memory, see Robert Orr, *Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2001); and Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Japanese Culture, 1945–1970* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). In Japanese, the best survey remains Yoshida Yutaka, *Nihonjin no sensōkan* [Japanese views of the war] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995). See also George Hicks, *Japan's War Memories: Amnesia or Concealment?* (Aldershot, Brookfield: Ashgate, 1997).
 20. Chūgoku kikansha rengokai, *Sankō* [Three Alls] (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1957).
 21. Hayashi Fusao, *Daitōa sensō koteiron* [An affirmation of the Greater East Asia War] (Tokyo: Banchō shobō, 1964). A sequel was published in 1965.
 22. Katsuichi Honda, *The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame*, ed. Frank Gibney, trans. Karen Sandness (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999). See also Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, “The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War Guilt

- Amid Fabricated Illusions,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 26, no. 2, (Summer 2000): 307–40.
23. *Sensō sekinin kenkyū* [Studies in war responsibility] (Tokyo, 1993—).
 24. *Kang-Ri zhanzheng yanjiu* [Studies of the war of resistance against Japan] (Beijing, 1991—).
 25. Radhika Coomaraswamy, *Violence against Women: Report Based on Research Visits to North and South Korea and Japan on Wartime Military Sexual Slavery* (1997).
 26. *Rijun qin-Hua yanjiu* [Studies of Japanese invasion of China] (Carbondale, IL, 1990—).
 27. For instance, Shi Young, Margaret Stetz, and Bonnie Oh, eds., *Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).
 28. *Hikōkai shiryō mokuroku (kōshi monjo)* [Catalog of classified materials (public and private documents)]. It includes two volumes of materials returned from the United States (Beikoku kara henkan o uketa shiryō mokuroku), which I was unable to see in July 2004. See also Yoshimi Yoshiaki, “Dokugasu mondai to shiryō kōkai” [The Issue of Poison Gas and Declassification of Documents] *Sensō sekinin kenkyū* 44 (Summer 2004), 10–13.
 29. There is a public catalog of returned documents (*Henkan monjo mokuroku*) in the Public Record Office reading room.
 30. Shōhei Muta, “The Lack of an Archives Tradition in Japan: Issues Surrounding the Planned Centre for Modern Japan-Asia Relations,” Australia-Japan Research Project at the Australian War Memorial, March 1999.
 31. Tanaka Akira and Matsumura Takao, eds., *731 Butai sakusei shiryō* [Materials created by Unit 731] (Tokyo: Fuji shobō, 1991).
 32. Ono Kenji et al., comps., *Nankin daigyakusatsu wo kirokushita kōgun heishi tachi* [Imperial Army soldiers who recorded the Nanjing Massacre] (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1994).
 33. Nankin senshi hensaniinkai, *Nankin senshi shiryōshū* [Historical materials on the history of the Nanjing Battle] (Tokyo: Kaikōsha, 1993).
 34. See http://www.jacar.go.jp/asia_en/index_en.html. The Web site is accessible in Japanese and English. These figures were valid in October 2004.
 35. Zhongyang Dang’anguan et al., comps., *Dongbei lici dacan’an* [Great atrocities in Northeastern China] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989); *Huabei lici dacan’an* [Great atrocities in North China] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995); *Nanjing datusha* (The Nanjing Massacre) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995).
 36. Zhang Kaiyuan, ed. and trans., *Tianli nanrong: Meiguo chuanjiaoshi yanzhong de Nanjing datusha (1937–1938)* [Unforgivable crimes: The Nanjing Massacre (1937–1938) in the eyes of American missionaries] (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1999).
 37. Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
 38. Rabe’s diary was later published as *The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe*, ed. Erwin Wickert, trans. John E. Woods (New York: Knopf, 2000).

39. Unfortunately, both Wu and Chang mistakenly attributed a key telegram that mentioned the Chinese death figure 300,000 to Japan's Foreign Minister, a mistake repeated in a *Washington Post* obituary of Chang.
40. Masahiro Yamamoto, *Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000). For a recent work that examines how the incident has been received in the world, see Takashi Yoshida, *The Making of the Rape of Nanking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
41. Enhao Li, *Ribenjun zhanzheng baoxing zhi yanju* [A study of Japan's war atrocities] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu chubanshe, 1994).
42. The Web site is <http://www.sjhistory.org>. It publishes news, research and source materials relating to the Nanjing Massacre, military "comfort women," biological warfare, forced labor, as well as other aspects of Sino-Japanese relations.
43. For a longer English survey of the historiography as well as leading works in Japan, China, and the United States, see Daqing Yang, "Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rape of Nanjing," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 842–65; Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, "The Nanjing Massacre: Now You See It..." *Monumenta Nipponica* 56, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 521–44.
44. Lincoln Li's *Japanese Army in North China* (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975) focused on Japanese military and political strategies and emphasized organizational conflicts among Japanese themselves. Masahiro Yamamoto, "Japan's Anti-Guerrilla Warfare in North China, 1939–45: Anatomy of Its Failure," paper presented at the conference on the military history of the Sino-Japanese War, Maui, Hawaii, January 2004.
45. For a study based primarily on interviews, see Jose Ma. Bonifacio M. Escoda, *Warsaw of Asia: The Rape of Manila*, revised ed. (Quezon City, Philippines: Giraffe Books, 2001).
46. For a study in English, see Cheah Boon Kheng, "Japanese Army Policy toward the Chinese and Malay-Chinese Relations in Wartime Malaya," in Paul Kratoska, ed., *Southeast Asian Minorities in the Wartime Japanese Empire* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 97–110; Takashima Nobuyoshi et al., *Maraya no Nihongun: Negurisenbiran shū ni okeru Kajiin gyakusatsu* [Japanese Army in Malaya] (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1989); Hayashi Hirofumi, *Kakyo gyakusatsu: Nihongun shihaika no Mare hanto* [Massacre of overseas Chinese] (Tokyo: Suzusawa shobō, 1992).
47. Zhang Lianhong, ed., *Riqin shiqi Xin-Ma Huaren shouhai diaocha* [Survey of Malaysian Chinese victims during Japanese invasion] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2004). It also includes testimonies concerning Japanese military scrip (currency issued by the military).
48. There are too many to name here. For a useful sampling, see Michale P. Onorato, ed., *Forgotten Heroes: Japan's Imprisonment of American Civilians in the Philippines, 1942–1945: An Oral History* (Westport CT: Meckler, 1990); Robert S. La Forte et al., eds., *With Only the*

- Will to Live: Accounts of Americans in Japanese Prison Camps, 1941–1945* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resource, 1994); Charles G. Roland, “Allied POWs, Japanese Captors and the Geneva Convention,” *War & Society* IX (1991): 83–101. A useful summary is provided by Gary K. Reynolds, “The US Prisoners of War and Civilians Captured and Interned by Japan in World War II: The Issue of Compensation by Japan,” Report for Congress RL 30606 (December 17, 2002).
49. Piccigallo, *The Japanese on Trial*, 27. The death rate of Soviet POWs in German camps was much higher and comparable to those in Japanese camps.
 50. Stanley Falk, *Bataan: The March of Death* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962); Donald Knox, *Death March: The Survivors of Bataan* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981). Other estimates of American deaths range from 650 to over 2,000; estimates of Filipino deaths range from 9,000 to 16,500.
 51. Gavan McCormack and Hank Nelson, eds., *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History* (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993).
 52. “POW list sheds light on deaths of Allied soldiers in Japan,” *Mainichi Daily News* (January 12, 2005). A list of the victims was compiled by the POW Research Network Japan, a private group founded in 2002, and published on its Web site: <http://homepage3.nifty.com/pow-j/>.
 53. Linda Goetz Holmes, *Unjust Enrichment: How Japan's Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001).
 54. I'd like to thank Professor Gerhard Weinberg for alerting me to this incident. For the experience of one of those eleven survivors, see Bob Wilbanks, *Last Man Out: Glenn McDole, USMC, Survivor of the Palawan Massacre in WW II* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2004).
 55. Gavan Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific* (New York: Morrow, 1994). See also E. Bartlett Kerr, *Surrender and Survival: The Experience of American POWs in the Pacific, 1941–1945* (New York: Morrow, 1985).
 56. Ikuhiko Hata, “From Consideration to Contempt: The Changing Nature of Japanese Military and Popular Perceptions of Prisoners of War through the Ages,” in *Prisoners of War and Their Captors in World War II*, eds. Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich (Washington, D.C.: Berg, 1996), 253–76.
 57. Yoichi Kibata, “Japanese Treatment of British Prisoners: The Historical Context,” in *Japanese Prisoners of War*, eds. Philip Towle et al., (London: Hambledon and London, 2000), 137, 144.
 58. Hank Nelson, “Measuring the Railway: From Individual Lives to National History,” in McCormack and Nelson, eds., *The Burma-Thailand Railway*, 21–22.
 59. R. P. W. Havers, *Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience: The Changi POW Camp, Singapore, 1942–45* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Sibylla Jane Flower, “Captors and

- captives on the Burma-Thailand Railway,” in *Building the Death Railway: The Ordeal of American POWs in Burma, 1942–1945*, eds, Robert S. LaForté and Ronald E. Marcello, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1993).
60. Paul H. Kratoska, *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown History* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005).
 61. For a report on a joint Sino-Japanese visit to one of these fortresses, see Kikuike Minoru et al., “Kyū-Kantōgun dai-4 (15) kokkyō shubitai Hutou yōsai no Nitchū kyōdō chōsa” [Joint Sino-Japanese investigation of the Hutou fortification of the Kwantung Army’s border unit 4 (15)], *Sensō sekinin kenkyū* 4 (Summer 1994), 12–22. Of the some 2,500 Japanese soldiers and civilians known to be inside one complex at the end of the war, only fifty-three managed to make it back to Japan after eighteen days of fighting.
 62. Rin Eita, *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū*, 8 vols. [Collected materials on wartime foreign forced laborers] (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1990–91); Nagasawa Shigeru, *Senjika Chōsenjin Chūgokujin, rengōgun horyō kyōsei renkō shiryōshū: Sekitan tōseikai kyokuhi bunsho*, 4 vols. [Collected materials on wartime forced labor by Koreans, Chinese and Allied POWs] (Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1992).
 63. Tanaka Hiroshi, *Chūgokujin kyōsei renkō shiryō* [Materials on Chinese forced laborers], 5 vols., (Tokyo: Gendai shobō, 1995).
 64. He Tianyi, *Huabei laogong xiehui zuie shi* [A history of North China Labor Association’s criminal deeds] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1995); Liu Baochen and Lin Fengsheng, *Riben luyi Zhongguo zhanfu laogong diaocha yanjiu* [Investigation into Japanese abuse of Chinese POW Laborers] (Baoding: Hebei daxue chubanshe, 2002).
 65. Ju Zhifen and Zhuang Jianping, comps., *Riben lueduo huabei qiangzhi laogong dang’an zhiliao* [Archival materials concerning Japanese abduction of Chinese forced laborers from North China], 2 vols. (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003).
 66. “‘Chōsenjin kyōsei chōyō’ Nihon no tankō kaisha no shiryō ga hakken” (Documents of a Japanese mining company that “forcibly recruited Koreans” are found), *Choson ilbo* (December 11, 2002) (Japanese edition).
 67. For example, “Japanese Use the Chinese as ‘Guinea Pigs’ to Test Germ Warfare,” *Rocky Mountain Medical Journal* 39, no. 8 (August 1942): 571–72. According to a U.S. document discovered by Japanese historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki at the MacArthur Memorial, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff informed the prosecutors at the Tokyo Trials of the Army position that the use of poison gas did not violate international law. *Let’s* 45 (December 2004): 23.
 68. Zhongyang Dang’anguan et al., *Xijunzhan yu duqizhan*, 621–24.
 69. *Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army, Charged with Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950).

70. Concerning this allegation, see Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, *The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets From The Early Cold War and Korea* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998). Others cite recently obtained Soviet documents to show the allegation was a Communist propaganda plot. See “New Evidence on the Korean War,” and Kathryn Weathersby, “Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 11 (Winter 1998): 176–99.
71. John W. Powell, “Japan’s Germ Warfare: The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 12, no. 4 (October–December 1980): 2–17; “A Hidden Chapter in History,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist* 37, no. 8 (October 1981): 45–53.
72. For instance, published before 1980 are Nagamatsu Asazō, “Sanzen’nin ga marutanbō ni natta saikinsakusen no zenbō” [Full picture of bacteriological warfare with 3,000 human Maruta], *Nihon shuhō* 456 (September 5, 1958); Yoshinaga Reiko, *Jintai jikken no kōfu* [Terror of human experiment] (Osaka: Naniwa shobō, 1963); Shimamura Kyō, *3000-nin no seitai jikken: Nihongun “Saikin Butai” no zaigo* [Live experiments on 3,000 human beings] (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1967, 1981); Morimura Seiichi, *Akuma no hōshoku: “Kantōgun saikinsen butai” kofu no zenbō* [Devil’s gluttony: The frightening whole picture of the “Kwantung Army’s bacteriological warfare unit”] (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1981).
73. *Zoku Akuma no hōshoku: “Kantōgun saikinsen butai” nazo no sengoshi* (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1982). Although Morimura used some original Japanese documents, the book contained no footnotes or bibliography. The second volume was criticized for its erroneous photos.
74. Tsuneishi Keiichi, *Kieta saikinsen butai: Kantōgun Dai 731-butai* [The bacteriological warfare unit that vanished] (Tokyo: Kaimeisha, 1981), 179; Tsuneishi Keiichi and Asano Tomizo, *Saikinsen butai to jiketsushita futari no igakusha* [Bacteriological warfare unit and two doctors who committed suicide] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1982).
75. This document, *Tōshō ni tsuite* (On hypothermia) was initially captured by the United States then returned to Japan, where it is now available at the National Record Office.
76. Tsuneishi Keiichi, ed., *Hyōteki Ishii: 731 butai to Beigun chōhō katsudō* [Target Ishii: Unit 731 and U.S. military intelligence activities] (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1984).
77. Morimura Seiichi, ed., *Sabakareta 731 Butai* [Unit 731 on Trial] (Tokyo: Banseisha, 1991).
78. Kondo Shōji, *731 butai saikinsen shiryō shūsei* (Collection of materials on Unit 731 and bacteriological warfare), 8 CDs (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2003). Kondo’s essay on the state of research, published in December 2004, is very valuable. See “731 butai o meguru chōsa kenkyū no genjō” (State of research on Unit 731), *Sensō sekinin kenkyū* 46 (Winter 2004): 38–43.
79. Kondo, *731 butai saikinsen shiryō shūsei*, 42. Many of these Japanese documents are reproduced in photo format in Jilinsheng Dang’anguan et al., comps., “731 budui” zuixin

- tiezheng: Tebie yisong, fangyi dang'an xuan* [Iron proofs of the crimes of Unit 731: Selected archival materials on special deliveries and epidemic prevention], (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2003).
80. Peter Williams and David Wallace, *Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II* (New York: Free Press, 1989). Interestingly enough, when their book was published in the United States, the chapter on allegations of America's use of chemical and biological warfare in the Korean War was dropped.
 81. Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the American Cover-Up*, revised ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994, 2002). Harris was a contributor to the 1999 compendium *Crimes of War* and textbooks on medical ethics compiled by the US Army. See review by Richard Minear in *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 4 (1994): 1265–66.
 82. U.S. House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Subcommittee on Compensation, Pension, and Insurance, *Treatment of American Prisoners of War in Manchuria*, 99th Congress, 2nd Session (September 17, 1986). (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).
 83. Tsuneishi, *731 butai*, 50. A Japanese Army doctor did draw blood from Allied POWs in Mukden in early 1943, he noted, for the purpose of studying their immune ability. However, he admits that the allegation concerning the use of American subjects for biological warfare experimentation during the Korean War, while lacking documentary evidence, cannot be entirely dismissed. See *731 butai*, 171–74, 179–80, and Harris, *Factory of Death*, 170–71.
 84. Matsumura Takao, “731 butai to Hoten horyō shūyōjo” [Unit 731 and the Mukden POW camp] *Sensō sekinin kenkyū* 13 (Autumn 1996): 74–76. The document was first submitted by the British prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and translated back into Japanese. Matsumura notes some discrepancy between that earlier translation and the Japanese original in his possession.
 85. Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Toshiya Iko, *731 Butai to Tenno, Rikugun chūō* [Unit 731 and the Emperor, Army High Command] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); Awaya Kentarō and Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Dokugasusen kankei shiryō* [Materials on poison gas warfare] (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1989); Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Matsuno Seiya, *Dokugasusen kankei shiryō* II (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1997).
 86. He mentions the report and other research data, which had been allegedly destroyed by the United States.
 87. Concerning Unit 1644, see Mizutani Naoko, “Moto 1644 butai'in no shōgen” [Testimonies of former members of Unit 1644], *Sensō sekinin kenkyū* 10 (Winter 1995): 56–65.
 88. This document was titled *Shina jihen ni okeru kagakusen reishō shū* [Cases of chemical warfare during the China incident] (Narashino: Rikugun Narashino Gakkō, 1942). The official history of the Narashino Military Academy is *Rikugun Narashino Gakkō kōshi hensan iinkai*,

- Rikugun Narashino Gakkō* [The Army Narashino Academy] (Tokyo, 1987).
89. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Dokugasu sen to Nihongun* [Chemical warfare and the Japanese military] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2004). He introduced the document in *Sensō sekinin kenkyū* 45 (Autumn 2004). Yoshimi has surveyed U.S. documents relating to the Japanese use of poison gas in China and the Pacific Theater in “Nihongun no dokugasu sen to Amerika” [Japanese Army’s poison gas warfare and the U.S.], *Sensō sekinin kenkyū* 40 (Summer 2003): 4–11.
 90. Zhongyang Dangangan, Zhongguo Dier Lishi Dangangan, and Jilinsheng Shehui Kexueyuan, *Xijunzhan yu duqi zhan* [Bacteriological warfare and chemical warfare] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989); *Zuie di “731” “100”: Qin-Hua Rijun xijun budui dang’an ziliao xuan bian* [The evils of Unit 731 and Unit 100] (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 1995).
 91. Zhongguo Kangri Zhangzhen Shixuehui and Zhongguo Renmin Kangri Zhangzhen Jinianguan, Ji Daozhuan, eds., *Qinhua Rijun de duqizhan* [Poison gas warfare by the invading Japanese troops] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1995). For an annual breakdown of alleged use, casualty figures, and geographical distribution, see pp. 69–73. For a Chinese study of a Japanese CBW unit stationed in southern China, see Sha Dongxun, *Jie kai “8604” zhi mi: Qin Hua Rijun zai Yue mimi jinxing xijunzhan dapuguang* [Demystifying Unit 8604] (Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 1995). Reports on victims of biological warfare include Qiu Mingxuan comp., *Zuizheng: Qin-Hua Rijun Quzhou xijunzhan jishi* [Criminal evidence: A truthful record of Japanese biological warfare in Quzhou] (Beijing: Sanxia chubanshe, 1999); Li Xiaofang comp., *Qixue kongsu: Qin-Hua Rijun xijunzhan tanju, biju shouhai xincunzhe shilu* [Blood-weeping accusations: Records of anthrax victims] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005). The latter is a bilingual publication.
 92. Bu Ping et al., *Ribeng qin-Hua zhanzheng shiqi de huaxuezhuan* [Japan’s chemical warfare during the invasion of China] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004).
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 94. Shusaku Endō, *The Sea and Poison: A Novel*, trans. Michael Gallagher (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1973).
 95. Timothy Lang Francis, “‘To Dispose of the Prisoners’: The Japanese Executions of American Aircrew at Fukuoka, Japan, during 1945,” *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. LXVI, No. 4 (Nov. 1997): 484–86. See also Thomas Easton, “A Quiet Honesty Records a World War II Atrocity,” *The Baltimore Sun* (May 28, 1995), A1.
 96. Zhongyang Dang’angan et al., *Xijunzhan yu duqizhan*, 747–817.
 97. See, for example, the diary of Ogawa Sekijirō, *Aru gun hōmukan no nikki* [Diary of a military legal affairs officer] (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 2000).
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- shobō, 1978); Kim Il-myon, *Tenno no guntai to Chōsenjin ianfu* [Emperor's army and Korean comfort women] (Tokyo: Sanichi shobō, 1976).
99. In English, see George Hicks, *Comfort Women: Japan's Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War* (New York: Norton, 1997); Keith Howard and Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, *True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women* (New York: Cassell, 1995); David Andrew Schmidt, *Ianfu—The Comfort Women of the Japanese Imperial Army of the Pacific War: Broken Silence* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000); Sangmie Choi Schellstede and Soon Mi Yu, *Comfort Women Speak: Testimony by Sex Slaves of the Japanese Military* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2001).
 100. Su Zhiliang, *Weianfu yanjiu* [A study of comfort women] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2001).
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 102. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Jugun ianfu shiryōshū* [Historical materials on the military comfort women] (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1992).
 103. Ajia Josei Kikin (AWF) comp., “*Ianfu*” *mondai kankei bunken mokuroku* [Bibliography of materials on the “comfort women” issue] (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997). It also published a collection of reports of investigation by commissioned historians into documents relating to “comfort women” in 1999. In addition, an updated version of the bibliography can be found online at <http://www.awf.or.jp/>. See also Ōnuma Yasuaki, ed., “*Ianfu*” *mondai to Ajia Josei Kikin* [The “comfort women” issue and the Asian Women's Fund] (Tokyo: Tōshindo, 1998).
 104. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, “Sensō no kioku, sensō no kiroku: ‘Jugun ianfu’ kankei kiroku no mondai o reitoshite,” (Memory of war, records of war) *Archives no kagaku* (1) (Tokyo, 2003): 276–96. A Japanese newspaper reported, however, that large quantities of Home Ministry materials were discovered in a building marked for demolition. *Mainichi shimbun* (Nov. 16, 1994). Some of these documents were included in AWF, *Seifu chōsa: “Jugun ianfu” mondai shiryō shūsei* [Compilation of government-collected documentary materials relating to wartime “comfort women”] (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1997–1998). According to Professor Nagai Kazu, these documents revealed that even Japan's local police were shocked by the operation to recruit “comfort women,” which was ordered by the military.
 105. Tetsuo Aso, *From Shanghai To Shanghai: The War Diary of an Imperial Japanese Army Medical Officer, 1937–1941*, trans. Hal Gold (Norwalk: EastBridge Books, 2004).
 106. Takasaki Sōji, “‘Hantō jōshi teishintai’ ni tsuite” [Concerning the “peninsula women's volunteer corps”] in “*Ianfu*” *mondai chōsa hōkoku* [Reports of investigation into documents relating to “comfort women,”] (1999): 41–60.

107. Hata Ikuhiko, *Ianfu to senjo no sei* [Comfort women and sex in the battlefield] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1999). A shorter essay of his has been translated into English and published as "The Flawed UN Report," *Japan Echo* (Autumn 1996), 66–73.
108. Eguchi Keiichi, comp., *Shiryō Nitchu sensōki ahen seisaku: Mōkyō seiken shiryō o chūshin ni* [Sources on the Sino-Japanese Opium War: Mainly sources from the Inner Mongolia regime] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1985).
109. John Jennings, *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895–1945* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997).
110. See Motohiro Kobayashi, "Drug Operations by Resident Japanese in Tianjin," in *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952*, eds. Timothy Brook and Bob Wakabayashi, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).
111. In English, see Jianmin Zhao, "The Looting of Books in Nanjing," in *Japanese War Crimes: The Search for Justice*, ed. Peter Li (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003). Zhao cited Matsumoto Tsuyoshi, *Ryakudatsu shita bunka* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993). Zhao's research has been vigorously criticized by Japanese historian Yuichi Kanemaru. See "Cultural Policies and Rule of Occupied China," paper presented at "Wartime China: Regional Regimes and Conditions, 1937–1945," June 2002, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/sino-japanese/session7.htm>.
112. Paul H. Kratoska, ed., *Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South-East Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
113. Kobayashi Hideo, *Nihon gunsei ka no Ajia: Daitōa kyoeiken to gunpyō* (Asia under Japanese military administration: The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and military scrip) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993); Nakamura Takafusa and Kobayashi Hideo, eds., *Senji kachū no bussai doin to gunpyō* [Material mobilization and military scrip in wartime central China] (Tokyo: Taga shuppan, 1994).
114. They claim that Emperor Hirohito not only systematically removed hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of gold, platinum, diamonds, art, religious artifacts, and other treasures from a dozen occupied countries during World War II, but also colluded with former U.S. President Herbert Hoover and Gen. Douglas MacArthur to deceive the world into thinking the war had bankrupted Japan in order to exonerate Tokyo from paying reparations, thus protecting American investments. Sterling Seagrave and Peggy Seagrave, *The Yamato Dynasty: The Secret History of Japan's Imperial Family* (New York: Broadway Books, 1999); and *Gold Warriors: America's Secret Recovery of Yamashita's Gold* (London: Verso, 2003). Two CD-ROMs containing 900 megabytes of documents and other evidence are available for purchase.
115. For example, Hayashi Hirofumi, *Okinawa sen to minshū* [The people and the battle of Okinawa] (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 2001).

116. Mayumi Yamamoto and William Bradley Horton, “‘Comfort Women’ in Indonesia: A Report on Dutch Archival Materials,” in *“Ianfu” mondai chōsa hōkoku* [Reports of investigation into documents relating to “comfort women,”] (1999): 107–41.
117. For a Japanese feminist view critical of positivist history that privileges official documents, see Chizuko Ueno, “Historian and Public Memory in Japan: The ‘Comfort Women’ Controversy,” trans. Jordan Sand, *History and Memory* 11, no. 2 (1999).
118. John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1985).
119. Yoichi Kibata, “Japanese Treatment of British POWs,” 147.
120. Yuki Tanaka, *Japan’s Comfort Women*.

Recently Declassified Records at the U.S. National Archives Relating to Japanese War Crimes

James Lide

IN MAY 2003, THE NAZI WAR CRIMES and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG) began a systematic survey of the approximately 100,000 pages declassified and released under the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act (JIGDA). In particular, the survey focused on identifying documents pertaining to the following issues:

- Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian internees, including any references to forced and slave labor
- Development and use of Japanese biological and chemical weapons during the war, particularly the work of Gen. Ishii Shirō and biological warfare experiments conducted by Unit 731
- The Japanese military's use of "comfort women" conscripted from occupied territories and forced to become prostitutes
- Allied policies regarding war crimes trials and, later, decisions to grant clemency to convicted Japanese war criminals

This chapter summarizes the findings of this survey, provides an overall assessment of the records released under JIGDA, and highlights some of the more important documents relating to the issues listed above.

Overview of Declassified Records

The records released by the IWG under JIGDA fall into two broad categories: those that were already in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and those still held by other government agencies. Although the vast majority of World War II-era files had long since been declassified and open to researchers, some

records that had been transferred to NARA in the past could not be publicly released under existing declassification regulations. These records, for the most part, contained information on U.S. intelligence-gathering methods or, in some cases, identified former agents and informants. Some files included documents from Allied governments that could not be released without the permission of the originating countries.

Some of the NARA collections initially reviewed under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act contained materials potentially relating to Japanese war crimes. For example, intelligence records from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) included many files from OSS stations in China and Southeast Asia. Likewise, some of the U.S. Army's Investigative Records Repository (IRR) files contained records on leading Japanese politicians and military figures, including several convicted war criminals.

During its review of NARA holdings, the IWG also identified a collection of Navy Judge Advocate General files dealing with war crimes investigations in the South Pacific. Though these records were actually released in 1997, they have not yet been widely used by researchers.

The second category of records released under JIGDA comprises records still held by government agencies. The largest group of these records consists of a series of FBI case files containing intelligence reports on Japan before and during the war, counterintelligence records relating to Japanese espionage, and postwar files on suspected American traitors and collaborators. Newly released U.S. Department of State materials include records dealing with postwar discussions between the United States and its former wartime allies regarding clemency proceedings for convicted Japanese war criminals. In addition, the new State Department records also contain a large volume of more recent materials concerning groups of former POWs, civilian internees, and "comfort women," and their efforts to claim compensation from the Japanese government in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, the National Security Agency released a collection of intelligence intercept files dating August–December 1945 to complement earlier intercept materials already transferred to NARA.

The records declassified under JIGDA include a range of materials covering many aspects of the Pacific conflict and postwar relations between the United States and Japan. In general, however, only a small portion of these records specifically pertains to Japanese war crimes. With the exception of a few files described in more detail below, most of the materials were not created in the context of any kind of war crimes investigation. Moreover, the majority of documents that do contain information on Japanese war crimes include only brief and often general references buried within longer reports. While the new documents certainly supplement the existing historical record, and in some cases provide additional details on events already known to historians, these records are not

likely to lead to any significant reinterpretations regarding the nature of Japanese war crimes.

Researchers should not assume that all documents released under the Disclosure Acts constitute new sources. Since reports were often shared among different government agencies, some of the records declassified under the acts may have already been available in existing collections at NARA or other repositories. For example, many of the declassified records from the State Department Special War Problems Division files consist of copies of OSS reports that have long been open to researchers working with the original OSS records. Likewise, some of the British intelligence records released by the IWG may have been available at the British National Archives. In other cases, while the declassified records themselves may now be available for the first time, the relevant information they contain may have been previously available in other sources.

Nonetheless, the materials released under JIGDA provide some new information relating to Japanese war crimes or, at the very least, will serve to draw more attention to documentation already available on these issues. In addition to scattered reports on individual Japanese atrocities, primarily in China, the newly declassified records will be most useful for additional details regarding Japanese treatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees. The released documents include interviews with former civilian internees and escaped POWs describing general conditions in various camps operated by the Japanese throughout its occupied territories. There are also some records relating to camps in Japan itself, though far fewer than those dealing with other parts of the Pacific Theatre.

The declassified records also include some new documents relating to Japanese biological and chemical warfare. For the most part, these consist of intelligence reports on suspected Japanese use of chemical and biological weapons in China. There are also several technical studies assessing Japanese chemical weapons captured by Allied forces toward the end of the war. However, only a handful of the new materials contains any details on the biological warfare experiments conducted by Gen. Ishii and Unit 731.

There is relatively little documentation in the newly released records regarding the various Japanese war crimes trials conducted at the end of the war. Though there are some individual records that generally describe Allied efforts to collect war crimes evidence, few of the new documents contain any significant details. However, newly released State Department records include several valuable documents that help illuminate postwar policies regarding clemency granted to convicted Japanese war criminals in the 1950s. In addition to records documenting discussions between Japan and the United States regarding procedural issues, the new State Department materials also include memos relating to conversations between the United States and its wartime allies.

The new IWG records will be least useful for researchers exploring the Japanese military's use of "comfort women" during the war. Other than a handful of documents that record individual accounts of Japanese troops kidnapping women and girls, none of the declassified materials contains any references to this issue. However, more recent State Department records released by the IWG contain a collection of news clippings and press summaries from the 1980s and 1990s, some of which discuss compensation claims pressed by groups representing former victims of Japanese enforced prostitution. Though these materials are not new records in the strictest sense, they provide some insight into how contemporary Japanese society has come to wrestle with the "comfort women" issue.

Survey Methodology

The survey of declassified IWG material aimed to provide a systematic and thorough review of all records likely to contain new information on Japanese war crimes. The specific methodology used to identify such records varied according to the nature of the document collection. In some cases, the total volume of records released in response to JIGDA was small enough that every document could be examined. Such collections included materials from the State Department, CIA, National Security Agency (NSA,) Air Force, Navy, and Office of the Pardon Attorney.

However, the process of reviewing other newly released records unavoidably involved using indices and guides to focus on the most potentially useful documents. This was especially true in surveying the huge number of recently declassified OSS records, which were not easily segregated into files dealing with Europe and those pertaining to the Pacific Theatre. Moreover, their volume (over 1 million pages) precluded any effort to examine every document. Investigating these documents proved to be especially challenging because the order of the records is not linked to subject matter or country. Accordingly, the only way to examine this collection is by using a rough index prepared by NARA that provides general information on subjects and geography. The survey targeted all documents listed under geographical headings such as Japan, China, Burma, Chinkiang, Chongqing, Korea, Indochina, Kunming, Malaysia, and other sites in the Far East. In addition, records listed under a variety of relevant subject headings were also examined. These included documents relating to chemical warfare, toxins and biological warfare, POWs, and war crimes.

This approach unavoidably entailed examining large numbers of documents unrelated to Japanese war crimes. Only a few documents listed as dealing with sites in the Far East include information on Japanese atrocities. Likewise, many of the records pertaining to POWs or war crimes deal solely with the European Theatre, while some of the chemical

and biological warfare records actually relate to U.S. programs. Nonetheless, this strategy offered the best hope for locating most documents from this collection that contained references to Japanese war crimes.

The survey followed a similar methodology whether dealing with whole record series that had been previously withheld in full or with sets of individual documents that had been withheld from previously open record series. In the second case, these declassified records have been refiled in their original folders found in a variety of OSS collections. Accordingly, the survey of the previously partially opened records also targeted all declassified records that originated from OSS stations based in China and other parts of southeast Asia, including Burma, Chinkiang, Chongqing, Hsian, Kandy, Kunming, Shanghai, and Singapore. In addition, the survey used indices prepared by NARA staff that provided general descriptions of the refiled documents and examined any records listed as pertaining to the Far East or war crimes issues. Again, this approach involved reviewing many nonrelevant documents with the aim of locating as much Japanese war crimes material as possible.

In two other cases, the survey used a combined sampling and targeted research approach to review the records. These cases were the collection of FBI case files transferred to NARA and the newly declassified name files from the Army's Investigative Records Repository. Both collections were too large to review in their entirety and are only partially indexed. The FBI case files, for example, are arranged according to an FBI filing scheme that organizes the records into broad categories (treason, foreign counterintelligence, etc.) and thereafter by individual name. Accordingly, the survey first targeted all files that seemed most likely to contain information on Japanese war crimes and then supplemented this research with a random sampling of the remaining files. Similarly, the newly declassified name files from the Army IRR are organized solely by individual name. In this case, the survey first searched for any new files on known Japanese war criminals and then examined a small group of newly released records in their entirety. This initial effort was followed by a random sampling of a much larger group of files containing information on unknown Japanese individuals to see how many of these contained war crimes information.

Guide to Specific Collections

Office of Strategic Services Records—RG 226

Because Gen. Douglas MacArthur actively sought to limit OSS operations in the Far East, OSS records released under the Disclosure Acts include material covering many different aspects of OSS operations in Asia during World War II, but mostly in areas outside of MacArthur's control. Much of the new material is very general in nature and

remained classified up to this point only because the documents include information on intelligence sources and methods. In particular, the U.S. intelligence agencies interviewed hundreds of professionals and missionaries who had visited or lived in China and Japan before the conflict. Their reports typically provide information on industrial facilities, brief accounts of political figures, or descriptions of local geography, and they lack direct information about Japanese war crimes. These reports remained classified not because they contained sensitive information but because the informants are identified by name. (Before their review under the Disclosure Acts, declassification reviewers had previously withheld whole documents rather than follow the onerous practice of redacting the names.) The newly declassified materials also contain many OSS cables and radio messages sent from OSS field stations in the Far East, but rarely do these documents provide information on war criminality.

Only a few such documents contain any information on Japanese war crimes other than occasional references to Japanese atrocities. For example, a 1944 OSS intelligence report on the Filipino guerrilla movement on Negros Island indicated that Japanese troops were routinely torturing and killing any guerrillas they captured and had begun to retaliate against the civilian population as well.¹ Similarly, a June 1945 OSS cable from Hsian noted that Japanese forces had begun shooting all civilians on the roads near Loning after Chinese guerrillas destroyed a bridge.² One newly declassified document includes information on atrocities that took place after the formal end of the war. An OSS situation report from Nanjing dated September 22, 1945, reported that elements of the Japanese 23rd and 27th Divisions had raped over a thousand women and killed several hundred civilians as they retreated through central China (see facing page).³ In most cases, the documents do not provide any further details beyond these general accounts, though a few identify individual victims.⁴

The newly released OSS records also include many copies of reports prepared by U.S. Allies during the war. Most of these are from British sources, although there are a few Dutch and French documents as well. Some of these records, which remained classified because they originated from foreign governments, also include information on individual Japanese atrocities. For example, an escaped Malaysian soldier interrogated by the British described the torture and murder of an elderly Dutch couple shortly after the Japanese occupation, while another British interrogation report recounts the execution of several hundred civilians in Malaysia in retaliation for the death of a Japanese officer.⁵ Similar documents include a British press release from November 1945 that describes the killing of several hundred civilians in the South Andaman Islands only a few days before the Japanese surrender.⁶

HEADQUARTERS
CHINESE COMBAT COMMAND
UNITED STATES FORCES
CHINA THEATER
Intelligence Section
Office of AC of S, G-2

LT. JCL-7

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Daily Intelligence
Summary No. 24
22 September 1945

1. JAPANESE ACTIVITY:

North China: Lt. Gen. SUMITA the Jap Army CG of SHANSI Province says that the date of the TAIYUAN surrender is not yet set. The Japs are interned in the four places General YEN named. The Japs will turn over all equipment to YEN. SUMITA claims there are 60,000 Jap troops and 20,000 Jap civilians in the vicinity of TAIYUAN. The Jap combat units in SHANSI province named by SUMITA are: 114th Division, including the 83rd and 84th Brigades under Lt. Gen. MIURA; the 3rd IIB under Major Gen. YAMADA; the 106th IIB under ITAZU; the 140th IIB under MOTOZUMI; and the 56th IIB under HARADA. Lt. Gen. SUMITA is the CG of the 1st Army Headquarters and his Chief of Staff is Major Gen. YAMAKAKA. The G-3 is Lt. Col. ITO, the G-4 is Lt. Col. MARITA and the G-2 is IWATA. SUMITA wants to move his men to the coast to safety from the Communists as, since the end of hostilities there have been 200 Jap casualties from the Reds. The railroad has been taken over by the Chinese but it is still Jap operated. (Irby, 21 Sept.).

A rumor says that on 20 August, Japs are selling horses and trucks and throwing ammunition into the river or giving it to guerrillas in TANGSHAN (118-11, 39-38) northeast of TIENTSIN. Some sort of disturbance is expected soon in FRIPING. Plain clothes Japs may aid the Reds. Chinese authorities are discussing the matter with the Japs, who still do not realize the extent of their defeat and talk of returning in 20 years. (OSS, 21 Sept, U/R). The Jap strength in TIENTSIN is officially announced at 20,000. Elements of the 118th Division still remain as garrison. (18 Sept, OSS, B-3).

Troops of the Jap 6th Independent Brigade with a crew from NANKING arrived at TATUNG (117-38, 30-52) and they destroyed large quantities of military supplies at ANKING (117-02, 30-31) and transported the remainder to NANKING. (OSS, 17 Sept, B-3).

General YEN HSI SHAN, CG Second War Area keeps one fully armed Jap Division at TAIYUAN and has agents watching the KUOMINTANG. The TAIYUAN surrender is moving slowly. The Japs are taking out confiscated food and supplied and have thoroughly destroyed radar equipment without interference. At YUTOU (112-44, 37-19) the Japs are selling arms to the Reds. (OSS, 21 Sept, C-3).


Central China: In the CHIAN area troops of the 23rd and 27th Jap Divisions raped over 1,000 women, killed 106 while resisting, and killed 330 civilians and wounded 100 in withdrawing from the area. (20 Sept, CHIAN Team-Red).

Occupation of AMOY still delayed due to no definite orders to move

New OSS Records Relating to Treatment of POWs and Civilian Internees


Beyond these scattered references to Japanese atrocities, the newly released OSS files include many records containing information on Japanese-run POW and civilian internee camps. One useful group of records consists of questionnaires filled out by former internees who were repatriated during the war in a series of exchanges between the United States and Japan. The questionnaires include questions on camp conditions.⁷ Another valuable document released by the IWG is a Netherlands Intelligence Service report on POW and civilian internee camps throughout the Dutch East Indies that includes descriptions of each camp along with a map showing their locations (see below).⁸ The new materials also include a general 1944 report on American POW camps in Formosa (Taiwan) based on visits by Swiss representatives of the Red Cross.⁹

Some new OSS documents contain references to brutal conditions at Japanese camps, although only a few provide any further details of specific atrocities or events. For example, a British interrogation report relates that six British POWs at a camp in Thailand were shot after their guards saw them clapping when British bombers attacked the railway line



they were helping to construct.¹⁰ A postwar OSS report on Jewish refugees in Shanghai includes information on eight internees who died in Japanese custody after they were arrested for helping escaped American POWs.¹¹ Likewise, another postwar report based on an interview with a former internee describes his torture at the hands of the Japanese police in Shanghai.¹² The new materials also include a longer list of incidents at various British and Australian POW camps based on postwar interviews with former Korean guards.¹³

Many of the new documents relating to Allied POWs held in Japanese occupied territories indicate that they were often put to work on road and railway construction projects, although most of the documents do not include any previously unknown details. However, there are a handful of records relating to POW forced labor in Japanese shipyards or factories. These include a November 1944 British interrogation summary indicating that three hundred British POWs were working at the Mitsubishi plant in Nagasaki. According to an interrogated Japanese soldier, the British POWs were being treated well and worked only five hours a day.¹⁴ A related document is a translation of



Report MI-1299, Netherlands Intelligence Service, 25 November 1944, POW and Internment Camps in the N.E.I., NA, RG 226, entry 154, box 97, folder 1838 (location: 190/8/32/4).

a 1943 Japanese news account reporting on comments made by Lt. Gen. Nemura, head of the Prisoner's Information Bureau in Japan. Nemura said that Allied POWs were helping to increase Japanese industrial production and claimed that all were well treated. He added that most Allied POWs could not match the efficiency of Japanese workmen, but described one unnamed site at a shipyard in Kyushu, where the employer had done such a good job providing leadership that the Allied POWs had almost reached the productivity of Japanese workers at the same facility (see facing page).¹⁵ Finally, a 1943 Dutch intelligence report based on information supplied by the East Indian Red Cross suggested that Dutch POWs held at camps in Japan and Formosa were poorly fed and forced to work in shipyards, docks, factories, and mines.¹⁶

New OSS Documents Relating to Japanese Chemical and Biological Warfare


For the most part, the recently released OSS documents dealing with Japanese chemical and biological warfare consist of technical studies and reports on various Japanese chemical weapons. One important group of files consists of a set of British reports that analyzed captured Japanese weapons left behind during the retreat from Burma in early 1945.¹⁷ The new documents also include more general studies, including a June 1944 report prepared by the U.S. Army Chemical Weapons Service (CWS) that discusses chemical weapons used by both Germany and Japan. The report describes two suspected poison gas facilities in Japan: the Aichi Tokei Denki Kabushiki Kaisha in Nagoya and a munitions and gas plant built at Ogaki on Honshu. It also refers to two suspected chemical weapons attacks against U.S. troops in the South Pacific.¹⁸ A similar document is a summary of enemy biological warfare programs prepared by the OSS Research and Development Branch in September 1945. The summary provides an overview of the German and Japanese biological warfare programs, noting that the Japanese efforts were probably the most developed. The document also refers to several incidents of reported use of biological weapons by the Japanese in China, although it suggests that the evidence of these attacks is inconclusive.¹⁹ Finally, the new records also include a May 1945 intelligence report based on a CWS mission to China to investigate Japanese biological and chemical activities. The document describes several reported incidents of biological and chemical attacks, although it noted that no Americans had personally seen any of these.²⁰

In addition to these more general reports and studies, the new OSS records include several documents that make individual references to Japanese chemical or biological weapons. These include:

- a 1941 account from an American official traveling in China stating that he had seen “10 authentic gas patients” during a visit to a hospital.²¹

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Japanese Tr. Series No. 35

TCA SHIMPS

"Enemy Prisoners helping to increase Production."

Statement by Lieut. General Nemuro after inspecting the camps.

TOKYO, 29th. JMMI. Lieut. General Nemuro, head of the Prisoners' Information Bureau, has since the winter been on a tour of inspection of camps in various parts of Japan Proper, Korea and Hokkaido (but not Formosa) to observe the living conditions and work of American, British and Dutch prisoners there. He returned to Tokyo on the 19th and on the 27th gave the following account of his impressions :-

All the American, British, and Dutch prisoners, with the exception of the officers, have got a job of work to do and are playing a part in the increase of production. Working conditions are on the whole good (lit. Kajime, "serious, sober"). Efficiency does not reach the standard of Japanese workmen on account of the chance in food and in environment etc., but for the most part attains about 75% of their efficiency. But whilst inspecting conditions of work, I had a keen appreciation of the fact that the development of efficiency depended on the guidance of the employer. In a certain shipbuilding yard in Kyushu, a substantial number of prisoners are working side by side with Japanese hands and are equalling the Japanese workmen in the discharge of their duties. The reason for this is that the prisoners' health and technical ability etc. were carefully examined and the men were then appointed in accordance with the principle of 'The right man in the right job'. They were given ample training and good leadership. The prisoners' living conditions are excellent and they are receiving proper treatment. I was pleased to see that they were taking their work seriously, out of gratitude, owing to the august virtue of the Emperor, for our just treatment.

May 30th, 1943.

Translated by K.A. Geary.

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- a translated December 1941 report from a Chinese medical team sent to investigate a plague outbreak in Chengde after a Japanese plane was seen dropping materials on the city. The document describes the team's investigation, which included efforts to assess other possible sources for the outbreak before concluding that the Japanese were probably the cause.²²
- a copy of a Chinese interrogation report of a Japanese POW that describes work done by the Japanese Bacteriological Warfare Section and provides information on its organization and operations in China.²³
- a December 1944 interrogation report of a Chinese soldier who claimed he had previously worked for the Japanese Department of Epidemic Defense and Water Supply at its branch in Kiukiang. The soldier reported that during the first period of the Chekiang-Kiangai battle, the Japanese used planes to spread typhoid, cholera, and dysentery in pools and streams along communication lines between Kiahwa and Lan-ch'i.²⁴
- a January 1945 interview with a Canadian Red Cross doctor based in China who reported that medical personnel had "almost conclusively" established that the Japanese had caused a spring 1943 plague outbreak in northern Kiangsi by dropping infected rice on the region by plane.²⁵
- a June 1945 report from the OSS Far East Division that mentions possible Japanese military plans to use chemical weapons to prevent Allied landings in China.²⁶
- a postwar interrogation of a Japanese soldier who reported that he had dumped poison gas into the sea before the arrival of Allied troops to destroy evidence of chemical weapons.²⁷
- several files describing Japanese work on atomic research. Under what was known as the Ramona Project, the OSS launched an investigation after the war to collect information about the Japanese program, especially regarding uranium mining in Manchuria. The investigation also examined efforts by the Chinese KMT government to develop its own atomic program using Japanese scientists.²⁸

New OSS Documents Relating to War Crimes Investigations

Only a few new OSS records pertain to war crimes investigations or trials. These include a series of cables and reports from OSS stations in China relating to the death of three American airmen killed by Japanese forces in Hankow. A U.S. war crimes investigator requested the arrest of the Japanese commanding officer, Gen. Okabe. However, Japanese Army officials requested that Okabe not be arrested until he had received

proper representation. Local U.S. Army officials accepted the Japanese request after contacting the Occupation Government headquarters in Japan.²⁹ Another postwar cable refers to a Japanese Army court-martial in China of Maj. Nakamura, who was accused of mistreating Allied POWs.³⁰

New OSS Documents Relating to “Comfort Women”

There is very little in the new OSS records relating to forced prostitution, with the exception of a few documents that report the kidnapping of women and girls. These include a translation of a 1943 Chinese newspaper describing the Japanese occupation in Singapore that reports Japanese forces had taken four hundred Chinese women.³¹ However, one newly released document, a postwar interrogation report of a Japanese officer in Indochina, contains a brief mention that Japanese soldiers may have threatened local women if they did not agree to become prostitutes for Japanese staff officers.³²

U.S. Department of State Records—RG 59

The volume of new State Department records released by the IWG is considerably smaller than the OSS files described above. These records include a set of files from the State Department Special War Problems Division relating to American POWs held in Thailand. The records provide information on POW camps and include many references to POWs being moved in the last months of the war. However, many of these new documents consist of OSS reports that are already available in the RG 226 records.³³

New State Department records also include a set of records from the State Department Legal Advisor Relating to War Crimes. These include a large collection of several hundred individual reports on mistreatment of American POWs that were filed with the UN Commission on War Crimes. These reports, dated between October 1945 and February 1946, in some cases identify individual Japanese soldiers accused of the crimes, and include lists of witnesses and other supporting evidence.³⁴ New records in these files also include lists of Japanese war criminals reported by the UN Commission on War Crimes, Far Eastern and Pacific Sub-commission. These documents are essentially identical to lists already available in these records. One list is especially intriguing in that it includes a reference to Ishii Shirō, identified as a colonel with the 18th Regiment, who is charged with using “deleterious and asphyxiating gases” at Changshen, China, in January 1941. From the brief description provided, it is not clear whether this Ishii is the same individual who directed the biological warfare experiments conducted by Unit 731.³⁵ These records contain another document that mentions Ishii. A State Department review of the Soviet press for June 1950 includes a summary of an article taken from the journal *Soviet State and Law* (No. 3, 1950) relating to the Khabarovsk war crimes trial. The article describes

Ishii's role in developing the Japanese biological warfare program, including the human experiments, and charges the United States with protecting Ishii as part of an effort to develop its own offensive biological warfare capability.³⁶

Finally, the Special Advisor Relating to War Crimes records also include several documents that discuss clemency for convicted Japanese war criminals in the 1950s. For the most part these consist of memoranda of conversation related to meetings between U.S. State Department officials and representatives from other members of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, or in some cases Japanese officials. One such document is a February 1950 memorandum summarizing talks with Australian diplomats on how to deal with a Soviet proposal that Emperor Hirohito and four leading generals be charged as Class C war criminals. Both the Americans and the Australians expressed a desire to let the war crimes issue drop, and the bulk of the discussion focused on how the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal could sidestep the Soviet proposal without examining whatever new evidence the Soviets might introduce.³⁷

Another related set of records is a series of memos summarizing conversations between Japanese and American officials during a visit by Japanese Prime Minister Kishi to Washington in June 1957. During his meeting with Eisenhower, Kishi noted that Australia had recently agreed to allow Japan to parole war criminals who had been imprisoned at Australia's request. This left the United States as the only country that still required Japan to keep war criminals incarcerated. U.S. officials expressed a desire to find a way to grant parole to the remaining war criminals, although they noted that this would have to be handled delicately to avoid arousing public indignation.³⁸ Additional documents from January and February 1958 describe conversations with British and Canadian diplomats over the best way to proceed with the idea of paroling the remaining Japanese war criminals. All countries agreed in principle, although the British wanted to make sure that the status of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal was not undermined.³⁹

Other new State Department records transferred to NARA also contain documents relating to the postwar clemency issue. These include an October 1957 memo on conversations between U.S. Embassy officials in Tokyo and the Japanese government in which the United States indicated that it would not accept a Japanese proposal that the Japanese National Offenders Prevention and Rehabilitation Committee (NOPAR) be given responsibility to review the cases of Class B and C war criminals. Instead, the United States proposed that the review board be made up of a representative from NOPAR, a representative from the Ministry of Justice, and the warden of Sugamo Prison.⁴⁰ In addition, these new records contain a September 1958 memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama relating to a Japanese request that paroled Class B and C war criminals have their parole

restrictions lifted. Dulles indicated that the United States would waive further parole requirements beginning in 1959.⁴¹

These new records also contain a handful of documents relating to discussions between Japan and China in the 1990s regarding disposal of Japanese chemical weapons left in China at the end of the war. The documents include some information on those chemical munitions.⁴² Estimates on the total number of chemical weapons munitions range from 700,000 (Japanese estimate) to 2 million (Chinese estimate), although the reports indicate that developing these estimates proved to be difficult. In 1991, China requested U.S. help in identifying Japanese chemical weapons dumps after Japanese negotiators reported they did not have access to such information because U.S. authorities had confiscated all related documentation during the military occupation.⁴³ However, a 1997 State Department memorandum of conversation suggests that the Japanese did manage to locate additional information after reviewing Imperial Army records in Japanese archives.⁴⁴

The vast majority of new State Department records transferred to NARA consists of correspondence, newspaper clippings, and press accounts relating to the increased public interest in Japanese war crimes issues during the 1980s and 1990s. The new documents contain information on all principal war crimes issues, including reports on the Japanese biological warfare experiments, treatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees, and “comfort women.” Correspondence from groups representing former POWs and civilian internees often describe their brutal treatment at the hands of the Japanese.

Army Intelligence Records—RG 319

The Investigative Records Repository collection contains a large volume of individual name files created by the Army Counterintelligence Corps after World War II. Although much of the IRR collection has long been declassified and available to researchers, two new groups of records from this series were declassified as part of the IWG effort. The first group consists of a batch of name files, most of which are European names, though there are also files on two Japanese Americans suspected of being Soviet agents.⁴⁵

The second group consists of files that either had not been formally declassified or had been declassified earlier but were used infrequently by researchers. Moreover, in some cases, portions of files may have been previously released but have now been supplemented by additional material. The majority of these records pertain to European individuals, though there are several files on known Japanese war criminals. The most important of these include Ishii Shirō, head of Japan’s biological warfare program, and Tsuji Masanobu, a Japanese Army officer who was accused of war crimes by the Chinese for his activities in Singapore during the Japanese occupation. Both these files include

some information on the suspected crimes of these individuals, though much of this material consists of copies of documents already available from other sources.

The IRR collection also contains several files pertaining to postwar activities of suspected Japanese war criminals, such as Kishi Nobusuke, a former official in the Japanese occupation government in Manchuria. Likewise, there are several files containing information on the activities of convicted war criminals like Shigemitsu Mamoru and Kaya Okinori, who took up political positions after their release from prison in the 1950s. While these files contain scant details on the crimes they were accused of, the records do shed light on the development of clemency policies toward former war criminals.

Other than such files, however, little of the newly released material from the IRR relates to Japanese war criminals. In fact, most of the Japanese individuals described in these records were suspected of being communist sympathizers or actual Soviet agents. In particular, there are numerous files containing investigations of former Japanese POWs captured by Soviet forces towards the end of the war who were repatriated to Japan in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

FBI Records—RG 65

The collection of newly released FBI case files covers a wide assortment of topics; however, very few of these records directly pertain to Japanese war crimes. There is only one file that deals specially with Japanese atrocities; primarily, it contains copies of general reports drawn from other sources, including press clippings.⁴⁶

One large group of files in the collection consists of general information on Japan collected by the FBI from other intelligence agencies. These records, which cover the period from the late 1930s through the early 1950s, include translations of foreign publications, copies of intelligence reports, and other materials gathered as part of the FBI's general counterintelligence efforts. For example, one large case file contains reports on leading Japanese individuals whom the FBI considered either potential intelligence assets or potential security threats.⁴⁷ Likewise, there are numerous files on suspected Japanese spies operating in the United States, Latin America, or Europe.⁴⁸ Other files contain more general records on Japanese security organizations such as the Tokkōtai (Special Higher Police) or the Tokumu-*kikan* (a political liaison agency that operated in many of the occupied areas).⁴⁹

A significant number of these FBI files relate to investigations of individuals suspected of collaborating with the Japanese during the war, particularly in the Philippines. Many of these investigations were launched by the FBI in response to accusations they received after the liberation of the Philippines. Such files often include nothing more than a short report summarizing the allegations. However, there are some much larger files relating

to Americans accused of treason for their wartime cooperation with the Japanese. These include individuals such as Tokyo Rose (Iva Ikuko Toguri d'Aquino), Wallace Ince, and Mark Lewis Streeter, all of whom made propaganda radio broadcasts. These records often include interviews with former POWs and civilian internees, which sometimes include general information about camp conditions and treatment by the Japanese.⁵⁰

Two of these treason investigation files include more detailed information relating to Japanese treatment of POWs. The first file pertains to the investigation of Tomoya Kawakita, a Japanese American who served as an interpreter and guard at a POW camp in Oeyama, Japan. Kawakita was accused and convicted of treating American POWs brutally, and the case files include many interviews with the POWs at the camp. Some of these interviews also describe working conditions at a nearby nickel smelting plant owned by the Mitsubishi Corporation that employed POWs from the neighboring camp (Kawakita also acted as foreman at the plant).⁵¹ The second treason investigation file covers John David Provoo, an American soldier captured in the Philippines who was accused of collaborating with the Japanese and being involved in the murder of another POW shot by a Japanese guard.⁵²

National Security Agency Records—RG 457

The NSA records transferred to NARA by the IWG include several different types of documents. The first includes paraphrases of intelligence intercepts covering the period from August to December 1945. Prepared by the NSA from the original documents, the paraphrases provide a general summary of the records but do not include any details on the source of the intercepts or other specific information. These records include several references to Japanese atrocities, including one October 1945 report about the killing of 700 Chinese soldiers on the islands of New Britain and Labuan.⁵³ There are also several records relating to atrocities committed against Swiss citizens, as well as one report describing the difficulties encountered by Swiss representatives in their efforts to inspect Allied POW camps in Japan during the war. The report notes that these representatives inspected only 36 of the 102 camps that were in Japan. Apparently, they were never informed about the others.⁵⁴

Another group of records contains copies of Japanese POW interrogations and translations of captured Japanese documents. Most of this material appears to be similar to records found in other collections, but some of the documents do contain information on Japanese atrocities. Such documents include translated portions of a diary from a Japanese soldier, which describes the beating of American airmen captured when their plane was shot down near the Kwajalein Atoll. There are also translations of Japanese judicial reports describing two cases of soldiers convicted of rape and looting in the Philippines.⁵⁵

The NSA records also include copies of messages intercepted from Japanese sources from August to December 1945. Many of these records come from Japanese diplomatic sources and deal with financial issues related to the operation of Japanese embassies and consulates in this period. Others summarize local press reports on Allied efforts to capture Japanese war criminals. There are also reports from Japanese military sources in China describing the effort to coordinate with American military teams that parachuted in to take over the administration of POW and civilian internee camps. Few of these reports include much detailed information. However, the collection does include one intercepted message from the Japanese Embassy in Switzerland relating to Swiss complaints about the execution of Dr. Fisher, the International Committee of the Red Cross representative in Binaniu who was killed by the Japanese in 1943.⁵⁶

Finally, these records also contain a large batch of index cards on Japanese war criminals, war crimes trials, and general war crimes issues. The cards provide a brief biographical or topical summary and include a source reference. For the most part, the source for these cards appears to be either press reports from the *New York Times* or the Foreign Broadcast Information Service or War Department correspondence.⁵⁷

Miscellaneous Collections

There are several other smaller collections of records released under JIGDA that have been transferred to NARA. These include approximately one thousand pages of Navy records, none of which relates specifically to Japanese war crimes. The Air Force also provided a small number of documents relating to manuals on evasion strategies for the crew of aircraft shot down over Japanese-occupied territory. CIA materials include a slim name file on Ishii Shirō and a small set of index cards from China listing Japanese war criminals.

In addition, the CIA has released a collection of name files relating to contacts between the CIA and postwar political and business leaders in Japan. In some cases, these involve individuals formerly accused or convicted of war crimes after the war, including both military officers and former members of the Japanese Imperial government. Key figures in these files include Arisue Seizo, Kawabe Torashirō, Hattori Takushirō, Kodama Yoshio, Tsuji Masanobu, and Kaya Okinori.⁵⁸ For the most part, the CIA name files include information about postwar contacts with these individuals, especially regarding CIA intelligence gathering activities in Japan and Asia after the war. While the files often mention the fact that these individuals were either accused or convicted of war crimes, the materials contain little additional detailed information about their wartime activities.

Finally, there are two small collections relating to postwar clemency policies. The first consists of a single file from the Office of the Pardon Attorney describing clemency proceedings for Japanese war criminals in the 1950s. The file includes a 1957 report

identifying convicted war criminals and their current parole status along with a summary of their crimes. In addition, there are several clemency hearing files from the Ford and Eisenhower presidential libraries relating to Tokyo Rose and Tomoya Kawakita.

Notes

1. Report 90920, 9 August 1944, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 1046 (location: 190/3/32/6).
2. Cable 32, Lion to Taper, 25 June 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 88, box 113, file 683 (location: 190/5/11/7).
3. Nanking Sitrep, 22 September 1945, no. 32, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 274, WN 10676, 22.9.45, p.1, last full paragraph (location: 190/64/26/6).
4. See, for example, Z.A. Report 215, 10 May 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 125, WN 4613 (location: 250/64/23/5). The report is based on the interview of the brother of an OSS operative in Burma who was killed by the Japanese.
5. Interrogation Report Y196, 15 March 1945, p. 6, and Interrogation Report Y194/2, 15 February 1945, pp. 3 and 5, NA, RG 226, entry 154, box 108, folder: POW INT EIF (location: 190/8/32/6).
6. Report ZM-5024, p. 3, 8 November 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 108, box 401, file ZM 5000 (location: 190/6/26/5).
7. There are many copies of these questionnaires in the new materials. See Report 51782, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 618 (location: 190/3/11/04); and WN 2492 and WN 2493, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 148 (location: 250/64/24/01). A general summary of interviews with civilian internees who returned on the *S.S. Gripsholm* can be found in NA, RG 226, entry 148, box 12, file: Gripsholm (location: 190/8/27/02). A similar British record is in Report 24081, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 213 (location: 190/3/15/06).
8. Report MI-1299, Netherlands Intelligence Service, 25 November 1944, POW and Internment Camps in the N.E.I., NA, RG 226, entry 154, box 97, folder 1838 (location: 190/8/32/4).
9. Report, 30 September 1944, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 481, WN 17128 (location: 250/64/31/1).
10. Interrogation Report Y320/1, 27 April 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 154, box 108, file: POW INT EIF (location: 190/8/32/6).
11. Report, 29 October 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 504 WN #18102.
12. Report from Hilaire du Berrier, 13 October 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 211, box 23, WN 24214 (location: 250/64/33/1).
13. MX 964, Southeast Asian Translation and Interrogation Center, Intelligence Bulletin 225, 4 January 1946, NA, RG 226, entry 108B, box 208, file: MX 960-979 (location: 190/7/3/2).
14. CSDIC (India) Report 204/3, 4 November 1944, p. 3, item 10, NA, RG 226, entry 154,

- box 88, file: CSDIC 204/1 Mitsubishi, Zospnsho Shipyards (location: 190/8/32/3).
15. Japanese Tr. Series 35, 30 May 1943, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 695, report 57702 (location: 190/3/25/5).
 16. Report, 9 December 1943, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 84, folder: Job 79-332A, f. 4, WN 2928 (location: 250/64/22/6).
 17. See C.I.D.R. 5, Enemy C.W. and Smoke Intelligence Summary 81, pp. 693–94, NA, RG 226, entry 145, box 15, folder 174 (location: 190/8/19/1).
 18. CWS Field Lab Memo 4-7-1, “Possible Chemical Warfare Agents and Gas Munitions of the Axis Powers,” 3 June 1944, pp. 16 & 91, NA, RG 226, entry 145, box 22, folder 257 (location: 190/8/19/2).
 19. Final Summary Report on BW, 27 September 1945, pp. A1-A2, NA, RG 226, entry 211, box 21, WN 24155 (location: 250/64/32/7).
 20. Report 130170, JICA report, 8 May 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 1499, folder 130170 (location: 190/4/7/1).
 21. Trip Report from Edgar Mowrer ca. autumn 1941, p. 29, n. 4, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 340, WN 13146 (location: 250/64/28/2).
 22. Report 18261, 12 December 1941, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 111, folder 18259-18287 (location: 190/3/13/5).
 23. Report YKB-695: Helliwell fr. Cox, 25 July 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 179, WN 7701, folder: Chihchiang (location: 250/64/24/6).
 24. Report Y-2167, 9 December 1944, NA, RG 226, entry 108, box 373, folder Y-2150 (location: 190/6/26/2).
 25. Report 115, 112, Det 202, Intelligence Note 1, 28 January 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 1313, folder 115 (location: 190/4/3/2).
 26. Far East Division Outpost Letter #63, 8 June 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 54, box 1, folder 1, (location: 190/5/5/20).
 27. WN 2098, Situation Report, 7 September 1945, p. 2, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 184, last item (location: 250/64/24/7).
 28. See, in particular, the Ramona files, NA, RG 226, entry 211, box 34, WN 20131 (location: 250/64/33/2). However, there are many other scattered documents relating to this issue, including: WN 010842, X-2 report, 24 June 1946, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 329, (location: 190/64/21/01) and WN 010844, Memo, 30 May 1946, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 329 (location: 190/64/21/01).
 29. Cable Seagull to Indiv, 27 October 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 154, folder 4, WN 6034 (location: 250/64/24/2).
 30. Cable Clark to Indiv, 6 November 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 154, folder 1, WN 5968 (location: 250/64/24/2).

31. Report 57663, Chinese Tr. Series No. 3, p. 3, translation of extracts from the Kukong Press, ca. Feb. 1943, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 694, folder 57659-57667 (location: 190/3/25/5).
32. MX 925, Interrogation Report of Capt. Konishi, Dec. 1945, p. 1, NA, RG 226, entry 108B, box 207, folder MX 920-39 (location: 190/7/3/2).
33. See, for example, OSS reports on Thai railroad traffic in NA, RG 59, lot file 58D7, box 89, folder: Americans in Thailand (location: 250/49/22/1).
34. See reports in NA, RG 59, lot file 61D33, entry 1369, boxes 6-7 (location: 250/49/25/03).
35. United Nations Commission on War Crimes, Far Eastern and Pacific Sub-commission, List No. 5 of War Criminals and Material Witnesses (Japanese), Jan. 1946, attached to Minutes of 12th Meeting, Far Eastern and Pacific Sub-commission of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, 25 January 1946, (Ishii is listed as Charge No. 522), NA, RG 59, lot file 61D33, entry 1369, box 12, folder: Far East Subcommission (location: 250/49/25/4). Note that a similar list that also contains this same information has been open to researchers in RG 59, entry 1370, box 17 (location: 250/49/25/4).
36. Review of Soviet Press, June 1950, pp. 10-14, NA, RG 59, entry 1370, box 23, folder: War crimes-Emperor (Japanese) (location: 250/49/25/5).
37. Memorandum of Conversation re: Soviet War Criminals Proposal, 8 February 1950, NA, RG 59, lot file 61D33, box 23, folder: War crimes-Emperor (Japanese) (location: 250/49/25/5).
38. See Memorandum of Conversation re: Kishi visit with the President, 20 June 1957, and Memorandum of Conversation re: Prime Minister Kishi, 19 June 1957, NA, RG 59, lot file 61D33, box 23, folder: Japanese War Criminals-Disposition 1954-1957 (location: 250/49/25/5).
39. See Letter from de la Mare to Parsons, 16 January 1958; SD Tokyo telegram no. 1896, 23 January 1958; and Memorandum of Conversation re: Canadian agreement to reduce sentence of 10 Class A war criminals, 27 February 1958; all in NA, RG 59, lot file 61D33, box 23, folder: Class A war criminals (location: 250/49/25/5).
40. Memorandum of Conversation re: Review Board for Class B and C War Prisoners, 14 October 1957, lot file 88D259, box 1, folder: Chron Memos of Conversation, State Department Records Released in Response to the IWG (location: 631/44/58/5).
41. Memorandum of Conversation re: meeting between Dulles and Fujiyama in Washington, 11 September 1958, document R40, p. 9, State Department Records Released in Response to the IWG, NA, RG 59, entry A1-5697, box 4, folder R (location: 250/C/31/3).
42. See, for example, Tokyo Embassy Message 1545, 28 June 1991, document J09, State Department Records Released to the IWG, NA, RG 59, entry A1-5697, box 3, folder J (location: 250/C/31/3).

43. State Department Message 289595, 2 September 1991, document J010, State Department Records Released in Response to the IWG, NA, RG 59, entry A1-5697, box 3, folder J (location: 250/C/31/3).
44. Memorandum of Conversation, ca. 1997, document Q9, pp 1–2, State Department Records Released in Response to the IWG, NA, RG 59, entry A1-5967, box 4, folder Q (location: 250/C/31/3). Note: the document says that a review of Imperial Army records indicates 70,000 chemical munitions were left in China; however, this is probably a misprint as other documents in the same file indicate that Japanese government officials were reporting 700,000 munitions. See Tokyo Embassy Message 006135, Jul. 1997, Doc Q2, *ibid*.
45. See files on Isami Tateishi in NA, RG 319, box 654 and file on Sydney Sako in NA, RG 319, box 655.
46. See NA, RG 59, FBI Records Released under the IWG, classification 100, box 80, file 100-75874 (location: 230/86/12/7).
47. See case file 64-175-234, FBI Records Released under the IWG, NA, RG 59, classification 64, boxes 31–35, folder 64-175-234 (location: 230/86/5/5).
48. See case files under classification 65 (Espionage) and classification 105 (Foreign Counterintelligence).
49. See case file 65-40048, FBI Records Released under the IWG, NA, RG 59, classification 65, box 235–37 (location: 230/86/10/4), and case file 105-9162, classification 105, box 185 (location: 230/86/17/2).
50. For Tokyo Rose, see case file 61-11000, classification 61, boxes 39–52; for Ince see case file 65-46128, classification 65, box 237-240; for Streeter see case file 61-11249, box 9-18, FBI Records Released under the IWG, NA, RG 59 (location: 230/86/3/3–4).
51. The Kawakita investigation records are in case file 61-11398, NA, RG 59, classification 61, box 33-38; on the nickel plant, see in particular FBI report by Sawtelle, 7 January 1947, box 33, folder 61-11398, Sec 1 (location: 230/86/3/7).
52. See case file 61-11342, NA, RG 59, classification 61, box 19-33 (location: 230/86/3/4-6).
53. Serial L-5300, 10/45, NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 1 (location: 190/C/80/03).
54. Serial H-211548, 10/45, NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 1 (location: 190/C/80/03).
55. See records in NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 2 (location: 190/C/80/03).
56. Memo from Bern to Tokyo, 29 September 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 2, (location: 190/C/80/03).
57. See records in NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 3 (location: 190/C/80/03).
58. See Japanese name files in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File.

Japanese War Crimes Records at the National Archives: Research Starting Points

Compiled by NARA staff

THIS CHAPTER PROVIDES STARTING POINTS for those interested in conducting research at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland, on Japanese war crimes in World War II. The chapter has three parts. First, we focus on records about Japanese mistreatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees. Next, we look at Japanese development and use of chemical and biological weapons. Lastly, we concentrate on atrocities committed by Imperial Japanese forces against Allied military personnel and civilians. In each section we offer a general description of the record groups that will prove most fruitful to researchers interested in the particular topic, and we end with a case study that highlights particular files within those record groups. Some of the records discussed in this chapter have been used extensively by researchers, and others have remained largely unexploited. This chapter is designed to provide researchers with an overview of certain record groups that contain information about Japanese war crimes and to offer examples of the kinds of topics that can be fruitfully explored using those record groups. We make no claim to comprehensiveness in each case study, and interpretation of the documents is minimal. Rather, we emphasize the nature of the records within each record group and the ways in which the information contained in the sometimes under-exploited records can be used.

Since this chapter deals only with those records created, collected, or retrieved by the U.S. government and now held by NARA, we do not discuss many areas of Japanese war criminality. For example, the Japanese military used sex slaves, or “comfort women,” during World War II, and while this important issue has received much attention in recent years, the U.S. government did not systematically collect or create records related

William H. Cunliffe, Senior Archivist at the National Archives, provided extensive assistance with this chapter. NARA student interns Sean Morris and Whitney Noland Zimmer conducted research and wrote portions of this chapter.

to the topic during or after the war. As a result, there are very few records about “comfort women” in NARA. This is also true for records related to the Rape of Nanking, the collective name for the widespread atrocities committed against Chinese civilians and POWs in and around Nanjing, China, after its fall to Japanese forces in mid-December 1937. Because the atrocities at Nanjing took place almost four years before U.S. involvement in the Asia-Pacific War, most of the contemporary documents at NARA are third-hand accounts from diplomatic, military, and naval attachés reporting from China, and records produced during the postwar Class A war crimes trial of the commanding general of Japanese forces deemed responsible for the Rape of Nanking.

Nevertheless, NARA holds millions of pages of records related to World War II. To find pertinent documents among these holdings, researchers must understand how NARA organizes federal records. World War II records are considered permanently valuable (in contrast to disposable records), and are organized into numbered record groups representing the primary offices of the government. Within a record group, the holdings are organized according to the lower offices and departments that created the files. The records are further divided into subordinate administrative units and chronological blocks of records. In general, NARA maintains its permanently valuable records in the manner they were kept by each agency. Most researchers must consult finding aids, created by NARA staff, to navigate the files of each record group.

Part 1: Records Regarding Mistreatment of Allied POWs and Civilian Internees

NARA holds a large number of records dealing with Japanese mistreatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees during World War II. At the end of the war in the Asia-Pacific Theater, U.S. forces engaged in a number of missions to liberate and safeguard POWs and civilian internees still in captivity. NARA also has extensive records of these missions scattered throughout many record groups.

General Records of the Department of State (RG 59)

Two U.S. Department of State series have the largest number of documents regarding American POWs and civilian internees held during World War II: the Special War Problems Division (SWPD), and the Central Decimal File.

SWPD Subject Files, 1939–54 contains many reports regarding the mistreatment of Americans in POW and civilian internment camps.¹ These reports are arranged by camp name and number, with Japanese camps followed by German camps. Documents are arranged chronologically within each camp file. The subject files also contain a list of Americans who were held captive in Japan and elsewhere in Japanese-controlled territory.

The nearly 3,000 names on the list are grouped into sixteen sections according to location or camp. Within each section the names are listed in approximate alphabetical order.

Another important set of SWPD documents is the *Inspection Reports on War Relocation Centers, 1942–46*.² Although these records deal mostly with civilian internment camps in the United States, they also contain information about Americans held by the Japanese in the Philippine Islands, including a list of names, correspondence, and descriptions of conditions and mistreatment in various POW and civilian internment camps in the Philippines.

The State Department Central Decimal File (which includes correspondence with U.S. diplomatic and consular offices in foreign countries, as well as correspondence with foreign diplomatic and consular offices in the United States) contains many documents related to the topic of Japanese-held American POWs and civilian internees. The collection is divided into seven periods: 1910–29, 1930–39, 1940–44, 1945–49, 1950–54, 1955–59, and 1960–63. Within each time frame, the records are arranged by decimal file numbers reflecting the subject of each document. Most documents pertaining to Americans held captive by the Japanese are filed under 1940–44 and 1945–49.³

Records of the Office of the Navy Judge Advocate General (RG 125)

During World War II, the Navy Judge Advocate General (Navy JAG) administered military justice and a legal assistance program, enforced court-martial sentences, initiated corrective legal actions, handled matters relating to international and admiralty law and claims against the Navy, and drafted departmental legislation. Navy JAG also investigated war crimes committed at sea and those for which the primary sources were naval as well as cases involving personnel or civilians under naval jurisdiction. The great majority of Navy JAG investigations dealt with war crimes committed in the Pacific Theater, and these files contain a large number of documents pertaining to the mistreatment of Japanese-held American POWs.

The main body of records produced by Navy JAG during its war crimes investigations is in the Records of the Navy War Crimes Branch collection, which has numerous entries with information on war crimes committed against Americans held captive by the Japanese. For example, *Case Files of Pacific Area War Crimes Trials, 1944–49* has many documents pertaining to the U.S. Navy trials of 123 Japanese military personnel tried on Guam and Kwajalein between 1945 and 1949, primarily for alleged mistreatment of POWs and the unlawful executions of captured Navy airmen.⁴ *Records Relating to Prisoners of War, 1944–49* also has a variety of documents on Allied military personnel and civilians held by the Japanese.⁵ Files include lists of liberated POWs and affidavits by U.S. Navy and Marine Corps POWs (searchable by last name) on living conditions in POW camps and the malicious treatment they received from prison guards and other officials.

Records of the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (RG 153)

During World War II, the Army Judge Advocate General (Army JAG) supervised the system of military justice throughout the Army, performed appellate review of court-martial records, and provided the Army with legal services. Additionally, Army JAG served as legal adviser to the Secretary of War and to all Army offices and agencies. Army JAG was also responsible for preparing war crimes cases against Axis leaders, and it represented the U.S. Army on the United Nations War Crimes Commission, formed in late 1943.

Numerous series within this record group, such as the *Records of the War Crimes Branch*, contain information gathered by Army JAG investigators about war crimes committed against American POWs and civilian internees by Japanese perpetrators. *Reports of Interviews with American Servicemen Who Were Prisoners of War, 1943–47* includes vivid descriptions of conditions in Japanese POW camps, as well as eyewitness accounts of atrocities.⁶ *Persons and Places Case File* contains information on suspected German and Japanese war criminals, as well as information on Axis-controlled POW camps.⁷ The files in this entry are arranged according to type of war crime or related war crimes. The documents in the files include correspondence, investigative reports, trial records, photographs, and published materials such as newspaper clippings and pamphlets.

Records of the Office of Strategic Services (RG 226)

President Roosevelt established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to conduct overt and covert intelligence activities in support of the war against the Axis powers, to analyze raw intelligence and disseminate finished intelligence to appropriate government agencies, and to engage in clandestine operations in support of planned military operations. The OSS also had responsibility for relief and rescue operations at various POW and civilian internment camps in German- and Japanese-controlled territories. For this reason, OSS records hold a wealth of information about American POWs and civilian internees held captive by Germany and Japan.

Numerous entries contain documents dealing specifically with the issue of war crimes committed against Americans by their Japanese captors. The entry *OSS Records of the Director* includes reports and correspondence that describe in great detail the Japanese mistreatment of American POWs and civilian internees, as well as atrocities committed against captured Allied soldiers by Japanese forces in the Asia-Pacific Theaters.⁸ *Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941–45* has thousands of intelligence reports on a wide range of matters, such as living conditions in POW and civilian internment camps in the Philippines and occupied China, and the forced labor of American POWs in mines on the Japanese main islands. It also

includes many reports on Japanese-held American POWs and civilian internees.⁹ *Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Formerly Security-Classified Intelligence Reports ("XL" Series), 1941–46* also includes a large number of reports pertaining to this topic.¹⁰ One report surveys Japanese POW and civilian internee camps, for example, and another explores Japanese violations of the laws of war, including the illegal treatment of captured airmen.

General Records of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Operational (RG 331)

General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was established in October 1945, as agreed to by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Republic of China, and Soviet Union, to carry out the terms of the Japanese surrender. SCAP produced a massive amount of records, which continue to be maintained roughly according to SCAP's original organizational structure.

Numerous entries within SCAP *Records of the Legal Section* contain general information about American POWs and civilian internees and specific information on abuses they suffered at the hands of their Japanese captors. *Records of the Administrative Division, Area Case Files* contains statements made by former POWs.¹¹ The *Records of the Investigation Division* entry has a large number of questionnaires completed by former Allied POWs who had been mistreated by their Japanese captors.¹² In addition, *Record of Trial File, 1945–49* has the case dockets of Japanese prisoner and civilian camp guards and other officials convicted of abusing Allied POWs and civilian internees.¹³

Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General (RG 389)

During World War II, the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) engaged in protective and law enforcement activities for the Army and maintained security in privately owned industrial facilities important to national defense. OPMG's Prisoner of War Division served as the central source of information regarding Axis and American POWs from all branches of the military as well as from the Coast Guard, the Merchant Marine, and American civilian internees. The Prisoner of War Division collected and organized information regarding captured individuals, making its records a good source for those conducting research on American military personnel and civilians held by Japan.

A good starting point in this record group is the *American POW Information Bureau Records Branch, General Subject File, 1942–46*, which constitutes the most significant collection of records about Americans held by Japan.¹⁴ Documents include lists of POWs and civilian internees and descriptions of conditions (often with photographs)

in camps in Europe and East Asia. Many of the files contain letters, notes, diagrams, maps, photographs, and forms produced by American POWs and civilian internees and by military personnel who liberated camps at the end of the war.

Records of The Adjutant-General's Office (RG 407)

During World War II, The Adjutant-General's Office (TAGO) provided administrative and support services to the War Department, maintained personnel records, developed data processing systems, and administered the non-unit reserve components of the U.S. Army. It also oversaw the army personnel statistical and accounting system, records management program, publications, postal services, historical activities, and special and heraldic services. TAGO's role as the primary record keeper for the War Department makes its records an excellent source for those conducting research on Japanese-held American POWs and civilian internees.

Several entries within this record group contain general information about American POWs and civilian internees, as well as specific details on war crimes committed against them. The entries *Records Maintained by the Communications Branch* and *Records of the Administrative Services Division* have the largest number of documents on the topic.¹⁵

TAGO records also encompass the very large *Philippine Archives Collection*. The Army's Recovered Personnel Division, which was responsible for the recovery, repatriation, and restitution of U.S. and Philippine military personnel and civilians interned by the Japanese during World War II, created the collection. Records include the experiences of Allied POWs and civilian internees in camps in the Philippine Islands, in Japan, and on the Asian mainland, as well as investigation reports, affidavits, trial transcripts, and other documents describing Japanese beating, torture, and executions of captives. Other records concern food, clothing, health, discipline, pay, and the routine administration of camp life. Particularly useful entries in this collection are:

- POW General Correspondence Files, 1941–45;
- Diaries and Historical Narratives, 1940–45;
- Sunken POW Transport Files, 1942, 1944–48;
- Records of Atrocities against POWs, 1942–45;
- POW Recovery Team Reports, 1944–45; and
- General Correspondence Files Pertaining to Civilian Internees, 1943–45.¹⁶

Case Study: American POWs in Mukden

In November 1942, nearly 1,100 American prisoners who had survived the Philippines campaign, the Bataan Death March, and imprisonment on Luzon and Formosa, arrived

in Camp Hoten, a POW facility located three miles northeast of Mukden (present-day Shenyang), Manchuria. Among the Americans held in Manchuria was Lt. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, commander of the American defense of Bataan and Corregidor. The Japanese sent Wainwright to a prison camp in Hsian (present-day Liaoyuan), 120 miles north of Mukden, where they held several dozen prominent British, Dutch, and Americans.¹⁷ U.S. officials knew virtually nothing about Camp Hoten or other Japanese POW camps; for several months, the U.S. government had little knowledge of the conditions in which its soldiers were held by the Japanese in Manchuria.

However, the State Department Special War Problems Division, which had been tasked in part with ensuring the humane treatment of U.S. POWs and civilian internees, attempted through diplomatic channels to learn more about American prisoners held throughout the Japanese Empire. For the prisoners at Camp Hoten, these efforts began to bear fruit in mid-1943. Neutral Swiss officials from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) pressed the Japanese on SWPD requests to collect intelligence on the health of Allied POWs held there. Acting as liaisons between Japan and the United States, the ICRC's personnel gained permission from the Japanese to learn more about the POWs and were eventually able to forward reports of the camp's conditions to SWPD.¹⁸ With their assistance, SWPD began to gain a sense of the conditions of POWs held in Manchuria.

The two key figures in ICRC efforts to assess conditions at the camp were Dr. Frederick Paravicini, an ICRC representative, and Max Pestalozzi, a well-connected businessman who worked in Yokohama. Paravicini received information about Mukden from the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau in July 1943. His information was forwarded to SWPD that month. Pestalozzi visited Camp Hoten in November 1943. SWPD received his report in December. In addition to allowing them to carry out a regular inspection, the Japanese government permitted Pestalozzi to interview two senior Allied officers held at Camp Hoten regarding conditions and the general treatment of the POWs held there. Their reports described the barracks arrangements, medical care, living conditions, work performed by the prisoners, and food situation at the camp. They were central to the U.S. government's understanding of the plight of U.S. POWs held at Hoten.¹⁹

By mid-1945, SWPD had gathered a great deal of information not only about Hoten, but also about other camps in the Asia-Pacific Theaters. Its files on Hoten include lists of POWs and civilian internees, specific allegations of abuse by Japanese camp administrators, and copies of official diplomatic protests lodged by the United States through Swiss intermediaries. Armed with information obtained from sources like Paravicini and Pestalozzi about the prisoners, the conditions they endured, and the

location of the camp, U.S. officials laid plans to reach the POWs in the last days of the war. On August 10, 1945, four days after the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan and two days after the Soviets commenced their invasion of Manchuria, the OSS informed its operatives in China about its plans to launch rescue missions to the scattered POW camps. The cables that the OSS dispatched to its field stations at this stage outline the planning and goals for several POW rescue missions, including the one to Mukden.²⁰

On August 16, 1945, just after President Harry Truman announced Japan's surrender, a team of five OSS operatives and their Chinese civilian interpreter flew from their headquarters in Hsian (present-day Xi'an), China, and parachuted into Mukden on a mission code named "Cardinal." Commanded by Maj. James T. Hennessy, their orders were to make contact with POWs in Camp Hoten and its subsidiary camps, provide emergency medical aid, and secure an operational airstrip for the delivery of supplies and the arrival of additional support personnel. In addition, anticipating that the Soviet Union would occupy Mukden after the initial invasion of Manchuria on August 9, OSS planners directed the Cardinal group to collect as many Japanese documents as they could, begin establishing a network of agents in Mukden, and make attempts to gather intelligence on Soviet activities there.²¹

The Cardinal team arrived in Mukden at 10:45 A.M., and, after some difficulties, contacted the prisoners at Camp Hoten. On August 19, two members of the Cardinal mission traveled to Hsian to liberate Wainwright from his prison camp. Meanwhile, the Cardinal team in Mukden provided the former prisoners with what aid they could and attempted to gather intelligence in a city filled with Soviet soldiers, newly liberated Chinese civilians, and recently interned Japanese POWs. Though they successfully cared for the liberated POWs, the intelligence they gathered on local conditions and the Soviet Army was only rudimentary. In late August, the entire team began evacuating the former American prisoners, including the American general, who departed on the 27th.²²

Two weeks after the OSS team's arrival, U.S. Army Prisoner of War Recovery Team #1, made up of nineteen men led by Lt. Col. James Donovan, arrived at the Mukden POW camp to continue processing and evacuating the former prisoners. Donovan's sole task was to prepare the POWs for evacuation; his team did not receive specific orders to gather intelligence. His team's work generated a great deal of useful documentation, including POW identification forms and reports of potential criminal activities perpetrated by the Japanese during the war, all of which is available at NARA.²³ In addition, Donovan's account of the operation itself is also available at the National Archives. Wide ranging in scope, the forty-one page report covers the activities of the Cardinal group (including the mission to Hsian to liberate Wainwright), his own recovery team's efforts, and a



POW cemetery at Hoten. NA, RG 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Field Station Files, Shanghai, entry 168, box 90.

number of general observations about the political and military situation in the city of Mukden. In addition, the cable correspondence in these records between Donovan's team to various administrative groups, the lists of prisoners liberated at Mukden, and the detailed information on the evacuation of POWs are particularly valuable for research on this subject. The file also contains operational directives issued by headquarters and recommendations for awards for individual members of the program. By the middle of September, the Cardinal mission and Donovan's POW Recovery Team managed to evacuate all of the Americans held in and around Mukden.²⁴ Taken as a whole, the documentation generated by Donovan's POW Recovery Team offers unparalleled insight into the liberation of the U.S. POWs in Manchuria, the conditions endured by prisoners of the Japanese, and the state of relations between U.S. and Soviet soldiers on the ground in Mukden. It is essential yet underexploited material for any investigation of this topic.

In the course of carrying out his work, Donovan suggested to his superiors that a narrative history of Camp Hoten be written. Accordingly, Captain William Thompson, a former prisoner in Mukden, agreed to write this history. Thompson's narrative made it into Donovan's report to the War Department, and in February 1946, Thompson obtained permission from the War Department to publish the work separately.²⁵ Thompson based his ninety-four-page narrative, "History of the Mukden Group," on notes that he surreptitiously kept in his diary during his incarceration. An extraordinary source, it offers an account of daily life in the camp and the conditions that prisoners had to endure while there. Thompson's sharply detailed work describes the prisoners' initial passage from the Philippines to Mukden, the military and social structure that developed within the prisoner community, the behavior of camp officials toward their inmates, and the camp's liberation at the hands of the American POW teams. It is important to note, however, that Thompson's status as a commissioned officer meant that he was segregated from the enlisted men and received marginally better treatment from the Japanese.²⁶

Other documents drawn from the Hoten prisoners' experiences are also available. After their liberation, former POWs at the camp completed questionnaires that documented the atrocities they suffered or witnessed. Though not all POWs held at Camp Hoten were aware of the atrocities committed against other captives, some were eyewitnesses to the executions of comrades, and the majority claimed to have either experienced or observed beatings by Japanese guards. Many testimonies and affidavits, collected in part by Donovan's recovery team, describe the behavior of Lt. Miki Toru and Corporal—later Sergeant—Noda Eiichi, two of the most infamous of Camp Hoten officials. The testimonies of American POWs led to the prosecution of Miki in 1946

and Noda in 1947. Both Miki's and Noda's trial records are also available in the SCAP records (RG 331).²⁷

Because of his background, Noda's case is particularly interesting. A second-generation Japanese American, Noda was one of the most notorious abusers of Allied POWs at Camp Hoten.²⁸ Affidavits and transcripts of U.S. POW testimonies can be found in his prosecution file.²⁹ Based on evidence gathered from former U.S. POWs, he was tried as a Japanese war criminal in Yokohama, Japan, in September 1947. Citing his participation in the unlawful killing of at least four men and the beating of countless others, prosecutors charged Noda with violating the laws and customs of war. The court found Noda guilty on all ten counts of abusing prisoners, though not of participating in certain activities that led to the death of four of them. It sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment.³⁰ One of the more interesting documents in Noda's legal file is a clemency petition that is supported by remarks from an American POW whom Noda befriended in Hoten.³¹

Part 2: Records Regarding Japanese Chemical and Biological Warfare

While the quantity of records held at NARA pertaining to Japanese development and use of chemical and biological weapons during World War II is not nearly as voluminous as those pertaining to Japanese mistreatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees, there are documents on this topic scattered throughout various modern military record groups.

Records of the Office of the Army Surgeon General (RG 112)

The Office of the Army Surgeon General provides advice and assistance on medical matters to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff. Likewise, it exercises general oversight and control of all aspects of Army health services. In addition to its normal duties, during World War II the Office of the Army Surgeon General monitored intelligence about German and Japanese biological weapons research. Record group 112 is a good starting point for researchers interested in exploring Japanese wartime use and development of chemical and biological weapons.

The records produced by the Army Surgeon General's Preventive Medicine Division contain information on Japanese use of and research on biological weapons. In particular, *Biological Warfare Specialized Files, 1941–47* includes items such as translations of Japanese-language documents concerning biological warfare measures taken by Imperial Japanese Army forces in northern China and Manchuria, interrogation reports of Japanese medical officers involved in chemical and biological warfare, and reports discussing suspected Japanese use of biological weapons in China.³²

Records of the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (RG 153)

The records of the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (Army JAG) have a limited number of documents pertaining to Japanese biological warfare. *General Records, 1944–49* includes Soviet requests to interrogate certain Japanese biological warfare specialists during the early postwar period.³³ Other folders include State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) memos discussing the rationale behind the decision not to pursue war crimes prosecution of Japanese scientists (including the head of Unit 731, Lt. Gen. Ishii Shirō) who conducted biological warfare experiments at secret laboratories in Manchuria during the late 1930s and early 1940s using human and animal subjects. The entry also contains several interrogations of former Unit 731 members.

Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165)

During World War II, the War Department General and Special Staffs prepared plans for national defense and wartime mobilization; investigated and reported on Army efficiency and preparedness; provided advice to the Secretary of War, the War Department, and the officer corps of the Army; and exercised general supervision over the Army. Entries within this record group contain documents about Japanese biological weapons use and research. For example, *New Developments Division, Security-Classified Correspondence File of Dr. G. W. Merck, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, 1942–46* has reports that evaluate the intentions and capabilities of the Japanese biological warfare program and explore how U.S. researchers could use the findings.³⁴ The reports include maps of Japanese biological warfare research facilities, interviews with Japanese biological weapon researchers, and diagrams of Japanese bacterial bombs. Documents in the *Security-Classified Office File of Gen. W. A. Borden, Director of New Developments Division* include U.S. Army intelligence reports evaluating Japan's biological warfare intentions and capabilities as well as extracts and summaries of captured Japanese documents related to biological warfare.³⁵ Likewise, *Civil Affairs Division, Security-Classified Papers of the Army Member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), 1942–June 1949* has numerous documents pertaining to the investigation of Unit 731 and the U.S. decision not to prosecute Ishii and other members of the now notorious biological warfare unit.³⁶

Records of the Chemical Warfare Service (RG 175)

This record group has papers documenting U.S. Army development and testing of offensive weapons and information on enemy development and use of chemical and biological weapons. The records contain a few documents pertaining to Japanese biological weapons use and research, including a report by U.S. biological weapon researchers based

upon early postwar interviews conducted with Japanese scientists (including Ishii) who recount experiments on humans in great detail.³⁷

Records of the Office of Strategic Services (RG 226)

OSS records include intelligence reports dealing with Japanese biological weapons use and research (particularly in China and Manchuria). A few are found in various entries in the Field Station Files, the Research and Analysis Branch Chief Files, and the OSS Classified Sources and Methods File.

Records of the Army Staff (RG 319)

The Records of the Army Staff contain some documents pertaining to Japanese biological weapons research and use, such as the files of four Japanese researchers who engaged in biological warfare experimentation: Ishii Shirō, Kamei Kanichiro, Masuda Shigeharu, and Kikuchi Norimitsu.³⁸ Several folders have reports on Japanese biological warfare activities (drawn mainly from interrogations of Ishii), descriptions of Japanese biological and chemical weapons, defensive measures, and reports of Japanese balloon bombs used to attack the United States.³⁹ Likewise, the *Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Intelligence Administrative Division, Intelligence Document File* contains several files on Japanese biological and chemical weapons and research, including reports of interrogations of Japanese medical officers engaged in biological weapons research.⁴⁰

General Records of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (RG 331)

SCAP files have a limited amount of information on Japanese biological warfare. Specifically, records produced by the SCAP Legal Section during the course of its early postwar investigations of suspected Japanese war criminals include a number of interrogations and investigation reports (dated during 1946 and 1947) that pertain to Japanese biological weapons researchers.⁴¹ A number of documents regarding the Soviet Union's requests to arrest and interrogate Japanese biological warfare experts in U.S. custody can also be found in this record group.⁴²

Case Study: The Hunt for Knowledge about Japanese Biological Warfare Programs

From Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1932 until its surrender in 1945, Japanese scientists conducted chemical and biological warfare experiments on animals and humans. Working at isolated, ultra-secret military bases in the region, they received a great deal of high-level support from the Imperial government. Under the yoke of a

powerful occupation authority, Manchuria offered Japanese researchers isolation from prying eyes as well as an abundance of subjects on which to experiment.

Spearheading this work was Lt. Gen. Ishii Shirō, the head of the notorious Unit 731, who held both medical and Ph.D. degrees from the prestigious Kyoto Imperial University. Ishii conducted experiments on humans with plague bacteria, cholera, glanders, and other pathogens, first at the Zhong Ma camp in Harbin, then at Pingfan, the large biological warfare research and development facility south of Harbin. Japanese scientists vivisected the infected bodies of their victims to record the day-by-day progress of pathogens through the system. In the final weeks of the war, to conceal the evidence of his and other units' atrocities, Ishii ordered the demolition of the experiment facilities and the killing of experiment subjects.⁴³

There is no question that Japanese scientists conducted experiments on Chinese, Mongolian, and Russian prisoners at Pingfan. In the years after the war, many others have claimed that American POWs were the victims of biological warfare experimentation, as well. For example, in December 1945, Japanese communists alleged that Ishii conducted medical experiments on Chinese and American POWs from Mukden. These allegations are some of the earliest intimations that U.S. soldiers may have been subjected to such experiments.⁴⁴ More recently, former American POWs themselves have claimed that they too were the victims of human biological and chemical warfare experimentation at the hands of their Japanese captors. In her important research on the abuse of U.S. POWs in Asia and the failure of Japanese officials to properly care for prisoners, Linda Goetz Holmes has called attention to this issue.⁴⁵ While the topic has justifiably received more interest because of her work, no documentary evidence of experimentation on American POWs has been found to date in the collections at NARA.

Nevertheless, the National Archives does contain a great deal of material on the Japanese biological warfare and chemical warfare research.⁴⁶ These documents also trace the evolution of official U.S. knowledge of the program during and after the war. In the early years of the war, the United States, not surprisingly, knew very little. The State Department and the fledgling OSS had virtually no information about Japanese developments in biological and chemical warfare. In 1941, one of the few pieces of evidence about Japanese chemical warfare was an account by an American reporter who claimed to have seen at least ten gas victims in a military hospital in Chongqing. The reporter suspected that the Japanese were responsible, but neither he nor the OSS could confirm it.⁴⁷ This report is one of the only intelligence leads that the OSS had early in the war.

As the war progressed, the Army Surgeon General received a variety of intelligence reports from a number of different organizations about foreign biological and chemical

warfare developments. It found much of the information about Axis capabilities difficult to confirm. The utter secrecy of Japan's biological and chemical warfare programs, combined with the remoteness of Pingfan and the difficulty of establishing an intelligence network in the far-flung location, limited the information coming out of Manchuria and made the little intelligence that did emerge suspect. Useful intelligence only began to appear in the middle stages of the war.

In January 1943, U.S. intelligence officials gathered the information they held on enemy biological and chemical warfare development into one concise report. The Army Surgeon General received a copy of this summary, which contains information on Japanese tactics and strategy, military hardware, and the state of technical and scientific development. The summary reports an outbreak of bubonic plague in China that likely had its origins in a Japanese biological attack. Notably absent, however, is any report on the development of biological weapons in Manchuria or elsewhere. At the time, U.S. intelligence still had virtually no information about the Pingfan facility or Unit 731. Nevertheless, the report remains a telling indication of the state of Allied information on Japanese biological and chemical warfare in early 1943.⁴⁸

U.S. intelligence began amassing concrete evidence of Japanese biological warfare activity in 1944. In March of that year, Chinese guerrillas captured a Japanese scientist involved in Ishii's biological warfare project. The scientist's interrogation revealed evidence of a peacetime and wartime research program to develop typhoid, cholera, and dysentery bacilli under the cover of the so-called Anti-Epidemic and Water Supply Section of the Japanese Army in Kiukiang. OSS officials also learned more about biological warfare activities in Nanjing, where Japanese scientists were also working to produce bacteriological weapons. The file containing this report includes the names of Japanese scientists involved in the work as well as the location of major biological warfare research and experimental facilities.⁴⁹

General MacArthur's staff also obtained intelligence about Japanese biological and chemical warfare activities. A July 1944 Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) research report confirmed the use of bacteriological warfare by the Japanese in China and Manchuria. The report includes extracts and summaries of captured documents that detail Japanese progress in bacteriological warfare, confirming that the Japanese had developed a so-called "bacillus bomb." Another ATIS report details activity at the Tagajo Arsenal since its origin in October 1944 and describes the materials required to manufacture incendiary products and other components needed to build a chemical bomb.⁵⁰

In August 1944, U.S. intelligence began receiving even more specific information about the development of the bacillus bomb at Pingfan. The information remained

unclear until October, when intelligence officials were able to confirm it through an interrogation of a Japanese POW. However, the United States did not form a clearer picture of the workings of Pingfan until March 1945, when interrogations of two Japanese medical officers uncovered a wealth of information indicating that, among other things, Ishii was in charge of the bacteriological laboratory in Harbin and that the “nature and types of experiments being carried on [there were] extremely secret ...” Interrogations of other Japanese medical officers led U.S. intelligence officials to conclude that the Japanese biological and chemical warfare program centered in Harbin was quite advanced.⁵¹ Persistent U.S. intelligence efforts had begun to pay dividends.

U.S. attempts to determine Japanese biological warfare capabilities and intentions reached a fever pitch in the last year of the war as officials became increasingly concerned that Japanese troops might employ chemical and biological weapons as a last resort. A 1944 War Department summary report warned that Japan was capable of easily mass-producing these weapons. The same file containing this summary report also holds translations of letters and witness statements given by Chinese and Westerners who confirmed the presence of bubonic plague in China and alleged Japanese involvement in its spread, which only strengthened official suspicion of Japanese willingness to employ biological warfare.⁵² In 1945, U.S. experts systematically examined the use of bubonic plague by the Japanese in China. They focused on an outbreak that occurred in 1941. In November of that year, a Japanese plane allegedly dropped rice grains, wheat, paper, and other particles embedded with bubonic plague bacilli over Chengde, in China’s Hunan province. Shortly afterwards, an outbreak of plague swept over the province. Chinese studies were inconclusive, but the epidemic raised a great deal of suspicion among residents and local medical workers. The 1945 U.S. Army study “Report on the Plague in Changteh, Hunan” describes the circumstances leading to the suspicion of plague and other information gathered from several investigations. It also contains copies of several communiqués and other messages describing the plague outbreak. Moreover, British officials offered a study of Japanese biological warfare intentions. Their May 1945 report covers allegations of the use of biological warfare by both Allied and Japanese forces, including the incident at Chengde.⁵³

The Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the War Department General Staff also took part in the hunt for knowledge of Japanese biological and chemical warfare activities. In July 1945, it published “Japanese Biological Warfare,” a report distributed to several U.S. agencies, including the OSS. Compiled from ATIS reports, War Department intelligence reports, and other U.S. publications, it indicates that Hsinking and Harbin were centers of biological warfare research in China and notes that Ishii was in charge of the program at Harbin. However, details about the program remained vague. The

report concludes that the Japanese would use biological and chemical warfare if their military leadership deemed it appropriate, and, in an acknowledgement of the Chengde incident, noted that the Japanese had indeed already deployed plague bacteria in China at least once.⁵⁴

With Japan's impending surrender, Ishii's men disposed of much of the evidence of biological warfare experimentation and destroyed the Pingfan facility in early August 1945. By that time, thousands of men, women, and children had died in experiments at Pingfan and elsewhere. In the immediate postwar years, Allied officials made extensive efforts to uncover and exploit the information gleaned from their work.

After the war ended, Ishii went into hiding. He planted a story in a local newspaper that he had been shot to death, and enlisted his friends to stage his funeral. U.S. intelligence authorities finally located him in January 1946, and interrogated him and other members of Unit 731 many times over the next year in an effort to gather information on Japanese biological and chemical warfare.⁵⁵

The first detailed postwar study of the Japanese biological warfare program, completed on November 1, 1945, by Lt. Col. Murray Sanders, notes that the Japanese Army embarked upon large-scale biological warfare experimentation in the early 1930s under Ishii's direction. Sanders also wrote that the Japanese feared that the Soviet Union, after having allegedly used biological warfare against the Japanese in Manchuria in 1935, would use it again if the two countries went to war. He based his report solely on interviews with Japanese participants and laboratory examinations, not on any documentary evidence, which purportedly was destroyed during the war. In so doing, he hewed closely to the official Japanese position and played into the hands of those who wished to protect the Emperor by asserting that Hirohito had no knowledge of the research. His report also contains a history of Japanese biological warfare efforts, the types of experiments carried out—with no mention of human experimentation—and the varieties of weapons the Japanese developed.⁵⁶

Sanders' initial investigation did not reflect the realities of the state of the Japanese biological warfare program. At the end of December 1945, Army officials at Fort Detrick, Maryland, ordered Lt. Col. Arvo Thompson to follow up on Sanders' flawed findings. Thompson conducted his investigation from January to March 1946. His report is drawn mainly from interviews with Ishii himself. Ishii proved evasive and sometimes uncooperative in his interviews, but he did provide Thompson with enough information to sketch out Ishii's personal biography, a history of the Pingfan facility, its organization, and most importantly, a lengthy summary of its work. With the completion of Thompson's report, U.S. officials were finally able to begin to arrive at a better assessment of the scope of Japanese biological warfare research.⁵⁷

Intelligence on chemical warfare also began to flow in after the close of hostilities. “Intelligence Report on Japanese Chemical Warfare,” compiled and disseminated by the Chief Chemical Officer in U.S. Army Forces Pacific, highlights Japanese research and production of chemical weapons and the training of troops in the use of chemical warfare. The report is based on interviews with participants in Japan’s chemical warfare development program, many of whom were not readily willing to divulge their knowledge, for fear of prosecution.⁵⁸

While Murray Sanders was submitting his report and Arvo Thompson was preparing to scrutinize the Japanese biological warfare program, Army intelligence officials in Japan were conducting their own investigation of Ishii. In December 1945, the Counter-Intelligence Services received a letter from tipster Imaji Setsu, who claimed that Ishii and his colleagues had experimented upon humans in the course of their work. According to Imaji, among the human subjects were Manchurian criminals, farmers, members of the Chinese Communist Army, a Russian interpreter, and women and children. Another document anonymously sent to SCAP headquarters contained information about Ishii’s activities and expressed the sender’s desire to participate in a clandestine investigation of Ishii. These and other letters made their way into the hands of the Investigative Division of SCAP’s Legal Section. The Investigative Division compiled them with eyewitness interviews about Ishii’s atrocities, and the Legal Section developed numerous leads on Japanese biological warfare experimentation during the war. The spotty and incomplete wartime intelligence was beginning to coalesce into more meaningful information for both scientific and legal investigators.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, U.S. prosecutors’ efforts to punish Ishii would fail, while military efforts to glean information from him would prove to be more successful.

In accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, in January 1946, SCAP organized the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal to bring to justice to major Japanese civilian and military leaders who had initiated and participated in a war of aggression and committed crimes against peace and humanity. Trials of lesser war criminals in Japan, China, Australia, the Soviet Union, and other locations involved over two thousand additional legal proceedings against several thousand Japanese nationals and their collaborators. Conspicuously absent from the ranks of individuals tried in hundreds of international war crimes cases in the Asia-Pacific Theaters were the former scientists involved in Unit 731, including Ishii.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, over the course of 1946 and into 1947, as trials of other Japanese multiplied throughout the Far East, Ishii’s fear of prosecution for war criminal activities likely increased. Occupation authorities interrogated several former members of Unit 731 and compiled increasingly damning allegations against him. By the end of 1947,

war crimes investigating authorities had amassed a considerable amount of evidence suggesting that, with Ishii's consent, a number of Japanese scientists had conducted biological warfare experiments on humans.⁶¹ U.S. investigators had numerous interrogation reports from Japanese scientists who worked under Ishii in Manchuria, who alternately confirmed and denied Unit 731's use of humans for experimentation. For example, according to a confidential informant of the Army Counterintelligence Corps, Ishii injected residents of Canton (present-day Guangzhou), China, with bubonic plague bacilli, causing a devastating plague. An informant named Nishimura provided more incriminating information by detailing Ishii's human experiments with glanders bacteria. However, other witnesses denied any knowledge of Unit 731 and its activities.⁶²

Japanese scientists proved to be cagey and evasive with American interrogators, even while Ishii tacitly confirmed the use of human subjects in experiments. Over the course of the interviews, Ishii hinted that he would be willing to provide more information if he were granted immunity from war crimes prosecution. Few dissenters in the U.S. government emerged, though some agencies, such as the State Department, sought to limit the commitment that the United States would make to a criminal as notorious as Ishii. For the most part, however, U.S. military and intelligence officials were receptive to a deal with Ishii in which the general would avoid prosecution in return for information about his work.⁶³

In early 1947, the Soviet Union began to gather its own evidence on the results of Japanese biological and chemical warfare research. This was a project that gave rise to considerable consternation in U.S. military and foreign policy circles. The concern was that Japanese scientists would reveal too much to the Soviets about their work and compromise the advantageous strategic position held by the United States concerning biological warfare. They also feared that a furor might develop over the appearance that U.S. officials were actively exploiting Japanese expertise in exchange for the Japanese scientists' immunity from prosecution. SCAP, the War Department Civil Affairs Division, SWNCC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department all attempted, to one degree or another, to shield Ishii and his colleagues from prosecution in order to keep the Japanese biological warfare program from exploding into the public domain while they gleaned more information about it for themselves. The Russian request to interrogate Ishii only added to U.S. difficulties. NARA holds a great deal of correspondence and meeting-related materials that document U.S. efforts in 1947 to discourage the prosecution of prominent Unit 731 members, and equivocation over Soviet efforts to prosecute.⁶⁴ After much delay and hand-wringing, SWNCC side-stepped these worries by allowing the Soviets to interrogate Japanese biological warfare specialists held by SCAP, but only on the condition that an American official be present during the interrogation, and after

U.S. authorities told the Japanese precisely what responses they were to give their Russian interrogators.⁶⁵

Meanwhile, the body of U.S. knowledge of Japanese biological warfare capabilities and criminal behavior continued to grow. In August 1947, the Technical Intelligence Center of the Office of Naval Intelligence compiled a report titled “Naval Aspects of Biological Warfare,” which claimed that the Japanese had experimented upon Chinese subjects during immunization and bacterial research conducted at Pingfan. Notably, this report asserted that American and Russian POWs were used to provide blood samples, while the more odious experimentation on humans was inflicted upon Manchurian criminals already condemned to death. Contrary to some postwar SCAP records claiming that the Japanese Emperor advocated Ishii’s biological warfare research, this report states that the Emperor had forbidden Ishii’s projects.⁶⁶

In the autumn of 1947, two scientists from Fort Detrick, Maryland, Edwin Hill and Joseph Victor, carried out their own investigation of Japanese biological warfare activities with the full support of Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s G-2 Intelligence Chief. They interviewed Ishii and several other scientists and pathologists regarding their studies of plague, typhus, tick encephalitis, botulism, cholera, and other diseases. While Hill and Victor noted that “no question of immunity guarantee from war crimes prosecution was ever raised during these interviews,” they also voiced their concern that the Japanese scientists were withholding information, intimating that they could be more usefully exploited if they were guaranteed protection from prosecution. Despite Japanese evasions, they did learn more details about the effects of these diseases on both human subjects and crops. They noted that, from the scientific perspective, the Japanese had done a great deal of work to advance the field:

Evidence gathered in this investigation has greatly supplemented and amplified previous aspects of this field. It represents data which have been obtained by Japanese scientists at the expenditure of many millions of dollars and years of work. Information has accrued with respect to human susceptibility to these diseases as indicated by specific infectious doses of bacteria. Such information could not be obtained in our own laboratories because of scruples attached to human experimentation. These data were secured with a total outlay of ¥250,000 to date, a mere pittance by comparison with the actual cost of the studies. It is hoped that individuals who voluntarily contributed this information will be spared embarrassment because of it and that every effort will be taken to prevent this information from falling into other hands.⁶⁷

By early 1948, with Cold War tensions mounting rapidly, the issue of prosecution

of Japanese war criminals faded. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal was ending its proceedings, and trials of Class B and C war criminals were also winding down. The fear of repercussions stemming from the protection of Ishii and others by United States officials began to abate. With the help of the U.S. scientific and intelligence communities, key members of Unit 731 had avoided prosecution for their use of humans in biological and chemical warfare experimentation.

Part 3: Records with Information on Atrocities

A significant number of documents at NARA pertain to atrocities committed by Imperial Japanese forces against Allied military personnel and civilians of various nationalities in the areas invaded and occupied by Japan during the Asia-Pacific War.

Records of the Office of the Navy Judge Advocate General (RG 125)

Several entries within the Navy JAG War Crimes Branch series contain documents pertaining to atrocities committed in the Pacific. For example, *Case Files of Pacific Area War Crimes Trials, 1944–49* includes the trial records of Japanese military and naval personnel, as well as the trial records of Pacific Islanders who collaborated with them.⁶⁸ *Records Regarding Pacific Area War Crimes Cases, 1944–49* has reports on the massacre of ninety-eight civilian employees of Pan American Airways on Wake Island accused of maintaining secret radio communication with U.S. naval forces following the island's occupation by Japanese forces, as well as a number of cases involving torture and murder (including beheading and cannibalism) of downed U.S. flyers, and the executions of Catholic priests and other civilians suspected of spying or engaging in other anti-Japanese activity.⁶⁹ *Records Regarding War Crimes Investigations and Trials, 1944–49* includes affidavits filed by American POWs who had been beaten and tortured; interrogations of Japanese defendants, witnesses, and collaborators; death notices of convicted war criminals; and transfer lists of convicted war criminals between Guam and Japan.⁷⁰

Records of the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (RG 153)

Army JAG War Crimes Branch records also include a number of entries with information on Japanese atrocities. One such entry, *Reports on War Crimes in the Philippines, 1945*, contains a large number of reports filed by Army JAG personnel charged with investigating atrocities and other war crimes committed by Imperial Japanese Army and Navy forces against civilians during Japan's iron-fisted and often brutal occupation of the Philippine Islands, from May 1942 to October 1944.⁷¹ The investigation reports describe numerous incidents of beating, torture, rape, and murder.

General Records of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Operational (RG 331)

SCAP records contain a large number of documents that deal with atrocities committed by Japanese forces against civilians and Allied POWs.

For example, *Legal Section, Administrative Division, Area Case Files, 1945–48* has hundreds of case files, organized by location, that contain death certificates, affidavits, investigation and interrogation reports, and photographs.⁷² These documents pertain to various war crimes committed against Allied military personnel and civilians in Japan and elsewhere. The war crimes mentioned include cannibalism, beheadings of downed airmen, bayoneting of wounded soldiers, massacres of villagers suspected of spying, intentional bombardment of field hospitals, and torture of captured seamen aboard Japanese vessels.

The entry *Legal Section, Investigation Division, Investigation Reports* contains hundreds of reports produced by U.S. war crimes investigators during the immediate postwar period.⁷³ The reports, many of which concern atrocities, are often voluminous and include very detailed testimonies from victims and witnesses, as well as interrogations of suspected war criminals.

The *Manila Branch* files contain numerous documents about atrocities committed against Allied POWs and civilians in the Philippine Islands.⁷⁴ Documents in this collection include the trial transcripts and exhibits of famous defendants as well as the records of less well-known individuals. One famous defendant was Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki, the so-called "Tiger of Malaya," who was found guilty and hanged in early 1946 for atrocities committed by soldiers under his command in the Philippines. Testimonies from war crimes suspects, statements and affidavits filed by victims and witnesses, files for individual Japanese POWs, investigation and interrogation reports, and photographs of victims and suspected war criminals comprise the remainder of the series.

Record of Trial File, 1945–49 has trial records of hundreds of accused Class B and C war criminals tried by military commissions for torture, murder, and mistreatment of civilians and POWs in Japan and Japanese-occupied areas.⁷⁵ The records contain testimonies, affidavits, exhibits, legal reviews, personal data of the accused, synopses of charges, findings, appeals, and clemency petitions.

The International Prosecution Section (IPS) contains documents produced by the SCAP section responsible for prosecuting Japanese leaders accused of Class A war crimes before the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. A few entries include documents pertaining to atrocities.

Numerical Case Files is the IPS Investigative Division record of its investigation of Gen. Matsui Iwane, the commanding officer of the Japanese expeditionary force judged

responsible for the “Rape of Nanking.” The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal found Matsui guilty, and he was hanged in late 1948.⁷⁶

Rules, Procedures, and Background Investigations on War Crimes and Atrocities Committed Against Chinese Laborers, ca. 1947 contains a number of documents on the mistreatment of Chinese slave laborers forcibly shipped to Japan during the latter part of World War II to work in mines and ports.⁷⁷ Lists of Chinese laborers in work camps, statements by former laborers, interrogations of Japanese overseers, investigation reports, death reports and monthly listings of deceased laborers, and photographs of labor camps make this a useful source.

U.S. Forces in the China-Burma-India Theaters of Operations (RG 493)

This record group has some references to atrocities and other war crimes committed by Japanese forces in China and Southeast Asia. For example, *Records Relating to War Crimes, 1945–48* has a number of documents about atrocities against Allied POWs, such as OSS intelligence reports, Army JAG investigation reports from the early postwar period, and copies of secret diaries kept by Allied POWs that vividly describe brutal beatings, torture, and murder.⁷⁸ There are also several reports regarding the unlawful execution of downed U.S. airmen (some of whom were allegedly cannibalized) and the murder of U.S. seamen. This entry also has miscellaneous documents about the Rape of Hong Kong, which occurred in the wake of the Japanese conquest of the colony in late December 1941, including testimonies given by people who had witnessed the rape and murder of civilians.

Case Study: Difficulties in Amassing Credible Evidence of War Crimes

Between August 1944 and March 1945, on Chichi-Jima, the largest of the Bonin Islands, Japanese forces executed eight downed U.S. airmen. In four of these instances, the prisoners were cannibalized after their executions.⁷⁹

The investigation into the Japanese treatment of Allied POWs on Chichi-Jima began on December 21, 1945, under the authority of Col. P.M. Rixey. In eight months, Rixey’s board of investigators interviewed over 120 witnesses and produced nearly a thousand pages of testimony. Many of the people they interviewed claimed to know nothing at all of atrocities, or to know about them only through hearsay.⁸⁰

Later, investigators discovered why they had little firsthand testimony. One witness, Maj. Horie Yoshitaka, gave Col. Rixey a statement concerning the four cannibalized airmen’s deaths, claiming they were killed in U.S. air raids. Later, he admitted that his statement was false, explaining that “a few days after the end of the war, an order was put out by [Lt.] Gen.

[Yoshio] Tachibana ... that all records [were to] be destroyed about American flyers, and no one was to say anything to the Americans about the flyers that were up here.”⁸¹ Horie acknowledged that the idea to give false reports about the airmen’s deaths was his own and that evidence had to be hidden from investigators in order to make the false reports convincing. Horie claimed that he was motivated by *bushido*, the warrior code of honor, but he also believed that, as Tachibana’s chief of staff, he would share responsibility for the crimes on Chichi-Jima. His false testimony was meant to protect his own life.

According to Horie, he had asked Maj. Matoba Sueo to help fabricate a plausible story and to instruct the 308th Battalion to provide supporting testimony for such a story.⁸² Horie’s account was later confirmed by 1st Lt. Enomoto Bunji, platoon leader of the 308th Battalion. Enomoto explained that Matoba chose the men to play the role of the guards for the POWs supposedly killed during the U.S. air raid. Enomoto said, “Major Matoba ... had everything mapped out to the smallest detail, right down to how the men were laid out near the area when the bombing happened and all the rest.” Bunji confirmed that, in fact, no POWs were killed during the U.S. air raid.⁸³

Matoba himself failed to stick to the story he had concocted to conceal the Japanese executions of the U.S. airmen. Matoba admitted, almost immediately, that POWs on Chichi-Jima were executed. However, the investigation board was not interested merely in whether the Japanese had executed POWs on the island, but whether the remains of the flyers had then been cannibalized. According to accounts of cannibalism on Chichi-Jima already in the board’s possession, Matoba was a central figure in these atrocities. But Matoba retorted that such stories were false and resulted from jealousies among the battalions and attempts to blame him for crimes committed by others on Chichi-Jima. The board believed he was lying.⁸⁴

During Matoba’s second interview with the board, he again willingly provided details of the airmen’s capture and execution on Chichi-Jima, and this time he admitted that the bodies were cannibalized. Matoba estimated that Japanese forces executed between eight and ten POWs on Chichi-Jima, and confessed that on three of these occasions he had participated in the cannibalization of the bodies. Asked whether he considered himself a cannibal, Matoba replied, “Yes, I was a madman due to the war and that is the only reason I can give for being a cannibal.”⁸⁵ Despite the false testimony prearranged by the Japanese military leaders on Chichi-Jima, Col. Rixey’s investigation board was able to draw fairly accurate conclusions about Japanese atrocities on the island.

In early August 1946, Lt. Gen. Tachibana Yoshio and thirteen other Japanese military personnel were tried on Guam for the unlawful executions of the eight downed U.S. airmen on Chichi-Jima.⁸⁶ Navy JAG prosecutors brought three charges: murder, violation of the laws of war, and neglect of duty in violation of the laws and customs of war. There were

thirty-eight specifications under the charges, one of which was “prevention of honorable burial.” Charges of cannibalism had to be brought under this specification, since military and international law at the time lacked provisions to punish cannibalism.

The court found thirteen of the fourteen defendants guilty of the charges brought against them. Tachibana and two officers received death sentences. The remaining ten defendants received prison sentences, ranging from five years to life.

Investigation of the atrocities committed on Chichi-Jima did not end with the trial of Gen. Tachibana and his accomplices because some of the perpetrators were yet to be apprehended. One was Teraki Tadashi, a medical officer who reportedly removed the flesh and organs from three cannibalized bodies. A request for his arrest was initially issued on January 23, 1946. However, on March 27 of that year, Teraki left a suicide note intended for his wife. The Japanese government was unable to discover any clue as to his whereabouts until early August 1948, when they learned that his wife had sent some of his personal effects to a “Maeda Tadashi” in Tokyo. Police found Teraki at this address running a small dispensary, and they arrested him on August 7, 1948.⁸⁷

Teraki’s trial began on March 4, 1949. SCAP charged him with violation of the law and customs of war. Four of the specifications were for mutilating the bodies of executed POWs by removing their livers and portions of their flesh, which were then cooked and eaten by other Japanese military personnel on the island. The fifth specification accused him of beheading a POW. The court found Teraki guilty of the first four specifications and not guilty of the fifth. On March 17, 1949, Teraki was sentenced to four years in prison.⁸⁸ Like many of the Chichi-Jima personnel convicted of war crimes, Teraki was paroled and left Sugamo Prison on January 25, 1951, having served approximately two-thirds of his sentence.⁸⁹

Conclusion

In this chapter we have provided researchers with an introduction to records held at NARA in College Park, Maryland, that deal with three areas of Japanese war criminality during World War II: mistreatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees, Japanese development and use of chemical and biological weapons, and atrocities committed by Imperial Japanese forces against Allied personnel and civilians. In doing so, we made no attempt to provide researchers with a comprehensive guide to all of the records at NARA regarding Japanese war crimes; instead, it was our intention to provide those interested in the topic with starting points by focusing on specific instances of criminal behavior and illustrating how specific records can be used. Our emphasis in some cases has been on those files in record groups that have been declassified for years but have been underexploited by researchers. These cases can be a useful place to start.

Notes

1. NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 1357, SWPD Subject Files, 1939–54, boxes 65–199 (location: 250/49/21/5–250/49/24/3).
2. NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 1352, SWPD Inspection Reports on War Relocation Centers, 1942–46, boxes 19–21 (location: 250/49/20/5–250/49/20/6).
3. See NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 205-E, Central Decimal File, 1940–44, boxes 1–5930, 711.94114 (location: 250/30/20/6–250/34/23/4); and *ibid.*, entry 205-H, Central Decimal File, 1945–49, boxes 1–7446, 794.00114, and 794.4114 (location: 250/34/24/1–250/38/28/1).
4. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 2, Case Files of Pacific Area War Crimes Trials, 1944–49, boxes 1–20 (location: 370/21/29/1–370/21/29/3).
5. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 8, Records Relating to Prisoners of War, 1944–49, boxes 1–3 (location: 290/C/69/2).
6. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 137, War Crimes Branch, Reports of Interviews with American Servicemen Who Were Prisoners of War, 1943–47, boxes 1–180 (location: 270/1/8/4–270/1/12/1).
7. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 144, War Crimes Branch, Persons and Places Case File (Dossier File), boxes 1–140 (location: 270/2/9/4–270/2/12/3).
8. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 116, Records of the Director, boxes 1–7 (location: 190/7/11/1–190/7/11/2).
9. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 16, Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Intelligence Reports (“Regular” Series), 1941–45, boxes 1–1685 (location: 190/3/11/4–190/4/10/6).
10. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 19-A, Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Formerly Security-Classified Intelligence Reports (“XL” Series), 1941–46, boxes 1–7 (location: 190/4/12/6–190/4/22/5).
11. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1189, Records of the Administrative Division, Area Case Files, boxes 919–960A (location: 290/11/9/3–290/11/12/7).
12. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1330, Records of the Investigation Division, Investigation Reports, 1945–49, boxes 1732–1752 (location: 290/12/24/1–290/12/25/2).
13. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1865, Records of the Judge Advocate, Records of the War Crimes Division, Record of Trial File, 1945–49, boxes 9494–9893 (location: 290/23/6/2–290/23/25/2).
14. NA, RG 389, OPMG, entry 460-A, American POW Information Bureau Records Branch, General Subject File, 1942–46, boxes 2069–2281 (location: 290/34/17/3–290/34/22/4).
15. See NA, RG 407, TAGO, entry 360-A, Records Maintained by the Communications Branch, boxes 1–3850 (location: 270/39/2/4–270/41/11/12); and *ibid.*, entry 371, Records of the Administrative Services Division, boxes 1–4 (location: 270/48/14/4–270/48/14/5).

Most documents pertaining to Americans held captive by the Japanese are filed under the decimals 000.5 (War Crimes and Criminals) and 383.6 (Prisoners of War).

16. NA, RG 407, TAGO, Philippine Archives Collection, POWs/Civilian Internees, entry 1063, POW General Correspondence Files, 1941–45, boxes 37–52 (location: 270/49/24/03–270/49/24/06); *ibid.*, entry 1067, Diaries and Historical Narratives, 1940–45, boxes 123–145 (location: 270/49/26/04–270/49/27/02); *ibid.*, entry 1069, Sunken POW Transport Files, 1942, 1944–48, boxes 146–148 (location: 270/49/27/02); *ibid.*, entry 1070, Records of Atrocities Against POWs, 1942–45, boxes 148–49 (location: 270/49/27/02); *ibid.*, entry 1073, POW Recovery Team Reports, 1944–45, boxes 191–95 (location: 270/49/28/02–270/49/28/03); and *ibid.*, entry 1075, General Correspondence Files Pertaining to Civilian Internees, 1943–45, boxes 196–200 (location: 270/49/28/03–270/49/28/04).
17. Among the prisoners was British Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur E. Percival, commander of the disastrous defense of Singapore.
18. NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 1357, SWPD Subject Files, 1939–54, box 89, folders: “Mukden [19]43–44” and “Mukden [19]45” (location: 250/49/22/1).
19. Both of their reports are in RG 59, Department of State, entry 1357, SWPD Subject Files, 1939–54, box 89. This box also holds an untranslated report (written in French) filed by ICRC delegate Marcel Junod in August 1945. A copy of the diary kept by British Maj. Robert Peaty (one of the Allied officers interviewed by Pestalozzi), which can provide some insights regarding day-to-day life at Camp Hoten, can be found in NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 180, War Crimes Branch, China War Crimes File, 1945–48, box 2, folder: Master Index VI-N: Major Peaty, Diary Whilst a P.O.W. at Mukden, Manchuria (location: 270/2/23/7).
20. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 90, Records of the Washington Radio and Cables and Field Photo Branch, box 3, folder 30 (location: 190/5/24/4).
21. NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 1357, SWPD Subject Files, 1939–54, box 90, folder: “Manchuria” (location: 250/49/22/1).
22. *Ibid.*
23. NA, RG 407, TAGO, entry 360-A, Army-AG Classified Decimal File, 1943–45, box 2437 (location: 270/40/17/3).
24. *Ibid.*
25. NA, RG 407, TAGO, entry 427, World War II Operations Reports, 1940–48, Pacific Theater 98-USF1 U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, box 1598 (location: 270/51/27/5).
26. *Ibid.*
27. For Miki’s trial, see NA, RG 331, entry 1321, USA versus Japanese War Criminals Case File, 1945–49, box 1662 (location: 290/12/18/06). For Noda’s trial, see NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1865, Records of the Judge Advocate, Records of the War Crimes Division, Record of

- Trial File, 1945–49, box 9640 (location: 290/27/13/01).
28. Noda was conscripted into the Imperial Japanese Army after his parents sent him to school in Japan.
 29. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1189, Legal Section, Administrative Division, Area Case Files, box 938 (location: 290/11/10/3).
 30. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1865, Judge Advocate Section, War Crimes Division, Record of Trial, 1945–49, box 9696, folder: “Eiichi Noda–Case #235” (location: 290/23/15/6).
 31. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1865, Judge Advocate Section, War Crimes Division, Record of Trial, 1945–49, box 9580, folder: “U.S. vs. Eiichi Noda” (location: 290/23/10/2).
 32. NA, RG 112, Office of the Army Surgeon General, entry 295-A, Biological Warfare Specialized Files, 1941–47, boxes 1–13 (location: 390/18/24/1–390/18/24/3).
 33. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 145, General Records (Set-up Files), 1944–49, boxes 1–241 (location: 270/2/12/3–270/2/17/3).
 34. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 488, New Developments Division, Security-Classified Correspondence File of Dr. G. W. Merck, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, 1942–46, boxes 180–188 (location: 390/40/1/5–390/40/1/6).
 35. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 487, Security-Classified Office File of Gen. W. A. Borden, Director of New Developments Division, boxes 151–169 (location: 390/40/1/1–390/40/1/3).
 36. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 468, Civil Affairs Division, Security-Classified Papers of the Army Member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), 1942–June 1949, boxes 548–638 (location: 390/39/12/5–390/39/14/4).
 37. NA, RG 175, Records of the Chemical Warfare Service, General Administrative Files, 1945–54, (WNRC Accession #67A4900), boxes 1–591 (location: 290/3/17/6–290/3/23/5).
 38. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 134-B, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (Intelligence) Army Intelligence and Security Command; Records of the Investigative Records Repository; Security Classified Intelligence and Investigative Dossiers; Personal Name File, boxes 1–694 (location: 270/84/1/1–270/84/19/5).
 39. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 82, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Intelligence Administrative Division Publications (“P” files), boxes 1–3816 (location: 270/7/34/6–270/10/7/5).
 40. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85-A, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Intelligence Administrative Division, Intelligence Document (“ID”) File, boxes 1–10, 140 (location: 270/10/33/1–270/15/1/4).
 41. These documents can be found in NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1294, Legal Section,

- Law Division, Miscellaneous Classified File, 1945–52, boxes 1434–1435 (location: 290/12/4/6).
42. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1901, Legal Section, Administrative Division, Administrative Correspondence, 1945 to June 13, 1952 (Formerly Top Secret Files), box 1 (location: 290/24/2/3).
 43. The most thorough English-language scholarly work on the subject is Sheldon Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–45, and the American Cover-up* (New York: Routledge, 1994).
 44. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 134-B, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), Records of the Investigative Records Repository, Security Classified Intelligence and Investigative Dossiers, 1939–76, Personal Name Files, box 549, file 441: Shiro, Ishii (location: 270/84/16/4).
 45. See Linda Goetz Holmes, *Unjust Enrichment: How Japan's Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001). Holmes has also begun work on the Japanese circumvention of U.S. and ICRC wartime efforts to help prisoners.
 46. “Select Japanese War Crimes Documents,” a list of NARA documents primarily related to biological warfare, was compiled by William Cunliffe and is found on the CD accompanying this book.
 47. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 210, OSS Classified Sources and Methods Files, box 340, folder 4: “Far East Report Edgar Mowrer 1941” (location: 250/64/28/3).
 48. NA, RG 112, Office of the Army Surgeon General, entry 295A, Records of the Preventative Medicine Division: Biological Warfare Specialized Files, 1941–47, box 9, file: “Current Intelligence, Gen.” (location: 390/18/24/2).
 49. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 210, OSS Classified Sources and Methods Files, box 179, folder: “Chihchiang” (location: 250/64/24/6).
 50. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1129, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), Intelligence Division, Library Section, subject file, 1945–50, box 242 (location: 290/10/6/7).
 51. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85, Intelligence Document (“ID”) File, box 7264, ID #919284, Targets BW: Japan (location: 270/13/31/5). This invaluable file contains interrogations of Japanese POWs and other efforts to learn more about the Empire’s biological and chemical warfare programs.
 52. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 489, Security-Classified Correspondence of a Special Committee on Secret Weapons, 1943–45, box 176, files 86 and 86-1 (location: 390/40/1/4).
 53. NA, RG 112, Office of the Army Surgeon General, entry 295A, Records of the Preventative Medicine Division: Biological Warfare Specialized Files, 1941–47, box 11, file 55: “Plague Incident in China” (location: 390/18/24/2).

54. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 134, Washington Registry Office Radio and Cable Files, box 42, file "M/8 Japan" (location: 190/7/28/5).
55. Ibid.
56. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 488, New Developments Division, Security-Classified Correspondence, File of Dr. G.W. Merck, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, 1942–46, box 181, file "Final Board Report" (location: 390/40/1/5).
57. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 82, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Intelligence Administrative Division, Document Library Branch, Publications ("P") Files, 1946–51, box 2097, file "Japanese Biological Warfare Activities, Army Service Forces" (location: 270/9/7/4).
58. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 82, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2); Intelligence Administrative Division; Document Library Branch; Publications ("P") Files, 1946–51, box 2098, file "Japanese Chemical Warfare Policies and Intentions" (location: 270/9/7/5).
59. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1294, Legal Section, Law Division, Miscellaneous Classified File, 1945–52, box 1434, folder 18: "Case 330" (location: 290/12/4/6).
60. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1294, Legal Section, Law Division, Miscellaneous Classified File, 1945–52, box 1434, folder 18: "Case 330" (location: 290/12/4/6).
61. Ibid.
62. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1294, Legal Section; Law Division, Miscellaneous Classified File, 1945–52, box 1434, folder 13 (location: 290/12/4/6).
63. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 145, War Crimes Branch, General Records (Set-up Files), 1944–49, box 73, folders 107-0 (location: 270/2/13/7). These folders contain a great deal of correspondence and memoranda generated throughout 1947 by various interested agencies, especially SWNCC subcommittees in which the debate over immunity played out. The policy memoranda and meeting protocols in which these decisions were made, including the final SWNCC decision recommending that Ishii not be tried, can be found in this file.
64. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 468, Security Classified Papers of the Army Member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), Jan. 1942–June 1949, box 628, file "SANACC 351/3" (location: 390/39/14/3).
65. Ibid.
66. NA, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Decimal Files, 1943–53, Confidential through Top Secret Subject Correspondence File, entry 199, box 103, folder CD 23-1-4 (3 of 7) (location: 190/25/17/7).
67. "Summary Report of B.W. Investigations," 12 Dec. 1947, p. 4, NA, RG 175, Records of the Chemical Warfare Services, WNRC Accession #67A4900, General Administrative Files, 1945–54, Confidential, box 217, folder: "Decimal 385, July–December 1954 Biological

- Warfare Investigations Summary report" (location: 290/3/19/3).
68. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 2, Case Files of Pacific Area War Crimes Trials, 1944–49, boxes 1–20 (location: 370/21/29/1–370/21/29/3).
 69. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 3, Records Regarding Pacific Area War Crimes Cases, 1944–49, boxes 1–3 (location: 290/C/68/4).
 70. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 21, Records Originated by Liaison Officer for War Crimes, Naval Forces Marianas; Records Regarding War Crimes Investigations and Trials, 1944–49, boxes 1–8 (location: 290/C/69/6–290/C/69/7).
 71. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 176, War Crimes Branch, Reports on War Crimes in the Philippines, 1945, boxes 1–2 (location: 270/2/23/6).
 72. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1189, Legal Section, Administrative Division, Area Case Files, 1945–48, boxes 919–960A (location: 290/11/9/3–290/11/12/7).
 73. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1330, Legal Section, Investigation Division, Investigation Reports, boxes 1732–1757 (location: 290/12/24/1–290/12/25/2).
 74. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entries 1336–1364, Legal Section, Investigation Division, Manila Branch, boxes 1853–2029 (location: 290/12/31/4–290/13/4/7).
 75. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1865, Judge Advocate Section, War Crimes Division, Record of Trial File, 1945–49, boxes 9494–9893 (location: 290/23/6/2–290/23/25/2).
 76. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 319, Numerical Case Files, boxes 1–64 (location: 290/9/7/4–290/9/8/6).
 77. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 292, Rules, Procedures, and Background Investigations on War Crimes and Atrocities Committed Against Chinese Laborers, ca. 1947, boxes 1–18 (location: 290/9/3/7–290/9/4/2).
 78. NA, RG 493, U.S. Forces in the China-Burma-India Theaters of Operations, Records of the Judge Advocate General, entry 117, Records Relating to War Crimes, 1945–48, boxes 679–685 (location: 290/41/18/5).
 79. Records held by the National Archives relating to Japanese atrocities against Allied POWs on Chichi-Jima are found primarily in two record groups: RG 125, Navy JAG, and RG 331, SCAP.
 80. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 23C, War Crimes Branch, Correspondence, Records Originated by the Director of War Crimes, Pacific Fleet, box 10, folder A17–25: "Chichi-Jima, Proceedings of the Board of Investigation re: Deaths of Allied Prisoners in Japanese Custody, 1946" (3 vols.) (location: 370/21/29/4), Colonel P.M. Rixey to Major Robert D. Shaffer, December 21, 1945, vol. I.
 81. *Ibid.*, Testimony of Major Yoshitaka Horie, Ninth Day, 7 Jan. 1946, vol. I, 140.
 82. *Ibid.*, Testimony of Major Yoshitaka Horie, Ninth Day, 7 Jan. 1946, vol. I, 140A.
 83. *Ibid.*, Testimony of First Lieutenant Enomoto Bunji, Eighteenth Day, 7 Jan. 1946, vol. I, 346–47.

84. Ibid., Testimony of Major Suelo Matoba, Fifteenth Day, 14 Jan. 1946, vol. I, 286–91; Testimony of Major Suelo Matoba, Thirty-Ninth Day, 6 March 1946, vol. II, 676.
85. Ibid., Testimony of Suelo Matoba, Thirty-Ninth and Fortieth Day, 6 March and 8 March 1946, vol. II, 694.
86. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1321, Legal Section, Prosecution Division, USA versus Japanese War Criminals Case File, 1945–49, box 1654, folders: “Yoshio Tachibana, et al., vol. I (Record of Proceedings), 1945–49” and “Yoshio Tachibana, et al., vol. II (Record of Proceedings), 1945–49” (location 290/12/18/5).
87. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 21, War Crimes Branch, Records Originated by Liaison Officer for War Crimes, Naval Forces Mariana; Records Relating to War Crimes Investigations and Trials, 1944–49, box 7, folder 402: “Teraki, Tadashi, June 1946–Mar. 1949” (location: 290/C/69/7). A more detailed account of the search for Teraki can be found in NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1221, Legal Section, Administrative Division, POW 201 File, 1945–52, box 1209, folder: “Teraki, Tadashi”; Chief, Investigative Division, Gumma-Ken Headquarters to Chief, Investigative Division, National Police Headquarters, 7 August 1948 (location: 290/11/26/05).
88. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1321, Legal Section, Prosecution Division, USA versus Japanese War Criminals Case File, 1945–49, box 1658, folders: “Case of Teraki, Tadashi, vol. I and Case of Teraki, Tadashi, vol. II” (location: 290/12/18/6).
89. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1221, Legal Section, Administrative Division, POW 201 File, 1945–52, box 1209, folder: Teraki, Tadashi. Information on other war criminals involved in Chichi-Jima atrocities recommended for or obtaining their parole, including Hayashi Minoru, Isogai Gunji, Kido Matsutaro, Masutani Shinichi, Matsushita Kanehisa, Mori Yasumasa, and Sasaki Mitsuyoshi, can be found in RG 331, SCAP, entry 1221, Legal Section, Administrative Division, POW 201 File, 1945–52, boxes 1164, 1170, 1176, 1182, 1183, 1186, and 1199 (location: 290/11/24/1–11/27/1).

Wartime COMINT Records in the National Archives about Japanese War Crimes in the Asia and Pacific Theaters, 1978–1997

Robert Hanyok

OF THE 100,000 PAGES of U.S. government records declassified under the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act, about 2,200 are cryptologic records from the National Security Agency (NSA). NSA released a relatively small number of records under the act because the overwhelming majority of wartime cryptologic records have been available to the public for several years. In a series of releases from 1978 through 1997, the NSA released to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) more than 2 million pages of cryptologic records from World War II, the majority of them relating to Japan. The U.S. Army's Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) created most of these records. In 1998, the Naval Security Group, the cryptologic element of the United States Navy, transferred to NARA over a million pages of records created by its wartime predecessor, OP-20-G. The NSG had held these records in its own records storage area for several decades before sending them to NARA. Like the material transferred by NSA, a large portion of the records dealt with the war against Japan.

The NSA and Naval Security Group records consist of translations, finished reports, technical studies, and administrative papers. Translations of intercepted messages of Japanese diplomatic, military, naval, and commercial entities constitute a contemporary, first-person record of Japanese plans and actions during the war in Asia and the Pacific. Other significant records include the translations of diplomatic messages of countries that corresponded with Japan during the war: Switzerland, Vichy France, Thailand, Portugal, Spain, and the Axis countries.

Besides providing information about war crimes, these translations offer a range of information about the planning and execution of Japanese military and naval campaigns; Allied plans and actions; diplomatic relations; political, economic, and cultural policies in occupied territories; relations with Asian nationalist movements in India, Indochina, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies; commercial ventures throughout the Greater East

Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; and other matters.

Despite the public availability of these translations, most scholars and researchers of the war against Japan have made very limited use of them.¹ A major impediment to using the translations has been a lack of indices to aid research. With various collections holding anywhere from 3,500–300,000 individual translations, researching these collections has meant reviewing each page—not a feasible option for researchers limited by time or finances.

This chapter will introduce these sets of translations and related reports, bulletins, and summaries by addressing three issues: (1) how the translations and other reports were created by the cryptologic agencies during the war and eventually came to reside at NARA, (2) how these records are organized, and (3) what information about Japanese war crimes and atrocities they contain.

How the Translations and Other Records Were Created

During World War II, the Allied communications intelligence (COMINT) system employed several thousands of men and women to intercept communications, decrypt and translate them, and disseminate the resulting intelligence to Allied political, diplomatic, military, and intelligence officials.

Allied cryptologic organizations underwent tremendous expansion during the war, resulting in a cooperative venture among the United States, Great Britain and its Commonwealth partners, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Before December 7, 1941, the Allied COMINT capability against Japan was very limited. A handful of intercept stations across the Pacific region and small analytic centers in Hawaii, Singapore, London, and Washington employed 300–400 people. The rapid conquest of East Asia and the Pacific by Japan's army and navy after December 7 forced the Allies to abandon many of these stations for more secure sites in Australia, India, Ceylon, and Kenya. Slowly, they rebuilt a cryptologic structure, constructing large intercept and processing facilities in New Delhi to support the India-Burma front; in Brisbane, Australia, for the Southwest Pacific; and in Hawaii for the Central Pacific. Concurrently, the U.S. military built a constellation of intercept and direction-finding stations in the western United States and the newly conquered islands in the Pacific.

Much of the capability that emerged later in the war was due to the cooperative nature of the Allied COMINT effort. Contingents from the United States and Commonwealth countries operated two of the three major processing centers, Brisbane and New Delhi. These sites exchanged all intelligence that they produced. This virtually complete cooperative venture in communications intelligence, unparalleled in military

history, broadened the scope and effectiveness of the Allied COMINT contribution to the defeat of Japan.

Besides targeting Japanese military communications, Allied COMINT personnel targeted the diplomatic and commercial communications of Japan and other countries with interests in the region: Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Nationalist China, France, and the collaborationist regimes of Burma, the Philippines, and Nanjing, China. These communications provided valuable intelligence on internal social and economic conditions, Tokyo's policy towards occupied territories, treatment of POWs and civilian internees, and atrocities committed by Japan.

Despite COMINT's many successes, the Allies were never able to break all of Japan's codes. Several of Tokyo's codes and ciphers resisted exploitation throughout the war, some took years to break into, and others were readable for only a limited time. The ongoing struggle between the Allied codebreakers and Tokyo's cryptographers was a dynamic contest with wins and losses on both sides. The Allies did not win every battle, but ultimately they won the codebreaking war.

The Communications Intelligence Process

The COMINT process had four steps: setting priorities, collecting communications, processing intercepts, and disseminating the resulting intelligence.²

Step One: Setting Priorities

By March 1942, Japanese military and naval forces had won a string of victories, driving U.S. and Commonwealth forces back into India, Australia, the South Pacific, the Hawaiian Islands, and the West Coast of the United States. At the same time, organizationally and structurally, COMINT was in flux. The United States and Britain were scrambling to establish new bases in India, Australia, and other places, replacing the ones lost in Manila and Singapore. In this demanding situation, Allied COMINT lacked the personnel, facilities, technology, experience, and technical knowledge to intercept and analyze the estimated 2–3 million Japanese Army messages sent that year on the airwaves throughout the operational theaters.³ Against this formidable output, the Allies at first could muster only a few hundred intercept operators to staff several score monitoring positions.

This disparity meant that COMINT had to establish a system of priorities that met current Allied military and political requirements. In 1942–43, major combat occurred only on the periphery of the territory recently conquered by Japan, so Allied COMINT concentrated its efforts against Japanese military and naval communications in these areas.

Regions deeper within the Japanese Empire, such as China, Korea, French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, Formosa, Malaya, and the Japanese home islands received far less

attention until much later in the war. Allied COMINT rarely covered the Philippines—an area of intense interest for Gen. MacArthur—until mid-1944, when planning for the recovery of those islands already was underway.

Unlike the European Theater of Operations, where the British were the principal COMINT authority and the Americans played a secondary role, in the Pacific the Americans commanded the principal analytic centers in Hawaii and Australia. In the Burma-India Theater (later renamed the Southeast Asia Command, or SEAC), the Commonwealth took the lead and supervised Allied COMINT from its major site, the Wireless Experimental Center near New Delhi, India.

As the war shifted against Japan, intelligence priorities changed. An increased ability to exploit Japanese messages meant that the Allies could target many more radio nets in Japan and its occupied territories. By mid-1944, Allies had expanded their ability to extract more usable intelligence from the intercepts. With radio traffic from within regional command areas now accessible, even areas outside immediate Allied military interest such as the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, the Celebes, Borneo, and elsewhere became productive intelligence targets. By the end of 1944, with the beginning of the invasion of Luzon, Japanese communications from Manila and Singapore topped the priority lists for U.S. Army monitors. But there was little intercept from areas of secondary military importance to the American and Commonwealth forces—China, Manchuria, Korea, and the Dutch East Indies.⁴

Step Two: Intercepting Japanese Messages

Three factors defined the ultimate success of the collection of radio traffic: geography, operational priorities, and the development and expansion of the collection system.

Geography greatly affected the structure and operations of Allied collection. First, the absolute distances across the various theaters in Asia and the Pacific were daunting: more than 8,700 miles separated Singapore from San Francisco. The war against Japan spanned eleven time zones. The high-frequency communications of the era traveled quickly over water, but many radio terminals were located in tropical locations that attenuated signals propagation. In addition, the vast landmass of Asia, its mountain ranges and jungles, severely hampered radio reception. Only in the last year of the war did the Allies have enough stations and personnel to cover the important Japanese radio terminals in the major regions of the remaining Japanese Empire. In the last two months of the war, the Allies intercepted close to 400,000 Japanese messages.⁵

The intercept effort was anchored in a string of large monitoring stations located in India, Ceylon, Australia, China, Hawaii, and the western United States. Smaller sites sprung up as the Allies advanced across Asia and the Pacific islands. Mobile

intercept units—ship-based, airborne, and motorized—intercepted tactical Japanese communications in combat zones in places such as the Philippines and Okinawa. Eventually, the Allies had over three dozen intercept and direction-finding stations targeting Japanese communications.

Another factor in the effectiveness of Allied intercept was their ability to greatly expand the corps of personnel who did the actual monitoring. By the last year of the war, the Allied intercept effort against Japan had expanded to twenty-four hour coverage of important terminals such as Tokyo, Manila, and Saigon.⁶ In the last three months of the war, the entire complex of Allied monitoring stations was being redirected to cover communications emanating from the remaining Japanese Empire. Much of the Allies' information on war crimes, atrocities, and economic exploitation came as a result of this increased intercept capacity.

Step Three: Processing the Intercept

At the beginning of the war, most intercept was sent to the processing centers in Washington by courier, mail, or by Pan-American Clipper across the Pacific. On December 6, 1941, Army sites on the U.S. west coast were finally able to send their intercept by secure teleprinter to SIS headquarters. Slowly, this capability, along with secure radio, expanded to America and British Commonwealth countries. By mid-1943, the majority of intercepted traffic reached processing centers by encrypted radio and cable, and by the end of the war, almost every major intercept site and theater processing center was connected with the major processing headquarters in Washington and London. By war's end, intercepted messages reached a codebreaker's hands in a day, a journey that had once taken weeks.

Once intercepts reached the processing centers, analysts reviewed them and extracted information such as the recipient, priority, and type of cryptographic system used.

Next, cryptanalysts attacked the ciphers and codes. It was a slow process, and success often relied on the capture of enemy codebooks and other cryptographic materials. In September 1943, a survey of work against all Japanese cryptographic systems by the SIS cryptanalytic B Branch showed that of 25 diplomatic systems, 14 (55 percent) were totally solved or readable to some degree. Meanwhile, of 64 Japanese Army systems, only 9 (14 percent) were readable to any degree, and 2 were in the process of being solved. The SIS could not read at all any of the rest of the army systems.⁷

Beginning in late 1942, the Allies consistently exploited Japan's main operational naval code, known as JN-25. In the spring of 1943, Allies broke the Japanese Army's Water Transport Code. Merchant ships employed by the Japanese Army for resupply and troop transport used this code. Later, the Japanese passed information about human

cargo—American POWs—using this code. The Allies were able to read the code for about a year before the Japanese changed it. In early 1944, Allies broke the main Japanese Army administration code following the capture of a library of army codes. Thereafter, codebreakers solved many other cryptographic systems of the Japanese Army and Air Force.

Once cryptanalysts decoded the messages, they passed the texts to linguists to translate. Producing a translation was also a slow process. The translation had to be written on a work sheet, reworked, checked by senior linguists, approved for release by section chiefs, and, finally, typed and reproduced. Sometimes translations could be produced within a day or two, but it often took two to three months. It was not uncommon for a translation to be produced after the intelligence it contained had lost its usefulness.

Also, the percentage of translated intercepts produced by the Allies was not large. Though complete statistics for the entire Allied effort are lacking, some examples from various missions suggest that, overall, the completion rate was 8–15 percent. For example, a July 1945 OP-20-G report noted that only 10 percent of all intercepted Japanese naval messages were processed fully and disseminated.⁸ In another case, in July 1945, Arlington Hall (headquarters for the U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Services) received over 380,000 intercepted messages, but managed in the same month to produce little over 32,000 translations, approximately 8.5 percent.⁹ Similarly, in 1944, Arlington Hall received 576,000 diplomatic intercepts, decrypted about 89,000 (15 percent), and translated about 50,000 (8.6 percent).¹⁰

Step Four: Dissemination

The British and Americans created special staffs to assess the intelligence and securely distribute it. The British adapted a system of control using a group of officers known as the Special Liaison Unit (SLU). In 1943, the United States created a version of the SLU, the Special Security Office (SSO), which first operated in the Pacific commands. Every major overseas Allied command acquired these units, which assumed complete control of the handling, dissemination, control, and destruction of COMINT. At every command headquarters, SLU and SSO personnel hand delivered or briefed the intelligence to the commanders and select parts of their staffs, and then destroyed it.

In Washington, the COMINT was circulated by summary reports and personal briefings, primarily the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary, which contained digests of translations based largely on diplomatic sources.¹¹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt also received personal daily briefings based on selected diplomatic and military translations.

How Cryptologic Records Came to the National Archives

It is difficult to reconstruct in much detail how the wartime cryptologic records got from the shelves of the National Security Agency to NARA. Various factors affected the way the records were handled and accounted for over the last sixty years, including (1) the postwar contraction of wartime cryptologic agencies, (2) the numerous organizational changes from 1945 through the formation of the NSA in 1952, (3) the methods of preserving the records, and (4) the classification of these records. The last factor especially influenced their release and format.

For U.S. signals intelligence agencies, the immediate postwar period was marked by drastic reductions in personnel and resources similar to those experienced by the U.S. military in general. Staffing was reduced to 20–30 percent of wartime levels, and many overseas facilities closed or reduced their operations.

The end of the war also marked the end of the COMINT missions against the former Axis nations, principally Germany and Japan. But in the immediate postwar period, there were four exceptions: (1) OP-20-G decrypted and translated Japanese navy messages intercepted before Pearl Harbor;¹² (2) the SIS decrypted and translated wartime German diplomatic and attaché messages exchanged between Berlin and Tokyo for information on technology and intelligence on the Soviet Union; (3) the Army processed wartime Soviet espionage messages known later as Venona into the early 1980s; and (4) the Army and Navy monitored and translated postwar Japanese diplomatic and military communications that dealt with disarmament and the repatriation of Japanese military personnel and civilian administrators and colonists. On this latter item, the U.S. allowed Japan to use its communication networks to facilitate the return of Japanese soldiers, but it was not allowed to use ciphers or codes. The Allies monitored these plain text communications to verify Japanese compliance with the terms of its surrender.

After the war, except for a handful of messages used for training (and those mentioned above), the rest of the unprocessed Japanese radio messages from the war were destroyed by the cryptologic agencies, most likely burned. These agencies had no systematic records disposition guide that specified the timelines for records retention or destruction. Records that had already been processed, such as translations, reports, and administrative files, were retained. Accounting for and protecting those records retained after the war was not an easy task. Storage space was at a premium, and it appears that in most cases agencies destroyed duplicate paper copies of records such as the translations.

In 1949, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was created as the single U.S. cryptologic agency. The Army and Navy transferred some of their personnel and records to AFSA. In the late 1940s, AFSA began to microfilm some of the wartime records it had received. When the National Security Agency was formed in 1952, it inherited AFSA's

records. NSA continued to microfilm the wartime records, and it retained over a million pages of administrative, technical, and operational records, as well. Some paper records duplicated the microfilm.

In the early 1960s, the Naval Security Group (formerly OP-20-G) stored its wartime records, which were a blend of paper and microfilm, at Crane, Indiana. Occasionally there were efforts by scholars to have them released, but national security restrictions prohibited their release.

This situation changed in the mid-1970s, when new legislation mandated their release. Title 32 specified a 30-year mandatory declassification review for all classified records, including records from World War II. NSA had to release its wartime records or demonstrate why specific series of such records should remain classified in the interest of national security. In addition, there was growing public clamor for release of these records following the publication of F. W. Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret*.¹³ Subsequent books and media stories reinforced the public demand for the release of the material. In addition, NSA had received a number of Freedom of Information Act requests for the wartime records. In the summer of 1977, NSA and NARA held a series of meetings regarding the release of the records. NSA offered to release redacted copies of the original records. In essence, this created two sets of records: the original set at NSA and a redacted copy at NARA. NSA did not indicate when it would declassify and release the originals.

The Defense Department confused the issue when, in 1977, it released *The MAGIC Background to Pearl Harbor*, which contained redacted versions of the Japanese diplomatic messages intercepted, decrypted, and translated by U.S. cryptologists in 1941.¹⁴ These translations were not new to the public; the Joint Congressional Committee Inquiry into Pearl Harbor had released many of the same translations in 1946.¹⁵ In both cases, however, the collections contained only Japanese diplomatic translations related to the six-month period leading up to and immediately following Pearl Harbor.

Beginning in 1978, NSA released the redacted copies of wartime Axis translations, as well as other selected records. This release included wartime Japanese military, diplomatic, and commercial translations. In addition, it released over three hundred Special Research History (SRH) and special wartime topical studies and collections, including a set of the MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries. Again, all of these records were redacted copies of the original records still held by NSA. Within a few years, NSA released copies the translations of intercepted wartime Vichy messages.

NSA finally released many of the original records to NARA in the 1990s. This transfer happened in large part because the wartime records had reached a fifty-year declassification review and NSA could no longer justify their continued withholding.

In 1993, NSA turned over the original MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries to the National Archives. In 1996, the largest release of unredacted records occurred when NSA shipped to NARA the so-called Historical Cryptographic Collection (HCC), numbering some 1.3 million pages. In 1998, the Naval Security Group turned over to NARA its wartime records, totaling 1.5 million pages.

How the Records Are Organized

There are three major types of NSA records containing intelligence on Japanese war crimes and other atrocities: translations, translation summaries, and summary or special research reports, such as the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary. Table 1 highlights the information that will be discussed in this chapter.

Translations

The various translation series constitute the largest portion of NSA's cryptologic records. The main value of the translations for researchers is their contemporaneous account of the events they reference. The translations are primary sources: they lack the additions, omissions, or later perspectives that distort memoirs, histories, or postwar interviews or interrogations.

That much said in their favor, the translations also present researchers with a set of technical difficulties that can limit their effective use. First, translations suffer from substantial gaps caused by poor, missed, or garbled intercept; incompleteness or errors in recovered Japanese codes or ciphers; and difficulties with the language itself. In addition, all translations contain technical processing information that is obscure to those unfamiliar with the wartime system. Finally, the translations are filled with mentions of Japanese equipment and base locations for which there are no easily available references.

In addition to these textual challenges, there are two formidable problems regarding the organization of the collections. The first is that there was sometimes a significant lag between the time a message was intercepted and the time it was formally assigned a serial number and officially released. The Army or Navy cryptologic service assigned translations a serial number and placed them in a series in the order of their release, not in the order of the date on which the message was actually sent by the originating country. While a number of translations were issued within a day or so of their intercept, many others were disseminated weeks and even months later. This means that many are chronologically out of order, forcing scholars to search for information about a particular event sometimes well beyond the date it occurred. The translations of Japanese Army messages sent on September 22, 1944, that reported the sinking of the prison ship *Rakuyu Maru*, for example, were not released until February and March 1945.¹⁶

Table 1. Summary of COMINT records at the National Archives

| Record Group | Entry | Entry title | NSA serial | Army/ Navy serial | Number of translations or boxes | Date |
|--------------|-------|---------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| 457 | 9006 | MAGIC Diplomatic Summary ^a | SRS | N/A | 20 | 1942–45 |
| 457 | 9005 | Army | SR | J | 136,800 | 1943–45 |
| 457 | 9004 | Army Attaché | SRA | JMA/D | 18,500 | 1941–45 ^b |
| 457 | 9011 | Diplomatic | SRDJ | JD-# H ^c | 126,800 | 1939–45 |
| 457 | 9012 | Air Force | SRF | F | 40,900 | 1943–44 |
| 457 | 9014 | Navy | SRN | JN-#, G ^d | 290,900 | 1941–45 |
| 457 | 9013 | Naval Attaché | SRNA | JNA | 5,300 | 1941–45 ^e |
| 457 | 9018 | Water Transport ^f | SRR | JR | 44,300 | 1943–44 |
| 457 | 9021 | Vichy Diplomatic | SRDV | N/A | 19 boxes | 1941–43 |
| 457 | 9027 | RED Machine Translations | N/A | N/A | 3,500 | 1934–38 |
| 457 | 9030 | MAGIC Diplomatic Summary | SRS | N/A | 19 boxes | 1942–45 |
| 457 | 9032 | Multinational Diplomatic | N/A ^g | H ^h | 201,571 | 1939–45 |
| 457 | 9032 | Summary of Japanese | N/A | SJM | 9 boxes | 1942–45 |
| 457 | 9032 | Summary of Multinational | N/A | SMM | 7 boxes | 1942–45 |
| 457 | 9032 | Army | N/A | J, JX ⁱ | 125 boxes | 1943–45 |
| 457 | 9032 | Air Force | N/A | F, FX | 48 boxes | 1943–44 |
| 457 | 9001 | MAGIC Far East Summary | SRS | N/A | 11 boxes | 1942–45 |
| 38 | CNSG | Navy | N/A | JN | 1800+ boxes | 1941–45 |

^a This is the redacted version of the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary.

^b The Japanese Military Attaché traffic was not broken until 1943. Translations of messages from prior years were done at the end of the war and afterwards.

^c From September–July 1940, translations of intercepted and decrypted multinational diplomatic translations carried both Army and Navy serial numbers.

^d This numbering system was maintained even after the war. Japanese naval messages encrypted in the main operational code, JN-25, prior to Pearl Harbor were finally decrypted and translated after the war. They carried the series prefix JN-5 for 1945.

^e The Japanese Naval Attaché messages were not exploited until mid-1943. Near the end of the war, messages prior to the exploitation were then decrypted and translated.

^f The “Water Transport” messages were sent by the various regional Japanese shipping centers of the Imperial Army’s Shipping Transport Command. The Japanese Army maintained its own shipping to assure supply and transport support of its garrisons.

^g Only a redacted version of these summaries was available prior to the 1996 release.

^h H was the last in a number of serial designators used by the SIS to identify diplomatic translations.

ⁱ Military serial designator with an x indicates that the translation is a synopsis or extract.

A second problem for researchers is the lack of a cross-reference system between the originally assigned wartime serial numbers and the serialization scheme NSA assigned when it released the translations to NARA. The two serialization systems do not match. The SIS or OP-20-G assigned a serial number to a complete individual translation, regardless of the number of pages, whereas NSA assigned a consecutive number for each page in a translation series regardless of whether a page belonged to a multipart translation. The original serialization provides a count of translations in a series; the NSA serialization provides a page count of the series. For researchers the problem is exacerbated because in the margins of MAGIC Diplomatic and Far East Summaries there are citations for the Army and Navy translations used, but these citations refer to the original serial numbers, not the later NSA serials. Neither NSA nor NARA has produced an index that cross-references the two systems.

A final problem is the lack of a topical index for any of the translation series in NSA or Naval Security Group record groups, leaving researchers unable to retrieve the relevant single translation or the set of them that they may want. Unless one can use the results of previous searches by others, the only strategy short of reviewing every translation in a series or entry is to rely on the fortunate selection of an entry point.

The following are brief descriptions of the translation series that deal with the war against Japan. Each section lists the title of the translation collection, the originator and NSA series designator, entry number(s), and box numbers where the translations can be found.

Japanese Service Translations

Japanese Army, J-series/SR, Entries 9006 and 9032, Boxes 1149–1273

The Japanese Army employed numerous codes and ciphers, as well as other cryptographic aids, cipher additives, encrypted address lists, and the like to secure its communications from the lowest level to the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo. The codes of the Japanese Army—specifically those that encoded the messages passed on the high-level administrative networks between Tokyo and the area army commands—were not exploited by the Allies until early 1944. As a result, prior to this time, there are very few translations available.

There are two entries that contain Japanese Army translations. The first, entry 9006, consists of the NSA-redacted versions of the original U.S. Army translations. The deleted information was almost exclusively technical in nature; message contents were seldom edited. The second, entry 9032, consists of the original versions of the translations. These are found in boxes 1149 to 1273. There are nearly 106,000 translations in both entries. The original translations carry the serialization scheme with the prefix J followed by the serial number. Multi-page translations have a suffix for each additional page, beginning

with the letter A. Some translations have a JX prefix, indicating that the translation is an extract or synopsis. Below is an example of such a translation of a September 14, 1945, message from the Southern Area Army Headquarters in Singapore to Imperial Army Headquarters in Tokyo listing internees in Japanese camps who are sick. It lists them by illness, nationality, and sex.

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J-104512-A-E

JZM 0000 9311 1233 6674 6062 0956
JZM 0000 9311 3976 6674 6062 1218
JZM 0000 9311 4114 6674 6062 0719
JZM 0000 9311 4599 6674 6062 0468
JZM 0000 0931 1123 3667 4606 2751

1110 14 Sep 45 1434 5
Tsu 505 On--M-- 35 13 Sep 45 0800
Ate: --G-- Fort de Kock to --M--
Special Urgent, (Tokyo (c) de Singapore (c) Ckt)

TOMI Staff Message #3711 Parts 1-5*

Patients: Personnel, by illness, by nationality [and]
by sex. (31 August survey) 1. Persons interned
by the Army [GUN] (1) This place (RANTAU PRAPAT)
Dysentery, HOLLAND, men 4, women 11, Total
15 (ck. 15); Malaria, HOLLAND, men 3, women 10,
Total 13 (ck. 13); Tuberculosis, HOLLAND, women 1,
Total 1 (ck. 1); Nervous diseases, HOLLAND, men 2,
women 7, Total 9 (ck. 9); --2G-- disease, HOLLAND,
men 2, women 5, Total 7 (ck. 7); --7G/M-- disease,
ENGLAND, women 1, HOLLAND, women 2, Total 3
(ck. 3); Cancer, HOLLAND, women 1, Total 1
(ck. 1); --2G-- disease, HOLLAND --1G-- 8,
Total 8 (ck. 8); Circulatory diseases, HOLLAND, men
2, women 1, Total 3 (ck. 3); Gastroenteric
diseases, HOLLAND, men 12 (including one child), women
8 (including one child), Total 20 (ck. 20);
External wounds, HOLLAND, women, 1, Total 1 (ck. 1)
Appendicitis, HOLLAND, boys 2, women 3, Total 5
(ck. 5);
Ma Tsu 506 On 3115
Ate: 3110 Tena Special Urgent(Tokyo (c) de Singapore(c)Ckt)
* - Parts 7, 26 and 27 same number.
Trans 1447 21 Sep 45 (9857-g)

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J-104512-A-E

In accordance with the Allied exchange agreement, SIS received numerous Japanese Army translations from Commonwealth sites. These translations can be identified by the presence of a special trigraph in the upper right side of the page, xBT for exchanged British translation, xAT for exchanged Australian translation, and xIT for exchanged India translation (probably referring to translations issued by the Wireless Experimental Center at New Delhi, India).

The translations cover a number of general topics that one might expect from army messages: intelligence reports, unit status, logistics and transport issues, and personnel actions such as officer postings and casualty notices. Combat reports are numerous, occasionally quite detailed. There are also translations about postwar concerns such as the location of POW and civilian internee camps, the accounting of prisoners, the surrender of Japanese troops and high-profile collaborators, and early nationalist agitation and conflict in Indochina and the Dutch East Indies.

Japanese Air Force, F-series/SRF, Entries 9012 and 9032, Boxes 628–676

The Japanese Army and navy both had aviation arms. Messages of the army's air force are contained in entries 9012 and 9032. The earliest translations date from February 1943. Almost all of these translations are messages between Japanese air bases and air force commands. Air-to-ground communications, which were intercepted and exploited from the first days of the war, were considered tactical and appear not to have been disseminated in a translation series. Forward-deployed Allied monitoring units copied these transmissions but issued no formal translations, though excerpts of some intercepts appear in Allied command summaries.

Air Force translations are found in two entries. The first, entry 9012, is the set of NSA-redacted translations. The second, entry 9032, contains the unredacted original translations. There are 40,980 translations in this series dating from February 1943 to August 1944. The original translations carry the serialization scheme with the prefix F followed by the serial number. Here, too, multi-section translations have a suffix for each additional page, beginning with the letter A. There are some translations with the prefix FX, which indicates that they are extracts or synopses.

The Japanese air force translations tend to concern technical aspects of its daily activity: logistics such as fuel, spare parts, repairs, and modifications to aircraft. A perennial topic was the availability of pilots and aircraft for each of the subordinate units of the air forces. The translations also contain reports of the damage caused by Allied air attacks on various airfields. Towards the end of the war, many pilots and aircraft were diverted from regular air units to form *tokubetsu kōgekitai*, special attack or kamikaze formations. These intercepted messages allowed the United States to track the deployment of these

units and their strength. Air force translations also contained several reports on Allied POWs, their locations, and their transfer to other camps.

Japanese Navy, JN-series/SRN, RG 457, Entry 9014, Boxes 1–358; and RG 38, Entry Japanese Navy Translations, Boxes 232–2391

The United States Navy's OP-20-G produced the translations in these collections almost exclusively, though Commonwealth cryptologists generated a small number dealing with operations in the Indian Ocean and waters around western Dutch East Indies and Malaya. These translations begin shortly before the war in the Pacific started and end with the continued disarmament of the Japanese Navy in early 1946. Both entries contain the translations of messages encrypted in the main Japanese naval operational code, JN-25.

Users should note that translations prior to March 1942, the month that the first real exploitation of JN-25 occurred, are often fragmentary. Translations of JN-25 messages dealing with the Pearl Harbor Striking Force (*Kido Butai*) were produced from September 1945 through January 1946. The translations were not released to the hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee inquiry into Pearl Harbor, but were withheld from the committee on the order of Admiral Chester Nimitz.¹⁷ The *Kido Butai* translations are found in entry 9014, boxes 144–147.

The translations generally are not in chronological order. For example, boxes 142–144 cover the January–April 1946 demobilization of the Imperial Japanese navy installations and resources. There is a 51-page index of translation serials with associated box numbers, but there is no topical index.

Most of the naval translations in record group 38 can be found in entry “XA List, Mixed Files, Translations of the Japanese Naval Messages.” This series of unredacted translations contains more than 2,600 boxes, referred to as “Japanese Orange Translations.” About 10 percent of the boxes do not contain translations. The translations are organized by topic, such as Japanese airbases, place names, Japanese ships, air and naval units, and chemical warfare. There is no topical entry for prisoners, internees, or general atrocities.

Within each topical section, the translations are arranged in reverse chronological order. These topical collections include translations of messages from other sources such as diplomatic intercept, summary reports, and captured documents. An index delineates box ranges of translations dealing with a particular topic. For example, translations pertaining to specific Japanese *maru* (merchant ships) can be found in boxes 1156 to 1355. The translations are grouped by *maru* listed in alphabetic order, enabling a researcher to locate all translations dealing with individual ships such as the *Arisan Maru* and the *Brazil Maru*. Other topics include warships and Japanese naval shore installations.

Japanese Army Water Transport Code, JR-series/SRR, Entries 9018 and 9032, Boxes 626–7, 531–575

During the war, the Imperial Japanese Army controlled a number of merchant ships through the management of various shipping agencies associated with the area armies. Messages about the activities of these ships cover loading and offloading; embarkation of troops, passengers, or prisoners; convoy routes and locations; attacks and incidents at sea; and arrival at port. These messages were encoded in a cryptographic system the Allies called the “Water Transport Code.” The code was exploited by the Americans and Commonwealth cryptanalysts from April 6, 1943, to July 17, 1944, when the Japanese switched to a new code system. During that period, Allies issued some 44,000 translations, though many more messages may have been exploited informally.¹⁸ Allies used the information in these messages to target convoys for attack by submarines and aircraft.¹⁹ Through these records, researchers can track the activities of Japanese merchant ships that may have been used to transport prisoners and internees from 1943 to 1944.

The translations found in entry 9018 are redacted. Those in entry 9032 are not redacted, though there are some gaps in the series near the beginning and at the end. Like most of the other series, the translations themselves were issued long after the original message was intercepted.

Japanese Diplomatic Translations

There are six series of translations of Japanese and other nations’ diplomatic messages available to researchers that are relevant to war crimes and atrocities in the Pacific. Two of these series are translations of the messages of Japanese Naval Attachés (SRNA) and Military Attachés (SRMA) that contain only incidental information about Japanese war crimes. The most relevant series is the “Multinational Diplomatic Translations,” which can be considered the “master set” of diplomatic translations. It contains the messages of Japan, Portugal, Spain, France (Vichy and Free French regimes), Thailand, Switzerland, China (Nationalist, Communist, and the collaborationist Nanjing regimes), and of numerous other nations. There are two additional sets of diplomatic translations drawn exclusively from the multinational collection, the diplomatic messages of Japan (SRDJ) and Vichy France (SRDV). These are redacted versions of originals found in the multinational collection. The final set consists of the so-called RED machine messages, translations of Japanese diplomatic messages encrypted with the M-2 cipher machine.

Japanese Military and Naval Attaché Translations, D-series/SRA, Entries 9004 and 9032, Boxes 677–698; JNA-SERIES/SRMA, Entries 9013 and 9032, Boxes 1441–1456

Allied intelligence officers and cryptologists were interested in messages sent from

Japanese military and navy attachés, especially those in Nazi Germany, but also those in minor Axis powers, such as Hungary and Finland. Like their counterparts everywhere, Japanese attachés observed their host country's naval and military services, reported on intelligence and technical matters, and in some cases, performed liaison duties. Tokyo's attachés reported on Nazi technological advances in military optics, radars, armored fighting vehicles, advanced aircraft design—especially the Luftwaffe's jet prototypes and operational aircraft—and the development of the V-series rockets. There is very little in these records about the war in the Pacific and Asia, except for occasional information about Japanese Americans, whose capture and subsequent interrogations by the Germans evoked much interest from Tokyo.²⁰

Entry 9004 holds over 18,500 military attaché translations dating 1941–45. However, the Allies could not read these attaché messages until 1943, so messages from the early years of the war were deciphered after the war, some as late as 1946. The collection begins with number 1001, but there is no explanation for the missing translations. Some of the translations are redacted. NARA has indexed the collection, and the finding aid is available for researchers.

Entry 9013 has over 5,300 naval attaché translations. Allies began to decipher these messages in mid-1943, but could not fully exploit them until March 1944.²¹ Translations range from 1941–45; much of the material preceding 1944 was completed in the early postwar period. These translations are not in chronological order, and some are redacted. Translations in entry 9032 are not redacted, but in some boxes they are mixed in with Japanese naval translations.

Multinational Diplomatic Translations, H-series, RG 457, Entry 9032, Boxes 286–516

This is the largest collection of diplomatic translations, with 201,571 unredacted translations totaling more than 225,000 pages. The translations date from November 1938 to August 1945. The translations are located in entry 9032, known as the Historical Cryptographic Collection (HCC). The set includes original ditto copies produced during the war. Some translations are missing, and some portions of the collection are out of serial order because NSA preparers rearranged some bunches of translations by country instead of by serial number. Translations from 1938 to 1940 are predominantly Japanese diplomatic messages. Tokyo's diplomatic messages account for approximately 55 percent of all translations in this collection.

The SIS assigned a serial number to these translations, and from mid-1941 to March 1942, OP-20-G also assigned a separate serial notation to them, the JP-series. During this time, both the Army and the Navy worked on Japanese diplomatic messages: the SIS processed all intercepted messages on even days, and OP-20-G did the same on odd

days. This practice of assigning double serialization ended in April 1942, when the SIS took exclusive responsibility for the records. From 1942, the SIS used different prefixes for the diplomatic series, SSD followed by SSB. From November 1944 through the end of the war, the SIS assigned the prefix H to the diplomatic series.

Allied cryptologists produced a small number of the translations in this series and exchanged them with the Americans as part of the British-American exchange agreement concluded in July 1943. These exchanged translations carry the trigraph XBT, for exchanged British translation, on the upper left hand side of the page. Occasionally, the original British serial number, noted by the prefix BJ, can be seen on the upper right hand side of the translation.²²

During the war, the Allies collected, processed, and translated the diplomatic radio or cable traffic of almost every nation in the world.²³ Early in the war, the SIS translated mostly Japanese, Vichy French, or Latin American messages. By 1943, the United States was also exploiting diplomatic messages of China, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Thailand, and the French administration in Indochina. Many of their messages were concerned with atrocities, plundering, and POWs (such as the one shown on page 128–29).

Japanese and Vichy French Diplomatic Translations, SRDJ, Entry 9011; SRDV, Entry 9021

NSA released these two special collections of diplomatic translations in 1983 and 1984, respectively. Both collections were extracted from the “master” Multinational Diplomatic series and were part of NSA’s early release of Axis wartime cryptologic material. Entry 9011 contains some 126,800 pages of redacted Japanese diplomatic translations from 1939 to 1945. Entry 9021 contains about 18,000 pages of redacted Vichy French diplomatic translations and includes messages from 1941 to 1945, although there are very few from the last two years of the war. Both of these entries, while composed of redacted translations, have the advantage of containing all of the Japanese and Vichy messages found in the larger multinational collection.

Japanese RED Diplomatic Machine Translations, Entry 9027

Before introducing the PURPLE Machine, the Japanese used the M-2 cipher machine that the SIS code named RED. RED was operational in the early 1930s. By late 1934, the SIS could exploit it and continued to do so right up to its replacement by PURPLE during 1938–1939. The translations of the RED messages are located in entry 9027. There are four boxes containing about 3,400 unredacted translations from July 1934 to November 1939. About 200–300 translations are not numbered. There is a small overlap with the Multinational Diplomatic series. Generally, these translations cover issues of Japanese foreign policy during the mid- to late-1930s: relations with the United

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708

From: Madrid
To : Tokyo
12 April 1945
SPA

25-27

(? Today ?) the Cabinet released the following note for publication:

"Direct reports, of Spanish origin and officially confirmed, leave no doubt of the assault carried out on the 12 February by Japanese troops on the Spanish Consulate at Manila when all Consular officials and other persons present were assassinated and the building wantonly burned.

There were, in addition, many other murders committed as well as deliberate destruction of property belonging to Spanish citizens.

In view of the exceptional seriousness --45U-- the loss of lives and damages caused to Spanish subjects".

The break of diplomatic relations does not imply the closing of the (? Embassies ?) which, for the time being, must continue to protect Spanish interests. On a reciprocal basis both the Japanese Representative in Madrid and the diplomatic personnel attached to the Spanish Embassy in Tokyo will remain at liberty, living either in the Legation building or in a hotel which is selected by common accord. While negotiations are

Spanish

H-177899

Page 1

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This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

Spanish Diplomatic Message, 12 April 1945, reporting 12 February attack on Spanish Consul in Manila by Japanese troops, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 482, H-177899.

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under way for an exchange, I will provide every facility, not only those prescribed as right and just but --24U--.

The Japanese Representative was informed (? of the above ?) when the note announcing the break of relations was given him.

Please acknowledge the receipt of these telegrams.

States, the increasingly close relationship with Nazi Germany, and Japan's aggression against China that began in 1937. NARA is currently developing an index to the RED translations.

Summaries of Messages, Summaries of Japanese Messages (SJM) and Summaries of Multinational Messages (SMM)

American cryptologists translated numerous intercepted messages from Japan and other countries that did not warrant a separate, serialized translation. These unserialized messages were placed in compendiums of complete translations, and should not be confused with the more recognizable MAGIC Summaries (discussed below). SIS generally did not serialize unencrypted messages or those encrypted in low-level or commercial code. There is no clear set of factors that explains why some translations were placed in serialized collections and others were not.

Many of these summaries, however, contained intelligence or information of interest, some of it important enough to be featured in MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries. SIS published three to six separate summaries per page. Each page carried a consecutive serial number. The Summary of Japanese Messages (SJM), Summary of German Messages (SGM), Summary of French Messages (SFM), and Summary of Multinational Messages (SMM) were all started during the war. An illustration of such a summary is shown on the facing page. It is a translation of a Swiss diplomatic message from Bern to Bangkok detailing the expenditures for the relief of British prisoners in Thailand, as well as further Swiss requests for relief of British prisoners in Burma.

Generally, these four series comprised translations of diplomatic or commercial messages. The SMM also contains messages from nongovernmental organizations, most notably the International Committee of the Red Cross. The SMM and the SJM, both located in entry 9032, are the most interesting. The SJM comprises more than 20,000 pages of summaries, and the SMM collection totals more than 8,000 pages.

MAGIC and Other Summary-type Collections

By the last year of the war, the War Department's Special Branch alone was receiving intelligence from over 800 separate sources including cryptology, foreign news sources, exchanges with numerous Allied governments, photographic intelligence, POW interrogation, and so on.²⁴ To help leaders in Washington and in the field manage the deluge of information available, intelligence staffs published bulletins that highlighted particularly important pieces of information. The War Department's Special Branch developed the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary and the MAGIC Far East Summary. Other commands developed their own summaries. In the central Pacific, there were

WAR DEPARTMENT

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S-Ser488

SMM

24 April 45

PAGE: 12072

BERN - BANGKOK

SZA W.S.173 18 Apr. 45
10849

74^a
Your #78.

I am remitting to you via Tokyo 500,000 baht for aid to British prisoners in Thailand for the first quarter of 1945. In the new regulation, which applies in general to all aid granted to British prisoners in the Far East, the British Government authorizes an expenditure up to 20 yen per month per person if that is shown to be essential to the minimum general well being of the latter.

Your 28^o In accordance with the wishes of the Canadian Legation and following your suggestion, we have commissioned Minister GORGE to obtain the authorization of the Japanese Government to the sending of funds for British prisoners in Burma.

POLITIQUE INTERETS.

a. SMM, p. 11028.

b. H-165715.

BERN - WASHINGTON

SZD W.S.414 22 Feb. 45

197^a
Your #155.

Since we have no supporting facts concerning the Swiss character of the enterprises mentioned, we have instructed Buenos Aires to refrain from any provisional representations and not to concern themselves with the prevention of an enforced sale. In case Swiss participation should be revealed later, our rights to the proceeds of the sale should at that time be insisted upon as the condition of our consent.

POLITISCHES.

C.T.

a. Not readable.

M

Swiss

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WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) Summary of Ultra Traffic and CINCPAC (Commander in Chief Pacific) Intelligence Bulletins. In the Southwest Pacific, Gen. MacArthur's staff issued the SWPA Intelligence Bulletin.

MAGIC Diplomatic and Far East Summaries

The MAGIC Diplomatic Summary first appeared in March 1942 and continued throughout the war. Initially, it relied almost exclusively on COMINT, but later incorporated limited information from other sources. The MAGIC Diplomatic Summary had five sections: Political, Military, Economic, Morale-Psychological, and Miscellaneous, and often contained extensive quotes from translations and occasional attachments with significant extracts. Each section cites its sources, which is a help to researchers who wish to see the original reports.

Sets of the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary are located in two entries. Entry 9006 holds 1,800 pages of the Diplomatic Summary initially transfer to NARA in 1983. This set covers material from January 1943 to August 1945. The Summaries in entry 9006 are redacted and many are missing substantial portions of text. In 1995, NSA turned over the record set of Diplomatic Summaries to NARA, which became entry 9030. Summaries in this entry date from March 1942 to August 1945.²⁵

The Special Branch's MAGIC Far East Summary highlighted intelligence from all sources that was relevant to the war against Japan. Like the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary, the Far East Summary began in March 1942, but it ran only through December 1943. The series restarted in February 1944 and continued until October 1945. The 823 redacted summaries are located in entry 9001. The original, unedited record set of Far East Summaries may be found in entry 9032. This collection runs from February 1944 to October 1945. The sample summary on the next page highlights a Japanese Southern Area Army directive regarding the handling of prisoners and internees in the post-hostilities period leading up to the arrival of Allied troops. The first three items in this particular summary deal with prisoner issues.

Other Command Summaries and Bulletins

U.S. commands in the war against Japan also issued their own intelligence summaries that contained much COMINT. These summaries, like the CINCPAC and Southwest Pacific Area Intelligence Bulletins, were oriented toward military interests and were used to inform various subordinate commands of Japanese activities, plans, and intelligence about Allied operations. Only rarely during the war did messages that contained information relating to Japanese war crimes and atrocities appear in the Summaries and Bulletins, and these references were oblique. On October 24, 1944, for example, U.S. submarines

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| <p>Total pages--5</p> | | <p>WAR DEPARTMENT Office of A. C. of S., G-2</p> |
| <p><u>"MAGIC"--FAR EAST SUMMARY</u></p> | | |
| <p>NOTE: No one, without express permission from the proper authorities, may disseminate the information reported in this Summary or communicate it to any other person.</p> | | |
| <p>Those authorized to disseminate such information must employ only the most secure means, must take every precaution to avoid compromising the source, and must limit dissemination to the minimum number of secure and responsible persons who need the information in order to discharge their duties.</p> | | |
| <p>No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of the source to the enemy.</p> | | |
| <p>The enemy knows that we attempt to exploit these sources. He does not know, and must not be permitted to learn, either the degree of our success or the particular sources with which we have been successful.</p> | | |
| <p>1. <u>Southern Area--Japanese Directive on Prisoners of War and Internees:</u> (J038)</p> | | |
| <p>On 19 Aug the Southern Army issued the following directive to its subordinate commands throughout the Southern Area:</p> | | |
| <p>"From now on, all Army commanders will handle prisoners and internees as follows:</p> | | |
| <p>"(1) Work involving the use of prisoners will cease.</p> | | |
| <p>"(2) Food, clothing, sanitation, lodging, etc., will be the same as for Japanese troops.</p> | | |
| <p>TOP SECRET ULTRA</p> | | <p>16</p> |

attacked a Japanese convoy sailing out of the Philippines and sank the prison ship *Arisan Maru*. The CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletin for November 5, 1944, mentioned that the convoy's escort, the destroyer *Harukaze*, was torpedoed, but it made no mention of the POWs aboard the *Arisan Maru*.²⁶ It is not altogether clear how much intelligence was available about the prisoners aboard the ship. In another example, Southwest Pacific Special Intelligence Bulletins in February 1944 carried information intercepted from Japanese messages about the intelligence gained from an American POW pilot, but the Bulletin made no mention of the treatment or fate of the pilot (see facing page).²⁷

What Is and Is Not in the Records

The intelligence contained in the translations and summary reports that relate to war crimes and atrocities committed by Japan during from 1931 to 1945 may be divided into four general categories: (1) the treatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees, including their roundup, conditions during captivity, transfer, and release; (2) the treatment of noncombatants, including suppression of indigenous populations and any punitive actions taken against them; (3) Japanese looting or exploitation of natural resources, national, cultural, or personal assets, and the use of forced labor; and (4) Japanese involvement in the research, development, or use of chemical or biological weapons. Much of the intelligence often concerned more than one category of war crimes. For example, in their efforts to exploit the industry of conquered areas, the Japanese worked laborers to death.

Treatment of Allied POWs and Civilian Internees

Early in the war in the Pacific, Japanese forces had captured or interned thousands of Allied soldiers and civilians. Although Japan signed the July 1929 Geneva Convention, it had never formally ratified the accompanying Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. During the Japanese war in China, COMINT revealed, Japanese had abused prisoners. In one case, the Japanese acknowledged shooting Chinese prisoners on Amoy.²⁸

On December 18, 1941, the United States, through a Swiss intermediary, asked Japan its intentions regarding the treatment of prisoners. On February 4, 1942, Japan replied that while not bound by the Convention's rules on the treatment of prisoners, Japan would apply *mutatis mutandis* provisions to every American POW in its control.²⁹

By April 1942, well over 220,000 Allied POWs were in Japanese hands. This included about 170,000 troops of the Commonwealth countries, 15,000 Americans, 30,000 Dutch, over 30,000 Filipinos, and smaller contingents of Burmese and other native colonial service personnel. Intercepts throughout the remainder of the war often provided scattered mentions of other sailors, airmen, and soldiers being captured.

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| DECODED BY: FINITE | CHECKED BY: X | FOR INFORMATION | 9 |
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| <p>BELIEVE ALL JAP ARMY FORCES ORDERED SUSPEND BATTLE ACTIVITIES EVENING 16 AUGUST. [REDACTED] JAP ALNAV ISSUED 15TH GIVES GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR DISPOSAL BY BURNING OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND OTHER CLASSIFIED MATTER. CLARIFYING MESSAGE NEXT DAY SINGLES OUT CERTAIN TYPES OF DOCUMENTS WHOSE FALLING INTO ENEMY HANDS WOULD BE IN NO WAY DETRIMENTAL TO JAP INTERESTS AND WHICH SHOULD THEREFORE BE PRESERVED. AMONG THESE ARE LISTS OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERVEES, PERSONAL RECORDS AND BELONGINGS OF PRISONERS, DEATH RECORDS, MEDICAL HISTORIES ETC. DIRECTIVE 16 AUGUST FROM 3RD SECTION (INTELLIGENCE) NAVAL GENERAL STAFF APPARENTLY ORDERS DISPOSAL OF ALL DOCUMENTS DEALING WITH PRISONER OF WAR</p> | | | |
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Special Intelligence Bulletin, # 293, 24 February 1944, and # 296, 27 February 1944, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, NA, RG 457, entry 9002, SRH-203.

Sometimes, especially with the capture of pilots, Japanese messages would give the prisoner's name or nationality, or both.³⁰

Whatever the Japanese may have meant by their February 1942 reply to the Americans, COMINT soon intercepted diplomatic messages that suggested that the Japanese were sensitive to charges about the mistreatment of Allied prisoners. In March 1942, the Japanese Foreign Office informed its Berlin embassy that it was sending out material to rebut "false British propaganda." It wanted Berlin to know that all wounded or sick soldiers and civilians interned in Hong Kong were being treated well and that no one was suffering any "inconvenience." This cable was likely a response to a speech by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who had reported to Parliament the mistreatment of Commonwealth troops captured in Hong Kong.³¹ In June 1942, the Japanese Foreign Office reported from Shanghai that the army was finally going to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit POWs in Hong Kong. This move, it hoped, would deny the Allies material for propaganda against Japan.³²

During the first two years of the war, COMINT did not provide much detail about the capture of Allied servicemen or the conditions in which Allied POWs lived. Atrocities like the Bataan Death March and the massacres of Dutch soldiers and civilians went virtually unreported. In the case of the construction of the Bangkok to Rangoon railroad, only a passing reference to the forced use of British prisoners for construction was included in the January 4, 1943, MAGIC Diplomatic Summary. Not until April 1944 did an intercepted Japanese air force message admit that the Allies were aware of the fact and that "strict measure[s] had to be taken to hide this information."³³

While the intelligence about POWs and civilian internees from Japanese sources was sparse, French colonial and diplomatic codes revealed much about the transport of 2,000 Allied POWs to French Indochina in March 1942.

Vichy France was officially neutral in the war against Japan and did not want to antagonize the Japanese, who had occupied Indochina since September 1940. The French were under no illusions about Japanese treatment of prisoners: they had experienced Japanese atrocities firsthand in 1940, when Japanese troops executed a number of officers and enlisted men stationed in border posts like Dong Dang and Mon Cai who had opposed their advance.

The Swiss consul in Saigon had sought permission to visit POW camps. The French administration, disgruntled that more POWs would be sent to Indochina, nevertheless assisted the Swiss representatives in securing visits to the camps. As the war progressed, the French colonial administration took the position that any Allied pilots shot down over Indochina and interned by the French would not be turned over to Japanese authorities. This practice became a point of friction with the Japanese, and was later cited as a reason for Japan's March 1945 takeover of Indochina.³⁴

In early 1944, Allies obtained intelligence about the Japanese plan to transport large numbers of POWs to the home islands to work in factories, mines, and elsewhere (see below). Messages between Tokyo and Batavia, Dutch East Indies; Singapore; Bangkok, Thailand; Rangoon, Burma; and Manila mentioned the number of prisoners to be shipped back: at least 10,000 were from Thailand; over 5,500 had already been shipped or were at sea.³⁵ In September, Tokyo reminded Manila that if it was sending prisoners, it also had to ship sufficient medicine for them, since medical supplies were scarce in Japan.³⁶

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SASO Kanchanaburi (d) to Tokyo (c) (Tokyo (c) de Singapore (c) Ckt.)

THAILAND Prisoner of War Camp Message #526

Please inform 1st Lt. KAWAI, superintendent of transferring prisoners to the control of this office.

1. If they stop sending prisoners here they should send a circular wire to us and also to the SUGUN.
2. 1st Lt. TAKAGI will communicate the gist of the above to each other officer in the branches of --2G--.

Addressee:
FURYU JOHU KYOKU

Reference:
(?SHI KU?)^a RENRAKUSHO CHU^b

a - May be "I"
b - CEF and KU (甲) Liaison Office CHU

Trans 25 Oct 44 (8062-z) F 35497

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Kanchanaburi, Thailand to Tokyo, F-35497, 25 October, 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1703.

Not all POWs were sent to Japan. In May 1944, at least 1,000 POWs were still working on the Thailand-Burma railroad.³⁷ In January 1945, another 5,000 prisoners in Thailand were organized into *yasen kimmukai* (Field Duty Units) to build an airfield.³⁸ In December 1944, the Japanese POW Authority in the Philippines sent a message to Tokyo discussing the advantages of shipping some 3,150 civilian internees to Japan. Their transfer to the home islands would be “profitable,” according to the message, because the internees were 18–40 years old, and some were technicians, lawyers, and corporate leaders and managers. However, the United States was invading the Philippines, making transport of the internees difficult.³⁹ But orders were issued to ship them anyway.⁴⁰

The prison ships that transported the POWs were notorious for their inhumane conditions. The Japanese starved and mistreated prisoners. In addition, the United States targeted the shipping lanes and convoys to Japan and torpedoed several of these ships, such as the *Rakuyu Maru* and the *Kenwa Maru*, with significant, sometimes almost total, loss of life. Intercepted messages provided some details on the losses. The *Rakuyu Maru* was carrying 950 prisoners when it was hit by a U.S. torpedo; the Japanese escort ships picked up many survivors, but 431 POWs remained missing.⁴¹

During the war, the Allied powers, principally the United States and Great Britain, tried to provide physical relief for their POWs held by the Japanese. The Allies’ most significant act was to arrange to transfer funds through the Swiss National Bank to the Yokohama Specie Bank. A number of Japanese and Swiss diplomatic translations tell of the negotiations, management, and outcome of this effort (see facing page).⁴² A special account was established in the Yokohama Specie Bank in August 1944 to hold funds that the Japanese were to spend on supplies for prisoners. Eventually, the United States, Great Britain, and the Dutch contributed several million dollars that were to be transferred into this account. But the Japanese withheld most funds, and, possibly as a result, the Swiss representatives in the Far East found it difficult to purchase supplies because of scarce supplies and rising expenses.⁴³

As the war moved closer to Japan, the fate of the prisoners became increasingly important to the Allies. The Allies were aware that the Japanese had plans to execute prisoners under their control at the end of the war.⁴⁴ They also knew that the Japanese had issued standing orders to punish captured Allied commandos and combat pilots under such rules as the “Southern Army Military Law, Punishment of the Crews of Enemy Aircraft.”⁴⁵ The Japanese had set a precedent for this behavior during the trial and subsequent execution of three captured crew from the April 1942 Doolittle Raid. After the war, the Japanese local commands were ordered to forward information to senior area headquarters about the judgments rendered on captured pilots and crewmembers, as well as about the executions of all POWs who had been under their control.⁴⁶

From: Tokyo (SHIGEMITSU)
To : Saigon (Japanese Minister)
13 November 1944

No Number.

(Request Message for Yokohama Specie Bank.)

16. Confidential.

According to the agreement between this bank and the Banque Nationale Suisse.

(1). The Swiss Minister will open a Swiss Minister's Special Account (TOKUBETSU KANJO) at the TOKYO Branch of our Bank. Our bank will open a Yokohama Specie Bank (SHOKIN) Special Account at the Banque Nationale Suisse, ZURICH.

(11). On the Swiss side profits, agency costs and expenses in connexion with the Red Cross to be remitted to JAPAN or to places in GREAT EAST ASIA will be paid into the Yokohama Specie Bank Special Account.

(111). All remittances to places in GREAT EAST ASIA will be made through the Swiss Minister's Special Account at the TOKYO Branch. Our branches at the places to which remittances are addressed will open Swiss Special Accounts and, on receipt of the money will pay by the same procedure

Japanese

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Page 1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~This document contains information of a confidential nature and its contents must be kept secret and not disclosed to unauthorized persons.~~



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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

After the Japanese accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies monitored their compliance with instructions regarding the treatment of POWs and civilian internees. A message from the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army to all army commands ordered the release of POWs and civilian internees. The Army would transport them safely to the transfer points specified by the Allies and provide proper food, clothing, accommodations, and health care. Senior POW officers were given jurisdiction over all materials, records, arms, and ammunition at the prison camps. Japanese commanders also had to provide complete lists that accounted for all prisoners and internees who were in their commands. All supplies air dropped by the Allies had to be delivered to the prisoners “without fail.” Finally, all camps had to be marked by the letters “PW” 20-feet high, oriented south to north, and written in yellow on a black background.⁴⁷

Many Japanese military and naval commands followed the instructions from Tokyo, although, on occasion, some disobeyed. For example, a Japanese Navy directive of the command in the Dutch East Indies ordered that any records concerned with the treatment of natives or prisoners that were “disadvantageous” from a “diplomatic standpoint” were to be destroyed.⁴⁸

Atrocities and War Crimes Committed against Noncombatants

By early 1942, Japan had over 200 million conquered people under its control. Official Japanese policy towards these people was *hakko ichiu*, “all the world under a single roof.” On the ground in the various theaters, however, policies varied from place to place. In northern China, military policy toward recalcitrant populations was *sanko sakusen*, or “kill all, burn all, loot all.”

There are more than a dozen translations dealing with the Japanese seizure of Nanjing in late December 1937 and the subsequent atrocities committed there by Japanese troops. Because the source of this information is diplomatic, not military, the messages concern the protection of foreign diplomatic facilities in the city and the establishment of a so-called “safety zone” that Japanese forces would honor. The Japanese were aware that some 150,000 Chinese civilians had taken refuge in this area, but on December 10, 1937, the Japanese ambassador in Washington admitted that Japan could not assure the safety of any Chinese in the zone.⁴⁹ Eventually, after reports of looting, murder, and rape at diplomatic compounds and other facilities run by foreigners reached Tokyo, the Japanese dispatched their General Consul in Shanghai to report. His cables from December 1937 and January 1938 contained a report of a number of “incidents” that he blamed on the lack of the presence of sufficient Japanese officers and military police.⁵⁰

After the outbreak of the war between Japan and the West in December 1941, the opportunities for significant reportage of Japanese atrocities faded because there were no

longer Western sources such as newspaper reporters actively chronicling such incidents.

During the war, the Japanese conscripted over a million indigenous people into labor battalions to work in industrial mining or construction projects such as the infamous Thailand to Burma railway, but only a handful of decrypted messages deal with this issue. For example, in September 1944, a Japanese command in Thailand organized a *tokushu romutai* (special labor unit) using former Indian soldiers. A July 1945 message from Singapore requests supplies and medicine for some 3,000 “sick and mutilated” Indian nationals from Malaya involved in the Thailand railway construction. In May 1944, the Southern Area Army in Rabaul reported to Tokyo that they were receiving two groups of Chinese and Formosans organized in Special Labor Groups.⁵¹

As for individual atrocities committed against indigenous populations, there is little information. However, in one instance, such a report was intercepted. On November 26, 1944, the 42nd Independent Regiment (Hohei Rentai) reported that one of its units had landed on Babar Island, a small island group in the eastern Banda Sea, east of Timor Island, to suppress a rebellion by natives. Ironically, the army unit suggested that the “oppressive discipline” by an Imperial navy unit of the 4th Expeditionary Fleet may have caused the uprising. The message noted that almost 600 of the rebels had been rounded up, and most of them had been executed. Another 100 or so were being “hunted down right now.” The Japanese reported that the revolt had not been caused by the Allies.⁵²

Economic Exploitation and Looting of Assets by Japan

Under the provisions of international agreements, Japan, as a conquering nation, had certain rights to the assets of countries it seized that could be applied to the prosecution of the war. One of Japan’s major purposes in its conquest of China and the rest of eastern Asia was to economically dominate the region. Under the aegis of the Greater East Asia Ministry, Japan would incorporate all conquered territories under the larger East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and control the economic bloc.

After the initial tide of conquests in early 1942, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Gen. Tōjō Hideki announced the formation of the Greater East Asia Ministry (GEAM). This organization transmitted messages on regular diplomatic radio networks, as did joint commercial enterprises and Japanese corporations. Many corporations, such as mining companies, industrial complexes, and export firms, reported their activities from places like Formosa, China, and Malaya. Much of their traffic was translated and disseminated in the sjm series. This series also includes the messages of many firms, such as Mitsui, Nissan, and Kawakishi, the trade associations, and the Yokohama Specie Bank.

GEAM traffic also contained political, military, and intelligence information. Much economic information that was reported also had military implications. For example, a

February 19, 1944, message to the Ministry headquarters in Tokyo from Hanoi contained a short report on the collapse of the north-south railway system in Indochina. To get around the lack of rail transit, the message said, the local East Asia Marine Transport Company was trying to arrange for the use of “junks” and small steamers to send goods along the coast.⁵³ An April 6, 1944, message from Hanoi to the Vice Director of the Formosa Development Company contained instructions about where along the northeast coast of Tonkin to safely load manganese ore to avoid air attacks.⁵⁴

Throughout the war, Allies gathered intelligence about Japanese exploitation of Indochina, including figures for the annual costs charged to the French by the Japanese for maintaining their defense forces there. (The same arrangement was forced on Thailand.) These charges, paid in the “special yen” currency converted at a rate favorable to the Japanese, led to steep inflation in Indochina. The cost of staple items, such as rice, climbed to three to four times their prewar costs. Inflation caused a serious disruption in the local economy.

At the same time, the Japanese exported extraordinarily high levels of rice and other foodstuffs from Indochina to Japan and territories in the Empire, leaving Indochina bereft of any surplus for emergencies.⁵⁵ By late 1944, a combination of wetter than usual winters, the breakdown of the internal transportation system due to Allied bombing, and the Japanese rice export quotas created a famine in the Tonkin and northern part of Annam. By conservative estimates, from late 1944 to mid-1945, about one million Vietnamese starved to death or died from disease caused by malnutrition. The Japanese had realized by late 1944 that conditions brought on by exporting so much rice from Indochina was leading to significant shortages.⁵⁶

Near the end of the war, the Japanese revealed that they had been looting the banks and treasuries of the countries and foreign colonies that they had overrun. In June 1945, the Area Army command in Moulmein queried Saigon about where it was to “drop” packages of rupee notes and other currencies, some weighing over 12,000 kilograms.⁵⁷ A June 15 message from Hanoi to Saigon asked for instructions concerning three tons of silver taken from the customs house in Qui Nhon.⁵⁸

Chemical and Biological Warfare

During its long war against China, 1937–1945, Japan used chemical weapons, notably poison and irritant gas, against Chinese troops and civilians, a practice the League of Nations condemned in May 1938. There is also evidence that Japan used germ warfare against China and that a special organization, Unit 731, conducted experiments on Chinese prisoners at special camps in Manchuria. Throughout the war, the Chinese continued to report chemical attacks by the Japanese.⁵⁹

Allied COMINT has little direct information on Japanese chemical or bacterial warfare. Any messages dealing with Japanese chemical attacks usually contained second-hand reports or discussions about how to refute Western or Chinese newspaper stories about the incidents, such as one message from Tokyo to London that suggested a Daily Telegraph news report about a gas attack near the Soochow River against Chinese troops was written by an “unreliable” reporter.⁶⁰

Intercepted radio traffic also contained hints of Japanese interest in bacterial warfare, but it was difficult for Allies to discern whether the ambiguous references in the messages were about legitimate research into treatment of tropical diseases such as the plague, cholera, and typhus, or were about research into biological warfare. COMINT revealed that the Japanese Army Medical Corps maintained an instructional staff in bacterial research.⁶¹

There were more intercepts concerning chemical weapons, but no clear conclusions can be drawn from the intelligence. Japan was aware of the threat voiced by America’s leaders early in the war that any use of such weapons would bring retaliation. In July 1944, the Southern Area Army staff sent a message to commands reminding them that in “view of the enemy’s recent actions in preparation for chemical warfare, be very careful not to give them any excuse for using gas and not to do anything that might lead to chemical warfare. This is an order.”⁶² In August 1944, the Japanese Army command in Burma notified its subordinates that it had obtained intelligence from intercepted Chinese Army communications that the Americans were warning the Chinese that the Japanese were planning to use bacteriological weapons.⁶³

During the war, Japan exchanged information with Germany on research into poison gases, as well as on chemical protection methods and equipment.⁶⁴ Japan also sought intelligence about U.S. chemical warfare capabilities and plans. It was common for Japanese intelligence officers to interrogate captured Americans about the latest U.S. developments in this field. In April 1944, one interrogation yielded information about the capabilities of U.S. bombers to deliver gas, the colors used to distinguish various poison gases, and even locations of chemical warfare plants in Utah, Texas, and Maryland.⁶⁵

As the war progressed, the Japanese became convinced that the United States would use chemical weapons against them. In March 1944, major Japanese commands in Singapore and Rangoon were urging local commanders to complete all defensive preparations and training as soon as possible. Their intelligence reported the presence of Allied chemical weapons stockpiles in Hawaii, New Guinea, and Guadalcanal. They may have even consulted their own report on chemical warfare in China, titled “Chemical Warfare Learned in the China Incident.”⁶⁶

By 1945, full-scale preparations were underway in Japan for chemical warfare. In the Southern Fleet and army commands in the Dutch East Indies, commands were urged to

prepare for Allied chemical attacks. The Japanese feared U.S. chemical warfare capability even though their examination of captured Allied equipment and the interrogation of POWs suggested the United States was not preparing to use such weapons.⁶⁷ In June 1945, the navy in the Southern Fleet completed an inventory of equipment. The Imperial navy had on hand over 32,000 gas masks and 3,000 sets of protective suits for 40,000 sailors and civilians.⁶⁸ COMINT indicated that the Japanese military had a limited number of mortar-propelled gas shells available.

Tokyo ordered naval commands to prepare to secure from chemical attack all underground operational bunkers, airbases, Kamikaze bases, gun emplacements, observations posts, storage areas, and depots. Defensive measures included special rollup curtains and ventilation systems. All troops were to be trained in the use of the equipment.⁶⁹

After Japan surrendered, some Japanese units were ordered by senior commands to destroy all chemical warfare materials, even including gas masks, “without a trace.” Some commands were even ordered by their superiors to “burn this telegram once you understand it.”⁷⁰ On August 24, 1945, the Navy Ministry ordered various navy units and installations to make an inventory of all types of defensive equipment such as masks, detectors, and decontamination sets. The 2nd China Fleet responded that it had some 55,000 pieces of such gear on hand.⁷¹ However, from the COMINT, the Allies could not determine the nature and inventory of Japan’s chemical warfare stockpiles and capabilities.

Notes

1. For example, Ronald Spector’s *Eagle against the Sun* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985) refers to translation series, but does not use them. Ronald Lewin’s *The American MAGIC: Codes Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1982) relies on the MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries. *The Invasion of Japan* by John Skates (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994) uses Southwest Pacific and Ultra Summaries. Edward Drea used summaries and the specialized research histories (SRH) based on translations in his *MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942–45* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992). Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida used mainly SRHs and record collections known as SRMNS in their study of Japanese submarines, *The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute press, 1995).

On the other hand, some histories have utilized individual translations. These include Gerhard Weinberg’s *A World at Arms* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), the late Iris Chang’s *The Rape of Nanking* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), John Winton’s

Ultra in the Pacific (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), Linda Goetz Holmes' *Unjust Enrichment: How Japan's Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), and Carl Boyd's *Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941–1945* (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993). John Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded: A Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II* (New York: Random House, 1995), makes very limited use of translations.

2. For a description of these steps and how they applied to the war in Europe, see Robert Hanyok, "Western Communications Intelligence System and the Holocaust" in *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (Washington, DC: National Archives Trust Fund Board for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2004), 443–53.
3. Drea, *MacArthur's Ultra*, 52–53.
4. SIS, "Allocation of Japanese Army Traffic Analysis Studies," March 1944 "Agenda and Minutes of Second Conference on Japanese Army Communications," NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1130, folder 3633.
5. ACSI, *The Achievements of the Signal Security Service in World War II* (Washington, DC: G-2, WDGS, 1946), 13
6. "Proposed Revision of Japanese Army Monitoring Assignments," 12 December 1944.
7. Memorandum, "Short Statement on the Survey of Schedules of all Cryptographic Systems Available for Analysis in B Branch," 3 September 1943, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1018, F3229, Coordination Section Correspondence and Reports.
8. Memorandum, From: Naval Inspector General, To: Secretary of the Navy, Serial 001971, "Survey of OP-20-G Section of Naval Communications Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel which Procures Uniformed Naval Personnel," 13 July 1945, NA, RG 457, HCC, box 1286, Item 23 (d).
9. ACSI, *The Achievements of the Signal Security Service*, p. 13 and Appendix "Bulletin production."
10. Frank Rowlett, *The Story of MAGIC: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer* (Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1998), 253–54.
11. "MAGIC" was the covername applied to translations of Japanese diplomatic messages encrypted by the PURPLE cipher machine. The summaries acquired the title MAGIC because of the preponderance of digests of MAGIC translations in the early summaries. Sometimes, these translations made up 100 percent of the summary. In most cases, they accounted for 75–90 percent of all digested items.
12. These translations were completed from about September 1945 through January 1946. Interestingly, these translations were completed at the same time as the Joint Congressional

Committee held hearings investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor. But the translations were not entered as evidence.

13. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.
14. Department of Defense, *The MAGIC Background to Pearl Harbor*, 8 vols. (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1977).
15. Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, 79th Congress pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution no. 27 authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto (Washington DC: GPO, 1946), 39 vols. and report.
16. Keelung to Manila and Singapore, J-24909A-P, 22 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1178.
17. Michael Gannon, *Pearl Harbor Betrayed* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 208–9.
18. SRH 280, *An Exhibit of the Important Types of Intelligence Recovered through Reading Japanese Cryptograms* (Fort George G. Meade: National Security Agency, 1983), 1–2.
19. Drea, *MacArthur's Ultra*, 76, 106–7.
20. For example, Berlin (Oshima) to Tokyo, 12 March 1944, SIS # 114434, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 402.
21. Frank Raven and H. Campaigne, “Japan, Naval Attaché Cryptosystem JNA-20 (Coral) History,” OP-20-G. 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1355, folder 4155.
22. “BJ” stood for either “black jumbo,” or “blue jacket.” The British also used the term “composition” or “composite” (shortened to “C”) to describe a translation. On many intelligence bulletins the notation “BJC” can be found denoting that this was a British translation.
23. Who was not targeted? Small states like San Marino and Andorra. Interestingly, messages of nongovernmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jewish Agency for Palestine were intercepted because they were carried on the circuits of countries such as Switzerland.
24. “Sources of Titles of Reports Received in Document Section of I&L Branch, SPSIR-7,” 19 February 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1432, folder: “Sources of Titles and Reports.”
25. That entry 9030, the original versions of the Diplomatic Summaries, is kept in fewer boxes (18) than the redacted versions in 9006 (19) is not a surprise. The redacted versions were copies made on thicker paper. The originals were on thinner carbon paper.
26. CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletin, 5 November 1944, 050255, NA, RG 457, entry 9002, SRMN-013.

27. Special Intelligence Bulletin, # 293, 24 February 1944, and # 296, 27 February 1944, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, NA, RG 457, entry 9002, SRH-203.
28. RED Machine Translations, Tokyo to Washington, 24 May 1938, NA, RG 457, entry 9027, box 3, No. 2030.
29. The terms referenced in the provision usually were translated to mean “as the situation arises.” In a later statement, the Japanese stated that any situation that might occur regarding prisoners would be observed without any “effect [on] Japanese law in force.” U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942*, Vol. 1, General, British Commonwealth, the Far East (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1960), 792, 796.
30. Navy Translation, JN-3: 2317, 30 December 1942, and Menado To Pinrang, J-5257A-C, 29 November 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1154.
31. ACSI, G-2, MAGIC Diplomatic Summary (hereafter referred to as “DS”), 20 March 1942, NA, RG 457, entry 9030, box 1.
32. DS, 2 June 1942, NA, RG 457, entry 9030, box 1.
33. Japanese Air Force translation, F-15121-C, Kanchanburi to Taihoku, 7 April 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 646.
34. MND (Multinational Diplomatic) Translations, Tokyo To Saigon, 15 February 1945, H-167851, and Saigon to Tokyo, 23 February 1945, H-168856, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, boxes 469 and 470.
35. Kanburi to Tokyo, J-26099A, 26 August 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1179.
36. Tokyo to Manila, J-24500A-B, 9 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1177.
37. Singapore to Tokyo, F-36346, 3 May 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 672.
38. Saigon to Tokyo, J-79202A-B, 15 January 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1242.
39. Manila to Tokyo, J-79210A-B, 29 December 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1242.
40. Manila to Tokyo, J-83042, 31 December 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1246.
41. Keelung to Manila and Singapore, J-24909A-O, 22 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1178.
42. Some of these include: MND Translations, Bangkok to Bern, 6 October 1944, SIS #1466190, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 442; Tokyo to Saigon, 13 November 1944, SIS #155528, box 453; and Bern to Tokyo, 17 February 1945, H-168286, box 469.
43. Bangkok to Bern (Political Interests), SMM 8142, 9 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 888. For more on this episode, see Holmes, *Unjust Enrichment*, 98–112.
44. For more on this order and excerpts see Holmes, *Unjust Enrichment*, 115–17.
45. Tacloban, Philippines, JC-14618 (JMCA 7519 XAT), 19 May 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1166.
46. Singapore to Saigon, J-104299, 1 September 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1271;

- Singapore to Batavia, J-105770A-B, 21 October 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1273.
47. Tokyo to Singapore, J-102444A-D, 30 August 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1269.
 48. Far East MAGIC Summary, No. 517, 20 August 1945, Item 9, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 760.
 49. RED Machine Translation, Washington to New York, 10 December 1937, SIS #1105, NA, RG 457, entry 9027, box 2.
 50. RED Machine Translations, Tokyo to Washington, 23 December 1937, SIS #1185, and 17 January 1938, SIS #1263, *inter alia*, NA, RG 457, entry 9027, box 2.
 51. Don Muang to Manila, J-28886, 8 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1182; Singapore to Bangkok, J-84808A, 8 July 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1248; and Rabaul to Tokyo, F-15948A, E, 3 May 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 646.
 52. Piru to Pinrang, F-39654A-D, 26 November 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 675.
 53. Multinational Diplomatic Translation, Hanoi to Tokyo (GEA), 19 February 1944, SIS #111803, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 398.
 54. Multinational Diplomatic Translation, Hanoi to Tokyo, 6 April 1944, SIS #156467, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 455.
 55. MND Translations, Saigon to Tokyo, 8 December 1944, H-157032, and Tokyo to Saigon, 9 December 1944, H-156819, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 455.
 56. MND Translation, Saigon to Tokyo, 23 November 1944, H-153457, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 451.
 57. Moulmein To Saigon, 7 June 1945, J-96533C-d, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1263.
 58. Hanoi to Saigon, J-102448, 15 June 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1269.
 59. Chungking to Stockholm, 17 November 1944, H-153947, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 451.
 60. RED Machine Translation, Tokyo to London, 11 November 1937, SIS #1013-A, NA, RG 457, entry 9027, box 2.
 61. Tokyo to Rabaul, 6 March 1945, J-97280, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1265.
 62. Manila to Salup, 15 July 1944, NA, RG 38, #2, "Translations of Intercepted Enemy Radio Traffic and Miscellaneous World War II Documentation, 1940–1946," box 915. Also, see Manila to Menado, 15 July 1944, F-39760A-B, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 675.
 63. Burma to Hankow, J-64269, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1224.
 64. Tokyo to Berlin, 4 October 1944, NA, RG 457, #2, "Translations," box 914.
 65. Tokyo to Berlin, 22 April 1944, H-186143, NA, RG 38, #2, "Translations," box 915.
 66. Pinrang to Saigon, 15 January 1945, J-26479, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1180.
 67. Commander 13th Base Force to CINC 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 22 June 1945, FRUPAC 221702-DISC-DI, NA RG 38, #2, "Translations," box 914.


68. CINC 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet to CINC 10th Area Fleet, 7 June 1945, NA, RG 38, #2. "Translations," box 914.
69. Tokyo Communications Unit to Circular, 17 June 1945, GZ #3540-H-DI, NA, RG 38, #2. "Translations," box 914.
70. Commander 23rd Base Force to Menado Detachment, 23rd Special Base Force, 17 August 1944, and 24 August 1944, NA, RG 38, #2, "Translations," box 914.
71. Matsushima Base to Navy Ministry, 1 September 1945, NA, RG 38, #2, "Translations," box 914.

SECRET

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

INFORMATION BULLETIN

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|---|--|------------------------|
| SUBJECT: | <u>JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR</u> | I.G. Nos: 6950 6951 |
| DATE OF ISSUE | 29 Apr '44 | No. 10 / 72 |
| SUMMARY: | <u>COMPILATION PREPARED FOR, AND SUBMITTED UNDER OATH TO "COMMISSION REGARDING BREACHES OF THE RULES OF WARFARE BY THE JAPANESE FORCES", (COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA) 7 MAR 1944.</u> | |
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General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Operations of The Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHA, SWPA, Volume V, Intelligence Series, 1948, pp 55, 64.

The Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records Relating to War Crimes, 1942–1945

Greg Bradsher

ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1945, Col. Sidney Mashbir, chief of the U.S. Army's Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), confronted Okazaki Katsuo from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs with grisly and compelling evidence of extensive Japanese war crimes against civilians and POWs.¹ Mashbir produced Japanese military orders to burn to death Filipino men, women, and children, and showed Okazaki photographs of the horrors of Manila. Okazaki, pale and shaken, asked Mashbir if the United States had the names of the Japanese soldiers responsible for the atrocities.

"You're damn right," replied Mashbir. "Depend on it: you will be very shortly called upon to turn them over to us for punishment."²

How the United States was able to produce such evidence the day after Japan's formal surrender is the topic of this chapter.

From early in the war, the U.S. military was prepared to collect, analyze, interpret, and disseminate captured documentation. Information from captured Japanese records supported intelligence and other military purposes during the war, and it was compiled with an eye toward postwar prosecution of war criminals.³ As a result, by the end of the war, ATIS had processed over 350,000 captured documents, thousands of which related to war crimes (see facing page for the cover of one such report).

Established in Australia by Gen. Douglas MacArthur in September 1942, ATIS was the largest translation and interrogation operation in the Pacific and Far East Theaters. By war's end, its Translation Section employed over 780 personnel. Similar operations included the Sino Translation and Interrogation Center in China; the Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center in India, Burma, and Thailand; the Joint Intelligence Center/Pacific Ocean Areas; the Alaska Defense Command; the Combat Intelligence Center/South Pacific; and the United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (SWPA). Because most of the war-crimes-related records were captured

in the Southwest Pacific Area and in Japan, this chapter will concentrate on the work of ATIS.

ATIS and War Crimes Documentation 1942–1944

In August 1942, not long after the Americans began operations in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, they began to capture numerous Japanese military orders, diaries, and field notebooks that contained evidence of Japanese atrocities. ATIS, as well as the Combat Intelligence Center and the U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, began translating and publishing these documents, making them widely available to U.S. military and intelligence organizations.

On December 25, 1942, ATIS received the diary of a Japanese commander who was captured south of Gorari, New Guinea. In his October 19, 1942, entry, the commander documented the gradual starvation of his platoon and their frantic efforts to get food. He then noted that meat had been carved from a dead American prisoner. He concluded, “This is the first time I have ever tasted human flesh—and it was very tasty.” ATIS quickly published this first documentary evidence of cannibalism.⁴ Similar reports soon followed.

In February 1943, MacArthur asked Brig. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, his G-2 (Intelligence) chief, to provide him with materials relevant to Japanese war crimes. Willoughby turned to Mashbir for this information. Mashbir produced several ATIS reports and preliminary interrogative material related to cannibalism, torture, and other war crimes.⁵ During 1943 and 1944, ATIS continued to receive evidence of Japanese atrocities such as beheadings, vivisection, and cannibalism. ATIS published all of it.

During 1942 and early 1943, the Australian government received numerous reports of Japanese breaches of the rules of warfare. In response to these reports, the Australians created the Commission of Inquiry into Japanese Forces Atrocities. In early March 1944, the Commission asked the Americans to compile all references to atrocities committed by the Japanese Armed Forces. In response, ATIS produced “Japanese Violations of the Laws of War” (published originally as ATIS Information Bulletin No. 14).⁶

During April and early May 1944, ATIS received extensive evidence of Japanese atrocities against American POWs, Philippine civilians, and others, including a report that Japanese forces massacred seventeen Americans at Panay and two Filipinos captured in the Hollandia area. Some victims were decapitated. On May 11, 1944, Willoughby asked the Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE) to recommend procedures for accumulating evidence for war crimes prosecutions. Two days later, the Acting Staff Judge Advocate suggested creating a board to conduct quasi-judicial investigations of the war crimes cases.⁷

With this response, Willoughby wrote the Adjutant General that atrocity cases and reports were accumulating in such numbers that there needed to be an agency specially charged with handling them. "Otherwise," he informed Col. Bonner Fellers, Army G-3 Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, "evidence available now or at some future date will not be discovered or will be lost ... before trial will be held." Willoughby recommended that the atrocity file and responsibility for developing atrocity cases for trial be charged to the Judge Advocate General, USAFFE, under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.⁸

On May 18, 1944, Fellers wrote to Gen. Sutherland, Chief of Staff GHQ/SWPA, that ATIS had already examined evidence sufficient to support the charges of war crimes against certain Japanese POWs and asked the Judge Advocate, USAFFE, to draft an order establishing a War Crimes Board to investigate and develop atrocity cases. The Judge Advocate drafted the order very quickly, and the War Crimes Board was formally established in August 1944.⁹

ATIS provided the Board with information about the identification of Japanese war criminals and furnished the Board with approximately 1,200 pages of translations. In addition, ATIS officers helped gather evidence from prisoners, and they testified before the Board about war crimes.¹⁰

In October 1943, seventeen Allied nations created the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes (subsequently called the United Nations War Crimes Commission, or UNWCC) to help identify war criminals, coordinate the war crimes investigations, and determine if there was sufficient evidence available to bring individuals to trial for war crimes. Member nations reported all crimes committed against any United Nations national, decided which war crimes should be brought before the Commission, and supplied the Commission with the evidence required for prosecution. If the Commission found that there was a *prima facie* case against any individual, it published his name on a list of alleged war criminals, thereby preparing for his apprehension and prosecution by one of the National War Crimes Offices of the member states. The Commission's Far Eastern Subcommittee investigated Japanese war crimes. The Commission itself was not empowered to prefer charges.

ATIS and War-Crimes–Related Publications 1944–1945

Because many Japanese units had served in China and elsewhere in Asia before coming to the Southwest Pacific Area, it is not surprising that some of the documents acquired by ATIS pertained to war crimes on the Asian mainland. One such document explained Japanese methods for obtaining intelligence in southern China: Soldiers were instructed to use threatening methods when rounding up Chinese, to secretly kill recalcitrant captives,

and to intimidate village chiefs or other influential villagers until they cooperated. Soldiers were also instructed to bring 14- to 15-year-old boys to view corpses, threatening them with death if they did not cooperate. “These measures,” the instructions noted, “will make the necessary intelligence more accurate.”¹¹

During late 1944 and early 1945, ATIS published Research Reports on Japanese tactics. For example, it published Research Report No. 84, “The Japanese and Bacterial Warfare,” in July 1944, and in January 1945 published Research Report No. 117, “Infringement of the Laws of War and Ethics by the Japanese Medical Corps,” which contained information on violations of the Geneva Conventions on the rules of warfare. Research Report No. 119, “Japanese Military Police Service,” published in February 1945, included excerpts from captured documents on Japanese research and on use of bacterial warfare.¹²

Records and Reports Relating to Philippine Atrocities 1945

Just seven days after landing on Leyte Island in the Philippines in October 1944, American forces captured a file of Japanese documents classified Most Secret. One document instructed Japanese forces to kill POWs in an isolated area, “taking adequate precautions to ensure that no police or civilian eye-witnesses are present” and to “leave no evidence.” Furthermore, “undesirables among surrendered persons will be ... secretly [killed].”¹³

In late February 1945, Willoughby wrote to G-2 USAFFE that U.S. troops in Manila were capturing considerable documentary evidence of Japanese atrocities. In March 1945, Willoughby received a memorandum about “the desperate and destructive defense of Manila,” which included brief descriptions of captured documents dating from January 23 to February 15 that called for the destruction of the city,¹⁴ and contained photographs of atrocities in Manila.¹⁵

Also in March 1945, MacArthur requested a formal report on the destruction of Manila and other Japanese atrocities.¹⁶ Willoughby again turned to ATIS for information on Japanese atrocities and violations of the rules of warfare. On March 24, Mashbir sent Willoughby a copy of ATIS Research Report No. 72, “Japanese Violations of the Laws of War,” Supplement No. 1, and a copy of Research Report No. 117, “Infringement of the Laws of War and Ethics by the Japanese Medical Corps.” Mashbir had already sent Willoughby a copy of “Japanese Atrocities on Prisoners and Civilians.”¹⁷ At the end of March, Willoughby sent copies of these publications to the War Department, the War Crimes Commission, and the Resident High Commissioner of the Philippines.¹⁸

Willoughby produced for MacArthur a “Report on the Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities, February 1945.” The report stated that the direct responsibility for the destruction of Manila “rests with the Japanese High Command and the government

of Japan, represented by the Emperor, while the people of Japan itself cannot ultimately escape the awful weight of moral participation and moral guilt.”¹⁹ The report included extracts from captured documents. One was a diary, presumably belonging to a member of Akatsuki 16709 Force, with entries from July 31, 1944, to February 21, 1945. The diary contained numerous accounts of the murder of Filipino guerrillas.

The report also included extracts from the Manila Navy Defense Force and Southwestern Area Fleet Operation Orders, dated December 23, 1944, to February 14, 1945. Among them was a February 8 battalion order that described the approved method of killing Filipino prisoners. These documents also contained a message book with orders and other documents of the Kobayashi Brigade. A February 13 entry noted that all people on the battlefield, with the exception of Japanese military personnel, Japanese civilians, and Special Construction Units, were to be killed.²⁰

In early April 1945, Willoughby informed the G-2 of the 6th and 8th Armies that the original Japanese orders for the destruction of individuals and property, including diary extracts, should be carefully handled because they might become evidence for War Department claims.²¹ He asked the G-2 and ATIS to make copies of original captured Japanese documents relating to atrocities.²² ATIS complied.

On April 10, 1945, MacArthur established a War Crimes Branch in the Judge Advocate General Section of HQ, USAFFE. By the end of April, the War Crimes Branch had taken charge of all ATIS material concerning atrocities.

The War Crimes Branch used ATIS materials for a variety of purposes during the summer of 1945, such as to compile lists of names of suspected and identified war criminals, which the Army CIC used to apprehend these individuals.²³

The State Department Confronts Japan

The Department of State also relied on ATIS information in its dealings with the Japanese government. In December 1941, the United States began confronting the Japanese (via the Swiss government) about the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees.²⁴ During the next four years, the United States sent Japan some 240 such messages.²⁵ The State Department frequently cited “reliable sources,” which, in many instances, appear to be eyewitness accounts. Although the State Department was aware of documentary evidence of atrocities and mistreatment, it was disinclined to use it, possibly fearing it might compromise intelligence sources and methods.

By mid-1944, the State Department, no longer hesitant to divulge the fact that the United States had captured Japanese documents, confronted the Japanese (through the Swiss) with information contained in the captured records. For example, in August 1944, the United States informed Japan that it had conclusive evidence that an American

airman captured by the Japanese in the Aitape area was tortured and decapitated by a Japanese civilian in the presence of three Japanese officers and fifteen Japanese soldiers. The United States charged the officers in charge with responsibility for the atrocity. Even though the names and location of the officers were included in the U.S. protest, the Japanese maintained that no units were in the area.

The United States continued to pursue the issues. In September 1944, the State Department informed the Japanese government that it knew of an Imperial Japanese Army order, dated February 11, 1944, indicating that “captured enemy air personnel are not to be treated as prisoners of war, that they are to be separated from other prisoners, that after being searched they are to be handed over to the gendarmerie, and that they are to be severely punished excepting those who can be put to some special use.”²⁶

The Japanese government denied the existence of the order.²⁷ A February 8, 1945, Domei news report from Tokyo acknowledged numerous reports of neglect and mistreatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese hands but dismissed them as “without foundation.”²⁸ In response to continuing denials from Japan, the State Department gave Japan the full names of three Japanese officers whom the United States government charged with the murder of the American flier.²⁹ On May 12, 1945, the State Department conveyed to the Japanese that it had concrete evidence that the government of Japan was responsible for the murder of the airman: it possessed the order itself.

Postwar Efforts to Acquire War-Crimes–Related Records

Early in August 1945, when it appeared that Japan would soon surrender, the U.S. Army developed plans to seize and exploit Japanese records. However, once the Japanese emperor announced the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese military began a somewhat systematic effort to conceal or destroy documentation, especially incriminating evidence of war crimes.³⁰ On August 14 and 15, 1945, high military and naval officials in Tokyo ordered units to destroy records.³¹ Additional instructions were issued in the days that followed. For example, on August 19, the Japanese Navy commander in the Borneo-Java area issued a directive indicating that “anything concerned with natives which is disadvantageous from a diplomatic standpoint” was to be burned.³² Messages concerning the destruction of documents continued to be sent through August 21.³³

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reported in early September that Japanese military and business firms in Shanghai, China, had been systematically burning documents since August 12; and observers reported that 108 sacks of papers were removed from Central Police Headquarters to be burned.³⁴ In Bangkok, Thailand, the OSS was hampered in its investigation of war crimes during August 1945 because the Japanese had destroyed

records. According to an OSS report, "Copies of orders issued by Japanese Army pertaining to control of [POW] camps, photographs, and written accounts of atrocities recorded at the time of their occurrences are not available, because the Japanese in 1944, when the war was turning against them, ordered that all written material be destroyed."³⁵ On August 17, the 88th Division on Karafuto (Sakhalin Island) reported that "all confidential documents have been burned."³⁶ Many records, including those relating to biological warfare, were destroyed the second week of August in Manchuria.³⁷ A U.S. Navy war crimes investigation on Wake Island resulted in a report that noted that "no written records concerning the American prisoners on Wake Island now exist on Wake Island. The report recommended searching the Japanese naval records at the Navy Ministry in Tokyo for reports concerning the death of American prisoners on the island."³⁸

U.S. military authorities reported in September 1945 that Japanese officials had destroyed all documents at Sasebo Naval Air Station and aircraft factory before Allied landings. They reported that the Air General Army Headquarters had taken similar action, and that documents had also been destroyed at Yokosuka Naval Air Station on August 15. The Chief Inspector at Nagasaki stated that he was ordered to destroy all classified information on August 15.³⁹ In October, the 6th Army noted that original records relating to pre-demobilization and current strengths had in some cases been destroyed by order of the Japanese Navy and Army authorities.⁴⁰ Other records were destroyed in the Hiroshima atomic bomb attack, and Maj. Gen. Miyoshi Yasuyuki, chief of Staff, Central Army, believed that subordinates destroyed all other records, but he could not obtain information about records due to "the deplorable state of communications in the Japanese Army at present."⁴¹ Some records had been destroyed during the war, often from air raids, such as was the case with some Japanese Foreign Ministry Records and those of the Indian National Army stored in Tokyo.⁴²

While many documents were destroyed, others remained to be captured. Immediately upon occupying Japan, China, and other areas held by the Japanese, Allied forces began securing records vital for war crimes investigations and intelligence. In Shanghai, China, U.S. military forces found the court-martial records relating to Doolittle flyers executed by the Japanese.⁴³ Southeast Asia Command Field Security Sections in September 1945 in Singapore seized important documentary evidence of war crimes, including photographs showing captured Indian soldiers being executed for refusing to join with Subhas Chandra Bose, who sought to free India from British imperialism by working with the Japanese to build the Indian National Army.⁴⁴ OSS Counter Intelligence (X-2) personnel in Rangoon, Burma, confiscated from the former Japanese Embassy a mass of documentation on the *kenpeitai* (Japanese military police), Japanese political intelligence organizations, spy schools, and other political and intelligence organizations.⁴⁵ In

Baguio, on Luzon, Allies found records of Japanese military courts on the arrest and trial of Filipinos, Chinese, and a few Japanese soldiers and civilians that “throw a sharp light on Japanese military practices in occupied territories, their military courts, and the heavy and often merciless sentences.”⁴⁶ OSS teams captured Japanese records secured in Mukden, Manchuria, including those of the Hoten Prisoner of War Camp.⁴⁷

Many of the records found during the fall of 1945 by the U.S. military in Japan had been hidden.⁴⁸ Among those more readily available were records of the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau. ATIS quickly began translating the records, and many that concerned the mistreatment of POWs and civilian internees were turned over to the International Prosecution Section (IPS) of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).⁴⁹

The Washington Document Center (WDC), which was established by the Navy in 1942 to translate captured Japanese documents, sent a 100-person unit to Japan in late 1945. This WDC unit worked closely with ATIS to search for and seize specific records at each Japanese Ministry. During the winter of 1945–1946, it seized hundreds of thousands of documents; by the end of March 1946, it had sent over 419,000 documents back to Washington for intelligence exploitation.⁵⁰ U.S. occupation authorities continued to seize and ship tens of thousands of documents, books, magazines, periodicals, and newspapers to the WDC in the following years, but the most important documentation was screened, processed, packed, and shipped early in 1946. Before shipping any documents to the WDC, the IPS and the SCAP legal staff were allowed to review and take records needed for their work.⁵¹

Willoughby established a document library in Tokyo to insure that Japanese documents requested by SCAP staff and others were readily available in a central depository. The library also housed selected Foreign Ministry documents that the Japanese wanted to remain in the theater.

Initially, SCAP turned over many Foreign Ministry documents to the IPS for possible use as evidence in the war crimes trials in Asia. SCAP later shipped 1,500 of these documents to the WDC, including original texts of international treaties, agreements, and conventions with related correspondence and secret clauses; official Ministry studies on a variety of Japanese foreign and domestic issues; diplomatic histories; periodic reports; and information on international organizations such as the Red Cross, League of Nations, and the Communist Party.⁵²

PACMIRS and War Crimes Records 1945–1946

During the fall of 1945, the Pacific Military Intelligence Research Service (PACMIRS), located at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, translated and published captured documents it

had received from both the WDC and directly from American units in Asia. PACMIRS was flooded with documentation, much of which had no practical intelligence value in the postwar period. For example, by the end of August 1945, PACMIRS had received 118,969 documents totaling 7,947,710 pages, of which 7,678,654 pages were found to have no value.⁵³ Therefore, in September 1945, PACMIRS withdrew many current documents from processing and sent others to the Military Intelligence Service Language School at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, for translation and publication.

In late 1945, PACMIRS received a collection of captured Japanese records from Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center (SEATIC) Headquarters in Singapore, via the WDC. PACMIRS destroyed approximately 95 percent of these SEATIC documents, most likely during the first couple of months of 1946. It brought the remaining 5 percent to the WDC when it merged with the WDC in April 1946.⁵⁴ A significant body of captured Japanese records that had come to PACMIRS from ATIS and other sources was also destroyed during 1945 and 1946.⁵⁵

PACMIRS still had much valuable material left. From August through October 1945, PACMIRS provided documents and translations, and undertook several special projects, including sending personnel to the Library of Congress to conduct research on Japanese ultra-nationalist organizations.⁵⁶ It provided war crimes information to the Eastern Division of the War Department's War Crimes Office. At the behest of the Division, PACMIRS officers looked for certain types of documentary evidence needed in the preparation for war crimes trials and obtained documents on short notice in response to specific requests.⁵⁷

Beginning in mid-November 1945, PACMIRS published the *PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series*, which contained translations of one or more documents, grouped together by topic, that might have some bearing on war crimes investigations. By April 9, 1946, PACMIRS had published twenty issues. Seven of the first eight publications in this series related to the Philippines. These were published between November 13, 1945, and March 8, 1946.⁵⁸ Two publications of this series dealt with views of Japanese leaders as expressed in magazine articles and speeches.⁵⁹ One publication dealt with nationalist organizations and their leaders.⁶⁰

In some instances, translation and publication were undertaken at the request of the War Crimes Office, established by the War Department in 1944 to support U.S. participation on the United Nations War Crimes Commission. The War Crimes Office had a particular interest in the Japanese military police. In August 1945, it asked PACMIRS to provide it with all copies of all ATIS reports or other documents pertaining to the Japanese Military Police, especially regarding its organization structure and staff names.⁶¹

The War Crimes Office was also interested in obtaining information about Allied POWs (especially those held at Mukden) and civilian internees. PACMIRS published three *War Crimes Information Series* reports relating to these topics. The first, published in early March 1946, consisted of translations of four documents dated 1943 to 1945 from the Medical Office at Mukden Prisoner of War Camp.⁶² The second publication provided information on the death of 184 Allied prisoners (all but three were American) at Mukden between 1942 and 1945.⁶³ The third was a list of Japanese military and civilian personnel at Mukden Prisoner of War Camp. PACMIRS also published several *Technical Service Translations*, some of which addressed Japanese biological warfare.⁶⁴ *PACMIRS Bulletin* 80A, published in March 1946, identified documents that PACMIRS acquired after the war ended.⁶⁵

ATIS and War-Crimes–Related Work in the Philippines and Japan 1945

The American trials began in the Philippines in the fall of 1945. To prepare for these trials, ATIS organized and disseminated evidence for war crimes trials.⁶⁶ In September 1945, USAFFE Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Marshall instructed ATIS and intelligence agencies operating in the theater to turn over to the USAFFE War Crimes Branch all material pertinent to war crimes. Shortly afterward, Willoughby informed Marshall that “ATIS cooperation and records are proving invaluable to War Crimes in the completion of its mission.”⁶⁷ Mashbir reported on September 22 that the United Nations War Crimes Commission had a representative with ATIS for ten days, and that every possible aid had been given the Commission in its research. Copies of all ATIS Research Reports dealing with atrocities, including Research Report No. 72, Supplement No. 3, were in the possession of the Commission.⁶⁸

Based on documents seized in Japan and documents captured earlier in the war, ATIS continued publishing Research Reports on various war-crimes–related topics during the occupation. On November 15, 1945, it published ATIS Research Report No. 120, “Amenities in the Japanese Armed Forces.” The report contained a lengthy section on Japanese field brothels.⁶⁹

Trials began in the Philippines in the fall of 1945. Many Japanese who participated in or witnessed war crimes were dead. Therefore, the number of trials was not as large as it might have been. Nevertheless, more than five thousand Japanese were tried for war crimes.

Although documents were submitted as evidence during the trials, documents were not used as extensively as they could have been because the prosecutors in most trials preferred statements and affidavits from eyewitnesses to or victims of Japanese war

crimes. But without the documents, the Allies would not have known about many specific crimes, criminals, and witnesses. The captured documents provided hard evidence for both Allied investigators establishing facts and for prosecutors preparing for and presenting their cases.

General Willoughby acknowledged the accomplishments of ATIS and the Nisei translators, noting they "... saved over 1,000,000 American lives and shortened the war by two years ... they collected information on the battlefield, they shared death in battle ... in all they handled between two and three million Japanese documents. The information received through their special skills proved invaluable to our battle forces."

Notes

1. Greg Bradsher is preparing a comprehensive account of the capture, seizure, exploitation, and ultimate return of Japanese documents from World War II. This and the following chapter provide a summary of his preliminary findings.
2. Sidney F. Mashbir, *I Was an American Spy* (New York: Vantage Press, 1953), 333–34.
3. The products of this thorough exploitation of the records—original documents, reports, analyses, descriptions, and investigative dossiers—remain among U.S. government records, only a small number of which are cited in the footnotes to this chapter. All of these records are available to researchers.
4. ATIS Spot Report No. 37, 25 December 1942, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 134, box 650, folder: F.E.L.O. (location: 290/46/12/05).
5. Mashbir, 234; "Stories of Cannibalism Among Japanese Soldiers Appear Periodically in Documents and PW Statements," No. 53, 31 January 1945, p. 19, NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 608, folder: Counter Intelligence Bulletin, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, Issue no. 49–55 (location: 390/33/33/04); NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 134, box 651, ATIS Documents Nos. 12595–12596, folder: ATIS Significant Items 1–75 (location: 290/46/12/05); ATIS Bulletin No. 1172, p. 10, *ibid.*
6. *Operations of the Intelligence Service SWPA*, Vol. 5, Intelligence Series, 1948, pp. 55 and 64, NA, RG 200, National Archives Gift Collection Records, entry 23310, box 91 (location: 130/76/5/3). Supplements Nos. I and II were published on 19 March 1945, and 23 June 1945, respectively.
7. Check Sheet, C.A. McV., G-2 to Judge Advocate General (Thru G-2 USAFFE), 11 May 1944, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United

- States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 186, box 860, folder 000.5 (location: 290/46/16/7); Check Sheet, Lt. Col. J. A. Myatt, JA, USAFFE to G-2, GHQ, 13 May 1944, *ibid.*; Memorandum, E.O.B.R, GHQ, SWPA to General Fitch, 21 December 1944, *ibid.*
8. Check Sheet, C.A.W. to G-1, Chief of Staff, 16 May 1944, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 186, box 860, folder 000.5 (location: 290/46/16/07).
 9. Check Sheet, B.F.F., G-1 to Chief of Staff, 18 May 1944, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 186, box 860, folder 000.5 (location: 290/46/16/07); Check Sheet, B.F.F., G-1 to Deputy Chief of Staff and Judge Advocate, USAFFE, 26 May 1944, *ibid.*; Check Sheet, Lt. Col. J. A. Myatt, Acting Staff Judge Advocate, JG, USAFFE to G-1, GHQ, 29 May 1944, *ibid.*; Memorandum, E.O.B.R, GHQ, SWPA to General Fitch, 21 December 1944, *ibid.*
 10. *Operations of the Intelligence Service SWPA*, Vol. 5, Intelligence Series, 1948, pp. 64, NA, RG 200, National Archives Gift Collection Records, entry 23310, box 91 (location: 130/76/5/3).
 11. ATIS Enemy Publication No. 169 Intelligence Work and "Rounding Up," 13 August 1944, pp. 12–15, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 134, box 651, folder: ATIS Significant Items 1–75 (location: 290/46/12/05).
 12. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 341, folder: ATIS Research Reports 82–85, Security-Classified Intelligence Reference Publications ("P" File), 1940–1945.
 13. In the original document, certain words were omitted and represented by an "o" or "oo" and were translated with an "x." In the context of the document, it is clear that the omitted words were "kill," "killed," and "killing." ATIS Bulletin No. 1703, pp. 24 and 25, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 134, box 651, folder: ATIS Significant Items 151–275 (location: 290/46/12/5).
 14. Memorandum, [name illegible] to General Willoughby, 11 March 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).
 15. Memorandum, F.M.B., G-2 Advon to G-2, USAFEE, 7 March 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).
 16. Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2 Section, GHQ SWPA to G-1, G-3, G-4, C.Sig.O, O.C.E., 29 March 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).

17. Memorandum, S.F.M., ATIS GHQ SWPA to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, 24 March 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).
18. Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2 Section, GHQ SWPA to G-1, G-3, G-4, C.Sig.O, O.C.E., 29 March 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).
19. Report on the Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities, p. 4, NA, RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General (Army), War Crimes Branch, JAG Law Library, 1944–1949, entry 135, box 64, folder FI l-376 (location: 270/1/16/7).
20. Ibid., 55.
21. Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2 Advon to G-2 6th and 8th Armies, 8 April 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.9 (location: 290/46/5/7).
22. Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2, SWPA to G-2 6th Army, G-2 XIV Corps, ATIS, 19 April 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.9 (location: 290/46/5/7).
23. Memorandum, Col. A. C. C., Acting Theater Judge Advocate thru G-2 to CIC, 18 August 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.9 (location: 290/46/5/7); Memorandum, C.A.McV., G-2 to OCCIO, 20 August 1945, *ibid.*; Memorandum, Lt. Col. C.A. McVittie, G-2, AFPAC to War Crimes Branch, Attn: Col. Carpenter, 21 August 1945, *ibid.*
24. Copies of many of these communications are contained in Letters Received, 1944–1951, NA, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, War Crimes Branch, entry 132, box 6 (location: 270/1/4/3).
25. “Japanese Atrocities: Report of the Department of State,” Department of State Bulletin, vol. 13, no. 324, 9 September 1945, 347.
26. NA, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, entry 132, box 6, folder: Charges and Documentary Evidence (location: 270/1/4/4).
27. Copy, Incoming Telegram, Huddle, American Legation, Bern to Secretary of State, No. 8221, 19 December 1944, Letters Received, 1944–1951, NA, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, entry 132, box 6 (location: 270/1/4/3).
28. Copy, Telegram Sent, Secretary of State to American Legation, Bern No. 463, 11 February 1944, Letters Received, 1944–1951, NA, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, entry 132, box 6 (location: 270/1/4/3).
29. Copy, Telegram, Secretary of State to American Legation, Bern, No. 1296, 31 March 1945, Letters Received, 1944–1951, NA, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate

- General, entry 132, box 6 (location: 270/1/4/3).
30. Incoming Telegram, Atcheson, Tokyo to Secretary of State, 28 September 1946, NA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, entry 205-H, box 7357 (location: 250/38/26/2); Incoming Telegram, Atcheson, Tokyo to Secretary of State, 27 March 1947, *ibid*; Incoming Telegram, Sebald, Tokyo to Secretary of State, 21 January 1948, *ibid*; Incoming Airgram, Sebald, Tokyo to Secretary of State for Noble, 26 February 1948, *ibid*; "History and Accomplishments of the Japanese Government Prisoner of War Information Bureau," n.d., ca. 1 March 1953, p. 1, NA, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, entry 363D, box 367, folder 314.4, Captured Records 1/1/51–12/31/52 (location: 270/45/33/5).
 31. MAGIC Far East Summary, 16 August 1945, SRS 513, NA, RG 457, Records of the National Security Agency, entry 9001, box 7, file 17 (location: 190/36/13/5); MAGIC Far East Summary, 17 August 1945, SRS 514, *ibid*; General Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, Staff, Ultra Intelligence Summary No. 125, 15/17 August 1945, p. 1, NA, RG 457, Records of the National Security Agency, entry 9002, SRH-203 Part 6 No. 1–137 (location: 190/36/10/5); General Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, Staff, Ultra Intelligence Summary No. 126, 17/18 August 1945, p. 1, *ibid*.
 32. MAGIC Far East Summary, 20 August 1945, SRS 517, NA, RG 457, Records of the National Security Agency, entry 9001, box 7, file 17 (location: 190/36/13/5).
 33. MAGIC Far East Summary, 21 August 1945, SRS 518, NA, RG 457, Records of the National Security Agency, entry 9001, box 7, file 17 (location: 190/36/13/5).
 34. OSS Report on the postwar situation in Kiangsu and Kwangtung, China, ID 197182, 4 September 1945, Classified Numerical Series of Intelligence Documents ("ID" File), NA, RG 319, entry 85, box 1285 (location: 270/11/28/04).
 35. X-2 Branch Report, Subject: War Crimes, R.W. Lawson, Bangkok, 5 September 1945, NA, RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General (Army), entry 135, box 66, folder: Vol. I L-384 (report continues in folder: Vol. II L-384) (location: 270/1/7/1).
 36. MAGIC Far East Summary, 16 August 1945, SRS 513, NA, RG 457, Records of the National Security Agency, entry 9001, box 7, file 17 (location: 190/36/13/5).
 37. Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the American Cover-up* (revised edition) (New York: Routledge, 2002), 245. Despite the destruction of records in Manchuria, the Soviet Army seized most of the records of the Kwantung Army and some records of Gen. Ishii Shirō's Epidemic and Portable Water Supply Unit (Unit 731). Richard B. Frank, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire* (New York: Random House, 1999), 325.
 38. Lt. J.D. Phillips, USNR, Report of Investigation of Alleged War Crimes, p. 8, n.d., NA,

- RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General (Army), entry 135, box 51, folder L-326 (location: 270/1/6/6).
39. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 28 September 1945, NA, RG 319 Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1344, folder MIS # 205421–205430 (location: 270/11/31/2); Memorandum, W.R. Collins, Commanding General to the Commanding General, Fifth Marine Division, Subject: Destruction of Japanese Documents, Investigation of, 27 September 1945, NA, RG 127, Records of the U.S. Marine Corps, entry 1011, box 23, folder: Intelligence-Japanese (1 of 2) (location: 370/b/18/5).
 40. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 15 October 1945, NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1377, folder MIS 209931–209940 (location: 270/31/11/6).
 41. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 21 October 1945, NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1386, folder MIS 21121–21130 (location: 270/11/31/1).
 42. Incoming Telegram, Tokyo to Secretary of State, 22 March 1947, NA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, entry 205-H, box 7357 (location: 250/38/26/2); Memorandum, Central Liaison Office, Tokyo to General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 5 January 1946, NA, RG 331, Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Documents of the Indian National Army, entry 1150, box 440, folder 314-4 SCAP (location: 290/10/17/6).
 43. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 30 September 1945, NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1357, folder MIS 207241–207250 (location: 270/11/31/03).
 44. Richard J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 370.
 45. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan*, 370–71.
 46. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 15 October 1945, NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1377, folder MIS 209931–209940 (location: 270/11/31/06).
 47. Memorandum, Lt. Col. Harry M. Manser, Adjutant General, HQ Shanghai Base Command to Commanding General, United States Force, Manila, P.I., 25 October 25 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (290/46/7/7); Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2 to Recovered Personnel (AFWESPAC), 21 November 1945, *ibid.*; *PACMIRS Bulletin* No. 80A, 8 March 1946, NA, RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General, entry 135, box 48, folder L-311 (location: 270/1/6/5).
 48. Memorandum, Lt. Col. R. V. Smith, Chief, WDC (Adv) thru ATIS and WDI to Assistant

- Chief of Staff, G-2, SCAP, 22 December 1945, NA, RG 331, Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, entry 1150, box 440, folder 314.44 (location: 290/10/17/6).
49. "History and Accomplishments of the Japanese Government Prisoner of War Information Bureau," ca. 1 March 1953, p. 1, NA, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General, entry 363D, box 367, folder 314.4 Captured Records (location: 270/45/33/5); Memorandum, Adjutant General's Office to Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP, 15 December 1945, NA, RG 331, Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, entry 1237, box 1262A, folder 313 (location: 290/11/30/6); Memorandum, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP to Adjutant General's Office, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, 26 December 1945, *ibid.*
 50. Included in the shipments to the WDC were medical reports relating to bacteriological research prepared between 1934 and 1944 by Japanese Army medical personnel, including Gen. Iishi. General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, *Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, SWPA*, Vol. 5, Intelligence Series (Tokyo: GHQ, FEC, 1948) in NA, RG 200, General Charles A. Willoughby Files, box 91 (location: 130/76/5/3). Foreign Documents Branch, CIA, Translation 102, 12 January 1948 (2 vols.), "Reports on Japanese Bacteriological Research", NA RG 38, Chief of Naval Operations, entry 182, box 69 (location: 370/15/22/6).
 51. In December 1945, the International Prosecution Section was established as a staff section of SCAP, under the direction of Joseph B. Keenan, to handle the prosecution before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
 52. Memorandum, I. Ota to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 26 May 1949, NA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, entry 1220, box 1, folder D-1.1 (Documents-Japanese [captured]) (location: 250/49/8/4).
 53. Military Intelligence Service, Pacific MIRS Monthly Report for March 1945, p. 4, AGAR-S-1444, NA, RG 242, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, entry 282BB, box 4 (location: 190/19/33/04); Military Intelligence Service, Pacific MIRS Monthly Report for August 1945, p. 4, AGAR-S-1455A, *ibid.*
 54. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, CIA to Chief, Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, 30 December 1947, NA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, entry 205-H, box 7357 (location: 250/38/26/2).
 55. NA, RG 319, Army Staff, Intelligence (G-2), entry 47D, box 240, folder MIS 314.4 Japan, [1] memo Lash for Ennis, 10 October 1947, with added comment [2] Willoughby Attn Ennis, 30 October 30 1947 and [3] Ennis to CINCFE, 8 January 1948 (location: 270/6/15/1).
 56. Memorandum, Lt. Col. B. E. Sackett, War Crimes Branch, Manila, GHQ US Army Forces, Pacific to Brig. John W. Weir, and others, Subject: Coordination of War Crimes Activities

- Between Washington and Manila, 18 October 1945, NA, RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General (Army), entry 145, box 12, folder: book-1 103-B (location: 270/2/12/4); Memorandum, C. B. Warren, Jr., to Director, War Crimes Office, Subject: Facilities and Personnel Available for War Crimes Assistance in Pacific Theaters, 29 November 1945, *ibid.*; Military Intelligence Service, Pacific MIRS Monthly Reports, Aug., Sept., & Oct. 1945, NA, RG 242, Foreign Records Seized, entry 282BB, box 12 (location: 190/19/33/4).
57. Originally organized as the War Crimes Office in October 1944 under the Judge Advocate General, its functions were transferred to the Civil Affairs Division in March 1946 and the name changed to the War Crimes Branch. On 1 January 1949, the function returned to the JAG and the name reverted to War Crimes Office.
 58. *PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series* No. 1, Monthly Reports on Military Internment and Prisoners of War in the Philippines, 13 November 1945; No. 2, Roster of the Japanese Fourteenth Army Military Police Unit [Philippines], 6 December 1945; No. 4, Combat Reports: Third Phase of Philippine Mopping-Up Operations [first six months of 1943], 10 December 1945; No. 5, The Philippine Press and Government in March 1942, 11 December 1945, all in NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1820, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, nos. 1–5 (location: 390/34/23/2); No. 6, Field Military Police Duties and Situation Problems and Names of Japanese Military Police in the Philippines, 13 December 1945; No. 7, Names of Philippine Officials and Mayors, 4 January 1946; No. 8, Report on the Activities of Indians Living in the Philippines, 8 March 1946, all in NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1820, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, nos. 6–9 (location: 390/34/23/2).
 59. *PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series* No. 3, Articles by Prominent Japanese on the Greater East Asia War, 7 December 1945; *PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series* No. 12, Speeches by Prominent Japanese on the Greater East Asia War, 15 March 1946; NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1820, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, nos. 1–5 (location: 390/34/23/2); *PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series* No. 12, Speeches by Prominent Japanese on the Greater East Asia War, 15 March 1946, NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1820, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, nos. 13–20 (location: 390/34/23/2).
 60. *PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series* No. 10, Japanese Nationalist Organizations and Their Leaders, 8 March 1946, NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1821, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, no. 10 (location: 390/34/23/2);
 61. Memorandum, Col. Abe McGregor Goff, Assistant Director, War Crimes Office to Chief,

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A “Constantly Recurring Irritant”: Returning Captured and Seized Japanese Records, 1946–1961

Greg Bradsher

MANY AMERICANS BELIEVE that the United States indiscriminately returned to the Japanese government incriminating records confiscated from Japan during World War II and the subsequent Allied occupation. The documentation, however, shows that the decisions regarding the return of the records to Japan were debated and coordinated at the responsible levels of government. This chapter outlines the complex story.¹

Captured and seized Japanese documents in U.S. government custody were held by several government agencies at locations in Washington and in Japan that changed during the fifteen years after the war. Some of the Japanese documents were returned early in the 1950s, some not until the 1960s, and some were integrated into U.S. records and are retained in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The body of “captured” records usually referred to when discussing the returned documents is the largest single body of materials, those held by the Washington Document Center (WDC), which it transferred to the National Archives in the late 1940s and which the government returned to Japan beginning in 1958.

In addition, however, the U.S. government held other records that were returned to Japan after being used in Japan for administrative, intelligence, and war crimes prosecution purposes. The records in this second category were administered and returned in a more ad hoc fashion than the more formal treatment of the main body of captured records. It is possible here only to touch on the highlights of administration of these records, namely certain of the Japanese Foreign Ministry records, records gathered by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and the Prisoner of War Information Bureau records.

The Central Intelligence Group and the Transfer of Captured Japanese Records to the National Archives

The Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which began administering the Washington Document Center (WDC) in late 1946, took custody of most captured and seized Japanese records that had been shipped to the United States. By mid-1947, the CIG had finished reviewing and extracting information from most of these Japanese records. The completion of exploitation of the records, combined with budget cuts, government reorganization, and a shortage of storage space, prompted CIG to consider what to do with its captured Japanese records.

In the late summer of 1947, the CIG contacted the National Archives about housing its WDC holdings, and asked Lee L. Gerald, Chief of the Army Branch of the National Archives, to inspect the records. Gerald reported that the records appeared to be divided into four major groups: records of the Japanese Navy Ministry, records of the Japanese War Ministry, organizational and operational records of several Japanese armies, and blueprints and plans of Japanese vessels and ordnance. Gerald estimated that there were 3,500 cubic feet of records packed in large wooden boxes that were “haphazardly stacked in a room approximately 20x40 feet” that lacked proper climate controls and fire safeguards. In addition to these, he reported, there were about 500 cubic feet of records in a building occupied by the WDC. He concluded that it was in the government’s interest to preserve the records indefinitely.² On September 18, 1947, the CIG became the CIA; the CIA’s General Counsel soon agreed that the Japanese documents should be preserved, although not necessarily by the CIA.³

Later that month, the CIA notified the intelligence chiefs at the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force that, in accordance with Executive Order 9784, it desired to dispose of these records, which had been examined and screened for intelligence purposes and were no longer of any value to the CIA. The agency briefly described the records and gave the chiefs an opportunity to request any of them; otherwise, they would all be sent to the National Archives.⁴ Having received no request for the records, on January 9, 1948, the CIA offered the National Archives its Japanese records, stating that the records were open and “not subject to any restrictions.”⁵ The CIA promised to furnish the Archives with a descriptive list of the individual documents, volumes, or packages, if the documents were accepted.⁶

The National Archives agreed to the offer, and in May and June 1948 the CIA turned over 1,478,611 items (7,097 cubic feet of records). In September 1948, the CIA gave another 157,685 items, largely books and periodicals, to the Library of Congress.⁷ On July 7, 1949, the CIA transferred to the National Archives another 47 cubic feet of records, for a total 7,144 cubic feet of records, or about 17,860,000 pages, significantly more than originally estimated.⁸

Developing a Policy on Return of Captured Enemy Records

Because of the volume of captured records, by 1949 the State Department recognized the need for a general policy to deal with issues of administration and possible restitution of the records. In November of that year, the Department initiated the Interagency Conference on Captured Enemy Documentation (ICCED), which ultimately consisted of representatives from the National Archives, Library of Congress, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the CIA, and the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Navy, Army, and Air Force.⁹ At the first ICCED meeting in January 1950, the consensus was that the captured Japanese records were now of historical—not operational—value and could be returned to Japan.¹⁰

At a May 17, 1950, ICCED meeting, National Archives representatives pointed out that the Japanese materials in their possession would probably be governed by Department of Defense (DOD) decisions, and noted that a Presidential or Congressional directive would be required to move the records out of the National Archives.¹¹ Because the Korean War started the following month, the ICCED did not meet again until February 1951.

The State Department believed the main issue facing the U.S. government was the need for an orderly and efficient program of restitution that considered the legitimate needs of both former Allied and enemy governments. G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the State Department's Division of Historical Policy Research, felt it inappropriate to restore all captured enemy documents, and proposed instead to determine "what categories of materials can and should be returned and under what conditions."¹²

At the February 1951 ICCED meeting, the Army argued that former enemy governments had no recognized rights, moral or legal, to any captured military records and that the Army was not considering any general restitution of military records except to further U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives. At this meeting, the consensus was that any policy decisions on restitution had to be made at the highest level in joint consultation with the United Kingdom.¹³

The next day, Noble wrote the Army requesting further information about the safeguards to be inserted in the forthcoming peace treaties respecting captured enemy documents, and categories of enemy documents eligible or ineligible for restitution. The Army responded that the Adjutant General had recommended to the Chief of Staff that the Army review its policy on the matter, but that the Army's position remained as outlined at the last meeting.¹⁴ Similarly, the JCS believed it was neither desirable nor appropriate to return all categories of captured enemy documents to ex-enemy countries, and advised that the United States retain documents containing information about certain intelligence activities, cryptographic matters, and information likely to prejudice the U.S. national interest.¹⁵ In September 1951, however, the State Department became

responsible for drafting a policy for the restitution of captured records that the ICCED would implement.¹⁶

That same month, the United States signed a peace treaty with Japan. The treaty did not address specifically the issue of the return of the captured Japanese records, but it stipulated that, with certain exceptions, the Allied Powers had “the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests” of the Japanese government and Japanese nationals “which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction.”¹⁷

By July 1952, the State Department had drafted a preliminary restitution policy. After several years of coordination with other agencies and the British, in October 1955 the U.S. and British governments adopted a policy for return of the German records, which served as a model for the return of the Japanese records. The policy recognized the right of a nation to the restitution of the records necessary to its basic functioning and allowed for three phases: declassification of records, microfilming of selected records, and actual return of both microfilmed originals and those originals not deemed worthy of microfilming.¹⁸

Return of Captured Japanese Foreign Ministry Records Held in Japan and the United States

Immediately following the conclusion of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in November 1948, the Japanese began to press for the return of their captured records used by the International Prosecution Section (IPS) for its work in the Tribunal.

In December 1948, the Japanese Foreign Ministry requested the return of records, asserting to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) that the Ministry’s official documents, which had been submitted to the IPS in early 1946, were indispensable for the transaction of the Ministry’s business. The request reappeared in February 1949.¹⁹ In May, the Foreign Ministry again asked that SCAP return the Ministry’s records, this time citing a SCAP memorandum of February 5, 1946, which stated that the WDC could hold the records only “temporarily.”²⁰ The issue of the return of Japanese Foreign Ministry records became an abiding source of irritation between the two nations.

Beyond asking generally for the return of records, the Foreign Ministry began lodging requests for specific documentation that it needed for daily business. Some of these requests were met with disappointing replies. For instance, in early September 1950, the Foreign Ministry asked SCAP to return material pertaining to the China Incident, which had been lent to the IPS on the condition that it would be returned as soon as it served its purposes.²¹ A month later, SCAP replied that they could not find the records “alleged to have been loaned” among their Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal holdings.²²

In mid-September 1950, the Japanese Foreign Ministry asked the U.S. Mission in Tokyo to assist it in recovering certain documents that were requisitioned from the Ministry in 1946, such as signed texts of old and revised treaties and agreements, copies of telegrams, and other important records that had been forwarded to the WDC. The U.S. Mission asked the State Department in Washington for permission to return the records, noting that favorable action by the United States on the matter "would be appreciated by the Japanese Government and would appear particularly appropriate at this time. Should it be deemed advisable to have copies of the documents and records permanently available to the United States Government, the original materials could readily be microfilmed."²³ The State Department agreed, and on October 30, 1950, SCAP informed the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that the documents would be returned as soon as it was determined that there was no further need for them in Washington.²⁴

In early August 1951, the Foreign Ministry informed SCAP that in order to prepare for the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and other countries, it required access to its records and asked to borrow those in U.S. custody. The State Department and the Army approved Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) and SCAP's recommendations that the United States microfilm all seized or borrowed documents before returning them.²⁵ Microfilming had in fact begun in the summer 1949 and was completed two years later. Some 2.1 million pages were reproduced on 2,116 reels of microfilm. Included were records from the Foreign Ministry and documentary evidence from the IPS.²⁶ IPS documentation alone filled 500 2x2x4 boxes. In a letter to Noble dated May 18, 1951, Glenn Shaw, who was working in Tokyo on the Foreign Ministry Microfilming, stated:

What we have here now is the entire file of IMT documentary evidence that I was told all along was in the Adjutant General's storage space in Virginia. It was really locked up in a basement room in the NYK Building in Tokyo. It includes a great mixture of material from Washington, Berlin and Japan, including some that perhaps once made the trip from Tokyo to the Washington Document Center and back again. Because of lack of space here, we have so far brought over only half (18) of the four-drawer filing cabinets and the boxes. I am told that there are some papers in a safe in the ATIS offices upstairs in the NYK Building, and these and the rest of the filing cabinets I intend to crowd into the middle of this room next week.

In a later report to Noble, Shaw wrote that he had been trying to get Army G-2 to return all Foreign Ministry documents to the Ministry, but G-2 claimed that directives from

the Pentagon were stalling the process. The Library of Congress sent Shaw thirty-seven folders of material belonging to the Ministry, which the WDC had forwarded to them sometime in 1948.²⁷

William N. Stokes, at SCAP's Office of the U.S. Political Adviser for Japan, wrote to State on December 13 that confusion arose because the Foreign Ministry documents sent to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal were not co-extensive with the bulk of Foreign Ministry files seized. Most of the Ministry documents that the WDC (Advanced Echelon) and ATIS confiscated in 1946 dealt primarily with intelligence matters, and only a handful were later loaned to the Tribunal. Of the 1,280 records the Japanese Foreign Ministry listed, ATIS was microfilming 420 and would return them when finished. According to ATIS records, it shipped nearly 700 other records to Washington, and Stokes believed that most of the missing records would be found among the Tribunal documents then en route to Washington.²⁸

In January 1952, Stokes informed Army G-2 that certain documents seized by ATIS had not been located in a preliminary survey of ATIS records, although there was no indication that the missing documents had ever left Tokyo. Because the Foreign Ministry had receipts from ATIS and WDC for the documents, their general character was known, and it was likely that CINCFE agencies were exploiting them for intelligence purposes.²⁹

In mid-January 1952, the State Department asked the CIA to ship all its Foreign Ministry documents to Stokes in Tokyo.³⁰ The first week of February, the CIA sent 49 Foreign Ministry documents and informed Stokes that the remaining documents would be sent after microfilming.³¹ By the end of September 1952, the CIA had sent 102 documents to Japan.

Earlier in January, State had asked the Army Adjutant General's Office to return 106 Foreign Ministry records, which were used as evidence at the War Crimes Trials. The Adjutant General's Departmental Records Branch (DRB) found twenty-nine of the requested documents, twenty-seven being official Tribunal exhibits, and the remaining two a miscellany assembled by the prosecution staff but not introduced into evidence.³² The Chief Archivist cited the Nuremburg trials as a precedent for not restoring original court evidence to the Foreign Ministry, explaining that the United States had a responsibility to the other nations represented on the Tribunal to maintain the integrity of the trial records. He insisted that photostating or microfilming the originals would not achieve the same integrity, so the originals had to stay in U.S. possession.³³

In March 1952, the State Department told Stokes of the difficulties in returning "all the documents that were 'borrowed or seized' from the *Gaimusho* [Foreign Ministry] back to it."³⁴ Although the Ministry had received no signed statement from a U.S.

authority specifically acknowledging taking the records, it had a copy of the WDC-ATIS shipping advice that accompanied the transfer from Tokyo to Washington. The Ministry felt that an unsigned copy of a U.S. government bill of lading did constitute sufficient evidence between friendly nations that the United States had duly accepted custody of the Japanese records.

Contrary to the Archivist, Stokes believed the records remained the property of the Japanese government. He cited provisions of the *Rules of Land Warfare*, which could be interpreted as giving the occupying power the right to custody and use of the property, but not to title. Since the Tribunal records were no longer intact—SCAP had returned Swiss documents from the official Tribunal records—once the Japanese Peace Treaty became effective, the Japanese government could cite the Swiss example to reacquire custody of official government records.³⁵

Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of North East Asian Affairs, believed that since the U.S. government could not return all original records, to promote good relations the United States should assume the cost of microfilming the records that were used as court evidence by the Tribunal and give a copy to the Japanese.³⁶

The Army agreed to pay for the project, and the microfilming began in the summer of 1952. However, the project took longer than expected both because several agencies shared the microfilming facilities at Alexandria, Virginia, and because sorting Foreign Ministry records used as Tribunal exhibits from the other ministry documents was slow work.³⁷

In early December 1952, the Adjutant General sent to the Japanese government, via the State Department, seven microfilm reels with fifty Foreign Ministry documents accepted as exhibits at the Tribunal, but noted that some of the requested documents could not be located on the basis of information the Japanese had furnished.³⁸

About the same time, John Steeves, the First Secretary of the Embassy in Tokyo, confirmed that the Embassy had received from the CIA several shipments of documents, and 102 volumes had been returned to the Foreign Ministry.³⁹ There was still "a discouragingly long list" of records not received, which the American Embassy in Tokyo determined had not been returned.⁴⁰ In late March 1953, Steeves learned that copies of the outstanding materials would not be returned anytime soon because the records could not be located. The records may have been shipped to Kansas City, or they may have been stored somewhere in Tokyo.⁴¹

Meanwhile, Franklin Hawley, from the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, investigated the matter of some 64,000 Japanese books seized by SCAP.⁴² The Library of Congress had several thousand volumes or pieces of Japanese publications that it had received from the WDC. Some of the material had been already incorporated into the Library's collections,

and duplicates of others had been transferred to other libraries. In addition, certain archival material that had been identified among the collections had been transferred to the National Archives “with a view to restoration to their original sources.”⁴³

In late August 1953, Japan informed the U.S. Embassy that it disagreed with the U.S. position that the original documents accepted as evidence by the Tribunal could not be returned; Japan as a sovereign state should hold its own important state papers.⁴⁴ J. Graham Parsons at the Tokyo embassy brought the ongoing problem of returning the Foreign Ministry records to the attention of the Acting Director of the State Department’s Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. Parsons indicated that the embassy had been trying to settle the issue and his intention to contact the Far East Command to ask it to make one last effort to turn up whatever books “they can shake loose, and then to close the matter.” With respect to returning original documents, he acknowledged the return of seized state papers was “a tiny part of our relations with the Japanese, but it is one which, if satisfactorily settled, will remove one more irritation and contribute to the better relations which we seek to establish.” Parsons recommended that the U.S. government inform the Japanese that the U.S. seized the records “as a matter of right,” had no obligation to return them, and had returned as many as possible.

State’s Legal Division still focused on whether the United States was obliged to retain documents that were part of the Tribunal record. It cited Rule 6(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal promulgated April 25, 1946, which stated that

in cases where original documents are submitted by the prosecution or the defense in evidence, and upon showing (1) that because of historical interest or for any other reason one of the signatories to the Instrument of Surrender of Japan or any other government which has received the consent of all the said signatories desires to withdraw from the records of the Tribunal and preserve any particular original document, and (2) that no substantial injustice will result, the Tribunal shall permit photostatic copies of the said original documents certified by the General Secretary, to be substituted for the originals in the records of the court, and shall deliver the said original documents to the applicants.

Because the Tribunal no longer existed, it was impossible to obtain its permission to withdraw the original documents in question.

In lieu of the Tribunal’s permission, the Legal Division suggested that State might informally convince associated governments to consent to the United States’ returning the originals to the Japanese government and substituting certified photostats in the record to satisfy the Chief Archivist. This issue was never resolved. Thus some originals were retained in the Tribunal files and some were replaced with certified copies.

On February 25, 1954, the Japanese Embassy again asked the Secretary of State for the return of original Foreign Ministry documents used as evidence by the Tribunal and for the Ministry's important state papers, such as treaties and diplomatic records.⁴⁵ Wanting to resolve this issue and remove what was constantly termed "a minor irritation," in April the State Department contacted seven countries (a majority of the governments participating under Article XI of the Japanese Peace Treaty in decisions with respect to persons sentenced by the Tribunal) and requested their concurrence in the return of those documents. While the United States had already microfilmed and returned most of the documents in question, it still retained the original Foreign Ministry documents that were part of the Tribunal records.⁴⁶

In August 1954, the originals reposed in the Adjutant General's Departmental Records Branch (DRB), in Alexandria, Virginia. The Army intended to microfilm the records before sending them to the State Department to return to Japan.⁴⁷ Before the microfilming began, the Acting DRB Chief notified his colleagues of two complications. First, the DRB had kept no copy of microfilm previously sent to the Japanese government, and it had been necessary to reconstruct the list of documents filmed. Second, he assumed that the Japanese would protest any discrepancy between the number of original documents returned and the amount of microfilm previously furnished to the Japanese. He was concerned that the Japanese may have received more than microfilms of originals. They may have received, for example, the record copy of translations, notes, or other materials that were also in the Tribunal exhibit folder.⁴⁸

In mid-October, the Secretary of State notified the Japanese Embassy that State would return the documents presented as evidence to the Tribunal as well as additional Foreign Ministry documents stored at the Records Center at Alexandria. The United States shipped these records to Japan on January 7, 1955.⁴⁹ The Department of Defense, however, retained war crimes documents that were not submitted as evidence to the Tribunal.

Although State wished to return these materials in late April 1955, DOD argued that the huge volume of these records delayed any response to the Japanese. Furthermore, the Clemency and Parole Board for War Criminals was still using trial records when considering appeals from convicted Japanese war criminals. In August, the State Department informed the Japanese Embassy of the situation.⁵⁰

The Return of Additional Captured and Seized Japanese Records Held in Japan

Meanwhile, Japanese records were surfacing at other locations. In June 1955, at a regular weekly staff conference at the American Embassy in Tokyo, the military attaché arrived

with an “imposing set of documents replete with tape and wax seals,” which turned out to be the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. The documents consisted of the Japanese and Russian texts of the Pact, the Japanese original of the instrument of ratification in English dated May 20, 1941, and a “strictly confidential” note dated Moscow April 13, 1941, from Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov to Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, agreeing with a Japanese proposal to establish commissions to settle boundary questions and border incidents and disputes. The U.S. Army had discovered the documents at its language school in Tokyo, presumably during a spring cleaning of their files.

Because the Neutrality Pact documents were among those listed as still missing by the Foreign Ministry, the Embassy wanted to return the documents to Japan, but worried that the Japanese would suspect an ulterior political motive at a time when “neutrality” was very much in the public eye as a result of the current Russo-Japanese talks in London. A discreet return, without publicity, could avoid that problem but would encourage the Foreign Office to ask for more documents, which, if possible, the United States should also return.⁵¹

CINCFE also wanted to return Japanese ordnance drawings and documents confiscated by the Occupation Forces, but learned that the return of the material required negotiations between the State Department and the Japanese government. The Army let State take the lead.⁵² In late June 1955, State’s Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs told the Acting Deputy Chief of Mission to return the Neutrality Pact documents to the Japanese. With respect to the general release of all Japanese documents, prospects appeared favorable, but the agencies were reluctant to approve any returns until they knew the contents of the material.⁵³

The Return of Prisoner of War Information Bureau Records

In September 1945, American forces took legal custody of the records of the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau (POWIB), which consisted of 1,470 volumes of material, many translated into English. POWIB records included cards on 171,898 POWs and 108,034 civilian internees.

Early in 1953, the Foreign Ministry notified the American Embassy that, under the terms of the 1929 General Convention relating to POWs, Japan was obliged to deliver its POW records to the respective government each POW served. To accomplish this requirement, it needed POW documents released from the United States. In mid-February 1953, USAFFE recommended to the Adjutant General’s Office that the POWIB Japanese language source records and documents be released to the Japanese government, while the United States would retain the translated records.⁵⁴

There were delays in obtaining the concurrences of the Provost Marshal General's Office, the Adjutant General's Office, Department of State, the National Archives, and a Congressional Committee, but at the end of May, Congress approved the return of the records.⁵⁵ Immediately, the Adjutant General's Office asked USAFFE to release Japanese language POWIB documents to the Japanese government and to retire the English translations to the Military Personnel Records Center (MPRC) in St. Louis, Missouri.⁵⁶

In the process of disposing of the records as required, in the spring of 1954, Japan asked the United States if it desired the identification cards of Japanese-held American POWs. After much internal discussion, the United States accepted the offer in April 1955 and on May 31, 1955, the POWIB delivered the cards to the American Embassy. The cards were immediately shipped to the MPRC.⁵⁷

Return of the Main Body of Captured and Seized Japanese Records Held in the United States

On October 25, 1954, the First Secretary of the American Embassy in Japan proposed to liquidate all outstanding World War II issues between the United States and Japan.⁵⁸ Around the same time, the Japanese displayed renewed interest in securing the return of any remaining captured records and again asked for State's assistance. Return of the records would end a longstanding, but minor, problem that "proved a constantly recurring irritant in United States-Japan relations."⁵⁹ Assistant Archivist Robert Bahmer and Noble discussed the matter. The National Archives raised no objections to returning the records if other government agencies agreed, so Noble contacted interested agencies.⁶⁰

In June 1955, the CIA informed Noble that the Agency had no objection to the return of the records because they had been thoroughly exploited six years earlier.⁶¹ On July 1, the Army's DRB concurred, provided that due consideration was given to the interests of American scholars, the Allies, and the potential interest of Defense contract agencies.⁶² The Navy also agreed, suggesting that the return of the records be governed by a joint policy allowing U.S. retention of records that had historical, security, or counterintelligence value. The Navy also desired an agreement with the Japanese government allowing it free access to the returned documents for research or microfilming.⁶³

The Army contacted Noble in early August asking for a policy statement consistent with the one governing the return of captured German records. Noble answered:

In the German case, a few qualifications were made of the principle of returning captured papers. The most important, in so far [*sic*] as they are applicable to Japan, were: (a) Documents which might, if returned, jeopardize the national security interests of our

country, or of our allies, would be retained indefinitely, though time and circumstances might change conditions; (b) Documents required for the time being for purposes of official study would be returned when the official need for them was at an end. These statements of principle are equally applicable to the holdings of Japanese documents.”

He added that the State Department and CIA had agreed to return the records and the National Archives was “anxious to be rid of the papers.”⁶⁴

In October the Army informed Noble that DOD agencies concurred in the return, subject to explicit rights to future access. Noble in turn notified the National Archives and suggested assuring future reference to the documents by inserting an ‘access clause’ in the receipt that accompanied the actual transfer of the records. He also recommended that the National Archives obtain Congressional approval for the transfer. The National Archives agreed.⁶⁵

Congressional Approval for the Return of the Records

The National Archives requested Congressional approval for the return of the records on March 23, 1956. The confiscated records had been seized largely for purposes of military and foreign intelligence and more than a decade later few had any value for military or foreign intelligence. Those that did had already been or were being used by the appropriate federal agencies which would return them to Japan at a later date. The Archives assured Congress that documents needed for intelligence or other research purposes would not be sent back. Congress approved the return on April 24, exempting “military, intelligence, cryptographic, technological or other military documents, that would, if returned, jeopardize the national security interests of the United States or its Allies” and “materials concerned primarily with Japanese occupation of other states, the return of which would jeopardize the national security interests of the United States or its Allies.”⁶⁶

During the spring of 1956, the Clemency and Parole Board insisted that there was no legal or moral obligation to make background material used in preparation of the war crimes trials available to the Japanese, and felt Japan could use the documentation to make the United States “look bad.” All of the evidentiary documents accepted by the Tribunal had already been returned to the Japanese in January 1955 and it would be a costly and time-consuming affair to locate additional backup documents.⁶⁷

The Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Intelligence Division contacted the State Department in the early summer of 1956 asking to retain about 2,500 linear feet of cartographic (terrain-intelligence) records for scientific use. These records, largely created by the Kwantung Army between 1931 and 1941, covered Manchuria, North China, a 75-mile strip in Siberia along the Manchurian border, and Sakhalin and Korea. Given

that the United States had already made a commitment to Japan, the State Department was reluctant to withhold them, and asked the Corps to prepare a detailed memorandum justifying their proposal to withhold terrain-intelligence material.⁶⁸

On July 3, the Corps' Acting Division Chief replied that the records had not yet been fully exploited because of insufficient time, and asked that the material be permanently retained for intelligence purposes. Given the oversize of maps and cartographic studies, much of the material could not be easily microfilmed. He wanted six months to study the material and make lists of non-returnable items.⁶⁹ By August, however, upon review the Corps had reduced its request from 2,500 to 350 cubic feet of records.⁷⁰ Air Force Intelligence was interested in about 50 cubic feet scattered randomly among the 7,000 cubic feet of its holdings. On July 20, the records center allowed two Air Force intelligence experts until January 1, 1957, to identify pertinent items.⁷¹

In mid-August, the State Department approved making the records available to the Engineers for any remaining intelligence exploitation, with the caveat that excessive delay would prove "embarrassing to our political relations with the Japanese Government."⁷²

The Intelligence Division of the Corps of Engineers agreed to complete its review by early 1957 and coordinate with the National Archives to identify files quickly in which they had no interest that could therefore be prepared for selective shipment to Japan.⁷³ Noble and the National Archives worked out the logistic and cost estimates for packing and transporting the records to the Baltimore harbor for overseas shipment.⁷⁴

Plans for the shipment of the records to Japan moved smoothly in early 1957. In February, the U.S. Air Force notified the National Archives that it considered the project closed because further exploitation was not justified, and all files were being returned. That same month, the Corps of Engineers notified the National Archives that it would return its Japanese materials no later than October 1.⁷⁵

Academic Interest in the Records

In the fall of 1955, the American Committee for the Study of War Documents, organized to coordinate the scholarly use of captured German records, visited the National Archives to discuss the exploitation of the German records. At that time, Bahmer suggested that there might also be an interest in the Japanese records, explaining that the Japanese records would most likely be returned before the German records. Later that year, Professor Ardath Burks inspected the Japanese Army and Navy records at the Franconia records center on behalf of the Far Eastern Association, an academic society of Asian specialists. Two Library of Congress representatives accompanied Burks, and all agreed that any large-scale screening and microfilming operation would be almost prohibitively expensive and difficult.⁷⁶

During the first week of December 1956, Sidney Wallach, Executive Secretary of the American Committee for the Study of War Documents, questioned the National Archives about the nature of the Japanese records, their extent and scope, the amount microfilmed, and whether a date had been set for the return of the material. Bahmer quickly informed Wallach that the records had been approved for return to Japan and that the actual transfer should begin early in 1957.⁷⁷

In April 1957, Professor C. Martin Wilbur of Columbia University, who had served in Office of Strategic Services in China, contacted the State Department about the pending return of the records. State responded that the Historical Division believed that most of the material of historical value had been copied, and suggested that Wilbur contact the National Archives about the matter. A week later, James William Morley, then a visiting professor at Columbia University, wrote to Bahmer about the records, noting that several scholars who had been using the Japanese Army and Navy records had expressed their concern about the records being returned to Japan and no longer available for scholarly research. Morley asked if there was any merit in conducting a preliminary search of the documents to determine which items might be of sufficient historical value to warrant microfilming. He also inquired if the National Archives knew exactly which documents had been microfilmed previously, and by whom, and whether copies were or could be made available for use or purchase. He also asked for specific information regarding additional documents still being held by the governments.⁷⁸

Bahmer replied that the greater portion of the Japanese records were in the custody of the National Archives, and that he did not know if isolated papers or technical materials were in the hands of other government agencies.⁷⁹ Since Morley had published his “Check List of Seized Japanese Records in the National Archives” in 1950, the volume of the collection had grown to over 7,000 cubic feet.⁸⁰ Apparently few had been copied.

Bahmer told him that the return of the captured and seized Japanese records would likely take place later in 1957, and he mentioned that, in their 1955 review of the records, experts agreed that microfilming was impractical.⁸¹

Bahmer sent a copy of this letter to Edwin G. Beal, Jr., then Acting Head of the Japanese Section at the Library of Congress, who clarified the situation. The microfilming project done in Japan between 1949–1951 had copied the archives of the Foreign Ministry on 2,116 reels of negative film, which the Library of Congress had in its custody with an index. There were another 72 reels of microfilm gathered from various Washington agencies now held in the Library of Congress, but without an index. Beal concluded by noting that if American scholars were going to do anything about the records, they should do it soon. “The archives,” he wrote, “have now been here for almost 12 years, and, in so far as I know, American scholars have made comparatively little use of them.

The Japanese Government wants them back, and the American Government would like to use the space for other material."⁸² (By early January 1955, the National Archives had sent approximately 7,848 cubic feet of captured and seized Japanese records to the records center in Alexandria, Virginia, in order to free space in its main downtown building).⁸³

In June, the Ford Foundation awarded a grant of \$18,000 for a microfilming project. Professors Edwin Reischauer of Harvard University, C. Martin Wilbur of Columbia University, James Morley of Columbia University, John Young of Georgetown University, and Chitoshi Yanaga of Yale University, and Edwin Beal of the Library of Congress, oversaw the project.⁸⁴ In early July, Yanaga, with Warren M. Tsuneishi of Hamden, Connecticut, and Tatsuro Tanabe from Columbia University, began a ten-week project to select appropriate documents for microfilming.⁸⁵ They aimed specifically to find material showing how Japanese military thought influenced Japan's national policy, and how domestic problems affected the thinking of Japanese military officials. Other research areas focused on information that would reveal how much Japanese intelligence units knew of communist influence in China and the part the Japanese Army played in promoting the use of opium by the Chinese. At that point, no one had determined who would do the microfilming or where it would be done.⁸⁶

Yanaga and his team found a great deal of material, including reports on the Mukden Incident of 1931 and subsequent events in Manchuria and documents on the Nomonhan Incident, when Japanese and Russian troops fought a small scale war in 1939. Other documents were confidential reports on activities of the Japanese Army and Navy during various wars, on work of the Home Ministry pertaining to Japanese internal security, and data on the government's conduct of World War II, particularly on the domestic front.⁸⁷

In September, Yanaga suggested that the only way to accomplish the project was to use Library of Congress equipment (under their strict supervision and on its premises) in exchange for the services already rendered. The Ford Foundation would pay for the cost of the film, processing, and inspection, as well as for supervisory time spent by Library of Congress employees. Yanaga and his colleagues prepared the documents and operated the microfilm camera. With the \$7,000 left from the Ford grant, they expected to film about 100,000 frames, but that many might not even be needed. This amount was far below the original estimate of 500,000 "which was pulled out of the air."⁸⁸

Microfilming began in October 1957 and ended in February 1958, when funds were exhausted and the documents were packed for return to Japan. In all, some 400,000 pages (about 160 cubic feet) were reproduced on 163 reels of microfilm; positive prints were given to the Library of Congress and to the National Diet Library in Tokyo.⁸⁹

The Records Returned to Japan

During mid-February 1958, the Army moved the Japanese records from the records center in Alexandria, Virginia, to the Baltimore harbor, and from there a Japanese ship carried them to Japan. Packing the records, trucking them to Baltimore, and loading them on the ship cost \$5,089.57, paid for by the U.S. Army.⁹⁰ Intensive searches have discovered no evidence that any provision was made for future U.S. government access. This apparently resulted from an oversight by officials involved in the transfer, and it is possible that those involved in the logistics were not informed about any access clause agreement.

In February 1960, the Corps of Engineers completed its study of the Japanese records in its custody, and a few months later⁹¹ the Army shipped the documents to Japan, along with captured Japanese embassy, consulate, and legation files that had been seized in Europe (microfilmed copies had been provided to the National Archives).⁹² These records, about 95 cubic feet, were turned over to Japanese officials on June 24, 1960. The receipt does not mention future access to the records.⁹³ In 1961, the U.S. Navy arranged to return some 650 cubic feet of captured Japanese hydrographic documents⁹⁴ to the Japanese Maritime Safety Board's Hydrographic Division. These records were returned in November 1961, and turned over to the Chief Hydrographer in mid-November.⁹⁵

Conclusion

The U.S. government returned the captured and seized Japanese records because of political considerations and generally accepted conventions regarding restitution of captured archives.

Critics have suggested that the records were returned to Japan without having been exploited for war crimes purposes, but the administration of the materials shows that this was not the case. The records were thoroughly exploited for war crimes purposes before coming to the National Archives in 1948 and also for historical and intelligence uses prior to their return to Japan. There is virtually no likelihood that captured Japanese records relating directly to war crimes were returned to Japan without having been copied or explored.

Even after the return of large bodies of original Japanese language records, NARA holds a substantial body of Japanese documents and information derived from them.⁹⁶ These records are originals, hundreds of thousands of pages of copies and translations, microfilm copies, and many reports and other derivative materials. Some are exhibits in war-crimes-related files and others are integrated into agency files. These records are open to researchers and have been for many decades. If Americans and the Japanese are to fully extract lessons from World War II, then archival records need to be not only accessible, but used.

Notes

1. A fuller treatment of the collection, exploitation, administration, and return of these records is contained in Greg Bradsher, *World War II Japanese Records: History of their Capture, Exploitation, and Disposition* (forthcoming).
2. Lee L. Gerald, Report on the captured Japanese documents, 21 August 1947, NA, Captured Japanese Records Retain File, Modern Military Records.
3. Memorandum, General Counsel, CIA to Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, undated ca. 1 December 1947, pp. 1–2, Copy in NA, Retain File, Captured Japanese Records, Modern Military Records.
4. Memorandum, Capt. C.E. Olsen, USN, Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination to Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, Department of State; Director of Intelligence, General Staff, Department of the Army; Chief of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2, Department of the Air Force, 26 September 1947, Decimal 894.414/9-2647, Central Decimal File 1945–1949, NA, RG 59.
5. The Army and the State Department replied that they had no need for the records. Memorandum, Col. R. F. Ennis, Chief, Intelligence Group to Assistant Director of Collection and Dissemination, CIA, 8 October 1947, Decimal 314.4, Japan, Army Intelligence Project Decimal File 1946–1948, entry 47D, Records of the Administrative Division, Records of the Army Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G-2), Records of the Army Chief of Staff, NA, RG 319. At the bottom of the document are the concurrences of the Far Eastern Branch (Lt. Col. Mellnik), Historical Division (Lt. Col. Clark), and Adjutant General's Office (Dr. Bahmer); Letter, W. Park Armstrong, Jr. Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence to Capt. C. E. Olsen, USN, Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, 23 October 1947, Decimal 894.414/10-2347, Central Decimal File 1945–1949, NA, RG 59.
6. Memorandum, William J. Marston, Records Administrator, CIA to Archivist of the United States, 9 January 1948, Job No. 448-145, Copy in NA, Captured Japanese Records Retain File, Modern Military Records.
7. When books gathered by the WDC in Japan arrived in Washington in 1946, the WDC sorted the material and distributed some of it to the Army, Navy, and other departmental libraries in Washington. Only material "of a purely cultural nature and of no interest to the Army or Navy" was sent to the Library of Congress at that time. Later, when the WDC no longer existed, several thousand volumes remaining in the collection were transferred to the Library of Congress. Letter, Verner Clapp, Acting Librarian of Congress to G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, 22 January 1954, NA, RG 59, Decimal 894.423/1-2254, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, .

8. The original figures were probably based, in part, on Gerald's estimates from 1946–1947. At that time, most of the records were packed in large, wooden, haphazardly stacked boxes.
9. Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin to G. Bernard Noble, 29 November 1949, AGAR-S-1327A, AGAR-S Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, RG 242. Membership list is based on a list of attendees at the 15 March and 17 May 1950 meetings, Minutes of the Meetings of the Interagency Conference on Captured Enemy Documentation, AGAR-S-1316 and AGAR-S-1319, AGAR-S Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242.
10. Minutes and Agenda, 25 January 1950 meeting of the ICCED, AGAR-S-1322, AGAR-S Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242.
11. Minutes and Agenda, 15 March 1950 meeting of the ICCED, AGAR-S-1319, AGAR-S Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242; Minutes of Meeting, 27 May 1950, AGAR-S-1316, *ibid.*
12. Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Sherrod East, 7 February 1951, AGAR-S-1339, AGAR-S Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242.
13. Minutes, Meeting of ICCED, 14 February 1951, AGAR-S-1339, AGAR-S Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242, Letter, Sherrod East to G. Bernard Noble, 27 February 1951, AGAR-S-1306, *ibid.*
14. Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Sherrod East, 15 February 1951, AGAR-S-1339, AGAR-S Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242; Letter, Sherrod East to G. Bernard Noble, 27 February 1951, AGAR-S-1306, *ibid.*
15. Various JCS Documents February–June 1951, file 40.6 Records of the Branch Archivist (“Archival Policy File”) 1954–1957, entry 371, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, NA, RG 407.
16. Letter, Robert A. Lovett to Secretary of State, 14 September 1951, file 40.6, Records of the Branch Archivist (“Archival Policy File”) 1954–1957, entry 371, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, NA, RG 407.
17. Treaty of Peace, 8 September 1951, Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950–1955 Vol. 1. Department of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117 (Washington, USGPO 1957), 432.
18. Letter, Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Director, Executive Office, Department of Defense to the Secretary of State, 4 June 1952, file 40.6 Records of the Branch Archivist (“Archival Policy File”) 1954–1957, entry 371 Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, RG 407; Letter, Ollen D. McCool to G. Bernard Noble, 11 October 1955, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64. See also Seymour J. Pomrenze, “Policies and Procedures for the Protection, Use, and Return of Captured German Records,”

- in Robert Wolfe, ed., *Captured German and Related Records: A National Archives Conference* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), 27.
19. Memorandum, Giichi Maekawa to G-2 Section, GHQ, SCAP, 13 December 1948, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118 entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Memorandum, K. Yoshida to General Headquarters, SCAP, 15 December 1948, *ibid.*; Memorandum, K. Yoshida to General Headquarters, SCAP, 21 February 1949, *ibid.*
 20. Memorandum, I. Ota to General Headquarters, SCAP, 26 May 1949, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59.
 21. This was volume 5 of the Diplomatic Data Series, *Circumstances attending the formation of the Provisional Government, the Renovation Government and the Mongol Government*, with records concerning other local governments appended.
 22. Memorandum, Kijiro Miyake to General Headquarters, SCAP, Attn: G-2, 2 September 1950, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Memorandum, Lt. Col. David S. Tait to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 October 1950, *ibid.*
 23. Air Pouch Memorandum, Charles N. Spinks, First Secretary of Mission to Department of State, Tokyo 467, 22 September 1950, Decimal 894.423/9-2250, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
 24. Copy, Cable to the Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, No. 60, 11 October 1950, Decimal 894.423/9-2250, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, RG 59; Letter, WJ. Sebal to Ichiro Ohta, 30 October 1950, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59.
 25. Memorandum, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to G-2, General Headquarters of the SCAP, 2 August 1951, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Memo for Record, [Sherrod East, Chief Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General], 6 June 1952, Decimal 314.4 , Army Adjutant General Classified Decimal File 1951–1952, box 3794, NA, RG 407; Check Note, Diplomatic Section, GHQ, SCAP, W.J.S. to G-2, 3 January 1952, Request for Search of SCAP and CINCFE Records for Japanese Foreign Office of Documents, 3 January 1952, an enclosure to Letter, William N. Stokes to Gerald Warner, 31 December 1951, with enclosures listing Foreign Ministry documents among Tribunal records and unaccounted documents, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118 entry 1220, NA, RG 59. References given for approval are CINCFE message C-51343 to DEPTAR 21 Sept 1951, DEPTAR reply DA 83154 4 Oct 1951, and State message 571 (MCN 78708) 11 Oct 1951.

26. Uyehara, Cecil H. Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 1868–1945, microfilmed for the Library of Congress, 1949–1951.
27. Letter, Gerald Warner to Alfred T. Wellborn, 2 November 1951, Decimal 894.423/11-251, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
28. Letter, William N. Stokes to Gerald Warner, 13 December 1951, Decimal 894.423/12-1351, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
29. Check Note, Diplomatic Section, GHQ, SCAP, W.J.S. to G-2, 3 January 1952, Request for Search of SCAP and CINCFE Records for Japanese Foreign Office of Documents, 3 January 1952, an enclosure to Letter, William N. Stokes to Gerald Warner, 31 December 1951, with enclosures listing Foreign Ministry documents among Tribunal records and unaccounted documents, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59.
30. Memorandum, Mr. Warner to Mr. Bagnell, CIA, 15 January 1952, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, RG 59.
31. Memorandum James M. Andrews, Assistant Director, Collection and Dissemination, to United States Political Advisor for Japan, Attn: William N. Stokes, 5 February 1952, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Memorandums, James M. Andrews to United States Political Advisor for Japan, Attn: William N. Stokes, 9 April, 2 July, and 29 September, 1952, *ibid.*; Memorandum, A.C. Malbouef, CIA, to Leonore Burmaster, 15 January 1953, *ibid.*
32. Memo for Record, (Brower) S. East, 8 December 1952, Classified Chronological File, 1947–1952, entry 371F, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, NA, RG 407.
33. Letter, Gerald Warner to William N. Stokes, 11 March 1952, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Memorandum: “Records Seized from the Foreign Office,” Attachment No. 1 to Letter, J. Graham Parsons, American Embassy, Tokyo to Robert J.G. McClurkin, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 21 October 1953, Decimal 894.423/10-2153, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59
34. Letter, Gerald Warner to William N. Stokes, 11 March 1952, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59.
35. Letter, William N. Stokes to Gerald Warner, 29 March 1952, Decimal 894.423/3-2952, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
36. Memorandum, Mr. Young (Office of Northeast Asian Affairs) to Mr. Allison (FE), 14 May 1952, Decimal 894.423/5-1452, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
37. Letter, Franklin Hawley to John M. Steeves, 13 October 1952, Decimal 894.423/10-1352, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

38. Letter, Maj. Gen. Wm. E. Bergin to John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 11 December 1952, Decimal 894.423/12-1152, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
39. Letter, Shigezo Yoshikawa, Chief of Archives Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to John M. Steeves, 11 December 1952, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59.
40. Letter, John M. Steeves to Franklin Hawley, 18 December 1952, Decimal 894.423/12-1852, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
41. Letter, Franklin Hawley to John M. Steeves, 30 March 1953, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59.
42. Letter, Samuel D. Berger to Franklin Hawley, 24 November 1953, Decimal 894.423/11-2453, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
43. Letter, Verner Clapp, Acting Librarian of Congress to G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, 22 January 1954, Decimal 894.423/1-2254, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59; Note, Marjorie McMullen to Mr. Franklin, n.d., and handwritten note to Noble, n.d., both attached to Letter, Verner Clapp, Acting Librarian of Congress to G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, 22 January 1954, *ibid.*
44. Letter, J. Graham Parsons, American Embassy, Tokyo to Robert J. G. McClurkin, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 21 October 1953, Decimal 894.423/10-2153, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59; Copy of Letter, Tatsuo Susana to Mr. Berger, 20 August 1953, attached to *ibid.*
45. Diplomatic Note, Charge d'affair ad interim, Embassy of Japan to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1954, Decimal 894.423/2-2554, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
46. Letter, Everett F. Drumright, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs to Robert T. Stevens, Secretary of the Army, 23 July 1954, Decimal 894.423/2-2554, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59; copies of the correspondence between the State Department and the various governments can be found in the various 894.423 decimal files for April, May, June, and July 1954, *ibid.*
47. Memorandum, Maj. Gen. John A. Klein, The Adjutant General to Mr. Pomrenze, 5 August 1954, file 40.6, Records of the Branch Archivist ("Archival Policy File") 1954–1957, entry 371, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, NA, RG 407; Memorandum for the Record, no author, 5 August 1954, *ibid.*; Letter, George H. Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army to Everett F. Drumright, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 11 August 1954, Decimal 894.423/8-1154, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
48. Routing Note, Ken Munden to Mr. East and Mr. Brower, 27 August 1954, file 40.6, Records

- of the Branch Archivist ("Archival Policy File") 1954–1957, entry 371, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, NA, RG 407.
49. Diplomatic Note, Secretary of State to the Ambassador of Japan, 18 October 1954, Decimal 894.423/10-654, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59; handwritten note on Letter, George H. Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army to Everett F. Drumright, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 11 August 1954, Decimal 894.423/8-1154, *ibid.*
 50. Letter, Vice Adm. A. C. Davis to Walter S. Robertson, 27 July 1955, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Letter, Richard S. Finn, Acting Officer in Charge, Japanese Affairs to Yasuhiro Matsuoka, 16 August 1955, *ibid.*
 51. Letter, George A. Morgan to Robert J. G. McClurkin, 8 June 1955, file 12.3, Captured Japanese Documents, Subject Files Relating to Japan, 1954–1959, Miscellaneous lot Files, lot 61D68, entry 1341, NA, RG 59.
 52. Letter, Maj. Gen. Elmer J. Rogers, Jr., USAF to George A. Morgan, 10 June 1955, file 12.3, Captured Japanese Documents, Subject Files Relating to Japan, 1954–1959, Miscellaneous Lot Files, lot 61D68, entry 1341, NA, RG 59; Letter, George A. Morgan to Robert J. G. McClurkin, 15 June 1955, *ibid.*
 53. Letter, Robert J. G. McClurkin to George A. Morgan, 24 June 1955, file 12.3, Captured Japanese Documents, Subject Files Relating to Japan, 1954–1959, Miscellaneous Lot Files, lot 61D68, entry 1341, NA, RG 59; Letter, J. Graham Parsons to Maj. Gen. Elmer J. Rogers, 11 July 1955, *ibid.*
 54. Memorandum, Col. C. C. B. Warden, Adjutant General, HQ, US Army Forces, Far East to The Adjutant General, Attn: Ollen D. McCool, Records Management Branch, Subject: Records of the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Decimal 313.3, 13 February 1953, Decimal 314.4, Disposition–Japanese Captured Records II NNA, box 367, Army AG Decimal File 1951–1952, NA, RG 407. Most of these translated records reside among NA, RG 389, Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General. See in particular Japanese POW Information Bureau Files 1946–1958, box 1530 (location: 270/50/21/06).
 55. Correspondence relating to the delay can be found in Decimal 314.4, Disposition – Japanese Captured Records II NNA, box 367, Army AG Decimal File 1951–1952, NA, RG 407, 28 May 1953, the Congress approval was received in The Adjutant General's Office, NA Job II-NNA-572 (H.R. No. 454, 25 May 1953). Decimal 314.4, Disposition – Japanese Captured Records II NNA, box 367, Army AG Decimal File 1951–1952, NA, RG 407.
 56. Memorandum, Col. R. H. Shell, Chief, Management Branch, Office of the Adjutant General to Commanding General, US Army Forces, Far East, Attn: Records Administrator, Subject: Records of the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau, 29 May 1953, Decimal

- 314.4, Disposition – Japanese Captured Records II NNA, box 367, Army AG Decimal File 1951–1952, NA, RG 407. In July the translations were sent to the MPRC. Memorandum Capt. C. M. Shugart, Adjutant, AG Administrative Center, 8234th Army Unit, APO 503 to Commanding General, US Army Forces, Far East, 11 July 1953, Decimal 314.4, Disposition – Japanese Captured Records II NNA, *ibid*.
57. Letter, W. Kenneth Hoover, Acting Records Management Officer, Department of State, to Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin, The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, 18 March 1954, Army Adjutant General Decimal File 1953–1954 box 144 Decimal 314.4 Captured Records-Japanese Identification Cards on American POWs, NA, RG 407; Letter, Maj. Gen. John A. Klein, The Adjutant General to Homer L. Calkin, Records Officer, Department of State, 27 April 1955, Army Adjutant General Decimal File 1953–1954, box 144, Decimal 314.4 Captured Records-Japanese Identification Cards on American POWs, NA, RG 407; Memorandum, Col. Ward W. Conquest, Chief, Comptroller Division, The Adjutant General's Office to Commanding Officer, Military Personnel Records Center, Subject: Japanese Identification Cards on American Prisoners of War, 27 April 1955, *ibid*.; Department of State Instruction A-732, Hoover to The American Embassy, Tokyo, 10 May 1955, *ibid*; Offer and acceptance signed by H. Maruo, Director of War Prisoners Information Bureau and Rudolph Soldan, May 31, 1955, Army Adjutant General Decimal File 1953–1954 box 144 Decimal 314.4; DD Form 111, Records Shipment List, 2 June 1955 and Army Shipping Document, DA Form 450-5-D, 7 June 1955, Army Adjutant General Decimal File 1953–1954, box 144, Decimal 314.4, Captured Records-Japanese Identification Cards on American POWs, NA, RG 407.
 58. This report, "A Preliminary Reappraisal of United States Policy With Respect to Japan," is the enclosure to despatch 516 from Tokyo, 25 October 1954, Decimal 611.94/10-2554, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
 59. Letter, Robert J.G. McClurkin to E.O. Alldredge, Director, Records and Management Division, National Archives and Records Service, 10 January 1955, Decimal 894.423/1-1055, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.
 60. Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to Robert J. G. McClurkin, 2 February 1955, Decimal 894.423/5-2455, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Memorandum, Mr. McClurkin to G. Bernard Noble, 17 February 1955, Decimal 894.423/5-2455, *ibid*. Bahmer provided Noble in late May with a very brief description of the records, citing Morely's article and mentioning additional accessions of records from the LC (413 cu. ft.) and from the CIA (230 cu. ft.). Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to G. Bernard Noble, 24 May 1955, Decimal 894.423/5-2455, *ibid*.
 61. Letter, Paul W. Howerton to G. Bernard Noble, 28 June 1955, Decimal 894.423/5-2455, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.

62. Memorandum, Chief, Departmental Records Branch to Chief, Records Administration Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, 1 July 1955, file 40.6 Records of the Branch Archivist ("Archival Policy File") 1954–1957, entry 371, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, NA, RG 407; Letter, Ollen D. McCool to G. Bernard Noble, 1 July 1955, Decimal 894.423/5-2455, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.
63. Memorandum, John D. Dillon to The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, 3 August 1955, Copy in Retain File, Modern Military Records, NA.
64. Letter, Ollon D. McCool to G. Bernard Noble, 9 August 1955, Decimal 894.423/8-955, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Ollen D. McCool, 29 September 1955, *ibid*.
65. Letter, Ollon D. McCool to G. Bernard Noble, 11 October 1955, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Robert H. Bahmer, 15 November 1955, Decimal 894.423/11-1555, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to G. Bernard Noble, 21 November 1955, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.
66. Robert H. Bahmer to the Congress of the States, Report of the Archivist of the United States on records proposed for disposal, Disposal Report No. 56-10, 23 March 1956, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.
67. Memorandum, Mr. Hemmendinger, NA, to Mr. Sebald, FE, 20 April 1956, Decimal 894.423/4-2056, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.
68. Letter, Merritt W. Matthews, Acting Chief, Engineer Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army to G. Bernard Noble, 3 July 1956, Decimal 894.423/8-1756, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Robert H. Bahmer, 28 June 1956, Decimal 894.423/6-2856, *ibid*; Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: The Return of Captured Japanese Document, Meeting Held in Mr. Noble's Office, 20 June 1956, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59.
69. Letter, Merritt W. Matthews, Acting Chief, Engineer Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army to G. Bernard Noble, 3 July 1956, Decimal 894.423/8-1756, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.
70. Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Robert H. Bahmer, 1 August 1956, Decimal 894.423/8-156, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.
71. Memorandum, Arthur E. Young, Deputy Regional Director, Records Management Service to Assistant Archivist of the United States, Subject: Seized Japanese Records in Custody of

- Federal Records Center, 9 August 1956, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.
72. Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Merritt W. Matthews, 17 August 1956, Decimal 894.423/8-1756, Central Decimal File, 1955-1959, NA, RG 59.
73. Letters, Merritt W. Matthews to G. Bernard Noble, 17 August 1956, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; G. Bernard Noble to Robert H. Bahmer, 31 August 1956, Decimal 894.423/8-2356, Central Decimal File, 1955-1959, NA, RG 59; G. Bernard Noble to Gordon Williams, Chief of the General Service Administration, Federal Records Center, 31 August 1945, *ibid*; G. Bernard Noble to Merritt W. Matthews, 5 September 1956, *ibid*; Merritt W. Matthews to G. Bernard Noble, 23 August 1956, *ibid*.
74. Memorandum, G. Bernard Noble to Marjorie McMullen, 20 September 1956, Decimal 894.423/9-1456, Central Decimal File, 1955-1959, NA, RG 59; Letter, Arthur E. Young, Deputy Regional Director, Records Management Service to G. Bernard Noble, 25 September 1956, *ibid*; Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Arthur E. Young, 24 September 1956, *ibid*; Letter, Arthur E. Young to G. Bernard Noble, 14 September 1956, *ibid*. Letter, Arthur E. Young to G. Bernard Noble, 25 September 1956, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.
75. Letter, W.F. Zimmerman, Assistant Chief, Reference Service Branch, Federal Records Center to G. Bernard Noble, 11 March 1957, Decimal 894.423/3-1157, Central Decimal File, 1955-1959, NA, RG 59; Memorandum, Merritt W. Matthews to Federal Records Center, Attn: William F. Zimmerman, 12 February 1957, *ibid*; Memorandum, Col. James T. Bull, D/Intelligence, HQ, USAF to Federal Records Center, Attn: Mr. Zimmerman, 26 February 1957, *ibid*.
76. Letter, Hans Kohn to Wayne Grover, 27 September 1955, Transaction Dossier P & C 056-102, American Committee for the Study of the War Documents, NA, RG 64; Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to Sidney Wallach, 10 December 1956, *ibid*; Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to James William Morley, 10 May 1957, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; Letter, Edwin G. Beal, Jr. to James W. Morley, 15 May 1957, *ibid*.
77. Letter, Sidney Wallach to Albert H. Leisinger, Jr., 5 December 1956, Transaction Dossier P & C 056-102, American Committee for the Study of the War Documents, NA, RG 64; Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to Sidney Wallach, 10 December 1956, *ibid*.
78. Letter, James William Morley to Robert H. Bahmer, May 6, 1957, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part

II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.

79. This is certainly evidenced by the textual and non-textual records holdings of the National Archives.
80. James William Morley, "Check List of Seized Japanese Records in the National Archives," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* Vol. 9 No. 3 (May 1950).
81. Robert H. Bahmer to James William Morley, 10 May 1957, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.
82. Letter, Edwin G. Beal, Jr. to James W. Morley, 15 May 1957, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64. For storage space concerns facing the National Archives in the mid-1950s, see my articles "An Administrative History of the Disposal of Federal Records, 1950–1985," *Provenance: Journal of the Society of Georgia Archivists* 4 No. 2 (Fall 1986), and "The National Archives: Serving Government, the Public and Scholarship, 1950–1965," in Timothy Walch, ed., *Guardian of Heritage: Essays on the History of the National Archives* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1985).
83. GSA Form 397, Transmittal of Government Records, 1 December 1954. Indicated transferred were approximately 250 FRC containers and 14,890 archives containers (including those loaned to the Navy) for a total of 7,205 cubic feet of records. Transaction Dossier, III-NWR-153, NA, RG 64.
84. John Young, comp., *Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1959), vi.
85. They were also joined by Mr. Kay Kitagawa, who may have been the same Kitagawa with the USGS mentioned previously.
86. Memorandum, Chief, Reference Service Branch to Chief, Federal Records Center, 10 July 1957 and note at the bottom of the document by Art Young on 11 July 1957, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; Letter, Chitoshi Yanaga to Robert H. Bahmer, 12 September 1957, *ibid.*
87. John Young, comp., *Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1959), vi-vii.
88. Letter, Chitoshi Yanaga to Robert H. Bahmer, 12 September 1957, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to Chitoshi Yanaga, 13 September 1957, *ibid.*

89. John Young, comp., *Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1959), vii.
90. Memorandum, Regional Director to Deputy Archivist, 10 March 1958, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.
91. Letter, G. Bernard Noble, the Director, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs to Robert H. Bahmer, 13 February 1960, Decimal 894.423/2-1360, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, NA, RG 59; Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to G. Bernard Noble, 3 March 1960, Decimal 894.423/3-360, *ibid.* On March 2, 1960, an internal National Archives routing slip noted that the Army Departmental Records Branch had 40 cubic feet and the Army Map Service had 30 cubic feet (the records Noble had written about) and that Map Service would send the records to the DRB, which would pack the whole collection. Routing Slip, to Dr. Bahmer, 2 March 1960, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.
92. Cable, Herter to American Embassy, Tokyo, 12 April 1960, Decimal 894.423/4-1260, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, NA, RG 59; Letter, Maj. Gen. R. V. Lee, The Adjutant General to G. Bernard Noble, 23 May 1950, Decimal 894.423/5-2360, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, NA, RG 59; Cable, Herter to American Embassy, Tokyo, 26 May 1960, Decimal 894.423/5-2660, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, NA, RG 59.
93. Despatch, Robert A. Fearey, First Secret, American Embassy, Tokyo, to State Department, 1 July 1960, with attachments, Decimal 894.423/7-160, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, NA, RG 59.
94. These included mainly old tide record books, bottom-sediment survey journals, sailing direction volumes, and air weather data. The charts returned consisted principally of tissue paper tracings of Japanese nautical charts.
95. Despatch, American Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, Subject: Japanese Hydrographic Materials, 1 December 1961, Decimal 894.423/12-161, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, NA, RG 59.
96. It should be noted also that the Library of Congress has custody of not only original seized Japanese material, but also copies of microfilm of Foreign Ministry records that the Library of Congress microfilmed in Japan as well as microfilm of captured and seized Japanese records that were microfilmed by scholars in 1957.

The Intelligence That Wasn't: CIA Name Files, the U.S. Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan

Michael Petersen

IN EARLY 2005, THE CIA DECLASSIFIED and released its files pertaining to World War II-era Japanese figures, revealing details of a large, widespread intelligence operation in the Far East that was supervised by the highest authorities in U.S. Army intelligence in Japan. Headed by a cadre of former officers from the Japanese Army and navy, loosely affiliated and constantly changing intelligence groups worked on behalf of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers' (SCAP's) intelligence arm, G-2, GHQ, under the command of Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby. United States intelligence personnel put unrepentant Japanese nationalists and military officers, some of whom had planned and conducted a pitiless war against Western influence in Asia, to work on projects designed to enhance U.S. security in the region and resist the spread of communism. In so doing, the United States offered material and financial support to a group that shared only the vaguest of anti-communist goals with U.S. officials and actively pursued its own often varying and conflicting—but primarily ultra-nationalist—agendas. Moreover, many Japanese agents directly or indirectly employed by military intelligence had criminal or suspected criminal pasts.

Before the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act, there was only fragmentary evidence of G-2's involvement with Japanese Army and navy officers, while documentary evidence of G-2's activities in operations associated with prominent right-wing figures was spotty and incomplete. Documentation regarding these operations in the SCAP records at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is virtually nonexistent. Lacking documentary evidence, historians were forced to depend on memoirs and interviews with participants—which told only half the story and tended to whitewash the embarrassing details—as well as on professional hunches about military intelligence activities. Although they were able to draw some broad and accurate conclusions, the inaccessibility of documentation meant that their findings could be

described as only speculative. Detailed discussions about many personalities in the so-called “underground” organizations, their funding sources, covert operational details, or the deeply duplicitous nature of the Japanese figures involved remained out of reach. Their work also contained virtually no assessment of U.S. use of suspected or convicted war criminals to gather intelligence, a practice that has received great attention in the case of Nazi war criminals.¹

Definitions of war criminality have been the subject of controversy for some Japanese. In this chapter, Japanese war criminals are defined as those found guilty by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and in other trials of Class B and C defendants.² A second grouping is more nebulous: those who had conspicuously criminal pasts or were suspected criminals held for a time by Allied authorities. Occupation authorities often detained members of this second group on the suspicion of crimes, sometimes with documented evidence, but in many cases did not indict the detainees. The reasons for this are varied and complex, but they relate less to legal considerations than to postwar geopolitics, a shortage of resources at the disposal of SCAP’s Legal Section, and domestic U.S. opinion, which was eager to move beyond the war years. As Cold War concerns drew the attention of American policymakers, targeting individuals for legal justice was set aside while the trail of evidence grew colder and potential defendants died. A final related category involves individuals who were members of organizations that became notorious for war crimes, such as the *kenpeitai* (the Japanese military police), or were influential people who worked closely with and supported the major war criminals found guilty of Class A war crimes.³ The majority of these people were not charged. In one way or another, the U.S. supported questionable postwar activities of Japanese in all three categories. All are considered relevant individuals under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Acts.

The CIA documents are also noteworthy because they open the door to a better understanding of the growth of CIA operations in Japan in the early Cold War. Gen. Douglas MacArthur famously despised the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its eventual successor, the CIA. With MacArthur’s full backing, SCAP’s Civil Intelligence Division, an arm of G-2, was able to keep the CIA from operating freely in Japan until 1950.⁴ However, by the beginning of that year, the CIA had begun to assemble an intelligence-gathering organization that maintained surveillance not only of Japanese and other foreign organizations, but also of G-2’s own activities. The CIA’s presence in Japan rapidly strengthened and deepened as the Cold War progressed, and by 1952, when the occupation officially ended, the CIA was the preeminent intelligence organization in Japan. Some of the important details of this growth can now be better traced.

The institutional rivalry between SCAP and the CIA strongly influenced the

relationship between the two organizations. The story that follows, based as it is on information gathered by the CIA, is told from the agency's perspective and does not reflect G-2's concerns, rationale, and decision-making processes. Nevertheless, this collection of documents provides the fullest information available on this subject. This chapter is a preliminary assessment of some of the CIA's recently declassified documents and the story they reveal about the U.S. occupation authorities' intelligence relationship with right-wing Japanese ex-military officers and politicians—many of whom had criminal pasts—as well as with some of Japan's well-known gangsters. The documents offer a detailed look into the tangled, morally ambiguous world of intelligence gathering in Japan in the earliest days of the Cold War and reveal the suspect sources used by G-2 in the Far East.

Willoughby, Japanese Intelligence, and Operation Takematsu

In the wake of World War II, Japanese ex-military officers and ardent nationalists formed a loosely knit network to preserve the prewar Imperial system (insofar as possible under the yoke of the U.S. occupation) and eventually to reconstitute the Japanese Army. This network was established in part by Arisue Seizo, chief of the intelligence department at Imperial General Headquarters at the end of the war. The energetic and shrewd Arisue received his officer's commission in 1917. He attended courses at the War College in Turin, Italy, from 1929 to 1931 and spent time attached to various Italian infantry regiments. From 1936 to 1939, Arisue, by then a Colonel, served as the military attaché to Italy. Between 1939 and 1945, Arisue held a number of different posts, including staff positions in the North China Area Army and army ministry. He advanced to the rank of Lieutenant General and eventually served as the Chief of Intelligence at Imperial General Headquarters.⁵

In June and July 1945, Arisue came to the conclusion that the war was irrevocably lost and began hiding intelligence documents that he deemed would be valuable to occupying forces. He planned to use the documents as a bargaining chip for himself and others, and felt that handing over such valuable information would help mollify any potential enemies within the occupation administration. However, in conjunction with other officers, he also laid plans to resist the U.S. forces should the occupation prove excessively punitive. The core of this resistance was to be a network of former classmates and students from the Nakano intelligence school who, among other things, buried secret caches of weapons across Japan and quietly maintained loose contact with one other.⁶ Many former Japanese Army and navy officers, who were purged during the occupation, maintained close ties with one another, their subordinates, and their superiors, in effect creating networks composed of former military and intelligence

specialists. In September 1945, Willoughby, MacArthur's devoutly conservative and anti-communist chief of intelligence (G-2) for the Far East Command, quietly enlisted Arisue to set up a clandestine intelligence section inside G-2.⁷ Tellingly, G-2 officials found it necessary to reassure Arisue that they did not wish him to gather information about potential war criminals.⁸

SCAP officials outside G-2 briefly considered Arisue himself a notable prospect for indictment as a Class A war criminal. As military attaché to Italy, he was an important figure in the negotiations leading up the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan. Indeed, U.S. Army documents in the recently released CIA Name Files reveal that after the war, some Japanese openly wondered why Arisue, "who was deeply involved in Japan's progress toward war," was not arrested and charged as a war criminal.⁹ According to these documents, Arisue was very much a part of the group of aggressive military officers around the Emperor who pushed Japan into its catastrophic war. Major General Tanaka Ryukichi, the prosecution's star witness at the Tokyo Trials, stated in his pretrial deposition that "Arisue was the driving force behind [Prime Minister] Hiranuma's desire for this Tri-partite Pact."¹⁰

After the war, Arisue continued to be a strong supporter of the ultranationalist groups and individuals that brought war to the Far East. For example, he was deeply concerned about the fate of former Prime Minister Gen. Tōjō Hideki. During the Tokyo war crimes trial, Arisue was convinced that a guilty verdict against Tōjō was preordained and that Tōjō would be hanged. He strove to introduce defense witnesses who would discredit the prosecution's case and vindicate Tōjō, which would, he reasoned, effectively clear Japan's entire military establishment, including himself, of war guilt. If Tōjō were found guilty, then Arisue hoped that his efforts would at least cast the legitimacy of the Tribunal in doubt.¹¹ According to historian Stephen Mercado, Arisue also withheld information from the prosecution at the trial in the Philippines of Lt. Gen. Homma Masaharu. Arisue's information purportedly would have implicated his friend and colleague, the notorious Col. Tsuji Masanobu, as the instigator behind the Bataan Death March.¹² The court found Homma guilty and he was executed, while Tsuji, whose whereabouts were unknown at this time, escaped indictment even in absentia.¹³ For whatever reason, international prosecutors never charged Arisue with any crimes.¹⁴

With the exception of Arisue and a few others, most of the links established by U.S. authorities to the Japanese "underground" groups, as the CIA called them, were to high-ranking officers with operational and combat experience. Most lacked strong intelligence backgrounds. One of the most prominent military leaders of these groups was army Lt. Gen. Kawabe Torashirō, who had been head of intelligence for the Kwantung Army in 1935–36, later served as military attaché to Berlin in 1938–39, and ended the war as

deputy chief of staff for Imperial GHQ.¹⁵ Kawabe, like his friend and colleague Arisue, fell within the circle of suspicion for the commission of Class A war crimes, though he was never charged. In August 1945, Kawabe led the Japanese delegation to Manila in order to discuss surrender terms with the Americans. While there, he met and established a friendly relationship with Willoughby.¹⁶ Upon his return to Japan, Kawabe joined Arisue in laying plans against a U.S. occupation they thought might turn harsh.¹⁷ Their efforts would prove unnecessary, and the leaders of Japan's military establishment found in Willoughby a kindred spirit who would encourage and support the resurgence of a strong Japanese military and intelligence establishment with the disbanded Imperial officer corps as its cornerstone.

In September 1945, Willoughby asked Arisue to set up a covert communications intelligence gathering group within G-2 to target communist elements in Japan in order to forestall a potential revolution. Kawabe joined the former intelligence chief's efforts, providing the services of former Japanese Army personnel to occupation authorities, particularly G-2.¹⁸ Because of Kawabe's senior position on the army general staff at the end of the war, he had the authority to order many groups and individuals within the army to cooperate in the endeavor.¹⁹ His network was made up primarily of former high-ranking army general staff members and their subordinates. These individuals were connected to a network of subordinate organizations (*kikan*) that conducted actual operations.

The use of Japanese personnel by G-2 corresponded to the general occupation practice that each division within SCAP recruited its own group of Japanese experts. The problem with this arrangement was that SCAP officials lacked the resources to maintain thorough oversight of many of their initiatives and reforms. Instead, they relied on their Japanese interlocutors to implement and supervise larger policy-related decisions. According to Michael Schaller, "This lack of oversight allowed the Japanese to ignore or defy many unpleasant demands or, more important, to distort the information on which SCAP relied."²⁰ The CIA files confirm the accuracy of this general observation in the more specific case of intelligence work and indicate that misrepresentation and distortion were serious problems in intelligence circles. By the middle of 1947, G-2 officials increasingly sought Japanese military and intelligence personnel for work against the Soviet Union and Japanese Communist Party. They valued these ex-military officers because they believed that the police and government officials were poorly equipped to handle such responsibilities. For the Japanese, however, this connection with G-2 provided a smokescreen for high-ranking nationalist and militarist officers to maintain their networks, enhance their standing among the informal intelligence groups, and gain resources for further operations, all while failing to fulfill their duties to G-2.

The picture of Japanese intelligence organizations during the occupation as portrayed by the CIA is unflattering. Previously, the nature of these networks remained mysterious, but it is now clear that employing former Japanese officers created numerous specific and fundamental problems. For the Japanese who built the networks, the dominant considerations were expediency and opportunity. An ex-officer might form a group from among former wartime associates or others who were willing and able to participate. As a result, many untrained, nonprofessional intelligence operatives jeopardized both operational security and the chances of a successful mission. Moreover, this ad hoc growth of intelligence networks resulted in a tangle of decentralized, thoroughly uncoordinated and fragmented groups that often worked at odds with one other. Japanese intelligence operations, which during the war were staffed by poorly trained personnel who were susceptible to outside political interference, became more disorganized after the war. In the words of one CIA report on the subject, the Japanese intelligence establishment was “mixed and confused as never before” during the occupation.²¹ As the likelihood of being punished for war crimes gradually diminished in the late 1940s, more and more individuals with questionable pasts and little professional training joined these networks, assuming prominent roles that were not always consistent with their G-2 advisor’s guidance and weakening the security of intelligence-related activities.

Indeed, the major pursuit of most of these networks during the occupation was not intelligence. Rather, they were engaged in independent operations to bring about a right-wing nationalist resurgence. Their early work centered on propaganda and political work, but later shifted to rearmament. Individuals within these networks often viewed these activities simply as a way to make money in a ruined economy. A CIA report on the subject stated that “to the leaders of the Rightist underground the rebirth of the J.I.S. [Japanese Intelligence Services] was a secondary objective, the conduct of pure intelligence operations a subordinate activity *except* for when such operations have served since 1946 as a natural outlet for clandestine activity and a valuable means of livelihood.”²² Further complicating matters, individuals in these networks, while generally agreeing on goals, did not always agree on methods, and fierce rivalries developed. Associations within the networks were extremely fluid, with some former officers supporting many different and competing subgroups simultaneously or changing allegiances without notice. Moreover, there were many personal and professional clashes as ideological loyalty to outside organizations drove the decisions of separate groups, interservice rivalries ignited conflicts, and animosity between individuals sparked larger doctrinal and ideological disagreements. As a result, the loyalties of those participating in any given intelligence-gathering activity were vague, covert action was often ad hoc, and operational security continued to be deeply flawed. When these networks worked

for the U.S. occupying authorities, these deficiencies likely had an adverse effect on U.S. interests.

Specific planning for larger-scale intelligence cooperation between G-2 and Japanese military figures began in late 1948, around the time when the risk of prosecution for war crimes began to abate. Conversations about planning for a new program took place between September of that year and January 1949. G-2 code named the operation "Takematsu" and agreed to finance Japanese agents who in turn would provide intelligence on foreign targets (the "Take" program) and gather domestic intelligence primarily on communist elements in Japan (the "Matsu" program). Kawabe and Arisue would run the program, and a strictly limited circle of U.S. Army intelligence personnel under Willoughby's direct supervision would be involved only at the highest policy level. In other words, the Japanese involved in Takematsu would have a great deal of autonomy. At the end of September 1948, Kawabe requested ¥87,000 (approximately \$250 in 1949—the average annual per capita income in Japan in 1951, after the onset of economic recovery, was approximately \$146) for initial startup funds from Col. Arthur Lacey of G-2, who would supervise Take and later become the head of SCAP's Civil Intelligence Division.²³ According to CIA documents, less than two weeks later, on October 9, G-2 representatives personally handed Kawabe an initial payment of ¥37,000 so that he could assemble the basic plan for the long-term operation.²⁴

On November 25, Kawabe met again with Lacey and other representatives of G-2, this time with operational plans for Take in hand. Kawabe recommended a two-pronged approach, basing operations in southern Japan against North Korea and Communist China, while also operating in northern Japan against Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In both places, Kawabe proposed using established smuggling routes to insert agents into hostile territory to collect both military and economic intelligence. In line with Willoughby's desire to establish a communications intelligence network, Kawabe also requested U.S. radio equipment to monitor Chinese, Korean, and Russian communications. In addition, Kawabe planned to recruit fishermen and sailors to observe Soviet shipping between Port Arthur, Vladivostok, and Dairen (present-day Dalian). Kawabe also asked that G-2 issue special credentials for all Japanese involved to protect them against interference by other occupation personnel and Japanese government authorities. By January 1949, Kawabe estimated that the expense of these operations would exceed ¥10 million (almost \$28,000 in 1949), 4 million of which would aid in setting up a smuggling ring for agents in northern Japan. He disingenuously claimed that the smuggling carried out as a cover for these operations meant that, over time, Takematsu would begin to pay for itself.²⁵

Willoughby approved Kawabe's plans almost in their entirety. He ordered that the operations focus on Sakhalin and the Kuriles, but he approved the infiltration of

agents into North Korea and Manchuria. Willoughby also promised to provide the Japanese Takematsu leaders with specific intelligence and as much of G-2's information as possible on potential target areas. If the cost of the operation, negligible at best, upset Willoughby, he did not indicate it, merely informing Kawabe to prepare separate budgets for the Take and Matsu elements of the operation. Willoughby did, however, wish to know how Japanese agents would use any intercepted radio messages, and the request for special credentials was a red flag to other G-2 observers. They recognized it as a bald attempt to allow former Japanese Army personnel to operate unmolested across international borders, conducting criminal activities. In the end, Willoughby's representatives brushed this issue under the carpet, informing Kawabe that the issue of credentials "would be studied," and thereafter ignored it.²⁶ By and large, however, G-2 officials in Tokyo embraced Kawabe's bold intelligence operation.

Some Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) members in the field voiced strong suspicions about Kawabe's and Arisue's intentions. They directed much of their criticism at Kawabe and his colleagues for obscuring the size of their own networks while also exaggerating their ability to run effective operations, all in a bid to gain both resources and influence from their occupiers. One officer in the Headquarters of the Sixth CIC District on Hokkaido, the point of origin for missions to Sakhalin and the Kuriles, stated, "I believe that most of the organization shown in the attached plan as 'proposed' already exists. I feel that the authors of the plan cannot be as uninformed about the target area as their draft would indicate." Worse, he argued, was that this was nothing more than an elaborate scam set up by Japanese ex-officers to bilk resources from occupation authorities. CIC in Hokkaido believed that the Japanese did not have the ability or intention of conducting such complicated operations. The U.S. officer stated flatly, "I feel that the whole operation is nothing more than a high level shakedown," and suggested that, as a test of Takematsu's utility, U.S. authorities provide support and funding only after Kawabe carried out a trial operation, complete with documented results and useful intelligence, at his own expense.²⁷

Despite field objections, Takematsu went forward in the winter and spring of 1949. Initial CIA reports about the operation were confused. From one perspective, Takematsu almost immediately ran into trouble—operations in northern Japan bogged down as early as May 1949. High budget requirements, a dearth of available Japanese agents, and a shortage of good case officers reportedly forced the complete cancellation of operations into North Korea. Matsu activities in Japan were likewise dramatically reduced.²⁸ However, other, more numerous and authoritative reports that emerged in late 1950 make it clear that Takematsu continued, backed with large contributions of financial and material aid that G-2 provided to the Arisue and Kawabe *kikan*.

Covert operations run by Japanese ex-officers and intelligence specialists ranged far and wide across Asia, but yielded mixed results at best. For example, supposedly under the direction of a former Maj. Gen. Kimura, the Arisue *kikan* scored a notable victory by placing agents (posing as technical advisors) in the Indian and Pakistani governments.²⁹ Of more dubious intelligence value were Arisue's efforts to set up a spy ring in North Korea.³⁰ Finally, Japanese intelligence networks headed by Kawabe and Arisue surreptitiously shipped Japanese volunteers to Taiwan in order to defend the island from the Communist Chinese and plan an eventual invasion of the Chinese mainland, an operation that, in the CIA's eyes, produced questionable results.³¹ Interestingly, Japanese operatives never devoted serious effort to Willoughby's primary focus, the plan to move agents north into Sakhalin and Kuriles.

CIA documents reveal little about the penetration of the Indian and Pakistani governments, but offer more details about activities in North Korea and Taiwan. Operations into North Korea began shortly after Kawabe and Willoughby finalized their planning in the spring of 1949. By the middle of that year, Arisue's subordinate, Maj. Gen. Watanabe Wataru, a close friend and supporter of the general, was the central figure in Japanese operations into Korea. During World War II, the hard-line Watanabe directed the Japanese military administration of Malaya. His administration proved to be especially harsh on the Chinese residents there, forcibly seizing their money and property and impoverishing them at a rate that concerned even the Japanese.³²

A common method of operations among Japanese intelligence personnel, one utilized by Watanabe, involved the creation of corporations to act as legitimate or semi-legitimate (these companies often engaged in illegal smuggling) business fronts while the employees, almost exclusively intelligence operatives, conducted covert operations. Watanabe created the Mitsuboshi Trading Company, staffed it with former subordinates, including former *kenpeitai* officers, and tried to make contact with Japanese officers either serving in the North Korean Army or hiding out across the border in Manchuria. Most of the information that these operations produced was fabricated, and the few activities that yielded information were poorly exploited by G-2.³³ This reflected a pattern in the general Japan-U.S. intelligence relationship in which, despite major G-2 support, Japanese operators regularly deceived their U.S. paymasters in an effort to enhance the standing and influence of former Japanese military officials, while simultaneously providing generally worthless returns on the U.S. investment.

From the U.S. perspective, results of the Taiwan operations were not much better. Many of the Japanese ex-officers had strong relationships with Nationalist Chinese leaders and supported the Kuomintang's efforts against the Chinese Communists. Some in Arisue's and Kawabe's organizations, such as Nemoto Hiroshi, former Commander of the

North China Area Army, successfully placed Japanese volunteer troops (including some high-ranking members of the *kenpeitai*) on Taiwan in exchange for sugar and bananas, which were shipped back to Japan for sale at a huge profit. At least four expeditions of Japanese troops arrived in Taiwan, all on the strength of G-2 funding and support.³⁴ However, Japanese operatives kept tight control over what little intelligence information emerged from this work, shielding information they had gathered elsewhere from the Kuomintang and the results of missions to Taiwan from G-2.³⁵ Arisue and Kawabe did not allow their hopes for the success of these operations or G-2's backing to interfere with their contacts with Chinese Communist intelligence operatives. According to CIA sources, both officers felt very strongly that they needed to develop "satisfactory future relations with whatever force and intelligence service controls China, which, realistically speaking, means the Chinese People's Government."³⁶ At the same time as they supplied anti-Communist troops to the Chinese Nationalists, elements of Arisue's network built covert links with Communist Chinese intelligence agents operating in Tokyo. Unknown to G-2, former Japanese officers who were already acting purely in their own interest had quietly created a situation in which they could, at a moment's notice, funnel high-level information about U.S. military interests to Communist intelligence services if it suited their needs.³⁷

Covert intelligence gathering operations under the guidance of G-2 were badly compromised between 1945 and 1952, though it is uncertain to what extent Willoughby realized this. One of the primary reasons was that most Japanese operatives had little interest in helping their U.S. occupiers and were instead more concerned with pursuing their own interests. Both Arisue and Kawabe used their connections to Willoughby to funnel high-level information about U.S. military interests not only to the Chinese, but also back into the Japanese underground.

In his 1982 memoir *Seiji to gunji to jinji: Sanbo honbu daini bucho no shuki* (Politics, Military Affairs, and Personnel: Memoirs of AGS Second Bureau Chief), Arisue described himself as Willoughby's confidant, a man who understood the G-2 chief's problems better than Willoughby's own staff. The American general, suspicious and jealous of many of his SCAP colleagues, told Arisue about the bitter interservice rivalries between the U.S. Army and Navy and the thorny relations between the U.S. Army's operations and intelligence branches.³⁸ Arisue apparently funneled this information back to Japanese intelligence circles throughout the late 1940s, a fact conveniently neglected in his memoirs. In addition, the CIA learned that Willoughby had a Japanese mistress, Araki Mitsuko, who was the wife of a former professor at Tokyo Imperial University and one of the Japanese government's principal sources of information on GHQ early in the occupation.³⁹ Worst of all, by the early 1950s Chinese Communist agents had penetrated

Arisue's group at several levels.⁴⁰ Until the present release of CIA documentation, such information has been unavailable in primary or secondary sources.

According to the CIA, most Japanese groups supplied inaccurate or useless information to G-2 authorities. The information commonly included outright fabrications, the assessments they made were usually incorrect, and their attempts to run operations for the United States often degenerated into nothing more than theft from U.S. authorities. For example, in the autumn of 1950, Kawabe accepted a G-2 request to recruit Japanese repatriates from Soviet prisoner-of-war camps and run them as agents on Sakhalin. For this purpose, members of Kawabe's group were to purchase a fifteen-ton ship with ¥500,000 (\$1388 in 1949, which was well over ten times the average annual per capita income and a huge sum on the black market) provided by G-2. After the money had been transferred to the Japanese, however, U.S. officials never again heard anything of either the ship or any personnel involved in the operation. The money and the operatives simply vanished, again illustrating that Kawabe and Arisue had no interest in Willoughby's primary objective of establishing an intelligence foothold for operations into the Soviet Union.⁴¹ The Japanese intelligence chiefs viewed their relationship with G-2 as a one-sided marriage of convenience. Reliability problems plagued U.S.-financed Japanese intelligence operations throughout the occupation.

Taken as a whole, the recently released CIA Name Files also illustrate other significant reasons why the attempt to gather intelligence through Japanese networks was a dismal failure that endangered U.S. interests. The fluidity and disorganization of the Japanese networks was one important factor. The few competent professionals, such as Arisue, were surrounded by charlatans and hacks who were included in the work because of prewar and wartime political and ideological loyalties. Moreover, both foreign and domestic communists were able to quickly and definitively identify rightists who attempted counterintelligence activities, making any attempts at cover useless and the spread of misinformation far easier. Finally, in a pointed criticism of its rivals in G-2, the CIA noted that part of the problem was caused by the "American need for information and American gullibility. The lack of familiarity of most Americans with Japanese language, traditions, psychology, and internal affairs made them easy to fool for a time."⁴²

War Criminals and Intelligence Gathering

The operational problems associated with using Japanese intelligence and military figures in a covert capacity were legion. Worse (in terms of concerns over war crimes) were the connections that developed from these operations. The Arisue and Kawabe *kikan* had extensive contact with many individuals whose wartime records were tarnished by allegations of major criminal activity, and many of them went to work on operations

financed by G-2. The CIA Name Files identify numerous occasions when G-2-funded or supported operations conducted by several prominent war criminals or suspected war criminals. They make it clear that G-2 was willing to overlook the tainted pasts of Japanese who directly or indirectly supported its anti-communist efforts. Kodama Yoshio and Tsuji Masanobu are two of several prominent examples of G-2's willful disregard of the backgrounds of Japanese agents.

Kodama Yoshio

Arisue recruited and employed several infamous individuals for intelligence work. Among the worst was the ultra right-wing gangster and backroom political fixer Kodama Yoshio. Born in Fukushima Prefecture in 1911, Kodama spent much of his childhood in Korea. When he was sixteen he came to Tokyo, where he worked as a laborer and sales clerk. In 1931, Kodama began serving a six-month prison sentence for threatening to assassinate members of the Imperial Diet. By twenty-three, he had accumulated a lengthy criminal record. The CIA claimed that, in 1934, Kodama founded the Tengyo Society, a right-wing fringe group that sought to bring about a reactionary government by intimidating and murdering leading businessmen and politicians. That same year, he was a key actor in a failed plot to murder several government officials in a series of bombings. Arrested before the plan could be carried out, Kodama was sentenced to three and half years in prison, during which time he attempted suicide. After release from prison, Kodama started the Japan Youth Movement and quickly gained the attention of many influential arch-conservatives in government and military circles.⁴³

In December 1941, after ingratiating himself with high-ranking naval officers, in particular Vice-Admiral Yamagata Seisho, Kodama went to Shanghai and set up what came to be known as the Kodama *kikan*, a purchasing and procurement organization for the Japanese Naval Air Forces. He received millions of yen from the navy to start this work. Eventually, Kodama employed hundreds of operatives, primarily professional criminals, right-wing thugs, and members of the *kenpeitai*. Originally tasked with delivering copper and airplane parts to the navy, Kodama rapidly expanded and diversified his activities. He established contacts with army officials in China and expanded his organization from its base in Shanghai to the Amur River in Manchuria and the Irrawaddi and Salween Rivers in Burma. In addition to war supplies, Kodama procured raw material, food, clothing, vehicles, and many other goods necessary for the Japanese war machine.⁴⁴ He also allegedly engaged in drug trafficking, setting up a large opium ring in China which he ran out of Shanghai.⁴⁵ In early 1944, the Kodama *kikan* received the navy's permission to acquire and operate mines in China. It worked at least four of these mines, which provided the navy with a large supply of rare metals such as tungsten and molybdenum.

According to the CIA, the navy paid handsomely for his work, sending Kodama's group approximately ¥3.5 billion between 1941 and 1945.⁴⁶ As the war was reaching its end in mid-summer 1945, Kodama transferred vast sums of money from Shanghai to Japan, even managing to bring more than a thousand gold bars back from China.⁴⁷ By the end of the war, Kodama had allegedly amassed a fortune worth over \$175 million. After serving briefly as an advisor to Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni's "Surrender Cabinet," Kodama was arrested and held in Sugamo prison for one year. U.S. authorities dropped the charges against him and released him in December 1948.⁴⁸

Allied prosecutors had missed an opportunity to try a dangerous gangster who made his fortune at the expense of the Chinese. Several CIC and CIA reports stated that most of the material supplied by Kodama's *kikan* to the Japanese armed forces was obtained illegally. His henchmen simply expropriated and stole whatever material they thought might be useful for the Japanese war machine, including food and clothing, from the Chinese. They often traveled into central China and held community leaders ransom until the local populace gave them the goods they sought. *Kenpeitai* members, whose operations Kodama supported financially, frequently provided the muscle for such forays. When Kodama's brigands actually paid for the acquisition of large amounts of goods, they usually forced the Chinese to sell for well below the market value and pocketed the balance of the money provided by the navy, profiteering at a rate that quickly impoverished many desperate Chinese.⁴⁹ According to CIA reporting, even many Japanese in occupied China viewed Kodama as "one of the worst profiteers."⁵⁰ The same report indicated that Kodama also organized slave labor during the war, but corroborating documentation has not been discovered.

The Japanese government was well aware of Kodama's activities, but did nothing to stop them. A CIA report on the subject stated that "The Japanese government, including the Foreign Office, the War Ministry, the Navy Ministry, and the Special Higher Bureau paid him well for everything he brought them, but turned a blind and almost condoning eye on his methods of operation. The army and navy are said to have profited well from the resale of looted articles 'procured' by Kodama and his strange consortium."⁵¹ Many Japanese made money because of Kodama's crimes, and since the only ones suffering in the bargain were the Chinese, few paid much attention to his methods. Although some details of Kodama's activities in occupied China remain clouded, he did head a vast operation dealing in drugs, thievery, looting, and illegal expropriation of property to exploit the Chinese resources and population, all with the tacit support of the Japanese government.

The Kodama *kikan* also handled an item of major attraction to U.S. forces in the immediate postwar period: intelligence. A 1952 CIA report describing Kodama's

operations in China gave a positive assessment of his resources and stated that “the item in which traffic was especially heavy, and of signal interest to Allied censorship in Japan, is intelligence. Kodama supervised a group of talented and persistent spies.”⁵² Populated as they were with smugglers, black marketers, and former *kenpeitai* officers, Kodama’s extensive networks of contacts across China made him an excellent potential source of intelligence information. This was especially true after the Chinese Communist Party seized control of mainland China in 1949, precisely when G-2 began concretely exploring the possibilities of sponsoring Japanese covert action as part of Operation Takematsu. Indeed, according to the CIA, it was rather widely known in intelligence circles that Kodama had offered his services to occupation authorities.⁵³ Given the lack of documentation in the recently released CIA files attesting to direct conversations between Kodama’s representatives and G-2, a reasonable assumption is that Willoughby’s staff ignored Kodama’s overtures. Arisue, however, seized this opportunity and made extensive use of the Kodama *kikan* for his operations on behalf of Willoughby’s intelligence service.⁵⁴

Indeed, Kodama’s network was deeply involved in some of Arisue’s most ambitious covert actions. In 1949, Arisue began laying plans to exploit Japanese commercial connections on mainland China in order to gather intelligence. He planned to use the Daiko Trade Company (a front company established by Kodama) to conceal illegal smuggling activities, as the route by which Japanese covert agents would get into China. The CIA—not to mention many Japanese—thought little of this plan:

Arisue intends to give some of the product to American GHQ agents in return for financial support, but will so disguise the means and methods of operation that GHQ will believe that it is completely the work of his own unit. The entire plan is considered by most of the other groups to be highly dangerous in view of the looseness of operations security that the two operating *kikan* have demonstrated in the past and particularly in view of the tight surveillance and close watchfulness of the Chinese People’s Government regarding Japanese shipping to their ports.⁵⁵

The CIA foresaw an intelligence disaster. Moreover, Kodama’s agents—including ex-*kenpeitai* Col. Kawai, who helped catch Soviet spymaster Richard Sorge in 1942—also began cooperating with Watanabe Wataru’s efforts to develop a covert intelligence net in North Korea and Manchuria in 1950.⁵⁶ This relationship may have developed because one of Watanabe’s chief assistants was Otsuka Kenzo, another former colonel in the *kenpeitai*.⁵⁷ How much G-2 knew about what amounted to Arisue’s subcontracting of Kodama’s services is not revealed in the CIA documents, but there is little indication

that Willoughby's staff took any time to investigate how its money was being spent. If they did, they would have also discovered that at the same time Arisue was shelling out cash for Kodama's assistance, Kodama was also involved in blackmail, including allegedly swindling the Mitsui Corporation out of ¥1 billion by threatening to flood the stock exchange with counterfeit Mitsui stock certificates.⁵⁸ The CIA claimed that members of the Kodama *kikan* had also infiltrated the CIC and were supplying information back to Kodama personally.⁵⁹ If this claim is correct, the influential power broker stood to profit handsomely at U.S. expense.

By 1953, the CIA had changed its assessment of Kodama. Agency analysts recognized that, despite the size and scope of Kodama's network, his greed made him a horrendous liability. One report (see next page) stated that

Kodama Yoshio's value as an intelligence operative is virtually nil. He is a professional liar, gangster, charlatan, and outright thief. His main objective throughout all his career was to get wealth and personal power for himself, regardless of consequences to his country ... The truth is that Kodama is completely incapable of intelligence operations, and has no interest in anything but the profits.⁶⁰

When the occupation ended in 1952 and the CIA took greater responsibility for intelligence gathering in Japan, the agency steadfastly refused to deal with him.⁶¹ Kodama's money and connections ensured that he would remain a player in Japanese politics, always operating backstage, and as an important go-between in restoring diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.⁶² After surviving the Lockheed-Martin bribery scandal and a rather theatrical assassination attempt in the 1970s, Kodama died of cancer on January 17, 1984.⁶³

Tsuji Masanobu

CIA documents indicate that Arisue was also responsible for recruiting into U.S. service one of the most notorious, unindicted war criminals in the Asia-Pacific War. Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, described by one historian as "a fanatical ideologue and pathologically brutal staff officer," was born in Ishikawa Prefecture in 1903.⁶⁴ He graduated from the Imperial War College in 1931, and was a staff officer in the Kwantung Army during the disastrous Nomonhan Incident in 1939.⁶⁵ He first met Arisue at Imperial GHQ before the Pacific war.⁶⁶ Tsuji later was reputed to have ordered the Bataan Death March, massacres of civilians in China, the Philippines, and Singapore—the infamous Sook Ching Massacre—and is alleged to have cannibalized an American flyer who was executed during the Japanese occupation of Singapore. CIA documents offer more

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| ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED | | | CROSS FILED BY |
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| FILE NO. | SOURCE | DATE OF DOCUMENT | ANALYST |
| 44-5-3-52 | ZJL-604 | 19 Apr 1951 | [] [] |
| SUBJECT | | | DATE |
| Background on JIS and Japanese Military Personalities | | | 10 Sept 1953 |
| <p>PERTINENT INFORMATION</p> <p>Evaluation: F-2 excerpt as stated</p> <p>Source: [] []</p> <p>The following information on Subject, KODAMA Yoshio, has been excerpted verbatim from the above referenced document.</p> <p>3. SAKATA Sadamasa</p> <p>a. SAKATA, OKADA's deputy in the MATSU Kikan, operated extensively in Shanghai during the war years always as a civilian. He came from a very refined and well-to-do family in Japan, and was considered by the Japanese in Shanghai at first (c. 1940) to be very sincere as well as competent. SAKATA's association with KODAMA Yoshio, with well-known Japanese gangsters, and with various Chinese of the Shanghai underworld only gradually became known and the venality and dishonesty of SAKATA only gradually recognized. By that time he was too powerful to eliminate or release. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that SAKATA had a genuine talent for clandestine operations of all sorts, although he was really too indolent and disinterested to worry about producing good intelligence information. Although the greed displayed in his economic operations often hindered the real purpose of his political operations against the Chinese in Shanghai, nevertheless, in some cases, his economic blackmail methods and involvement of Shanghai Chinese business interests served to insure to some extent the loyalty of these personages to the Japanese regime by making it commercially profitable to all concerned as well as to himself. There can be no doubt in the mind of anyone who knew very much at all of his operations that SAKATA thoroughly understood the principles of control, however unscrupulously and avariciously he might have used them.</p> <p>10. KODAMA Yoshio</p> <p>a. KODAMA Yoshio's value as an intelligence operative is virtually nil. He is a professional liar, gangster, charlatan, and outright thief. His main objective throughout all his career was to get wealth and personal power for himself, regardless of consequences to his country. He currently enjoys the dubious confidence of certain Foreign Office diplomats along with the former Communist NABEYAMA Sadachika, and also the trust of ARISUE Seizo, who is using KODAMA's present "Kikan" supposedly to gather intelligence. The truth is that KODAMA is completely incapable of intelligence operations, and has no interest in anything but the profits. Even other information brokers are amazed at the boldness of KODAMA's boasts and fabrications of information. Anything coming from KODAMA can be virtually discounted as false, or at least misleading. The Japanese government had the same experience with</p> | | | |
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FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

(131)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

Background on J.I.S. and Japanese Military Personalities, 10 September 1953, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I, page 1 of 2.

evidence of Tsuji's participation in the expansion of the Sook Ching Massacre, noting that he countersigned an order to murder Chinese merchants in Malaya.⁶⁷ U.S. officials also investigated the possibility that, late in the war, the Japanese Army expropriated three tons of gold from French Indochina with the idea that it would be used at a later date to finance the resurgence of the Japanese military establishment. Reports indicated that Tsuji, who spent a great deal of time in Southeast Asia, had distributed part of this haul to his officers and told them to hide it away from Allied hands.⁶⁸

After the war, according to the agency's reporting, many Japanese wondered why he was never charged for these crimes and brought to trial "since others have been convicted and executed for the same crimes."⁶⁹ Tsuji remained a person of interest to war crimes investigators, especially the British, but was never arrested because his whereabouts were unknown.⁷⁰ He avoided capture first by hiding in Southeast Asia and was later sheltered by Chang Kai-shek on mainland China. In 1948, he quietly slipped back into Japan and lived in hiding, staying for a time in a residence owned by Kodama, who had befriended the officer in Shanghai during the war.⁷¹ The United States dropped its war crimes charges against him in 1950, and soon afterward Tsuji burst back on the public scene, publishing two books about his wartime and postwar experiences that quickly became best sellers.⁷²

Even before U.S. authorities rescinded his status as a war criminal, however, Tsuji became involved in covert activities backed by U.S. military intelligence. Documents suggest that he was initially involved in the scheme to recruit Japanese soldiers for service in Taiwan. Though the CIA's early reporting on the details of the operation was sketchy and contradictory, Tsuji dispatched former Japanese Army personnel to assist Chinese Nationalist forces on the island.⁷³ Moreover, in 1950, after Allied authorities dropped criminal charges, Arisue asked Tsuji to expand Japanese intelligence operations into Southeast Asia. Tsuji had met many of the former Imperial Japanese Army officers associated with this operation while he was in Singapore. Most of the officers thoroughly detested Tsuji and successfully demanded that Arisue remove him. He was replaced by former Shanghai *kenpeitai* Chief Tomita Bunichi.⁷⁴

Tsuji was not finished, however. He had also re-established contact with an ultra-conservative circle of former military officers who sought, illegally, to recreate the Imperial Japanese Army. Many were directly employed by G-2, and through them, Tsuji's covert activities also received U.S. support. G-2's Historical Branch in the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Building (NYK) was the hub of this activity. Through Arisue, G-2 recruited and employed some 200 former Japanese officers to assist historian Gordon Prange's work on the history of MacArthur's Pacific campaign.⁷⁵ A central figure in this effort was Col. Hattori Takushirō, who, along with his friend Tsuji, had served as a senior operations staff officer

in the Kwantung Army during the Nomonhan Incident. Shortly afterwards, Hattori, a disciplined, reticent officer, became Chief of the Army General Staff Operations Branch, making him one of the principal planners of the successful Japanese Army offensives of 1941–42. After the war, Hattori believed that the rearmament of Japan could not be achieved “through democratic methods,” and advocated a revival of the disbanded army, in which he would be Chief of Staff. He concealed these convictions from G-2, “accepting from them material aid and pretending to cooperate fully.”⁷⁶ Nevertheless, spearheaded by Hattori, many former officers in G-2’s Historical Branch carried out anti-communist covert operations both within and outside of Japan with Willoughby’s approval. One of the most important members of the Hattori *kikan*, known in some CIA documents as “Willoughby’s Stable,” was Hattori’s close friend Tsuji Masanobu.⁷⁷

Through Hattori, Tsuji became involved in planning one of Willoughby’s most ambitious operations, a Chinese Nationalist invasion of mainland China. In January 1951, G-2 began toying with the notion of encouraging Chang Kai-shek’s forces to invade south China and establish contact with Chinese anti-communist resistance forces. Willoughby’s subordinates approached Hattori and requested that he and Tsuji prepare the operational details of such a plan. Hattori, whom the CIA believed was a key figure in getting the war crimes charges against Tsuji dropped, now sought to put Tsuji’s military expertise to work for G-2.⁷⁸ Planning proceeded through early March, with Tsuji taking the lead. From the CIA’s perspective, however, Willoughby’s trust in the two officers was misplaced because Tsuji, who had himself become enmeshed in rearmament plans, purportedly stated in 1951 that it was necessary to “deceive the ally prior to the enemy.”⁷⁹ The agency’s analysts also saw “a serious danger that American military personnel in G-2, GHQ will be taken in by [Hattori’s group].”⁸⁰ In any event, the planning came to very little, as Willoughby learned in March 1951 that news of the preparations leaked to the Communist Chinese, and the idea was shelved.⁸¹

By 1952, Tsuji was convinced that cooperation with the Americans was the best way to rapidly rearm Japan, a stance that earned him the opprobrium of many of his former colleagues in the army.⁸² Hattori was not one of them. The two officers, backed by Kodama and others, were increasingly unhappy with Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s policy of exclusively relying on U.S. military protection instead of rebuilding Japan’s own army. Hattori had long loathed Yoshida for the Prime Minister’s purported hostility toward purgees and nationalists. In July 1952, Hattori hatched a plot to conduct a coup by murdering Yoshida and replacing him either with the more sympathetic Hatoyama Ichirō or Ogata Taketora. Despite his initial enthusiasm, Tsuji convinced Hattori to hold off his coup d’état as long as the conservative Liberal Party was in power, leaving posterity with the irony of America’s staunchest political ally in Japan being protected

by one of Japan's most well-known alleged war criminals. Nevertheless, the group did consider murdering other government figures to send a message to Yoshida (see pages 216–17).⁸³ Hatoyama succeeded in deposing Yoshida in 1954, but it is unclear what role, if any, Hattori and Tsuji played in this. In 1952, Tsuji was elected to the Diet and began a flamboyant career in politics.

Tsuji's disappearance in 1961 is commonly attributed to his death in Laos. Less likely, he is reputed to have secretly worked for Vo Nguyen Giap as an operations staff officer through 1968. Although CIA documents indicate that in April 1961 Tsuji traveled to North Vietnam, they cast further doubt on any work he might have done for the North Vietnamese Army. A CIA report placed Tsuji in Laos in June, where he was traveling to meet members of the Pathet Lao. Thereafter, reporting becomes confused, placing Tsuji alternately in Indonesia, Nepal, and China. It appears likely that Tsuji traveled from North Vietnam through Laos to China, where he was imprisoned by the Chinese Communists in January 1963, possibly in Yunnan Province. One unconfirmed report claimed that the Chinese executed Tsuji. Unfortunately, much of what is reported in these documents is hearsay and supposition, and the documents offer no firm conclusions as to the circumstances of Tsuji's death.⁸⁴

After the Occupation: The CIA and Japanese Assets

In 1950 and 1951, the Japanese intelligence networks, already badly decentralized, splintered further. Most of the leaders in the influential Japanese intelligence circles broke with Arisue, whose pompous, self-serving personality alienated many, while his extensive contacts with G-2, which he lorded over others, only made matters worse. As his support gradually withered, Arisue hoped to maintain his influence by openly advocating that Japan rearm in close cooperation with the United States, thereby gaining more influence with G-2. This plan backfired, estranging even Kawabe. Only Kodama and Watanabe Wataru stood by the old intelligence hand.

By the spring of 1951, Arisue found himself almost totally excluded from any plans for revival of the Japanese Army and intelligence services and had lost the support of several of his subordinates, thereby dramatically reducing his utility to G-2.⁸⁵ Finally, rising animosity between Kawabe's faction and an increasingly influential cadre of former field officers around Hattori and Tsuji splintered the Japanese intelligence groups further still. This friction was the result of Kawabe's over-reliance on his former staff officers to the exclusion of experienced field officers from the nascent central Japanese intelligence service that he would presumably head after Arisue was discredited.⁸⁶

Moreover, according to the CIA, G-2 cut funding for its Japanese-led operations in 1952 in anticipation of the end of the occupation. In April, GHQ informed Hattori that

SECURITY INFORMATION

REPORT NO. 211-239

INFORMATION REPORT

JAPAN COMPOSITE UNIT

COUNTRY Japan

DATE DISTR. 31 October 1952

SUBJECT Coup d'etat Allegedly Being Planned by Ex-Militarists and Ultranationalists.

IND. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo

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DATE OF INFO. Page to 25 October 1952.

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 211-238

| GRADING OF SOURCE | | | | COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|--------------|--|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|----------------|------------------|
| COMPLETED/USUALLY RELIABLE | FAIRLY RELIABLE | NOT USUALLY RELIABLE | NOT RELIABLE | EXAMPT AS REPORTED | CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES | PROBABLY TRUE | POSSIBLY TRUE | DOUBTFUL | POSSIBLY FALSE | CANNOT BE JUDGED |
| A | B | C | D | E | F, X | L | Z | Y | U | V |
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE American observer from:

- (a) Former Chinese general officer with Third Force contacts, and with wide contacts among ex-Japanese army officers formerly stationed in China and now engaged in intelligence activities. (Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.)
- (b) Japanese rightist, associate of well-known ultranationalist leader. (Paragraphs 3, 5, 6.)
- (c) Minor Japanese police official in a position to be cognizant of rightist activities in the Tokyo area. (Paragraphs 3, 5.)

Field Comment. Since the practical completion of the depurge of ex-militarists and rightists in the spring of 1952, there have been many rumors concerning rightists attempts to stage a comeback into Japanese political life. This report is the first to mention a definite rightist plan involving violence. The existence of this plan is not corroborated from any other source. 211-238 contains information indicating that persons mentioned in this report are considered by certain police officials as capable of plotting violence at some future date.

1. Since the beginning of July 1952 plans for a coup d'etat have been initiated by a group of ex-purged including former military officers. The leader of the group is ex-colonel HATTORI Takushiro (2591/6752/587/0943/6766), the other five members of the group being: KUMATA Igaburo (1312/3782/6235/1807/1160), TAMAKI Tatsuo (1131/6851/6591/1113), KIKUCHI Kenichiro (2609/7035/2609/0001/6745), and ex-colonels IMOTO Kuzo (0064/2509/1946/7180) and ICHIBARA Jun (1461/6745).

2. KASAI Masao (11/2977/0007) had been chosen as the front man for the group, and is reportedly under IMOTO's control. Not a member of the group, but closely associated with IMOTO, is former Rear Admiral SUZUKAWA Saburo (2623/1472/0074/7456), who has close connections with Third Force Chinese. Sympathetic with the aims of the group are: ex-General WAKAI Sakumichi (0342/0892/0001/6850), KIMURA Noboru (2666/2825/1795/1132/6745), OGURA Fiketomo (4872/455/554/5706), MORITA Masao (2773/3944/4412/1133), HATAKURE Tetsuo (3256/6709/692/5661), and an unspecified number of former members of the Wakano Intelligence School. The group has the backing of 500,000 persons throughout Japan.

3. The original plan of the group was to engineer a coup d'etat, including the assassination of Prime Minister ICHIDA, on account of his hostile attitude toward depurges and nationalists. The group hoped to replace ICHIDA

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Page 2

as Prime Minister with NAKAGAWA Ichiro (7682/1472/0001/8745). TSUJI has persuaded the group that now is not the time for a coup d'etat. He maintains that it is not YOSHIDA who is the prime adversary of the group, and of rightists in general, but rather the Socialist Party.

4. The group is now amenable to postponing the coup as long as the liberal Party remains in power, or even if SHIGEMITSU Maruma (6850/0342/3525), president of the Progressive Party, should become Prime Minister. Ultimately they hope to succeed in having OGATA take over as Prime Minister once the rightists get into power again.
5. The group is considering the possibility of some minor assassination attempt in lieu of a coup d'etat. HIROKATA A. Eizen (1684/1557/24/4407) is the likely candidate for assassination, and the agent of assassination might probably be either NAKAMURA Takeshi (0022/2625/2976) or SAGAKA Hideo (0145/6763/1450/3966/7160).
6. The National Safety Agency is to be utilized in the event of the coup d'etat. IMOTO has already been appointed to a post in the Agency, and TSUJI is in contact of a faction within the Agency.
 1. Field Comment. OGATA, AKIHO, and BUKAWA are well-known ultranationalists who have from time to time been mentioned as associates of TSUJI. IMOTO has previously been reported to be KATSUMI's colleague (see ZJJ-57, 72, 84).
 2. Field Comment. TSUJI does not have the reputation of being under anyone's control. His very successful personal publicity campaign in the summer of 1952 resulted in a landslide vote electing him to the Diet in the 1 October election. Paragraph 3 of this report indicates that TSUJI is capable of influencing the RAIKOKU group.
 3. Field Comment. MORIYA Masao is the successor to his brother-in-law, the late NOTA Hideo, as leader of the Patriotic Youth Committee Association (Aikoku Seinen Fushu Kai). (See ZJJ-238)
 4. Field Comment. No breakdown is given for this figure, which seems to be an exaggeration. TSUJI, as leader of the revived East Asia League (Toa Renmei), probably has a following of between 50,000 and 75,000 members.
 5. Field Comment. ZJJ-238 mentions the animosity of AKIHO and SAGAKA toward YOSHIDA.
 6. Source Comment. OGATA is reputed to have influential connections in China and other Asiatic countries, and would therefore be useful in any effort made later by the rightists toward an Asiatic sphere.
 7. Field Comment. See ZJJ-238 for police opinion concerning the animosity of SAGAKA toward HIROAKI, and concerning the possibility of violence being staged by NAKAMURA or MORIYA.
 8. Field Comment. TSUJI is reported to have a faction in the National Safety Agency, comprised in part of members of his own 35th class of the Military Academy.

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his position as Chief of the Historical Records Department in G-2 would be terminated when the peace treaty took effect, a move that cut off his operational funds and left his organization with little money to carry out its domestic intelligence-gathering activities. By late in the year, the Hattori *kikan* ceased to exist.⁸⁷ CIA reports note that in December, G-2 informed Kawabe that he too would have to reduce his personnel roster because of a lack of funding. Rather than acquiesce to this diminished position, Kawabe rejected G-2's terms and dissolved his group, a melodramatic and unnecessary step since Kawabe had been anticipating this move for months and had placed his personnel throughout the nascent government intelligence services and in the National Safety Force.⁸⁸

Finally, the CIA reported that as the occupation began winding down, a "feverish scramble for power" to lead the Japanese intelligence community was developing among leaders of the various *kikan*. In the amorphous world of backroom Japanese politics, *kikan* chiefs broke with former allies, struck temporary alliances, and bargained their assets all in a bid for increased power under a newly independent Japanese government. Japanese operatives increasingly jockeyed for power by using their connections with G-2 as leverage to enhance their own individual prestige, but the sloppy tradecraft this involved created yet another major security problem. The CIA noted that

in most cases, groups are separated only by shades of opinion or personal ambitions; therefore, when circumstances favor a merger, the differences are forgotten and the assets of both sides are reviewed. Often, at such times security is ignored and the discussion of the assets might include the description of an intelligence target or a connection with American G-2 or CIC.⁸⁹

Intelligence relationships were fluidly established and then broken as the occupation came to an end, creating a situation in which U.S. intelligence links with the Japanese became an open secret and exposed U.S. interests to further exploitation.

Meanwhile, the CIA was evaluating the Japanese intelligence groups to determine which *kikan* were the most likely to be involved in a central Japanese Intelligence Service in the future. The CIA would use G-2's old networks, but did not know which ones were trustworthy. If their operatives contacted some *kikan* chieftain, this connection might instantly be exposed to the rest of the Japanese networks and, given their leaky security, possibly to foreign enemies. Complicating matters, many of these intelligence operators would likely become important members in the nascent Japanese Intelligence Service. Then, analysts noted, "there will be files, security, and perhaps some sort of a directed attempt to play their operation back into us."⁹⁰ In evaluating the security of Japanese intelligence operations, the CIA was usually more cautious than the G-2 officers

supervising Operation Takematsu and other U.S.-sponsored Japanese operations.

The CIA used networks controlled by influential Japanese, but was more selective than G-2 about specific organizations and individuals. Agency analysts accepted that, in order to be successful in East Asia, they would need Japanese resources, but they attempted to evaluate the usefulness of such networks on the bases of cost, the quality of operatives involved, and the potential returns on investments, not merely on Japanese assessments of their own worth, which had been G-2's standard.⁹¹ Their knowledge of the problems associated with G-2's lax oversight also shaped their dealings with the potential Japanese agents. For example, in October 1958, Arisue tried to rekindle an intelligence relationship with the CIA by contacting an agent in Tokyo who was posing as an embassy employee monitoring political events. The single instruction the CIA official received from his superiors was to "let [the idea] die on a well-known vine ..."⁹²

U.S. employment of Japanese war criminals was not limited to G-2 GHQ, nor did the United States exploit only well-connected Japanese ex-military figures. The example of Kaya Okinori, who established contact with the CIA in the late 1950s, is a case in point. Kaya was the Finance Minister, first in Konoye Fumimaro's 1937 cabinet and again in Tōjō's wartime cabinet. He accepted the correctness of Japanese hegemony in the Far East, proclaiming shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor that it was Japan's goal "to force Britain and the U.S. to retreat from East Asia."⁹³ After the war, the Tribunal found him guilty on count one of the indictment for Class A criminals (conspiracy to wage war) as well as on several counts of waging aggressive war, and it sentenced him to life in prison. He was paroled in September 1955 and pardoned in 1957.⁹⁴ In 1958, Kaya, esteemed by conservative Japanese, was elected to the Diet and became a well-respected leader of the fractious Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In addition, he was also one of future Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke's most trusted advisors. Shortly after he was elected, he joined the LDP's Internal Security Committee. Kaya, a dedicated anti-communist, appeared perfect for the position. He was deeply concerned and well versed in issues pertaining to Japan's national security, and after his release from prison, argued forcefully for strengthening the alliance between the U.S. and Japan.⁹⁵

To this end, in February 1959, Kaya traveled to the United States to discuss Japanese security with representatives from several government agencies, including the State Department and Navy Policy Planning Board. Most notably, Kaya wanted to meet with CIA Director Allen Dulles. His trip took place at a sensitive point in U.S.-Japan relations because it coincided with a groundswell of opinion in Japan to revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In the CIA's eyes, Kaya, who was well versed in international affairs, who publicly favored cooperation with the United States, and who was one of

the most influential politicians in the LDP, was potentially a first-rate intelligence source. The CIA was, however, understandably nervous about a convicted Class A war criminal conferring with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). They decided that they had little to fear, noting in part that “Kaya has been behaving admirably since his return to public life.”⁹⁶ After interviewing him directly in January 1959, CIA agents in Japan noted that Kaya “is highly influential and, being able and vigorous, probably will become more so. His present professed pro-American orientation, whatever its motivation, seems real enough.”⁹⁷

On February 6, 1959, Kaya, accompanied by Japanese Embassy Secretary Omori Sei'ichi, visited the DCI's office, where he told Dulles that Japan was especially vulnerable to Communist infiltration and viewed it as his task to ensure that Japan was able to successfully resist Communist influence. Kaya asked Dulles to authorize intelligence sharing between the CIA and the LDP's Internal Security Committee. Dulles demurred, but noted that the CIA could be helpful in preventing Communist infiltration in Japan. The minutes of the meeting reflect that “everyone agreed that cooperation between CIA and the Japanese regarding countersubversion was most desirable and that the subject was one of major interest to CIA.” Both sides also agreed that the details of their cooperation should be worked out in the field, and that CIA operatives in Japan would be informed accordingly.⁹⁸ Kaya had scored a major victory in his efforts to deter any communist threat and strengthen U.S.-Japan relations.

Dulles personally took the lead in attempting to establish Kaya as a CIA source. Six months later, in August, he sent a letter to Kaya, classified secret, that reaffirmed the CIA's commitment to the Japanese politician. In it, Dulles stated in part that he was “anxious to do anything” he could to keep U.S.-Japanese relations in good standing. More specifically, he wrote, “I am most interested in learning your views both in international affairs affecting relations between our countries and on the situation within Japan...”⁹⁹ In November, CIA headquarters followed up Dulles' letter with a request for information about any progress that had been made with Kaya and whether or not the agents on the ground were interested in working with the politician.¹⁰⁰ However, in the period between August and November 1959, CIA personnel in Japan began having second thoughts about Kaya.

By early 1960, the agency operatives in Japan concluded that Kaya was not as reliable as they had previously thought. During the summer and fall of 1959, they observed Kaya closely through their established intelligence contacts, discovering that he was not as influential as his reputation indicated and that he might even be a serious liability. They had the uncomfortable task of explaining to their superiors, including the legendary DCI, why they did not want to exploit Kaya:

In the Station's recent contact with [Kaya], we found that [he] has a distinct tendency to "blow his own trumpet" too loudly and consistently[,] trying to impress the American side with how well he understand[s] the East-West tensions and how he "single-handedly" was able to get the whole LDP in line behind revision of the Security Treaty. [He] is too staid in his ways as a politician of the "old school" we believe, to be willing or even capable of understanding the subtleties of modern-day [parliamentary politics] and political action methods ... As of this writing we are not very optimistic that anything further will result from this relationship.

The agents in Japan determined that contact with Kaya would continue only at his initiative and they that would not pursue him as a source.¹⁰¹

After this episode, the CIA only had one casual meeting with Kaya—in Hong Kong in 1961—and had no further interest in him until the middle of 1964. That summer, the agency contacted him through an intermediary in order to discuss what it saw as a growing leftist threat in Japan. At this point, the CIA agent evaluating Kaya claimed that Kaya was "extremely reliable and security conscious. The basic evidence to this nature is to be found in the leading role he has played in his country's political scheme of things since prior to World War II."¹⁰² CIA Headquarters accepted this evaluation and granted operational authority to exploit him in December 1965.¹⁰³ Three years later, the CIA reported that Kaya, then Prime Minister Sato Eisaku's chief LDP advisor, was amenable to covert action directed against the Okinawa elections as well as gathering information on his own party, and that contact with him was being maintained for these purposes.¹⁰⁴ Unfortunately, there is no further documentation available as to Kaya's activities in this regard. In 1975, the CIA cancelled its operational authority to utilize Kaya because his case had become inactive. He died two years later.

The Lessons of Intelligence Gathering in Japan

The Name and Subject Files released by the CIA reveal a great deal about intelligence gathering in the earliest days of the Cold War in East Asia while confirming the conclusions of historians who have written on the subject. It is no surprise that the Japanese who performed these tasks had their own motives that had nothing to do with U.S. interests. Unfortunately, it also comes as little surprise that U.S. Army intelligence, which employed Klaus Barbie, Otto von Bolschwing, and Reinhard Gehlen in Europe, would attempt to gather information in the Far East using individuals who were suspected of war crimes or who were outright criminals during the war. There is no evidence of conscious, coordinated policy between Europe and the Far East, but it is clear that in both theaters, the fear of communist expansion trumped moral and political concerns.

Above all, GHQ sought stability. In employing the intelligence operatives it did, G-2 turned to the Japanese nationalist establishment, the only group Willoughby and others assumed could provide it. Japanese assets were of course indispensable for intelligence work, but from the CIA's perspective, G-2 officials appear to have been willing to exploit any potential intelligence asset, regardless of value or risks to operational security. The widespread use of such people presented a number of problems for U.S. intelligence, not all of which appear to have been clearly understood at the time.

The CIA's Name Files related to Japan also highlight the agency's own thinking about intelligence sources with questionable pasts. CIA analysts were concerned about the intelligence product, as well as about the varied motivations that led the Japanese to produce such poor or fallacious results insofar as they ran counter to U.S. interests. The CIA's criticism of G-2's Japanese sources was not that the individuals involved were supposedly criminals or suspected criminals, but only that they passed bad intelligence. CIA analysts quickly identified larger political, ideological, and even personal considerations among the Japanese that were antithetical to U.S. interests, but were only mildly concerned about the criminal pasts of active or potential informants. Indeed, they gave scant consideration at all to the potential criminality of the sources in their evaluations. The possible security risks posed by ignoring the pasts of Japanese operatives still remain subjects worthy of further study.

Despite this new information, some fundamental questions in the areas of policy, intelligence, and criminality remain unanswered. It is not yet clear how this relationship affected SCAP's long-term intelligence strategy vis-à-vis the Japanese government or during peace treaty negotiations. Circumstantial evidence in these documents also suggests that Willoughby's office kept important Japanese from being arrested as war criminals. If Willoughby did indeed stonewall war crimes investigators, what, if anything, did the CIA know about it?¹⁰⁵ The CIA Name Files reveal very little about the agency's connections to well-known rightists such as suspected war criminal turned Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke in the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁰⁶ The extent of the agency's contacts with individuals who had criminal or quasi-criminal backgrounds remains shrouded, as do the intelligence benefits of this alleged relationship. The documents also do not reveal how the Korean War might have affected the CIA's attitudes regarding alleged war criminals. Nevertheless, while questions about these issues remain, the records released by the CIA under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Acts have suggested broader avenues of inquiry and a fruitful new path on which to approach the subject of the Japan-U.S. relationship in the early years of the Cold War.

Notes

1. See, for example, Stephen Mercado, *The Shadow Warriors of Nakano: A History of the Imperial Japanese Army's Elite Intelligence School* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002); Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum Books, 2002); John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan and the Postwar American Alliance System, A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press, 1985); and Richard Breitman, et al., *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (Washington, DC: National Archives Trust Fund Board for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2004).
2. Definitions of war crimes in the wake of the trials conducted by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and other trials throughout the Pacific and China Theaters remain controversial for some. This is true in the particular cases of Class A war criminals tried in Tokyo by the Tribunal. Historical controversy has justifiably swirled around the indictments submitted to the Tribunal, especially count one, charging a conspiracy to wage aggressive war. Admittedly, the selection of defendants was in some cases controversial and arbitrary, but the decisions made by the Tribunal were, in the context of the times, agreed upon on the basis of accepted standards of evidence for a military tribunal, following the model of the Nuremberg Tribunal in Germany. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal may have been fraught with problems, but as a legal matter, the results were legitimate insofar as the evidence indicated guilt based solely on the indictment. Trials of Class B and C defendants, whose illegal acts had vastly better case precedent and were more easily identifiable as criminal, did not provoke the same level of criticism. See John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 461–69.
3. Certainly, most crimes committed by the Japanese in the Asia-Pacific Theaters were perpetrated by the regular Army personnel, but the *kenpeitai* gained notoriety for abetting and participating in criminal activity in China and Malaya. Many American prisoners of war also recall the *kenpeitai* members who treated them with special contempt. Though there are many studies of the *kenpeitai* in Japanese, an English-language scholarly monograph is unavailable.
4. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 167.
5. Arisue Biographical Sketch, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
6. Mercado, *Shadow Warriors of Nakano*, 174.
7. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 165. Arisue and others had offices literally inside a SCAP building, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) Building in Tokyo.

8. Mercado, *Shadow Warriors of Nakano*, 192.
9. G-2 Intelligence Section Notes, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
10. Tanaka Ryukichi Statement, NA, RG 331, International Prosecution Section, entry 319, numerical case files, box 31, folder: Cases 155–159. Tanaka also believed that Arisue had connections with the opium trade in China. Ironically, Tanaka worked closely with Arisue to gather intelligence after the war.
11. G-2 Intelligence Section Notes, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
12. Mercado, *Shadow Warriors of Nakano*, 197.
13. Phillip R. Piccigallo, *The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 63–66.
14. See Arisue's interrogations in NA, RG 331, International Prosecution Section, entry 319, numerical case files, box 31, folder: Cases 155–159.
15. Torashiro Kawabe Biographical Sketch, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kawabe, Torashiro.
16. Mercado, *Shadow Warriors of Nakano*, 181–86. According to Mercado, Willoughby sent Kawabe back to Japan loaded with cigarettes and whiskey.
17. Immediately after the war, Kawabe also received financial help from Arisue. CIA Report ZJJA-383, undated, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
18. See Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 165; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, 66.
19. CIA. Report, "J.I.S. Underground Groups and Japanese National Revival," 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. 1.
20. Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 29.
21. "J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival," 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
22. Ibid. Emphasis in original.
23. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 167.
24. CIA Memo, names redacted, 20 May 1949, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
25. See the series of CIA memos written on 20 May 1949 in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
26. Ibid.
27. Draft Memo, author unknown (HQ of 6th CIC District, 441st CIC Detachment) to Lacey, 5 February 1949, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
28. CIA Memo, names redacted, 20 May 1949, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box

- 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
29. "Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups," 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo. A later CIA report describes Kimura as "a former Major General From Burma," but this is almost certainly in error. Major General Heitaro Kimura served in Burma as Commander of the Burma Area Army in late 1944, but he was executed in 1948 after being found guilty of war crimes by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. It is possible that the Kimura referred to in the document is either Maj. Gen. Kimura Naoki, who served in the Philippines and Japan, or Lt. Gen. Kimura Matsujiro, who served in Thailand at the end of the war.
 30. "Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups," 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
 31. "Secret Shipping Plans and Activities of the JIS Groups," 14 September 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
 32. Akashi Yoji, "Watanabe Wataru: The Architect of the Malaya Military Administration, December 1941–March 1943," in Mohd Hazim Shah, Jomo K.S., and Phua Kai Lit, eds., *New Perspectives in Malaysian Studies* (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 2002), 123.
 33. "Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups," 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
 34. CIA Report ZJL-446, 14 September 1950, and "Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups," 9/13/50, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
 35. CIA Report ZJL-446, 14 September 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
 36. Ibid.
 37. Former Kwantung Army Major Sato, who was instrumental in establishing the troops-for-bananas trade, established contact in Tokyo with the Overseas Democratic Chinese Cooperative Association, a front organization for Communist Chinese intelligence. The CIA stated, "This liaison is definitely an attempted doubling operation from both sides, with Kumamoto probably giving more than he gets." "Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups," 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
 38. Mercado, *Shadow Warriors of Nakano*, 197.
 39. CIA Report ZJL734A, 12 October 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
 40. CIA Report ZJL-390-C, 3 August 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

41. CIA Report ZJL-788, 22 January 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
42. "J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival," 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
43. CIA Biographical Sketch, "Kodama, Yoshio," NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
44. "1948 Press Censorship Reports," 11 February 1952, NA, RG 263, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
45. "Kodama, Yoshio," USAFPAC, Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, 18 October 1945, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
46. Undated CIA Report, partial copy, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I. According to the CIA, the Japanese navy helped establish the Kodama *kikan* to circumvent the *zaibatsu*. It provided business and financial backing to Kodama in exchange for the promise of quick delivery of supplies and material.
47. Undated CIA Report, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
48. CIA Biographical Sketch, "Kodama, Yoshio," NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
49. CIC Intelligence Summary, "Kodama (War Criminal)," NA, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, box 1178, folder: Kodama, Yoshio.
50. G-2 Summary Report, Kodama, Yoshio, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
51. 1948 Press Censorship Reports, 11 February 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
52. Ibid.
53. Counter Intelligence Review #8, Kodama Yoshio, 15 April 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
54. CIA Report ZJL-604, 19 April 1951 NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
55. Plans and Activities of the J.I.S and Rightist Groups, 13 November 1950 NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
56. Organization of Rightist and J.I.S. Groups Under Ugaki, 8 September 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
57. J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival, 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
58. Recent Activities of Kodama Yoshio, 25 January 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

59. Japanese Intelligence Service, 24 January 1950 NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
60. Background on J.I.S. and Japanese Military Personalities, 10 September 1953, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
61. Whether or not Kodama had a relationship with the CIA later in the 1950s remains unknown.
62. Japanese and South Korean operatives communicated with each other through a Japanese company, Kinoshita & Company, in which Kodama owned a majority interest. A 1963 CIA cable noted that "It would appear that a conspiratorial group consisting of Kim Chong-p'il [founder of South Korea's KCIA] with their operational base in Tokyo where they are closely linked to Kodama Yoshio, are maintaining clandestine communications to Kim Chon-nak and Pak Chong-hui in Seoul through the facilities of this firm associated with Kodama." CIA cable, sender and recipient redacted, Kodama Yoshio Relationship with Kinoshita and Company, Ltd., 17 May 1963, in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.
63. The documents in Kodama's CIA file do not reveal whether the CIA was aware of Lockheed-Martin's payoffs to Kodama and others.
64. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 511–12.
65. Saburo Hayashi and Alvin Coox, *Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War* (Quantico, Va: The Marine Corps Association, 1959), 238.
66. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 511–12.
67. CIA Report, date unclear (likely April 1952), in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I. Between 5,000 and 25,000 supposedly anti-Japanese Chinese and Malaysians were murdered in the Sook Ching Massacre.
68. Gold, 22 May 1946, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu Vol. I.
69. Undated CIA Report, in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu, Vol. I.
70. CIA Report, date unclear (likely April 1952), in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
71. Tsuji Masanobu Activities During April 1952, 16 March 1953, in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I. Kodama was also instrumental in getting Tsuji's bestselling memoir, *Senko sanzenri* (Underground Escape), published.
72. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 511–13.
73. J.I.S., 1 December 1949, NA, RG 263, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu, Vol. I.
74. Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the J.I.S. Groups, 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263,

- entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo. In line with their desire to establish themselves as a third major force in the Far East, Japanese officers involved in this operation planned to play both sides of the ongoing colonial conflict in an effort to establish covert connections with the Communist Chinese through the Viet Minh. Little information is known about Tomita.
75. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 165–66.
 76. Japanese Rearmament Attempt by Former Japanese Army Officers to Gain Control, 3 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
 77. The CIA successfully penetrated the Hattori *kikan* and reported in great detail on its activities. The documents in the CIA Name File for Hattori are a rich source for researchers seeking information about Japanese rearmament efforts during the occupation. They reveal the depth and complexity of G-2's involvement in such efforts. Kawabe Torashirō also cooperated in this work.
 78. Hattori Takushiro, 18 April 1953, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu, Vol. I. The details of Hattori's efforts on Tsuji's behalf are still unclear.
 79. Former Japanese Army Officers Engaged in Rearmament Activities, 21 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu, Vol. I.
 80. Japanese Rearmament Attempt by Former Japanese Army Officers to Gain Control, 3 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
 81. Japanese I.S. Personalities, 6 March 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
 82. Japanese I.S. Personalities, 9 March 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu.
 83. Coup d'état Allegedly Being Planned by Ex-Militarists and Ultranationalists, 31 October 1952, Activities of Hattori Takushiro, 10 December 1953, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
 84. See collection of reports on Tsuji's whereabouts in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 10, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu, Vol. II.
 85. FBI Memo, Deputy Director, Plans to Director, FBI, Arisue, Seizo, 16 March 1961, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
 86. J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival, 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I.
 87. Hattori Takushiro's Position, 9 May 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I. Hattori went to work for a short time at the Demobilization Bureau, but resigned in early 1953 to open the Historical Facts Research Institute, a thinly veiled anti-communist intelligence operation that was funded by right-

- wing businessmen and politicians. His benefactors probably would have been apoplectic had they known that six months earlier Hattori had sold many of his intelligence assets to Minami Kiichi, the former head of the Japanese Communist Party. See Purchase of the Hattori Takushiro Organization by Minami Kiichi, 29 May 1952, and Activities of Hattori Takushiro, 10 December 1953, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I.
88. Dissolution of the Kawabe Intelligence Organization, 16 January 1953 in folder: Kawabe, Torashiro, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kawabe, Torashiro.
 89. J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival, 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I.
 90. Ibid.
 91. See, for example, CIA Report ZJL-801, 5 February 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I.
 92. CIA Memo, Contact with Ex Lt. General Arisue, 8 October 1958, and Instructions from C/IOB, 21 October 1958, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.
 93. Intelligence Summary, 20 April 1944, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.
 94. Okinori Kaya Personal Record Questionnaire, undated, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.
 95. CIA Cable 7082, 22 January 1959, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori. Kishi had been imprisoned from 1945 through 1948 on suspicion of war crimes.
 96. CIA Cable 26893, 22 December 1958, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.
 97. CIA Cable 7144, 27 January 1959, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.
 98. Memorandum for the Record, Visit of Mr. Kaya Okinori, 6 February 1959, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.
 99. Dulles to Kaya, 13 August 1959, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori. The CIA requested that Kaya return the letter to them for fear of adverse political repercussions should Kaya's political enemies discover the relationship.
 100. Dispatch, Acting Chief Far East to Chief of Station [redacted], 10 November 1959, Posonnet/1 NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.
 101. Dispatch, Chief of Station [redacted] to Chief, Far East Section, Posonnet/1, 12 January 1960, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.
 102. CIA Personal Record Questionnaire (PRQ), 22 November 1965, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-

- 18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.
103. CIA Memorandum, Chief, Far East Division, 6 December 1965 NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.
 104. CIA Report FJTA 55122, 25 September 1968, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori. At that time, Okinawa, which had been an important staging area for B-52 missions against North Vietnam, was embroiled in a furious debate over reversion back to Japanese territory.
 105. Indeed, on Willoughby's orders, G-2 put up a spirited defense of suspected war criminal Sadamu Shimomura, who allegedly signed the execution order for the Doolittle flyers and was a cooperative intelligence asset after the war. G-2 stonewalled attempts by army investigators in the China Theater to have Shimomura arrested in Japan, argued for his release after he was briefly imprisoned, and quietly set him free shortly thereafter. See Shimomura's file in NA, RG 319, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Records of the Investigative Records Repository Personal Name File, entry 134B, box 211, folder: Shimomura, Sadamu.
 106. News of this alleged relationship became public in the U.S. in late 1994. See "C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50s and 60s," *New York Times*, 9 October 1994. Though former CIA and State Department officials have acknowledged a relationship between the CIA and the LDP, thorough documentary proof remains absent.

About the Contributors

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